

JOURNAL OF

UKRAINIAN STUDIES

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SPECIAL ISSUE ON
Ukraine: A Decade of Independence

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Introduction: Overcoming Legacies of the Past. Observations on Ukraine's First Decade of Independence

Taras Kuzio

In January 1992 Ukraine became an independent state with historical baggage from empire and totalitarianism. Of the twenty-seven post-Communist countries, those with the smallest imperial and totalitarian legacy have produced a more successful transition.¹ This legacy has shaped Ukraine's path dependency and division into roughly three equal camps—active national-democrats (often mistakenly referred to as “nationalists”), who are the most active members of civil society, a passive centre which draws upon those with an amorphous identity and former national-communists turned oligarchs, and Ukraine's largest political party, the unreformed Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). The only exception to this rule are the Socialists.

This path dependency and the resultant three-fold division of political forces has produced a relatively stable outcome, since none of the three political forces is able to dominate the country and impose its will. Breakthrough in reform along the lines of East Central Europe was, therefore, impossible (but so was a complete return to the past, as in neighbouring Belarus). In the first decade of Ukraine's independence her virtual polity, in which declared and actual policies

1. See Alexander J. Motyl, “Ten Years After the Soviet Collapse: Persistence of the Past and Prospects for the Future,” in *Nations in Transit, 2001: Civil Society, Democracy, and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States*, ed. Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl, and Amanda Schnetzer (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers; New York: Freedom House, 2001), 36–44.

are very different, followed a “muddle way”²; that is, Ukraine never outlined a concrete goal or domestic or international vision of what it was building or where it was heading. Former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko pointed out that “We had a clear political orientation prior to independence [when national-democrats dominated the agenda] and none after independence [when former national-communists-future oligarchs took over].”³

The national aspects of Ukraine’s path dependency have played a decisive role in Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition.⁴ Ukraine’s inherited legacy within the national domain produced a country lying midway between denationalized Belarus and the highly nationally conscious three Baltic states. This has led to phenomena such as strong support for current borders, the weakness of separatism, a close correlation between national identity and civil society, and an amorphous “pragmatic centre,” which has acted as a buffer between national-democrats and the Communists.

Ukraine’s path dependency has helped to facilitate a delegative democracy in which most Ukrainians are inactive between elections. Russophones and Sovietophiles, who live in the most populous regions of eastern and southern Ukraine, largely do not participate in civil society, and their main participation in the political process is only during elections. As a consequence of this political configuration, Ukraine’s elites have ignored the national-democratic constituency during election campaigns and Russophone and Sovietophile constituents between elections.⁵

The Twin Legacies of Empire and Totalitarianism, and Ukraine’s Path Dependency

The legacies of empire and totalitarianism fundamentally affect Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition. Due to this legacy the national idea in Ukraine was strong enough to propel the country to independence but not to become hegemonic in post-Soviet Ukraine. Ukraine’s path dependency is influenced by these twin legacies in a number of areas.

2. See Dominique Arel, “Ukraine: The Muddle Way,” *Current History* 97, no. 620 (October 1998): 342–6.

3. *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, 28 April–4 May 2001.

4. See Philip G. Roeder, “Peoples and States after 1989: The Political Costs of Incomplete National Revolutions,” *Slavic Review* 58, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 854–81; and Taras Kuzio, “Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?” *Politics* 21, no. 3 (September 2001): 168–77.

5. See Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Taras Kuzio, and Mikhail Molchanov, eds., *Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002). Other bibliographic sources on Ukrainian security policy can be found at <www.taraskuzio.net/ukrainian/bibliography.html>.

The link between nationalism and modernization, which has been strong since the late eighteenth century and remains so in modernizing states in southeast Asia today, was broken in eastern Ukraine. Until the early 1930s nation building and modernization developed simultaneously in Soviet Ukraine because of the policies of indigenization and national communism. After Joseph Stalin consolidated his power these twin policies were dropped in favour of a fusion of Soviet communism and Russian great-power chauvinism, which masqueraded as “internationalism.”

These policies lasted for five decades from the mid-1930s to the mid-1980s and created an urban and industrialized population with a territorial attachment to Soviet Ukraine and, in some cases, to the USSR, but with little attachment to Ukrainian culture and language. Among this element of the population only two of the three political groups that dominate Ukrainian politics have been successful in winning their support—centrists (dominated by former national-communists turned oligarchs) and the left.⁶ During the March 2002 elections Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc changed this pattern when it successfully penetrated eastern and southern Ukraine. Even Our Ukraine was unable to cross the four-percent threshold in the two Donbas oblasts, which account for ten percent of the country’s population.

The Hard-line Communists

Ukraine’s twin legacies account to some extent for the CPU’s inability to evolve into a national-communist or social democratic, statist political party, as communist parties have done elsewhere in East Central Europe. After the national-communists (that is, Leonid Kravchuk) and the CPU’s economic elites (that is, Leonid Kuchma) defected to the national-democrats, the rump CPU remained disorganized and illegal. In October 1993 it was finally permitted to establish a new CPU, which consisted of the hard-line minority “imperial communists” from the pre-August 1991 CPU. Until Yushchenko created his Our Ukraine bloc in 2001–2, the CPU was the most popular party.

The CPU has always commanded a large number of seats in the Ukrainian parliament, its only source of influence in Ukrainian politics, ranging from eighty in the years 1994–98 to 120 in the years 1998–2002. Only in 2002 did this fall by half to sixty deputies and the public no longer equated “opposition” solely with the Communists. Henceforth, the opposition was understood in a broader sense to include the pro-statehood left (Socialists), populist nationalists (Iuliia Tymoshenko’s bloc), and Our Ukraine.

6. This legacy is discussed in my “Ukraine: Coming to Terms with the Soviet Legacy,” *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 14, no. 4 (December 1998): 1–27.

The CPU was absent from the Supreme Council only in 1992–93, when it was outlawed. During this period the Supreme Council under President Kravchuk and Prime Minister Kuchma could have ostensibly introduced radical reforms. The fact they did not do so was a reflection of the lack of commitment to political and economic reforms among the former Soviet Ukrainian elites who took control in Ukraine in 1992.

The National-Democratic Reformers

The national-democrats in Ukraine, unlike the three Baltic states, have been unable to take power. Ironically, the Soviet regime strengthened an already powerfully entrenched national idea in western Ukraine. During the Second World War the national profile of the small number of urban centres in western Ukraine changed dramatically: their Jewish and Polish populations were replaced largely by Ukrainians. Nationalism and modernization of the region went hand in hand as Russification measures were relatively relaxed in comparison to those in western Belarus, also annexed by the USSR from Poland at the same time.⁷

In the mid-1990s many Western scholars, policy makers, and the media celebrated this weakness of the national idea in Ukraine because they feared that the “nationalizing policies” of what they negatively termed “nationalists” would lead to civil war between the Russians in Ukraine and the Ukrainians or between the Russophones and the Ukrainophones. In reality, inter-ethnic and centre-periphery relations have always been good (see Stephen Shulman’s essay in this issue).⁸ This negative view of nationalism did not define it in the broad sense

7. See Roman Szporluk, “West Ukraine and West Belarusia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication, and Linguistic Assimilation,” *Soviet Studies* 31, no. 1 (January 1979): 76–98.

8. See also Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Dominique Arel, “Ukraine—The Temptation of the Nationalizing State,” in *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 157–88; and David Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998). For alternative views, see Taras Kuzio, *State and Nation Building in Ukraine* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998); “‘Nationalising States’ or Nation Building: A Review of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence,” *Nations and Nationalism* 7, pt. 2 (April 2001): 135–54; and “The Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn’s Framework for Understanding Nationalism,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25, no. 1 (January 2002): 20–39. Other alternative views include Alexander J. Motyl, “Imagined Communities, Rational Choosers, Invented Ethnics,” *Comparative Politics* 34, no. 2 (January 2002): 233–50; Lowell Barrington, “Russian-Speakers in Ukraine and Kazakhstan: ‘Nationality,’ ‘Population,’ or Neither?” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 17, no. 2 (April–June 2001): 129–58; and Eduard Ponarin, “The Prospects of Assimilation of the Russophone Populations in Estonia and Ukraine: A Reaction to David Laitin’s

of the term as able to lead to positive or negative outcomes depending on the manner in which it was applied and defined (see Glenn Goshulak's essay).⁹

In East Central Europe regimes changed as a consequence of "collective non-violent civic action" produced by mass movements campaigning on nationalist and democratic platforms.¹⁰ National-democrats were able to push Ukraine towards independence only with the assistance of the national-communists, and this meant that both sides had to compromise.¹¹

The Ideologically Amorphous Centre

The "pragmatic centrist" oligarchs are little interested in ethno-national questions and have never opposed Ukrainian national symbols, nationalist historiography, or other facets of "nation building" (in the late Kuchma era Minister of Education Vasyl Kremen has been a member of the oligarchic social democrats). The centrists have always been statist and this was an important reason for their defection from the anti-independence CPU.¹² Nation-building policies (historiography, symbols and, to a lesser extent, language and culture) were relegated to the national-democrats while the oligarchs acted as "border guards" to ensure that policies in sensitive areas, such as language, remained evolutionary and thereby did not upset Russophones. The oligarchs who were former national-communists were willing to relegate these areas because they had nothing to offer in place of national symbols or Mykhailo Hrushevsky's scheme of Ukrainian history.¹³ Soviet nationality policies had also instilled a commonly accepted view that Ukraine was the homeland of a titular nation—the ethnic Ukrainians. An independent state needed a state language; otherwise it would go in the manner of denationalized Belarus (see the essays by Tamara Hundorova, Maksym Strikha, and Oleksandr Hrytsenko).

In turn, the same oligarchs remain distrustful of Russia, even though Ukraine's foreign policy has undertaken a reorientation eastwards since 2000. Such a distrust is reinforced when Russia supports Belarus's Sovietophile

Research," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 8 (December 2000): 1535–41.

9. See also Taras Kuzio, "Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards a New Theoretical and Comparative Framework," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 7, no. 2 (June 2002): 133–61.

10. Adrian Karatnycky, "Nations in Transit: Emerging Dynamics of Change," in *Nations in Transit, 2001*, 17.

11. See Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (London: Hurst, 1999); and Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence*, 2d ed. (Hounds mills: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).

12. This point is made in Paul J. D'Anieri, *Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).

13. See Nancy Popson, "The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing Children to the 'Ukrainian Nation,'" *Nationalities Papers* 29, no. 2 (June 2001): 325–50.

president Aliaksandr Lukashenka.¹⁴ This means that they agree with their national-democratic colleagues that Ukraine needs to maintain the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) at a distance and use “strategic partnerships” with the United States and NATO to deflect Russian proposals for integration.

How the Communist system collapsed and what followed very much depended on the “strength of the national idea.” The national-democrats could *not* take power in Ukraine because they were unpopular in eastern Ukraine. It was primarily in eastern Ukraine that the national-communists transformed their political power into economic power and become oligarchs. Ukraine’s oligarchs are based in eastern Ukraine. The Kyiv clan’s Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (Unified) is unpopular even in its home base of Kyiv.

The package of policies promoted by the national-democrats—political and economic reform, de-Sovietization, and integration with Europe—which has been successfully implemented in the three Baltic states, could not be implemented in Ukraine. Instead, Ukraine has “muddled” along: she has been unwilling to break fully with the Soviet past or its geopolitical space and has accepted a perverted “democratization” and “market economy” in what scholars now define as a “hybrid regime.”¹⁵

In Ukraine upwards of a third of the population supports neither the CPU nor the national-democratic camp. This third is likely to live outside western Ukraine and is either Russophone or bilingual. Not supportive of the programmatic “package” offered by the national-democrats, these people, despite a decade of socio-economic crisis, have also been unwilling to support a return to the past and hence have not voted for the CPU.

Initially, the genuine centrist political parties attempted to gain support among this segment of the population. But they failed and these genuine centrist parties then gradually moved into the national-democratic and anti-oligarch, anti-Kuchma camps.

The centrists have created top-down parties (for example, the Labour Ukraine party and the Regions of Ukraine party); captured genuine centrist parties (the Green Party, the Social Democratic Party (Unified), and the Popular Democratic Party); defected from a left-wing party (the Peasant Party) to a new one (the Agrarian Party); or have created a completely fake party evolving out of organized crime (Aleksandr Volkov and his Democratic Union). Not surprisingly, most of these parties have little to do with their names (protection of the environment, defence of regions and labour, or promoting democracy).

14. See Taras Kuzio, “Identity and Nation-building in Ukraine: Defining the ‘Other,’” *Ethnicities* 1, no. 3 (December 2001): 343–65.

15. See Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 21–35.

They are regionally based (the Agrarians in Galicia, Labour Ukraine in Dnipropetrovsk, the Regions of Ukraine in Donetsk, and the Social Democrats [Unified] in Kyiv) and, therefore, usually represent regional “parties of power.”

More importantly, they represent the de-ideologized spectrum of Ukraine’s political groups. Only the national-democrats and the left have concrete ideological programmes that represent polar opposites—a complete break with the Soviet past through reform and integration with Euro-Atlantic structures (that is, the European Union and NATO) or a total return to the former USSR. The national-democrats look to the Baltic states and East Central Europe, while the CPU looks to Belarus. CPU leader Petro Symonenko endorsed Lukashenka’s candidacy in the September 2001 Belarusian elections.

Lacking any ideology, the centrists are unable to develop a vision for the country they lead because they are products of the Soviet past who cannot fully escape from its twin legacies.¹⁶ Therefore, they have positioned themselves midway between their ideological competitors through alliances with each side at different times.

Iuliia Tymoshenko, head of the anti-Kuchma Front for National Salvation, which became the Iuliia Tymoshenko Bloc in the March 2002 elections, explained the lack of ideology and directionless state of Ukraine as follows:

All his policies are based upon tactical manoeuvres. Leonid Danylovych [Kuchma] simply acts without any kind of strategy and moves from one dead end to another. At one moment he is convinced that it is better to orientate towards Moscow. The vector of Ukraine’s [foreign] policy immediately turns eastward. In a month everything changes. He turns to the West.¹⁷

“Pragmatic” domestic policies are promoted as the centrist alternative to “romantic” national-democratic policies, on the one hand, and restorationist CPU policies, on the other. Sometimes called the “third way” or the “Ukrainian way,” these policies that do not completely reverse the Soviet legacy (for example, in the language domain), yet they ensure that non-transparent economic reform inordinately benefits the former Soviet Ukrainian ruling elite.

In foreign affairs the centrists adopted a “multi-vector” foreign policy that is deliberately vague so as to be able to adapt to short-term geopolitical changes. With Leonid Kuchma’s accession to the presidency in July 1994, Ukraine was no longer portrayed as an anti-Russian “buffer” but as a “bridge” that linked Europe and Eurasia. Between 1995 and 1999 Ukraine’s “multi-vector” foreign policy was pro-NATO and pro-American as a way to pressure Russia into accepting Ukraine as an independent state. After 2000 this “multi-vector” policy

16. See F. M. Rudych et al., *Politychni struktury ta protsesy v suchasniïi Ukrayini* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1995), 34, 36, 58, 63, 112, 195.

17. *Moskovskii komsomolets*, 17 April 2001.

became pro-Russian after Russia finally ratified the 1997 state treaty, President Vladimir Putin was elected, and Kuchma became isolated in the West after the “Kuchmagate” crisis and the Iraqi arms scandal.¹⁸

Domestic political and economic reforms have been insufficiently radical, and the regime is too corrupt to allow Ukraine’s integration into Europe; hence its declared foreign policy strategic goals remain impossible to fulfil. Ukraine’s oligarchic centrists have close economic and often corrupt ties to Russia and the CIS, particularly through barter and the re-sale of energy. “Consequently, both economic and political interests of these groups are associated with Russia rather than the West.”¹⁹

The Yushchenko Phenomenon

Ukraine’s path dependency has been convenient for both the centrists and Kuchma, who have played off the CPU and the national-democrats against one another. In the 1999 presidential elections Leonid Kuchma won a second term by appealing to the national-democrats to not allow the Communists to regain power. Kuchma won some of his support in western Ukraine. By 2001 he had ditched the national-democrats for the CPU, and in April 2001 the CPU backed the centrist oligarchs’ removal of Yushchenko’s government.

President Kuchma’s ability to play off the CPU against the national-democrats became diminished because of Yushchenko, an eastern Ukrainian married to a Ukrainian American, who was prime minister for eighteen months (December 1999–April 2001). During that time he was probably the first head of a Ukrainian government who thought more about the country than enhancing or creating a personal fortune.²⁰ This logically followed from his patriotic, national-democratic leanings. In thinking more about the country at large at a time of economic upturn, he was able to repay salaries and pensions that had often gone unpaid for months at a time under his predecessors.

Thus an uncorrupted prime minister became Ukraine’s first-ever popular politician. This dispelled the notion that Ukrainians did not trust politicians and institutions because they did not support democratic politics. The real reason was far simpler. Until Yushchenko came onto the scene, Ukrainians believed that

18. See “Ukraine: Russian Reorientation,” *Oxford Analytica*, 26 September 2002; and Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine’s Security Policy Turns East,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review* 13, no. 12 (December 2001).

19. “Opportunities and Obstacles of the Road of Ukraine to NATO,” Center for Peace, Conversion, and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, Occasional Report 25 (August 2001).

20. The editor of Ukraine’s respected weekly *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, Iuliia Mostovaia, sees employees in the Presidential Administration as only following “greed and discrediting materials against their rivals” and having no interest in the fate of the state as a whole. The president, meanwhile, is “completely directionless” (2–8 June 2001).

people only went into politics to enrich themselves and did not care about the welfare of the population at large. Seeing that this was not the case with Yushchenko, the Ukrainian people have given him consistently high popularity ratings, this in a country where politicians regularly have received only single digit figures. These ratings show that, when the national-democratic programme is enhanced by socio-economic and anti-corruption policies, Ukrainians are willing to support it.

Ukraine as a “Blackmail-State,” Corporatist, Electorally Authoritarian, and Delegative Democracy²¹

Western political scientists were very creative in the 1990s in inventing new definitions for Ukraine’s emerging post-Soviet regime as democratization regressed from 1997 onwards and as the Kuchma regime entrenched itself. Although the parliamentary elections of 1994 and 1998 and the presidential elections of 1994 were pronounced largely “free and fair” by international observers, the 1999 presidential elections reflected a regressive tendency to rely on undemocratic practices already evident in other areas.²² The “Kuchmagate” tapes revealed that there were widespread malpractices in the October–November 1999 elections and Kuchma-orchestrated April 2000 referendum.

The first half of the 1990s witnessed a growth in independent media, a solidification of civil society and political parties, and advances in democratization across a broad front. Women’s rights, however, did not radically change for the better during the decade (see Alexandra Hrycak’s essay).²³

In June 1996 and October through December 1998 the Ukrainian and Crimean constitutions were adopted (see Robert Kravchuk’s essay). This signalled no going back to the Soviet era and an end to any confusion as to the Crimean peninsula’s status. The Supreme Council’s adoption of the parliamentary

21. See Keith Darden, “Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine under Kuchma,” *East European Constitutional Review* 10, nos. 2–3 (Spring–Summer 2001): 67–71; Paul Kubicek, *Unbroken Ties: The State, Interest Associations, and Corporatism in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Paul Kubicek, “The Limits of Electoral Democracy in Ukraine,” *Democratization* 8, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 117–39; Paul Kubicek, “Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 27, no. 4 (December 1994): 423–41; and Sarah Birch, “Nomenklatura, Democratization, Electoral Clientelism, and Party Formation in Post-Soviet Ukraine,” *Democratization* 4, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 40–62.

22. See Sarah Birch, *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine* (Hounds-mills, Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).

23. See Taras Kuzio, “Gender Issues in Election Campaign,” *RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, Ukraine Report*, vol. 4, no. 6 (12 February 2002).

variant of Ukraine's constitution represented a defeat for Kuchma, who had always wanted to introduce a Russian-style presidential system. In 1998 Soviet passports also became invalid.

Since the second half of the 1990s Ukraine has been evolving into an authoritarian state (see Paul D'Anieri's and Mykola Riabchuk's essays). While the centrists have largely supported this consolidation of corporatism, the only groups to oppose the executive power and support democratization and economic reform remain the very people whom Western scholars have been quick to castigate as "nationalists," namely, the national-democrats. The only exception to this has been Oleksandr Moroz's Socialist Party of Ukraine, which supports the anti-Kuchma opposition's platform of statehood and democracy (the CPU's claim to be the "main opposition" has been shallow). During the "Kuchmagate" crisis in the winter of 2000 and the spring of 2001, it was the national-democrats, emboldened by the fact that Yushchenko was prime minister, who demonstrated in support of democracy and created the first serious threat to Kuchma's presidency. The national-democrats have attempted to halt Kuchma's plans to take Ukraine down the Belarusian-Central Asian authoritarian path but have been insufficiently strong to remove him by staging a national-democratic revolution like the one in Serbia in autumn 2000.

In the second half of the 1990s, especially under Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk during the years 1998–2000, Ukraine increasingly proclaimed its foreign-policy goals to be "a return to Europe." In the domestic arena, democratization regressed and economic reform stalled and stagnated. Ukraine's domestic and foreign policies became unco-ordinated and inconsistent.

With the onset of the Iraqi arms scandal in autumn 2002 the United States declared there to be a "crisis of trust" between Ukraine and the USA. Kuchma was advised to not attend the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002. In the end he attended but the NATO-Ukraine Commission was downgraded to the level of foreign ministers and at the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council the seating was re-arranged according to the French alphabet so that the United Kingdom and the United States would not sit next to Ukraine.

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) under Leonid Derkach (1997–2001), whose son is a leading member of the Dnipropetrovsk-based Labour Ukraine oligarchic group, resurrected some of its old KGB activities (for example, political surveillance of regime opponents). The State Tax Administration (STA) has been used to harass and close down businesses owned by the president's rivals. Derkach and the disgraced minister of the interior, Iurii Kravchenko, were sacked in February 2001.

It was during 1999 and 2000 that SBU Major Mykola Melnychenko, who worked in counter-surveillance in the President's office, witnessed these negative tendencies at first hand and taped hundreds of hours of conversations between

Kuchma and his associates that revealed a wide range of illegal activities.²⁴ Kuchma no longer denies the authenticity of the tapes, but he has claimed that different sections of his conversations were spliced together to incriminate him. This argument collapsed after FBI experts examined and declared genuine the tape of the July 2000 meeting at which Kuchma authorized the sale of radars to Iraq.

In 1994 Kuchma came to power arguing that he would resolve the economic crisis that had worsened in Ukraine under his predecessor, especially after the hyperinflation of 1993. A relatively radical programme—Ukraine's first reformist programme—was launched in October of that year. Money flowed into Ukraine from international financial organizations after she agreed to give up her nuclear weapons and did so in June 1996. Kuchma's reform programme had mixed results (see King Banaian's essay). It succeeded in speeding up privatization but failed to lead to structural reform and the creation of more efficient enterprises. Monetary reform in 1996 led to the introduction of the new currency, the hryvnia, which has done relatively well considering the state of the Ukrainian economy. Inflation was also brought under tighter control through monetary stabilization. Nevertheless, Kuchma's promise of ending the economic crisis was fulfilled only in 2000, when the economy began growing for the first time in a decade. Whether this growth is sustainable under an oligarchic elite interested mainly in exporting, not in investing, capital and concerned only with short-term profits and asset-stripping is doubtful.²⁵

Corruption grew at an alarming rate throughout the 1990s. In 2000 Transparency International ranked Ukraine eighty-seventh out of ninety countries on its corruption scale. When he came to power in 1994, Kuchma promised to reduce the size of the shadow economy, but he has failed to do so. Legislation, committees, and decrees did not resolve Ukraine's corruption problem, and they have been, like much else in Ukraine, mere declarations rather than real policies. Charges of corruption against high-ranking officials have been laid only *after* they had become opponents of the executive power (for example, former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko). Trials of corrupt high-ranking Ukrainian officials have occurred only in the West, never in Ukraine.

Conclusion

During the first decade of independence Ukraine's politics were confusing because they were neither fully reformist nor restorationist. Ukraine neither fully

24. "Ukraine: An Insider Report," *Jane's Intelligence Digest*, 13, 18, and 27 September 2002.

25. See Robert S. Kravchuk, *Ukrainian Political Economy: The First Ten Years* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

broke with the Soviet past, as did the Baltic states, nor returned to the Soviet past, as did Belarus. Instead, Ukraine muddled along between those countries that have rejected the Soviet past and those that are trying to return to it.

A full break with the Soviet past and consistent implementation of reform would have required a victory by the national-democrats in Ukraine. In other words, the national question has continued to play an important role in post-Communist transitions. At the same time, the combined strength of the national-democrats and the centrists has prevented the realization of the Belarus under Lukashenka model, favoured by the CPU. These muddled domestic policies have undermined Ukraine's declared strategic foreign-policy goals of "returning to Europe." They have led to equally muddled "multi-vector" foreign policies that have left unclear whether Ukraine is part of Eurasia or Europe (see the essays by Jennifer Moroney, Victor Chudowsky, and Marko Bojcun).²⁶ Some elements in Ukraine's elite believe that the only way to deal with this question is to make Ukraine's foreign policy even more confusing by declaring that Ukraine will "join" Europe only if Russia does.²⁷ Such a policy will ensure that Ukraine *never* "joins" Europe.

The twin legacies of empire and totalitarianism have led to Ukraine's post-Soviet path dependency. This "muddle way" is by its very nature unstable. Ukraine's leaders have acted only in the short term and have not been able to resolve medium-or long-term problems or provide goals or a vision. Their actions have been premised on a narrow corporatist elite's exploitation of state independence. After a decade of "muddling" along, Ukraine is now a "virtual state" in which legislation and official rhetoric are at odds with implemented policies. How, when, and at what speed Ukraine will move away from its muddled path and its authoritarian corporatism depends on one factor, which usually has been condemned by Western scholars of contemporary Ukraine. The only alternative to short-term, muddled policies that benefit a small oligarchic elite is the strengthening of a patriotism (civic nationalism) combining radical reform with the dismantling of most elements of the Soviet past and taking the national interests of the country, not simply of the elite clans, to heart. Such a change would produce both domestic and foreign medium- and long-term policies for the country and a vision of the future—something Ukraine completely lacked during its first decade of independence.

26. See also Marko Bojcun, "Where is Ukraine? Civilization and Ukraine's Identity," *Problems of Post-Communism* 48, no. 5 (September–October 2001): 42–51

27. Taras Kuzio, "To Europe with Russia! Ukraine's 'Little Russian' Foreign Policy," *RFE/RL Newsline*, 4 June 2002.

Democracy Unfulfilled: The Establishment of Electoral Authoritarianism in Ukraine

Paul D'Anieri

From the perspective of 2001, democratization in Ukraine appears to have peaked around 1994. In that year, two national elections (one for Parliament, one for president) were conducted in very competitive conditions, and incumbents fared poorly. The peaceful transfer of power from the defeated incumbents to the new office holders contrasted starkly with the near civil war that characterized the contest for political power in Russia. While Ukraine had massive problems at this stage, especially in the economic realm, optimism about the development of liberal democracy was palpable. That optimism evaporated, slowly at first, and then, between 1999 and 2001, very rapidly. Today, the Ukrainian president, Leonid Kuchma, rules essentially as an authoritarian, with the press controlled by the state, the opposition divided and confused, and the prospect for relatively fair elections seemingly remote.¹

After I describe the current state of affairs (circa October 2001), I explore various explanations why democratization in Ukraine has taken this dramatic turn for the worse. An understanding of the development and the present operation of Ukraine's political system will provide some clues about its future evolution. Unfortunately, when one looks at the major forces in Ukrainian politics, one sees little reason to expect a substantial change any time soon, but one cannot dismiss all hope of change.

1. For an overview of the events of 2000–1 in Ukraine, see Dominique Arel, "Kuchmagate and the Demise of Ukraine's 'Geopolitical Bluff,'" *East European Constitutional Review* 10, nos. 2–3 (Spring–Summer 2001).

The Present Situation

Democratization is a major theme in the discussion of politics in the former Soviet Union, and there is a huge literature on this subject, as well as an entire branch of the discipline of political science.² We should be wary of this label, however, because it implies that the necessary outcome of this process is democracy. In reality, democratization can fail, sometimes with tragic consequences. Moreover, it is worth noting that in many cases, key actors have no desire to build democracy, and hence they do everything possible to block it. Rather than asking the question, "Is Ukraine a democracy?" which presents a false dichotomy, it is more useful simply to assess the state of Ukrainian politics according to a number of criteria that are often associated with notions of democracy.

Ukraine has a form of government that is not authoritarian in the traditional sense, but is far from liberal or democratic in the ordinary sense of these terms.³ She has a constitution written largely on Western models, regularly scheduled elections, a vibrant parliament, and a smorgasbord of political parties. The institutions of democracy in Ukraine are not complete shams, as they were in the Soviet Union, and yet the peculiarities of the system allow the president to rule almost unchecked. While elections are not completely fixed, to a considerable extent the president can ensure the results he wants. Ironically, elections make this form of authoritarianism much more robust by providing it with a more convincing veneer of legitimacy than the Soviet system had.

Ukraine's electoral authoritarianism⁴ differs from Western liberal democracy in several ways. First, there is almost no free press (this makes informed voting impossible). Second, the institutional constraints on presidential power that exist on paper do not do much to limit presidential power in practice. This is partly

2. Even a brief review of this literature is impossible here. Recent highlights include Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 3 (July 1996); and Evelyn Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John Stephens, "The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 3 (1997).

3. See Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is ... and Is Not," *Journal of Democracy* 2–3 (Summer 1991); Lucan A. Way, "Weak Parties and Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru, Russia, and Ukraine," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 30 August 2001.

4. Electoral authoritarianism and similar concepts are discussed and applied to Ukraine in a paper by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regime Change in Peru and Ukraine in Comparative Perspective," presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 30 August–2 September 2001.

due to the constitution, which grants the president extensive legal power, and partly to the fact that the president is not constrained by the constitution or the laws, because the court system is feeble and incapable of challenging executive actions. It is also due to the extensive fragmentation of the political-party system and the accompanying ineffectiveness of Parliament.

While the overall progress of the Ukrainian political system toward democracy has disappointed many observers, it is important not to overlook some of the successes of the first decade of independence. Most significant is the establishment and consolidation of Ukraine's independence and sovereignty. Even after the August 1991 declaration of independence and the December 1991 referendum, there was considerable skepticism that Ukraine would establish full sovereignty typical of other states in the international system. Western governments, including that of the United States, suggested that full international recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty was contingent upon certain policies on nuclear weapons. Russia continued to question the extent of Ukrainian sovereignty throughout the decade. Today, however, no one seriously questions the existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state.

Moreover, the process of building an independent state proceeded without significant ethnic conflict, despite widespread predictions of strife. Very early in its independence drive Ukraine adopted laws that guaranteed the rights of national minorities, and, while laws often mean little in Ukraine, the substantial political power of the key national minority—ethnic Russians—has made it possible for it to enforce its rights. There has been significant disagreement over issues concerning language rights, but it has been channeled into political action, in contrast to the ethnic violence in much of the post-Communist world.⁵ In this very important sense, Ukraine's first decade of post-Soviet politics can be considered a success.

Many observers would argue that these two tasks—establishing independence and preventing ethnic strife—were more important or at least more immediate than building a liberal democracy on the Western model. One might debate the point, but it is important regardless of whether one agrees or not. It is important to recognize that for many key actors establishing liberal democracy has not been the top priority in Ukraine. Other goals have been seen as more important, either intrinsically or as prerequisites to liberal democracy and hence of higher priority. It is important, therefore, not to carry on a discussion of Ukraine's political

5. See my paper "The Mitigation of Ethnic Conflict in Ukraine: The Mysterious Case of the State that Didn't Collapse," presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 31 August–3 September 1998. For one of the more prominent dire predictions concerning Ukraine's ethnic politics, see David Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 178–80.

problems in a vacuum. To understand why certain policies and strategies were adopted over others, it is necessary to understand the variety of competing goals pursued by the actors. While some might see the contrasting progress on different goals as paradoxical, it might be argued that this represents natural tradeoffs: the state was consolidated at the expense of building democracy, or ethnic peace was achieved at the expense of far-reaching political and economic reforms.

To the extent that Ukraine has strayed from the path to liberal democracy, why has it happened? A variety of answers are possible, and these answers have significant implications for how academics think about Ukraine and how policy-makers deal with Ukraine. An understanding of what has happened so far and why is a prerequisite to answering the questions many people consider more relevant: what is possible in the future and how can positive change be effected?

In particular, we want to know whether change is possible in the short term (perhaps through simply rewriting election laws), or whether it depends on longer-term changes, such as generational turnover. We also want to know whether specific governmental policies (either by Ukraine or by external actors) can accelerate this process or whether it depends more on society.

Explanations

There is no shortage of explanations for the failure of Ukraine to move rapidly to liberal democracy and it is impossible to examine them all here. Some specialists find deeply rooted causes in Ukrainian history, others point to the contingencies of the Soviet collapse. Here we must be content to summarize a few key schools of thought derived from work in political science on comparative democratization as it is relevant to Ukraine. In political science, explanations that apply only to a single case are treated with skepticism; the question is always asked whether things worked the same way in similar cases (or differently in different cases). Keeping this in mind, let us examine different explanations of Ukrainian politics.

To simplify, we can identify three broad categories of causes that political scientists use to explain the outcomes of democratization processes.⁶ One school of thought focuses on the citizenry and on mass attitudes, because these are presumably the underlying driving force in a democracy.⁷ A second school of

6. These three categories are not exhaustive. There is an extensive literature on the links between economic growth and democratization, as well as on elites and other approaches.

7. The classic statement is Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). A more recent assessment is David Laitin, "The Civic Culture at 30," *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 1 (March 1995). See also Ronald Inglehart, "The

thought focuses on institutions, because these are seen to influence in crucial ways how public opinion is translated into policies and how political elites are constrained.⁸ A third school of thought focuses on the process of democratization, because early developments in a new democracy structure and constrain everything that comes after.

1. Civil Society

In theory, at least, functioning democracy depends on a competent and democratically inclined citizenry. Therefore, one of the most widely influential approaches to comparative democratization has been the approach focused on civil society. In the 1950s Almond and Verba's seminal work on civic culture linked democracy with a set of cultural attributes concerning citizens' attitudes toward cohesion, activism, and participation. While that approach has been out of vogue in political science for many years, it has returned recently in a different form in Robert Putnam's ubiquitously cited work on social capital.⁹ While not identical to Almond and Verba's cultural model, Putnam's work focuses on micro-level social cohesion and on the attitudes that lead to it. The research implies that democratic attitudes and practices are formed over generations.

The influence of this school of thought is demonstrated by the incredible resources dedicated to survey research in the former Soviet states. What do these studies show? Although the notion that these societies are not ready for democracy is widely accepted, there is little evidence to support it.¹⁰ In surveys in the early 1990s attitudes in Ukraine demonstrated tolerance of opposing viewpoints, belief in effecting change through the political system, and strong commitment to democracy. Even the economic downturn, which has impover-

Renaissance of Political Culture," *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (December 1988).

8. See, for example, Giovanni Sartori, *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes* (New York: New York University Press, 1997); and Timothy J. Power and Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World," *Comparative Political Studies* 30, no. 2 (1997).

9. Robert D. Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

10. See Arthur H. Miller, Vicki Hesli, and William M. Reisinger, "Reassessing Mass Support for Political and Economic Change in the Former USSR," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (1994): 399–411; and James L. Gibson and Raymond M. Duch, "Emerging Democratic Values in Soviet Political Culture," in *Public Opinion and Regime Change: The New Politics of Post-Soviet Societies*, ed. Arthur H. Miller, William M. Reisinger, and Vicki Hesli (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

ished many people, has not led to widespread sympathy for authoritarianism, as it did in several key cases in the 1930s. The only substantial change in more recent years is an increase in apathy and a decrease in the sense of political effectiveness (phenomena not unknown in the West). Whether these attitudes are a cause of non-democracy or a result of it is worth considering. In any event, it is hard to identify any mass-cultural belief patterns that make it clear why democratization has proceeded so much more slowly in Ukraine than in Poland or the Czech Republic.

A second dimension of the debate on civil society in Ukraine has focused on nationality or ethnic and linguistic divisions. These questions, perhaps, have been the most heavily researched areas of Ukrainian politics.¹¹ Scholars such as Taras Kuzio have questioned whether Ukraine can build a functioning democracy without a coherent conception of national identity.¹² Unless Ukrainians see themselves as a single people with a single future, how can they forge a consensus on the underlying institutional issues needed to build a democracy? In this view nation building is a necessary prerequisite to democracy building. This assertion leads necessarily to the question of what the basis of Ukrainian nation building should be, but I deal with that question at length elsewhere.

There is some evidence that regional, ethnic, or linguistic divisions hamper genuine democracy building in Ukraine, and we see this most clearly in the structure of the political parties.¹³ No party has been able to build support across Ukraine. The party system is badly fragmented, and this contributes to an ineffective parliament and, hence, justifies a stronger presidency. However, there are several reasons why we should not infer too much from this fact. First, as will be detailed below, there are clear institutional reasons for the fragmentation of the Ukrainian political-party system that have little to do with societal cleavages. Second, once they are inside Parliament, the parties tend to vote not along regional lines, but rather along a standard left-right cleavage.¹⁴ Moreover,

11. For a general analysis of this problem, see Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga V. Shvetsova, "Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties," *American Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 1 (February 1994): 100–24.

12. See Taras Kuzio, "National Identity and Civil Society," chap. 7 in *his Ukraine: State and Nation Building* (London: Routledge, 1998).

13. On the political party structure, see Andrew Wilson and Sarah Birch, "Voting Stability, Political Gridlock: Ukraine's 1998 Parliamentary Elections," *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 6 (1999): 1039–68; and Sarah Birch, *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine* (London: Macmillan, 2000), chap. 7.

14. See my paper "Identity in Action: Assessing Russian Language Identity in the Ukrainian Parliament," presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 2 September 2000.

it appears that Ukraine's societal cleavages are not so wide as to make compromise impossible.¹⁵ In other words, it is not clear that societal cleavages account for the lack of nationally based parties or have a discernible effect on political outcomes.

One aspect of civil society in Ukraine, which many observers have noticed, is the seeming inability of the society to mobilize (or to be mobilized) for political reform. This is sometimes seen as a sign that indeed the society is not yet ready for democracy. The inability of organizers to get significant turnout at rallies protesting President Kuchma's involvement in the murder of the journalist Heorii Gongadze was taken as evidence that Ukraine lacked civil society to some degree. If Ukrainians would not protest this, what would they protest?

Three points are worth noting here. First, there is a great deal of research in political science on social movements and mobilization, and these phenomena are not well understood. It is especially difficult to explain the absence of protest. However, it is clear that even in societies that are viewed as being most democratic and whose civic culture is not in question, protest activity is highly variable and depends not simply on the culture of the citizenry, but on the skill of organizers, the policies of government, and the perceived effectiveness of such demonstrations.¹⁶ While protest has been difficult to mobilize in post-Soviet Ukraine, it was not hard to mobilize in late Soviet Ukraine, as massive demonstrations for independence and against unpopular governments in 1990 and 1991 showed. Those examples indicate that there is not something immutable in the Ukrainian people that makes them reluctant to protest, but rather that something else has changed.

Ironically, it may be that the Soviet regime of 1990 and 1991 was more susceptible to the influence of protest than the post-Soviet regime of 2001. This second point is a key one: the perceived lack of civil society may be the result of a poor democratic transition, not the cause of it. In the late Soviet era, protest was seen to be effective in part because the regime was afraid of it, because it undermined the regime's legitimacy in a crucial way. But in a system in which the regime has been elected in an election that appeared to be fair and in which the government is challenged daily in the halls of Parliament, it is much more difficult to challenge the government's legitimacy. Moreover, in a situation in which the major political parties appear to the voters as equally undesirable and a protest against the president presumes someone to replace him, the absence of a credible alternative logically hampers mobilization. It is also worth noting that

15. Melvin J. Hinich, Valeri Khmelko, and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Ukraine's 1998 Parliamentary Elections: A Spatial Analysis," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, April–June 1999: 183.

16. See Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

by 2001 the level of official repression of protest in Ukraine was closer to that of the pre-Gorbachev era than of the era when protests were widely attended.

Finally, Ukraine's seemingly low mobilization must be seen as a benefit as well as a cost, especially in the realm of inter-ethnic relations.¹⁷ Those who sought to whip up sentiment for more confrontational approaches to regional, ethnic, and linguistic questions must also have lamented the difficulty in getting ordinary Ukrainians into the streets over these issues. It is this difficulty in mobilizing people that is partly responsible for the lack of ethnic violence, which is perhaps Ukraine's greatest achievement.¹⁸ In sum, there is no firm reason to conclude that Ukrainians are not ready for democracy.

2. Institutions

If the problem is not with the citizens, perhaps it is with the institutions and procedures that are used to represent the citizens. The notion that politics are shaped and democracy guaranteed by institutions is not new. The importance attributed to the American and the British constitutions is one example of the institutional argument. After the fall of Communism, much attention has been given to the design of constitutions and other questions of institutional design in the reforming states.¹⁹ Essentially, the argument here is that institutions can provide the incentives that lead to consolidated democracy or, if institutions lead to chaos or stalemate, to the breakdown of democracy. An extensive literature, often highly technical, has developed in political science examining the effects of different types of institutional arrangements, and much of this analysis has been applied to the post-Communist states.

Among the key debates in this literature are those over the ideal form of government for democracy (presidential versus parliamentary systems) and the sort of electoral rules that lead to stable party systems that can provide stable majorities to pass legislation. Both of these broader debates are central to the Ukrainian case. A separate strand of institutional literature focuses primarily not on the design of institutions, but on their strength, defined broadly as the ability of the state to implement its policies in society. This question too is relevant to

17. This point is emphasized by Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 90–2.

18. See my article “The Mitigation of Ethnic Conflict in Ukraine.” The low degree of ethnic conflict in Ukraine and the broader issue of nationalism are covered in great detail in Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

19. An entire journal, *East European Constitutional Review*, is devoted to this issue. See also Arend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., *Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Boulder: Westview, 1996); and Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, *Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

Ukraine, where the state seems extremely weak in some key areas (such as tax collecting).

The question of presidential versus parliamentary rule essentially boils down to whether the cabinet and, by extension, the executive branch will be controlled directly by parliament or by a separately elected president.²⁰ Advocates of a presidential system argue that, especially in times of rapid transformation, a single unified leadership can govern more effectively than one controlled by multiple parties and factions. Particularly where party systems are not yet well-formed, government control by parliament may be a recipe for stalemate, with postwar Italy being a case in point.

Advocates of parliamentary rule point to the danger that, in a system where checks and balances have yet to develop, the control of the state by a single leader can allow that individual's power to increase rapidly to the point of authoritarianism.²¹ Recent examples include Fujimori's Peru and Yeltsin's Russia.²² Scholars have reached no consensus on this issue, but the salient point for Ukraine is that it has both problems (an overly powerful president and a badly divided parliament). In fact, the two phenomena tend to reinforce one another, since a fragmented and ineffective parliament provides justification for giving more power to the executive, and a lack of parliamentary prerogative reduces the incentive for compromise in order to form a ruling coalition. Much of this seems to stem from two aspects of Ukraine's institutional setup that, in theory, are relatively amenable to change—the constitutional division of powers and the parliamentary election law.

The constitution gives a great deal of power to the president.²³ Because he has the right to appoint the prime minister, the president has effective control over the executive branch. The division of executive power between the president and the prime minister is a recipe for intra-executive conflict, which has been constant in Ukraine and has always been resolved in the president's favour.

When the president and Parliament disagree, the president's wishes often win simply by default, a factor that Leonid Kuchma has used skillfully. The debate over election laws in 2001 is a good example. Kuchma and Parliament largely

20. See Giuseppe DiPalma, *To Craft Democracies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

21. Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 30–1; Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (1989): 51–69.

22. The comparison between Ukraine and Peru is made explicitly in Levitsky and Way, "Competitive Authoritarianism."

23. See Katarzyna Wolczuk, *The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001).

disagreed on what the new parliamentary election law should look like. But Parliament was unable to override the presidential veto, so Kuchma simply vetoed consecutive drafts of the law until he got what he wanted. As critics of presidential rule predict, in a situation where the president can prevail on policy without the approval of Parliament, there is no reason for compromise and the result is institutional confrontation.

But why is Parliament itself so fragmented? One easy answer is that this is simply a reflection of the fragmentation of opinion in society. But those who focus on institutions reject such an explanation, arguing that institutional arrangements can provide the incentives for elected representatives and party officials to compromise and coalesce even when they do not agree on much. This discussion focuses largely on electoral laws, and, unfortunately, Ukraine's electoral laws seem designed to translate fragmented public opinion into Parliament rather than promote consolidation. We also see, however, that the Ukrainian electoral laws and party system interact in ways that are not anticipated by the theory of institutional design.²⁴

It has been persuasively established that elections based on single-member districts with the winner requiring a plurality tend to produce two-party systems. On the other hand, proportional representation allows a broader range of views to be represented in parliament and, in particular, for representation of dispersed minorities.²⁵

Ukraine's first post-Soviet parliamentary elections in 1994 were based on the old Soviet model. Deputies were elected in single-member districts and had to win a majority of the votes. If no candidate won a majority in the first round, a second round was held. This two-round format reduced pressure on candidates and parties to join forces. More significantly, however, this system had an effect not anticipated in studies of electoral systems. Not only did it fail to force parties to coalesce, it even reduced the incentive for politicians to join parties. As long as elections were locally defined, local political power and reputation was a much bigger asset than affiliation with a national political party (which was weak anyhow). Thus, before the problem of the number of political parties in Ukraine could be solved, the party system itself had to be constructed. The 1994–98 Parliament was horrendously fragmented, with a large number of unaffiliated deputies known as “the swamp” sometimes providing situational majorities for

24. For a comprehensive treatment of Ukraine's election laws and their effects, see Sarah Birch, *Elections and Democratization in Ukraine* (Hounds mills, Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).

25. The literature on this subject is immense. A good overview is Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

particular legislation. No group came close to a working majority that could be used to advance a political programme or challenge the president.

This was true despite the phrase so often used in the Western press about the “Communist-dominated Parliament.” The Communists did have the largest single bloc, but they never came close to attaining a majority. We continued to read of “Communist domination” in the 1998–2002 Parliament despite the fact that the Communists controlled only one-fourth (112 out of 450) of the seats. The key point is that no one party or bloc has ever dominated Parliament, and this made it impossible for Parliament to take an active role in governing.

The immobilized nature of the 1994–98 Parliament led to calls for a proportional-representation system in 1998. In this system, voters would vote for parties rather than individuals. Any politician who wanted to be in Parliament would have to join a party. Presumably, this would force the development of the party system. The problem with a proportional-representation system is that, if the minimal limit of votes needed for a party to enter Parliament is set too low, a large number of parties can enter Parliament and there is little incentive for consolidation. A large number of small parties makes building a governing coalition more difficult, although proportional representation promotes party discipline, because without the party politicians cannot be elected. Proportional representation also promotes the representation of regional interests.

Parliament and the president eventually agreed to a mixed system in which half the seats were elected by single-member districts and half were elected via proportional representation. The system closely resembled that used in Russia. This was in part simply a compromise between those who anticipated advantage from the proportional-representation system (including the Communist Party) and those whose power was locally based. Theoretically, however, some predicted that the mixed system would provide the best aspects of both its components: the proportional-representation portion would strengthen the party system, and the single-member-district portion would drive the number of parties down towards two.

In reality, however, the mixed system yielded the worst outcomes of both systems; perhaps this should have been anticipated.²⁶ The single-member-district system allowed politicians with local power bases to get into Parliament without joining a party. The deleterious effects of the single-member district on party building remained. The proportional-representation system, especially with the relatively low threshold (four percent) for getting into Parliament, led to a large number of parties getting into the Supreme Council. As mentioned above, the

26. The effects of this system are discussed in Erik S. Herron, “Measuring Electoral Influences on Legislative Behavior in Mixed Systems: Evidence from Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 27 (August 2002): 361–81.

largest party there was able to muster only one-quarter of the deputies. Something resembling a working coalition existed only briefly in 2000.

New parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2002, and a new election law has been under debate since late 2000.²⁷ It is not difficult to anticipate what sort of system would lead to a more highly structured Parliament (with fewer and larger parties). Shifting to a total proportional-representation system would force politicians into the party system, so the problem of independents constantly switching sides would disappear. Raising the bar for a party to enter Parliament from four to even five percent (or higher) would create much more significant incentives for parties to merge.²⁸ In 1998 two parties won between four and five percent of the vote, and two more fell just short of four percent. This was exactly the proposal made by the current Parliament and vetoed repeatedly by Kuchma in 2001. A second version that would have retained the mixed system but reduced the single-member-district portion to one-quarter was also vetoed.

While it is relatively easy to change the electoral law to increase the effectiveness of Parliament, it appears that Kuchma does not want this to happen. This raises a key point about institutional design that is often missed in academic studies. For politicians the main incentive is gaining and holding power, and they will consider any institutional design with this in mind. Where power is initially divided, compromise will be needed to approve a new system, and that system will likely not privilege any one group. Where power is unbalanced to begin with, those with power are able to write the rules in ways that play to their strengths. This is what we see in Ukraine, and it underscores the distinction between an analysis of which institutions would be best by some normative criteria and an analysis of which institutions are likely to emerge from an existing constellation of power. It is a rare politician indeed (Gorbachev is the most notable example in recent decades) who voluntarily overturns a system that guarantees his power. Clearly, we should not expect this from Kuchma or from any of his likely successors.

A second kind of institutional explanation for Ukraine's political problems is that the state is weak. The question of state strength is not merely an academic one; creating a strong state has been a central goal of many Ukrainian elites, especially nationalist ones. From the perspective of nationalist theory, if the state is to be the embodiment of the nation, it should be unified rather than divided. To the extent that the state should promote the "national idea" (whatever that

27. Sarah Birch, "Options for Change: The Parliamentary Electoral System in Ukraine," *Development Associates Occasional Papers in Democracy and Governance*, no. 8 (2001).

28. Birch, "Options for Change" discusses various alternatives to the existing law, and arrives at a more refined (but not fundamentally contradictory) recommendation than that outlined here.

might be), it must be unified and able to pursue effectively the state or national interest in society. From the perspective of constructing liberal democracy, the question is whether the state has the capacity to resist encroachment by societal actors seeking private benefits, which would undermine democracy or the rule of law.

Often the most basic measure of state strength is the ability to collect taxes. The state can do nothing without money, so the ability to collect taxes from an unwilling population is the first priority. More broadly, the state has to be able to create the laws necessary for the public good and to enforce those laws. In the past decade Ukraine has been very deficient in all these areas.

In some respects, the problem is not that the state is weak, but that it has been taken over by private interests. Unfortunately, it appears that the one thing that has been most extensively privatized in Ukraine is the state, which, above all, should remain under public control. Leaving that question aside for the moment, let us see how the state's weakness influences the development of liberal democracy and the rule of law.

The question of state strength is closely linked to the problem of corruption. For the state to work effectively, it must be able to pay its own agents sufficiently to reduce incentives for corruption, and it must be able to monitor and enforce its own rules. Ukraine has made almost no progress in this area. Official salaries are so low and paid so sporadically that many employees of the state feel it is both necessary and justified to extort bribes from the citizenry. The problem is not new to Ukraine: it was endemic to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, where it reached its apogee under Brezhnev. However, with the partial marketization of the economy, which occurred after 1991, the resources held by private actors compared to those held by the state vastly increased. It is understandable then that private actors can outbid the state for the services of state employees.

The problem for Ukraine and other countries in a similar situation is that state corruption and, more broadly, state weakness tend to be self-reinforcing. Corruption will not go away by itself and will prove quite resistant even to serious efforts at combatting it (which have not yet materialized in Ukraine). The problem is especially evident in tax collecting. Because tax collecting is corrupt, the state does not have enough resources to combat corruption more resolutely. Because the state lacks the resources to combat corruption, officials will always have much to gain by taking bribes.

It might seem odd to claim that the state is weak while one laments the incredible power of the executive branch and points out that society is largely quiescent. But these three phenomena are in fact compatible. The executive branch largely dominates the legislative and judicial branches, so there is no doubt who controls the state. And the state does have the ability to manipulate society through its control of the press and economic opportunities. But those

powers are limited to preserving the current regime's hold on power and extend only in very limited ways to effecting positive change in society. Similarly, society is largely able to resist many types of encroachment by the state, but finds itself unable to control the state through democratic channels. Thus, while the usual formulation of state-society relations sees state power and societal power as inversely related (a strong state implies a weak society and vice versa), in Ukraine we have a weak state and a weak society.²⁹

It is worth asking, in conclusion, whether there is a connection between these two different institutional problems—the form of institutions and their strength relative to society. As noted above, many researchers have linked a strong executive with a strong state, but Ukraine has a strong executive and a weak state. It is probably the case that to the extent that people see electoral competition as meaningless, recognition of the state's legitimacy will decrease and justification of resistance to or circumvention of state policies will increase. Based on the experience of Ukraine, most of the post-Soviet states, and much of the developing world, we can say one thing with certainty—a strong executive branch does not necessarily increase state strength. It seems to be linked more closely with venality than with state strength or reform.

So far we have explored various aspects of the societal and institutional situation that may account for the current political state of affairs in Ukraine. But the reform process itself may also have led to certain aspects of the present political situation. Particularly with regard to institutions, arrangements or laws made at key times in a state's history may last long after the conditions that gave rise to them disappear. Because decisions made at one point in time create the conditions for making further decisions, it is not always possible at a later date to realize an option that may have been possible earlier.

3. The Reform Process

Several aspects of the reform process in Ukraine need to be highlighted. What is most material is the fact that while Ukraine had a national revolution in 1991 (in the sense that she became independent), she did not really have a political revolution in the sense of overturning the existing system and deposing the governing elite. Politically, Ukraine underwent a significant change in 1991, but there is an evolution of power arrangements from 1990 to the present rather than a single turning point. This is a process of evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. In some respects it has not been very far-reaching, and it has allowed the pre-August 1991 elite to adapt to changes and, to a large extent, control them.

29. I discuss this phenomenon in more detail in my "Conclusion: Power and Politics in a De-institutionalized State," in *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, ed. Taras Kuzio, Robert Kravchuk, and Paul D'Anieri (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

The reasons for the lack of a revolution in 1991 are clear and have been elaborated by several authors. The primary opposition to the Soviet regime in Ukraine was focused above all on an agenda of national liberation. Moreover, the Soviet regime in Ukraine was entrenched much more securely than in Poland. Therefore, the proponents of national independence and democracy were concerned that by pursuing revolutionary change in both areas they might fail in both. Essentially, a deal was struck whereby the existing elite retained power and the existing institutions remained intact in return for a fundamental break with the Soviet Union.

Much of the discussion of this process has focused on the ability of elites to remain in power, but it is equally or perhaps more important to focus on how the evolutionary path affected the subsequent development of the institutional arrangements described above. When one considers that until 1996 the Soviet constitution was repeatedly amended without being replaced, it is not surprising that the institutional setup did not function well in creating a normal liberal democracy.

Ukraine's political makeup began evolving before August 1991.³⁰ The 1990 elections to the Supreme Council saw a substantial number of reformers and nationalists admitted to the legislature. Their initiative allowed them to use Parliament as it was used in other republics—as the main platform from which to challenge Soviet rule. Perhaps this role contributed to the notion that Parliament did not need to be reconstituted after the Soviet collapse. Because Soviet Ukrainian leaders sought compromise with reformers, it was possible to strike a middle ground that left existing institutions intact. In hindsight it is perhaps easy to say that the reformers should have confronted and destroyed the existing institutions. But it is not clear that they would have prevailed in such a confrontation. This perhaps is the key difference from the Polish case: in Poland it was clear that an attempt by the Communist elite to arrest a fundamental restructuring of politics would be soundly defeated, so the elite had little choice but to give in and make the best of the situation. The willingness of the reformers to leave the existing institutions intact may have contributed to one of the biggest successes of Ukraine's transformation—the avoidance of violence.

The parliament that was charged with fundamentally transforming Ukraine, therefore, had relatively little interest in doing so. That parliament lasted until 1994, and the subsequent parliament was elected according to the same rules, guaranteeing that it would be ineffective as a legislature and convenient for elites trying to maintain economic and political power. The 1998 elections were

30. The gradual nature of institutional and political change is well documented in Roman Solchanyk, *Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

conducted according to rules that were substantially different, but they still gave local elites easy access to power. We can only speculate what might have resulted had the 1992 elections been held according to a fundamentally new election law.

The creation of the presidency was also carried out in a somewhat evolutionary fashion. Prior to the 1991 presidential election, the speaker of Parliament performed many of the functions of a head of government. That year the speaker, Leonid Kravchuk, was elected president. The new presidency amounted to much less in practice than on paper because there was no clear division of responsibilities among the president, the Cabinet, and Parliament. None of this was worked out until after the existing elite and power structure had made the transition from Soviet to post-Soviet rule. The presidency gradually accumulated *de facto* power, especially after 1994, and this power was then used in 1996 to shape the constitutional provisions to give the president even more power.

In sum, the gradual nature of Ukraine's political transition meant that the existing elite could adapt rather than be expelled from office. And since this elite never lost power, it was the driving force behind all subsequent changes. It was to be expected, then, that these changes would benefit that elite rather than give rise to a fundamentally new system.

It should also be pointed out that throughout this formative period the democratic opposition, such as it was, was weak, disorganized, and preoccupied with questions of nation building. Indeed, perhaps the most significant characteristic of Ukraine's development over the past decade has been the problematic development of a distinct democratic opposition separate from the nationalist opposition. The group of parties and people usually associated with reform in the West is often labelled "national-democratic," and the label is telling. That most of Ukraine's nationalists were committed to democratic principles was responsible in part for Ukraine's ability to pursue her national agenda without violence. But it also meant that there was a constant tension between the national and the strictly democratic agendas.

This tension led to the first split in Rukh. A substantial portion of the movement felt that it was wrong to oppose President Kravchuk on the grounds of democratic reform because this might weaken the new state's independence or its nation-building project. Thus, much of the democratic opposition supported on nationalist grounds some of the institutional developments that have contributed most to Kuchma's ability to accrue so much power by 2001, most notably the establishment of a strong presidency and the construction of a unitary form of government. My purpose is not to criticize these decisions, but to explain them. Without first developing a unified and independent nation-state, debates about the distribution of powers may have been moot. It may be, as Motyl contends, that certain components of the state-building agenda were prerequisites

for political and economic reform, but it is equally the case that the national agenda was pursued at the expense of democratic reform.³¹ Moreover, the problem is one that Ukraine continues to contend with in 2001, as it did in 1991 and 1996. The right opposition to Kuchma continues to be flummoxed by the dual need to pursue national goals and push political reform.

Electoral Authoritarianism

Having summarized some of the explanations for how Ukraine got where it is, we can attempt to describe the “rules of Ukrainian politics” as they exist today. By “rules” I do not mean official rules in the legal sense, but rather the political tendencies, constraints, and realities that will help us understand what is likely or unlikely to happen. I focus on two key phenomena that contribute to what I call electoral authoritarianism in Ukraine. First, the inability of the left and the right to join forces behind reform makes it relatively easy for Kuchma to play off one side against the other and prevent a serious challenge to his power. Second, the fact that the president has massive *de facto* political power in addition to that given to him by the constitution gives him little reason to pursue compromise or reform.

These two factors interact. First, even though the left and the right cannot become allies (which is true in many states), the battle for control of the centre could still lead to compromise and reform. But the president’s extraordinary powers, most notably patronage powers, allow him to control the centre.

To understand why Ukraine works as it does, we do not need a deep understanding of Kuchma’s motivations or hopes. All we need is to view him as a typical politician of the sort envisioned by the American federalists—who will accrue as much power as others let him. In this sense, the key difference between Kuchma and any American president is not that Kuchma is less honest or more ambitious (though he may be), but simply that he can get away with much more. Why? Because, both in constitutional and practical terms, political power in Ukraine is fundamentally unbalanced. Moreover, the power imbalance has tended to increase as power becomes more concentrated rather than dispersed.

Much of the presidential power rests on the constitutional provisions adopted in 1996. This raises the question, of course, why the president accrued so much statutory power to begin with. Constitutions are not drawn up in a political vacuum to build some sort of ideal government. Rather they are made within a particular configuration of political forces and tend to reflect the prevailing balance of forces. As discussed above, Ukrainian politics had evolved from 1991 in such a way that in 1996 President Kuchma had the power to force through a

31. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence*, 67–70.

constitution that expanded presidential authority. Then, in 2000, he was able to force through a referendum that expanded presidential prerogatives even further (despite the fact that this seemed unconstitutional).

The essential problem in checking executive authority in post-Soviet Ukraine is that the left and the right see each other as a greater threat than creeping authoritarianism. At crucial times during his tenure Kuchma has been able to gain more power by allying with one wing against the other. It is for this reason that the large bloc of Communists in Parliament is so important. The Communists do not dominate Parliament in any conventional sense of the word. But because nationalists will not ally with them and vice versa, Kuchma is able to manoeuvre so as to augment his own power. Neither group sees Kuchma as the worst alternative. Therefore, while they agree on the desirability of getting rid of him and curbing presidential power, the two groups disagree on the crucial question of who should gain power as a result. When it appears that the Communists would gain from limiting presidential power, the nationalists tend to support augmenting presidential power. And when it looks as though the nationalists would gain power, the Communists support the president. The combined effect is that Kuchma remains secure.

Nationalists provided Kuchma with crucial support in the 1999 elections (even though they saw him as anathema in 1994). They also provided him with important support in the constitutional debate in 1996. As long as the Communists formed the largest bloc in Parliament, nationalists were willing to cede institutional power to the presidency. As long as developing a federal system was equated with building the basis for separatism, nationalists supported a unitary state headed by a strong executive.

In early 2001, when many people believed that the scandal over the Gongadze case and the Melnychenko tapes would force Kuchma from power, the same dynamic took over. Both the left and the right attacked Kuchma, but the key question was who would come to power if Kuchma was deposed. As long as the answer was Viktor Yushchenko, the nationalist and market-oriented prime minister, the Communists refrained at key junctures from doing anything that might bring down Kuchma. They would rather see a corrupt and authoritarian Kuchma in power than any kind of nationalist or liberal.

In some sense, divisions between the left and the right are characteristic of many democratic societies. The difference in Ukraine is that the left and the right are so far apart and so resolutely opposed to one another that not even the president's most egregious behaviour will prompt them to join together for the good of the country.

The question still remains, however: how does Kuchma retain such firm control over the centre? Theoretically, a presidential candidate who was positioned in the centre and was seen as less authoritarian and corrupt than Kuchma could prevail. The most likely candidate to do this was Oleksandr Moroz, who

posed a credible threat to Kuchma in the 1999 presidential elections. But in that instance and again in the referendum of 2000 and the scandals of 2001, Kuchma was able to use the levers at his disposal to ensure that much of the centre of the Ukrainian political spectrum supported him. He has three incredibly broad and powerful tools at his disposal: control over administration of the economy, control over law enforcement and tax collecting, and control over vast numbers of jobs in a system in which much of the economy is still state-controlled and much of the state is centralized.

Because the executive branch controls administration of the economy, it essentially decides who in Ukraine will become wealthy and who will not. Especially in a period in which state-owned enterprises are being privatized, those who earn the president's favour can be richly rewarded, while those who oppose him can be punished. Perhaps the most notable example of the use of executive authority to enrich supporters of the administration was Pavlo Lazarenko's efforts in 1996–97 to restructure Ukraine's energy sector so as to allow his allies to earn perhaps more than a billion dollars. As long as Lazarenko was Kuchma's ally, this conduct was allowed, but as soon as he emerged as a potential political challenger, he was removed from office and, eventually, had to flee the country.

Control over the economy is particularly important in a system in which political and economic power are closely intertwined. The far-reaching role of the government in the economy means that those with important economic interests must be politically involved. The somewhat undeveloped campaign-financing laws make economic assets an even bigger advantage in running for office in Ukraine than they are elsewhere. As a result of these two factors, those who possess economic power have both the incentive and the means to seek elective office, and those who possess political power can acquire economic power very quickly. Hence, many deputies in Parliament have significant business interests and have much to lose if they earn the enmity of the presidential administration. While those on the far left and the far right are often more ideologically motivated and, therefore, less subject to economic pressure, those in the middle have high incentives to get along with the president, and they are his key to controlling Parliament.

The second lever is control over law enforcement and tax collecting. In some respects, this is the most powerful instrument, because it can be extended into any realm. Control over law enforcement can be used to intimidate rival politicians either by directly threatening them with prosecution or by threatening their business interests with administrative sanctions that will put them out of business. Most notably, law enforcement has been used to squelch the independent press in Ukraine. We should not romanticize the state of the Ukrainian press even at its best. Many of the major outlets are controlled by oligarchic interests. But there has been a plurality of outlets that have expressed a plurality of views,

including views critical of the president. Much of the opposition press in Ukraine has been silenced through transparent but effective mechanisms such as voiding the lease on a newspaper's office because of a technical error.

Tax enforcement in Ukraine is most ingeniously organized to serve as a tool of political control. The tax code is so onerous and complex that it is almost impossible to do business without violating some aspect of it. Rather than simplify the tax code or make a serious effort to prosecute violations equitably, the strategy of Kuchma's administration has been to foster a situation in which everyone breaks the law and, therefore, is liable to what seems to be quite legitimate prosecution. But only those who have failed to co-operate with Kuchma's administration have been prosecuted. There is one telling conversation recorded on Melnychenko's tapes in which Kuchma tells the head of the tax inspectorate, Nikolai Azarov, to make sure he has something on everyone and to prosecute those who do not deliver enough votes in the referendum campaign.³² By making the tax code impossible to comply with, the government has seemingly legitimate grounds for prosecuting any person or organization it sees as a threat.

The state's control of much of the economy enables it to control the press. Unco-operative newspapers can find it difficult to rent space, since most real estate is still state-owned, or they might find it impossible to buy newsprint from factories that are owned either by the state or by allies of the executive. Control of the media is significant because it confers influence not only over the elite but also over the electorate. The latter is necessary for maintaining the appearance of legitimacy.

Kuchma also has control of a massive patronage network that allows him to deny or grant jobs to millions of Ukrainian voters. Because Ukraine is a unitary state, even low-level local workers are employees of some central ministry. Every single one of Ukraine's 600,000 teachers is employed by the Ministry of Education. In 2000 at least some teachers were told that they would lose their jobs if not only they but also their students' parents did not vote in favour of the proposed constitutional amendments.³³ The exact number of government employees is not known, but the number is certainly high enough to constitute a huge factor in elections. In terms of patronage, the state has become an enormous vote-manipulating machine. Such political machines enabled individual politicians to remain in power for decades in some American cities, and there is no obvious reason why this cannot happen in Ukraine.

32. "New Tape Translation of Kuchma Allegedly Ordering Falsification of Presidential Election Returns," kievpost.com, 13 February 2001.

33. Author's interviews with voters in Kyiv in May 2000.

In sum, control of the executive branch gives Kuchma power to control the vital centre of the political spectrum on two different levels. On the level of Parliament, the legal embodiment of the public will, his power to grant lucrative business favours, enforce tax laws, and control the media keeps the deputies in line. On the level of popular elections, the mainstay of legitimacy in a supposedly democratic society, his control of the media and several million jobs enables him to sway the voters. The only way to overcome these incredibly powerful built-in advantages of the president is for a broad coalition from across Ukraine's political spectrum to challenge Kuchma's dominance. The left and the right may be more principled than some of the oligarchs in the centre of the political spectrum, but they are also too principled to join together ever to fundamentally change the system.

The system of electoral authoritarianism is thus well entrenched. Not even the convincing evidence of the president's criminal behaviour, the sort of evidence that in recent years has led to the ouster of presidents in Peru, the Philippines, and Indonesia (none of which are stalwarts of democracy), has seriously threatened Kuchma's rule.

Prospects for Change

Ukraine had a national revolution in 1991, but not a democratic one. Rather, politics in the country evolved from Communist authoritarianism to electoral authoritarianism based on the political use of the law and on machine politics. To the extent that this portrait of Ukraine is accurate, what are the prospects for change? Is further evolution towards democracy possible, or is democracy attainable only through some sort of revolution?

Today it is difficult to find a good reason for optimism. Since mid-1998 (roughly corresponding to the preparations for the 1999 presidential elections), executive control has been expanded and used much more willingly, with surprisingly little backlash. Therefore, it seems that the situation will get worse before it improves. Moreover, this is not a system with centrifugal tendencies—power tends to concentrate rather than disperse, as we have seen since 1995. Political power led to constitutional power, economic power led to political power, and all these powers tend to reinforce one another. The system is stable and is not going to collapse by itself.

Another source of stability in the present system lies in the techniques of electoral manipulation and machine politics that Kuchma and his followers have perfected in the last few years. The techniques have been tested across the former Soviet Union, and the leaders have been learning from each other. Kuchma's 1999 re-election campaign adopted many of the techniques Boris Yeltsin used in 1996 in Russia. The 2000 referendum, which gave the president additional powers, had precedents in Central Asia. As these techniques are honed, the chances of overthrowing the regimes using them decrease.

A third source of stability in Ukraine has already been mentioned—the division of the opposition. Both the left and the right will support Kuchma if they believe the alternative will benefit their rival. Moreover, the only democratic opposition, that on the right, is itself badly divided, and there is little reason to believe that consolidation is likely. The Rukh movement, which started to fragment at the beginning of the independence era, continued to do so in 2000. Even in early 2001, when it looked as though a concerted national-democratic effort might force fundamental reform, the various leaders and factions were unable or unwilling to put aside their differences.

There are, however, sources of instability in the system as well. Since it is a system in which the winner takes all, any potential leader has to try to topple the existing ruler. Unlike a system of divided power, in which the opposition parties retain some influence on policy, some perquisites of power, and a chance of coming to power in the future, Ukraine's system, in which almost all the political and economic rewards accrue to the president, leaves runners-up with very little. The question is how successful Kuchma will be in foreseeing challenges and either co-opting or suppressing them. So far he has succeeded, firing Pavlo Lazarenko and then running him out of the country when he got too powerful, getting Iuliia Tymoshenko arrested, and preventing (exactly how is not clear) Viktor Yushchenko from turning against him in the Gongadze scandal. Indeed, it is hard to imagine what can topple Kuchma if the affair concerning Gongadze and Melnychenko's tapes failed do so.

Beyond Kuchma, however, there is the larger question: how long will the system last? In a winner-take-all system with highly manipulated elections, presidential succession becomes a key source of crisis. In general, authoritarian systems without well-established procedures for changing leaders face a crisis every time this must happen (usually when the leader dies). In the case of Ukraine, it remains to be seen whether Kuchma's system can be passed on to someone else in an orderly way.

The Ukrainian president is limited by the constitution to two terms, and Kuchma's second term will end in 2004. It is not certain that he will leave at that time. His associates have already argued, as Boris Yeltsin's once did, that since the first term began before the two-term limit was adopted, the current term is actually the first term under the limit.³⁴ Should Kuchma wish to remain in office past 2004, he could easily induce the Constitutional Court to adopt such an interpretation. That would postpone the problem for five years. Considering the constitutional referendum of 2000, it would probably not be difficult to hold a constitutional referendum to extend Kuchma's term (as presidents of some Central Asian republics have done).

34. RFE/RL, *Newsline* 4, no. 17, pt. 2 (25 January 2000).

In any event, either constitutional restrictions or human mortality will require a leadership change, and there is no reliable mechanism in place that will protect Kuchma from possible prosecution for his misdeeds. Again, the most obvious precedent comes from Russia, where Boris Yeltsin solved a similar problem by choosing a successor who would assure his protection and resigning in time to give his successor the advantages of incumbency and of choosing the timing of the next election. Because Ukraine's laws regarding succession in the event of the president's resignation or death are similar to Russia's, the same strategy could be followed.

The uncertainties of succession are rich in possibilities for genuine political liberalization. But the outcome is unpredictable: it is entirely possible that the system will remain largely intact, as it has in post-Yeltsin Russia.

It may well be that the system will change not because of pressure from the left or the right opposition, but rather because of the dissolution of Kuchma's primary base, the support of the forces in the centre. This is what happened in several notable democratic revolutions in recent years, including the ousters of Suharto in Indonesia, Milosevic in Yugoslavia, and, of course, the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. This vague possibility brings us back to perhaps the key assertion of this paper: that Ukraine did not have a political revolution in 1991. If it is true that Ukraine needs a revolution, not just more evolutionary change, to fundamentally move toward democracy, then it is very hard to predict when she will change. Usually, such revolutions have been unforeseen. Sometimes such revolutions lead to a worse system.

One would like to end on an optimistic note by asserting, for example, that in the second decade of her independence Ukraine can become more like Poland or Germany rather than like Russia or the Central Asian states. But an analyst who at least tries to be objective can hardly avoid the conclusion that the vast preponderance of political and economic power in Ukraine currently resides with those for whom the development of a vibrant, competitive, liberal democracy is a low priority. When will it be in her leaders' interest to create a system of government that divides and constrains political power and necessitates compromise? Sadly, in 2001 the point seems much farther off than it did in 1991 or even 1995.

A FUNDAMENTAL STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE

Bohdan Harasymiw

Post-Communist Ukraine

Post-Communist Ukraine by Bohdan Harasymiw, published recently by the CIUS Press, is one of the most comprehensive and penetrating studies of the political and social realities of independent Ukraine. The masterfully written, multi-faceted analysis presented in this 480-page book attempts to document and explain that country's successes and its more frequent failures during its transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

Taking a comparative approach, Bohdan Harasymiw breaks free of the usual historical-cultural mode of dealing with Ukrainian politics by other scholars. Step by step, he examines the primary elements of a modern, democratic state and the degree to which these are in place: an agreed-on set of rules of the game in the form of an accepted constitution; a state capable of governing and claiming the loyalty of its people; a Parliament representative of the public and able to legislate; a bureaucracy skilled at fashioning and implementing public policies, and not just following orders; a nation of fellow citizens living as a community; political parties channelling the interests of, and responsive to, their followers; elections that reflect the preferences of the voters; and policies ensuring the security and well-being of both state and society. These are analyzed in view of other countries' experience with these institutions and processes. As a result, a comprehensive portrait of Ukraine's politics, which can be characterized as "post-Communist" but not yet "post-Soviet," emerges.

Post-Communist Ukraine will be an indispensable guide for students and scholars of comparative, East European, and post-Soviet politics. It will also be of great value to anyone interested in learning about contemporary Ukraine from a social-science perspective.

(Toronto–Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2002), xiv, 469 pp.

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Administrative Reform and Centre-Local Relations

Robert S. Kravchuk

The Imperative of Administrative Reform

The central challenge for East European and former Soviet countries is to develop administrative institutions compatible with a market-oriented democratic system. This raises the question of the changing role of the state.¹ Many reformers and Western advisers have called for a drastic *shrinkage* in the size and scope of the state in transitional economies. As Chester Newland observes, however, such emphasis is largely due to the current fashion in the West of de-emphasizing the state in favour of market relations.² The transition to the market does not necessarily imply a smaller, weaker state. In fact, successful transition depends vitally upon the ability of the state to transform itself, not to shrink drastically or disappear altogether. Remnants of the socialist state are ill-equipped to direct and manage the transition process effectively.

What is needed, then, is a new and different state, not necessarily a smaller one. An important problem in recent theorizing about economic transition is that institutional and administrative issues have been treated largely as “exogenous” factors.³ Recently, however, administrative weakness has been recognized as a

1. See Anders Åslund, *How Russia Became a Market Economy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Leszek Balcerowicz, *Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995); and Marie Lavigne, *The Economics of Transition* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).

2. See Chester A. Newland, “Transformational Challenges in Central and Eastern Europe and Schools of Public Administration,” *Public Administration Review* 56, no. 4 (July–August 1996): 382–9.

3. See, for instance, Nicolas Spulber, *Restructuring the Soviet Economy: In Search of the Market* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); Graham Allison and

roadblock to economic reform and development.⁴ Other factors undoubtedly intervene, but the "problem area" of structural reform and adjustment is recognized increasingly as one of implementation, which ultimately concerns administrative processes.

Administrative reform has become an imperative in Ukraine. Her limited governance capacity and administrative capabilities have emerged as the critical constraint on Ukraine's efforts to formulate and execute policy, especially in the critical areas of fiscal reform, monetary management, privatization, and the fight against corruption. The most serious problems include the institutional inertia of Ukraine's inherited Soviet-era bureaucracy, confused and overlapping jurisdictions, penetration of the state administration by powerful economic interests, outright corruption, and the fluctuating commitment to reform on the part of political leaders.⁵ It has become clear that institutional capacity building can no longer be neglected.

But administrative reform in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is a relatively new area of inquiry. Recently, it has received increasing levels of attention by policy-makers and scholars concerned with the prospects and possibilities of economic reform. This article briefly summarizes important aspects of Ukraine's administrative-reform efforts. It focuses throughout on the inadequate institutional-administrative basis of governance in Ukraine and explores the critical need to emphasize the establishment of effective governmental administrative institutions and to extend the reform process to Ukraine's regions.

Grigory Yavlinsky, *Window of Opportunity: The Grand Bargain for Democracy in the Soviet Union* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991); Olivier J. Blanchard, et. al., *Reform in Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992); and Jeffrey Sachs, *Poland's Jump to the Market Economy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993). A notable exception is Åslund, *How Russia Became a Market Economy*.

4. See The World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa—From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long Term Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1989); Stephen Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in Newly Industrializing Countries* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, ed., *Institutional Change and the Public Sector in Transitional Economies* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1994); Leila L. Frischtak, *Governance Capacity and Economic Reform in Developing Countries*, The World Bank Technical Paper, no. 254 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1994); and Paul Aligica, "The Institutionalists Take on Transition," *Transition*, 7 March 1997, 46–9.

5. The World Bank, *World Development Report—1997: The State in a Changing World* (Washington and New York: The World Bank and Oxford University Press, 1997).

Building Effective Administrative Capacity

Administrative reform seeks to build specific capacities or performance capabilities.⁶ Administrative reform authority Beth Honadle writes that “capacity building means institutionalizing or embodying strengths in an organization.”⁷ To the extent that capacity building is concerned with developing specific administrative and managerial competencies, the process may be characterized as the pursuit of “responsive competence.”⁸ At base, it concerns the ability of governments to select and fulfill their policy objectives. A useful conception of capacity for present purposes is that of Gargan. Simply stated, “a government’s capacity is its ability to do what it needs and wants to do.”⁹ Consequently, the concept of capacity includes the state’s policy-, resource-, and programme-management tasks.¹⁰ Along similar lines, Collins argues that formerly Communist states in transition must develop public-service-management capabilities in three general areas:¹¹ (1) core institutions of governance (for example, bureaucratic management, policy development, and analytical capabilities); (2) public administration *per se* (including a professional civil service, appropriate centre-local relations, and decentralization); and (3) enterprise restructuring and management education.

These concepts collectively support Honadle’s definition of capacity as the government’s ability to: identify problems; develop policies to deal with these problems; devise programmes to implement the policies; attract and absorb

6. Most of the developed literature on governmental capacity concerns states and municipalities in the United States. While there are obvious institutional differences (in the most *general* sense) between the American subnational governments and those in transition economies, I maintain that there is a certain internal integrity to the concept of capacity, which transcends time and space. For instance, all governments levy and collect taxes, print money, and regulate its value, administer programmes, etc. In this regard, I shall employ the terms “governance capacity,” “managerial capacity,” and “administrative capacity” interchangeably.

7. Beth Walter Honadle, “A Capacity-Building Framework: A Search for Concept and Purpose,” *Public Administration Review* 41, no. 5 (September–October 1981): 578.

8. See Terry M. Moe, “The Politicized Presidency,” in *The New Direction in American Politics*, ed. John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), 235–71.

9. See John J. Gargan, “Consideration of Local Government Capacity,” *Public Administration Review* 41, no. 6 (November–December 1981): 652.

10. Much the same perspective is adopted R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, “Assessing the Effects of Institutions,” in *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad*, ed. Weaver and Rockman (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993), 1–41.

11. See Paul Collins, “Civil Service Reform and Retraining in Transitional Economies: Strategic Issues and Options,” *Public Administration and Development* 13 (1993): 323–44.

financial, human, informational, and capital resources effectively to operate programmes; manage these resources well; and evaluate programme outcomes to guide future activities.¹² This definition is consistent with that of World Bank specialist Arturo Israel, who focuses institutional development efforts on building competence in specific functional areas, especially in the effective use of financial and human resources:

Institutional development (or institutional analysis) is concerned with management systems, including monitoring and evaluation; organizational structure and changes; planning, including planning for an efficient investment process; staffing and personnel policies; staff training; financial performance, including financial management and planning, budgeting, accounting, and auditing; maintenance; and procurement.¹³

We must note at the outset that building administrative competence poses a certain paradox for state transition in a reforming economy. Paraphrasing Leila Frischtak, we may term this phenomenon the “paradox of the reforming state.”¹⁴ The paradox arises from the observation that economic reform does not necessarily imply a minimal state. Quite the contrary.¹⁵ Successful privatization, liberalization of prices, removal of trade restrictions, decentralization of fiscal processes, and redesign of the social safety net all depend upon expanded state capacity. Rather than a weakening of the state, then, just the opposite is required. The formerly socialist state, therefore, must expand in new directions in order to support economic reform even as it abandons its traditional socialist functions of command and control.

The Compelling Need for Reform in Ukraine

In Ukraine administrative-capacity building must address the state’s policy-making and administrative capabilities and the apparent gap between them.

12. See Beth Walter Honadle, “Identifying Management Capacity among Local Governments,” *Urban Affairs Papers*, no. 3 (Winter 1981): 1–12; and idem, “Issues in Defining Local Management Capacity,” chap. 2 in *Perspectives on Management Capacity Building*, ed. Beth Walter Honadle and A. M. Howitt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 24–46.

13. Arturo Israel, *Institutional Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 11–12.

14. In *Governance Capacity and Economic Reform in Developing Countries* Frischtak calls it more broadly “the paradox of the adjusting state.”

15. See Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, “The Politics of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment,” in *Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance*, vol. 1, *The International System*, ed. Jeffrey D. Sachs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 232–9. See also Frischtak, *Governance Capacity and Economic Reform in Developing Countries*.

Ukraine's governmental system largely consists of semi-reformed vestiges of the former Soviet regime. There is a chronic shortage of governance capacity. It is characteristic of the former Soviet republics that their ability to design, develop, and implement public policy was grossly underdeveloped. This was due largely to the central role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in the affairs of state. The great influence of the CPSU and its role as the principal monitoring and control mechanism in the Soviet system developed over time as the leadership's answer to the "information problem." Since "the overriding concern was with monitoring and enforcement, the primary criteria for selection [of bureaucrats, managers, and other *apparatchiks*] was loyalty to ... the party rather than entrepreneurial skill."¹⁶

The attempt to control the entire economy from the centre involved enormous organizing, monitoring, and enforcement problems leading to overbureaucratization. Effective administrators succeeded—despite the controls placed on them—by developing "informal adjustment mechanisms" (essentially side deals worked out with others) based on personal contacts and patronage relations. This was done precisely in order to compensate for the weaknesses inherent in the system.¹⁷ Formal centralization was thus offset by networks of informal fragmentation.

As a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the abolition of the central authority, Kyiv inherited a highly fragmented public administration lacking in unity and coherence. Bureaucratic inertia plagued Ukraine's efforts at reform from the start. Past experience and current expectations have combined to lock the emerging tasks of the Ukrainian state into something very close to the all-too-familiar pattern of Soviet-style state-society relations. New tasks and functions have been added, often with no break with the administrative past. It is hard to change direction. As the old apparatus adapts to its new environment, it becomes more dysfunctional. The co-ordinating role of the CPSU has given way to multiple political elites that compete for power, leaving the nomenklatura largely unsupervised. The low cohesion of elites and the multiple veto points available to the apparatchiks present serious obstacles to setting clear priorities.

The elites themselves are fragmented and incoherent. In any case, politically influential groups are not very interested in the efficient operation of government. In fact, efficiency may not concern them at all. Rather, structural changes tend to be evaluated from the standpoint of (primarily) individual or group opportu-

16. Thrainn Eggertsson, "The Economics of Institutions in Transition Economies," chap. 2 in *Institutional Change and the Public Sector in Transitional Economies*, ed. Schiavo-Campo, 28–9.

17. See Jerry F. Hough, "The Bureaucratic Model and the Nature of the Soviet System," in *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory*, ed. Jerry F. Hough (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).

nities to influence policy for purposes of securing private interests and exacting rents. The lack of bureaucratic coherence severely restricts the competence and accountability of government officials. The clear implication is that Ukraine simply cannot rely on the tools and instruments by which political and economic competition was managed under the old Soviet regime. According to President Leonid D. Kuchma, "the present bureaucracy is unable ultimately to overcome the remains of the former administrative system. Its constructive potential is fully exhausted."¹⁸

The Dominant Features of the Administrative System


The dominant features of Ukraine's administrative system have militated against the effective implementation of reforms. The 1996 Constitution of Ukraine served to clarify somewhat many important issues. However, serious difficulties remain to be resolved:

- excessively executive-oriented, top-down authority structures;
- complex, confused, and often overlapping jurisdictions among the major political institutions, leading to counterproductive institutional competition (such as that between the president and Parliament);
- extensive centralization in Kyiv of decision making concerning oblast and local affairs;
- strictly hierarchical, closed, and exclusionary decision-making processes;
- "hollowness" of many government ministries;
- "paper ministers," whose roles are almost entirely dominated by the former Communist nomenklatura;
- absence of both a rule-of-law tradition and a public-service ethic; and
- lack of a developed civil-service system with an adequate number of appropriately trained and motivated personnel.

The concentration of administrative functions at the highest levels of the executive branch has reached excessive levels. Regional policy is unbalanced. The bureaucracy is inaccessible to the public and, in any case, beyond its control. Public policy is non-transparent, and corruption and economic crime are rampant. Quite understandably, then, the prestige of public service is low. All governmental institutions suffer from lack of public trust. Figure 1 presents the results of an April 2000 survey taken by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies. While the president of Ukraine ranks highest in public trust, his

18. Address of the President of Ukraine to Parliament, "Ukraine: A Move into the Twenty-first Century. The Strategy of Economic and Social Development for 2000–2004," *Uriadovyi kurier*, 23 February 2000.

Figure 1
Public Trust in Governmental Institutions
(Percent of Respondents; Survey Taken April 15-24, 2000)




Source: The Ukrainian Centre for Economic & Political Studies.

support is a meager 33.5 percent. By contrast, Parliament's trust level is a mere fourteen percent.¹⁹

A most serious obstacle to effective implementation is the presence of multiple veto points, which are effectively "bottlenecks" that can squelch action. The result is that there is poor co-ordination of activities on the part of different ministries and other executive bodies. Many mistakes have been made, leading to the serious lack of public trust observed in figure 1.

According to a particular pathology, such over-bureaucratization leads to excessive business regulation, awkward licensing requirements, an intrusive state inspection system, and much unnecessary expense. There has been a virtual explosion of regulations in many areas. A pointed example is tax-payment procedures. Figure 2 indicates that from 1991 to 1999 the number of regulatory acts pertaining to this policy area has grown from a mere twenty-one to over 500. It is little wonder that tax policy ranks first in a list of factors impeding foreign business

19. A. Bychenko, "Administrative Reform in Ukraine: Sociological Survey of the Population," *National Security and Defence*, 2000, no. 5: 53-8.




Source: State Tax Administration of Ukraine.

investment in Ukraine. As can readily be seen in figure 3, the vast majority of such factors, including official corruption, bureaucratic delays, and multiple oversight bodies, are administrative in character and would be subject to improvement through genuine reform.

Another bothersome aspect of the centralized but largely unco-ordinated policy and administrative process is the fragmentation that results from it. Fragmented states are easily susceptible to anti-reform forces and vested interests that mobilize to block reforms. Even the president has been unable to force through the necessary reforms. Despite Kuchma's efforts, the president is institutionally not well-equipped to co-ordinate reforms. According to the Constitution of Ukraine, the president does not formally head the executive branch; rather, he is the head of state. The president appoints a prime minister who is accountable to the head of state and to Parliament. But Kuchma has sought to extend the influence of the presidency over the executive. The president has his own administration, which assists him to fulfill his constitutional functions in the areas of national security and foreign policy, but not only these functions.

By creating his own administrative bodies largely in parallel to the Cabinet, President Kuchma has afflicted the Cabinet of Ministers and the presidential administration with both fragmentation and duplication of functions. The lack of a law governing the work of the Cabinet of Ministers makes it very difficult to delineate carefully the powers of the government and its areas of jurisdiction.

Figure 3
Factors Impeding Foreign Business in Ukraine (Percent of Respondents; Survey Taken January 2000)



Source: the Ukrainian Centre for Economic & Political Studies.

According to one estimate, the government's activity is regulated by some 250 different laws, and the premier's by over 440 laws.²⁰ Many of these laws deal with minor issues that could be delegated to lower administrative levels. To speed enactment of the law on the Cabinet, a joint conciliation commission was created, but to no avail.

The 1990s witnessed the emergence of qualitatively new public problems connected with managing decline, for which the administrative apparatus in Ukraine had little preparation. Unfortunately, Ukraine has fallen into the trap of Charles Levine's "management science paradox": when needed, policy-analysis capabilities are not present, and vice versa.²¹ Hence, when resources are scarce, analytical capacity tends to rank low on the government's priority list. To be fair, the policy-making process is being improved. In 2000 a Cabinet resolution established four government committees to co-ordinate policy formulation and adoption, to settle differences between members of the government, and approve draft governmental acts for consideration.²²

The following government committees have become the working bodies of the Cabinet: Economic Development, Social and Humanitarian Development, Reform of the Fuel and Energy Complex, and Reform of the Agricultural Sector and Environmental Issues. Only members of the Cabinet are members of government committees, which are now headed by vice-prime ministers. Hence, the role of ministers in government policy making has been strengthened, and that of the apparatus weakened. Freed from the fetters of the Cabinet administration, ministers themselves are now responsible for formulating and implementing the programme of the Cabinet. This has greatly enhanced the accountability of the Cabinet and increased its influence over the mechanisms of implementation.

20. See the Analytical Report of the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, "Administrative Reform in Ukraine," *National Security and Defence*, 2000, no. 5: 13–14. According to the Centre's estimates, in 1999 the government passed 3,879 directives and resolutions. This would require adopting on average seventy to eighty documents a week. If each decision took thirty minutes, the government would have had to meet in continuous session in order to approve them all, leaving little time for day-to-day administration. Obviously, many of these decisions were taken with little or no discussion or analysis.

21. Charles H. Levine, "More on Cutback Management: Hard Questions for Hard Times," in *Managing Fiscal Stress*, ed. Charles H. Levine (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1980).

22. Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "On Government Committees," no. 339 (17 February 1999). The need for informed government decision making based on rigorous policy analysis was recognized also in a Cabinet resolution to improve forecasting capabilities. See Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "On Formation of the Government Commission on Issues of Reforming the Infrastructure of Analytical Support of the Activities of the Executive Branch," no. 777 (7 May 2000).

The public-policy process in Ukraine is still not transparent, however. Between 25 January and 5 February 2000, some 2,010 citizens were polled at random in every one of Ukraine's oblasts. Only sixteen percent of them described governmental activity as "transparent," and only seventeen percent called local authorities' actions transparent.²³

The Kravchuk Commission and the Concept of Administrative Reform

From mid-1997 to July 1998, a special presidential commission headed by the former president, People's Deputy Leonid M. Kravchuk, developed a strategy for administrative reform and the transformation of the bureaucracy, titled "The Concept of Administrative Reform in Ukraine."²⁴ "The Concept" defined the general strategy for reforming the system of governance and specified the legislative basis for reform. It was approved by Parliament on 25 March 1998 and promulgated by presidential decree on 22 July 1998.²⁵ From July to December 1998, by presidential decree, the first steps were taken towards the formation of a more rational structure of government, streamlining the work of the government apparatus, and deregulating business.²⁶ But by the end of 1998 administrative reform suffered a distinct loss of momentum. Most of the steps envisaged by "The Concept" and backed up by Kuchma's decree were not implemented. This was not for want of trying, however.

On the basis of "The Concept," in March 1999 President Kuchma reorganized the bodies of the executive branch.²⁷ Several ministries, such as Family and Youth, Information, and Sports, were reduced in status to state committees. A number of departments and committees were renamed, and several were combined. But the president's decree failed to define the separate status of ministries and state committees. Nor did it adhere to certain prudent and useful provisions of "The Concept," such as reducing duplication or clarifying jurisdictional boundaries. Subsequently, in direct contradiction to "The Concept," some seven additional amendments to the March 1999 decree were made, increasing the number of executive-branch agencies (including three state departments pertaining to the

23. Bychenko, "Administrative Reform in Ukraine," 53.

24. Decree of the President of Ukraine "On the State Commission for Administrative Reform in Ukraine," no. 620 (7 July 1997).

25. Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Measures for Implementing the Concept of Administrative Reform in Ukraine," no. 810 (22 July 1998).

26. Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Priority Measures for Conducting Administrative Reform," no. 1284 (20 November 1998).

27. Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Changes in the System of the Central Bodies of the Executive Branch in Ukraine," no. 250 (13 March 1999).

energy complex alone), so that, unfortunately, the executive branch did not see any significant structural simplification until the end of 1999.

On 15 December 1999 Kuchma enacted three key decrees aimed at implementing administrative reform.²⁸ The decrees clarified the roles and improved the functioning of the members of the Cabinet of Ministers, both as heads of their respective ministries and as members of the government. One decree limited the “government” to the prime minister, vice-prime ministers, and ministers. Previously, the government had included also the heads of state committees, resulting in a total exceeding forty persons. Further, the ministries of Defense, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Information were transferred from the president’s jurisdiction back to the Cabinet’s. However, a fourth decree issued two months later subordinated the Main Directorate of State Service directly to the president. This increased the role of the president in the selection and appointment of civil servants.²⁹

Attempts at Business Deregulation

A positive development in early to mid-1999 was the introduction of several presidential decrees aimed at deregulating and simplifying business registration and licensing procedures. This shortened the registration period from thirty to fourteen days and the average licensing period from thirty-five to fourteen days.³⁰ Several decrees during this period also reduced the tax burden on enterprises and simplified the accounting and reporting requirements for small business.³¹ Other decrees attempted to regularize and reduce the number of on-site inspections by central state bodies.³²

28. See decrees of the President of Ukraine “On the System of Bodies of the Executive Branch,” no. 1572 (15 December 1999), “On Changes in the Structure of the Central Bodies of the Executive Branch,” no. 1573 (15 December 1999), and “On the Composition of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine,” no. 1574 (15 December 1999).

29. Decree of the President of Ukraine “On Raising the Effectiveness of the Civil Service System,” no. 2081 (11 February 2000).

30. Decree of the President of Ukraine “On Introduction of a Licensing System in the Sphere of Business Activity,” no. 539 (25 May 1999).

31. Some fourteen types of taxes and duties (including the value-added tax and individual income tax) were replaced by a single tax, with the result that thirty-seven thousand businessmen switched to the simplified tax system within the first year when it was available. See Decrees of the President of Ukraine “On the Simplified System of Taxation, Accounting and Reporting for Small Businesses,” no. 727 (3 July 1998), “On Introduction of Amendments to the Decree of the President of Ukraine no. 727,” no. 746 (28 June 1999), and “On the Systematization of the Market Duty Payment Mechanism,” no. 761 (28 June 1999).

32. Decrees of the President of Ukraine “On State Support of Small Business Activity,” no. 456 (12 May 1998), “On Certain Measures Regarding Deregulation of Business Activities,” no. 817 (23 July 1998), and “On Implementing a Uniform

Inconsistent Administrative Reforms

In early 2000 President Kuchma charged the Cabinet and heads of both central and local executive-branch bodies with identifying and eliminating areas of overlap and duplication in their functions.³³ A further decree approved a strategy for reforming the system of public service in Ukraine.³⁴ This decree substantially supplemented the main recommendations of the 1998 "Concept." To add some "teeth" to these efforts, Kuchma also demanded cuts of forty percent in budget expenditures and of thirty percent in personnel in the central state executive bodies. But the proposed staff reductions were not based on any studies of the necessary staff levels for specific functions.

Lack of consistency in reform efforts continues to be a problem; for instance, the main provisions of the December 1999 decree that prohibited the creation of a branch structure for the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers were not fully implemented. The Department of Expertise and Analysis of the Agro-industrial Complex was set up in the Secretariat. Contrary to adopted policy, this led to the duplication of functions in the Cabinet apparatus and the ministries. Further, the establishment of new departments having legal status of their own within existing ministries has greatly complicated the system of governance and led to much new overlap, duplication, and an unhealthy degree of internal competition. For instance, the reorganization of the Ministry of the Economy in early 2000 resulted in a convoluted structure encompassing the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the State Investment Committee, the National Agency for Development and Foreign Investment, and several state committees (Energy Conservation; Building, Architecture, and Housing; Industrial Policy; and Standardization and Certification). Also, in April 2000 the head of the State Tax Administration was given the status of minister (*ex officio*). President Kuchma commented on these developments that "this kind of logic for the implementation of administrative reform is completely incomprehensible."³⁵

Regulatory Policy in the Sphere of Business Activity," no. 89 (22 January 2000); and Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "On the Procedure for Co-ordinating Scheduled On-site Inspections of Financial-Economic Activity of Subjects of Entrepreneurial Activity by Control Bodies," no. 112 (29 January 1999).

33. Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Improving the Activity of State Bodies, the Work of Public Servants, and Raising the Efficiency of the Use of State Funds," no. 207 (11 February 2000).


34. Decree of the President of Ukraine "On the Strategy of Reforming the System of Public Service in Ukraine," no. 599 (14 April 2000).

35. Quoted in UNIAN, *News from Ukraine*, 19 April 2000.

Administrative Reform as an Antidote for Corruption

Corruption may be defined as the exploitation of public power in the service of private gain. Corrupt practices can also be the means to gain and hold political power. Both variants are apparent in Ukraine. The line between corruption and official abuse can be very blurred. In 1998 over 2,600 bribery cases were opened; some 768 criminal cases were referred to the courts, including 200 involving bribes to high-ranking government officials.³⁶ In a 2000 survey conducted by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, some 47.5 percent of respondents reported having had to pay a bribe in order to process rather routine matters.³⁷ Ukrainian business owners report spending up to 6.5 percent of their average annual incomes on bribes, and the World Bank estimated that the yearly amount of bribes in Ukraine is equal to two months' worth of its trade turnover. (See figure 4 for trend data on reported bribery cases.)

Figure 4
Number of Registered Bribery Cases, 1990-1999



Source: The Ukrainian Centre for Economic & Political Studies.

What is regarded as corruption in Ukraine also encompasses so-called "economic crimes." These involve the unlawful (and sometimes semi-legal) appropriation of former state property, often by enterprise directors and others in their circle. In 1999 close to 400 executive-brach officials at various levels (including deputy ministers and heads of oblast state administrations) were charged with corruption and economic crimes. In 2000 18,300 economic crimes

36. State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, *Ukraine's Statistical Yearbook for 1999* (Kyiv: Tekhnika, 1999), 482.

37. Bychenko, "Administrative Reform in Ukraine," 54.

were reported, a figure thirty-three percent higher than in 1999. Corruption in Ukraine has taken on a political dimension and has substantially sullied Ukraine's international reputation. In 1999 the World Economic Forum ranked Ukraine among fifty-nine countries with the highest level of political corruption.

While it is not a panacea, administrative reform can help reduce official corruption and economic criminality considerably. The fight against corruption involves reducing (through deregulation, simplification of business licensing procedures, restricted inspections, etc.) the opportunities of officials to exact bribes; introducing greater transparency in official decision making (for instance, in privatization tenders); imposing stiffer criminal penalties for corruption; raising the base compensation of civil servants; and enacting a formal administrative law code embodying a code of ethical conduct.

Reform of Regional Government

A critical element in improving the administrative system is the reform of local self-government and the division of administrative powers and state finances on a territorial basis. Ukraine needs a qualitatively better regional distribution of powers and budget resources, harmonization of development among the regions, and a certain minimal living standard in the various regions. Transfer of functions to the regions must be accompanied by an appropriate reallocation of budget resources, as well as the development of policies to promote regional economic development. The status of local government remained unsettled after the adoption of the Constitution of Ukraine in June 1996, which ought to have resolved the basic issues.

Early Legislation for Local Self-Governance

The legislative basis for local government in Ukraine was established in February 1992, soon after the referendum on independence, with enactment of the Law on Local Self-Government, which amended the 1991 law of the Ukrainian SSR. The 1992 act granted substantial independence and powers to local governments.³⁸ Indeed, article 12 stipulated that "higher-level bodies [of government] may not interfere in the development, approval, and execution of local budgets."³⁹ The act also separated local budgets from those of higher levels. In practice, however, Ukraine's regions have little fiscal independence.

38. Law of Ukraine "On Local Councils of Peoples' Deputies and Local and Regional Self-Government," 7 February 1992. The legislative basis for local self-government in Ukraine can be traced to the former Soviet period. For a fuller enumeration of the legislative basis for local government in Ukraine, see Iurii Sainko, Anatolii Tkachuk, and Iurii Privalov, *Mistseve samovriaduvannia v Ukrainsi: Problemy i prohnozy* (Kyiv: Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 1997).

39. In the act, "local" is understood also to mean regional.

The 1992 law directly contradicted the centralizing approach embodied in much existing legislation. The 1991 Law on the Budget System, for instance, authorized higher-level governments to determine annually the types and levels of responsibilities they would assign to subordinate governments.⁴⁰ This provision of the law was used fairly aggressively by Parliament in a manner that compromised almost completely the fiscal autonomy of Ukraine's regions. The Law on the Budget System was amended twice, and, with the enactment of a new Budget Code in 2001, there is now a clearer definition of the local tax and expenditure assignments.⁴¹ However, subnational governments still find themselves in a fiscal "vise grip" owing to a significant narrowing of the local tax base by the central government and a substantial devolution of expenditure responsibilities.⁴² As a practical matter, fiscal decentralization has not proven to be an entirely workable concept in Ukraine.

Kravchuk's Network of President's Representatives

There have been frequent changes to the legislative regime governing local government in Ukraine. In the month following the enactment of the 1992 law, President Kravchuk issued a decree establishing the system of "president's representatives," who were appointed as titular heads of oblast administrations and acted in the name of the president.⁴³ In April 1992 Kravchuk issued another decree, pursuant to the first, formalizing the role of the president's representatives' as heads of the oblast state administrations.⁴⁴ Kravchuk also terminated the activities of previous state administrations, thereby usurping even those powers previously exercised by the oblast councils, which by then were legally in the hands of the president's representatives. Later that same year, another presidential edict subordinated all local state administrations jointly to the president and the Cabinet of Ministers on all matters falling within their respective jurisdictions.⁴⁵ Parliament shared some of the blame for this by enacting in 1992 a law on presidential

40. The Ukrainian SSR Law "On the Budget System," 5 December 1990. VR-513-12.

41. Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Law of the Ukrainian SSR 'On the Budget System of Ukraine,'" 19 April 1995.

42. The current tax and revenue assignments are quite restrictive. See the Law of Ukraine "On the Introduction of Amendments to the Law of Ukraine 'On the System of Taxation,'" 18 February 1997. VR-77-97. See *Golos Ukrayiny* 25 March 1997, 6–7. FBIS-97-070.

43. Decree of the President of Ukraine "On the Representatives of the President of Ukraine," 20 March 1992. The text was published in *Holos Ukrayiny*, 20 March 1992.

44. Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Regulations Concerning Local State Administration," 14 April 1992.

45. Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Subordination of Local State Administrations," 27 October 1992.

representatives, which effectively formalized presidential control of local government.⁴⁶

Throughout 1993 economic and political regionalism was on the rise. Politicians in eastern Ukraine and Crimea were especially adamant that regions should not be impeded by Kyiv in re-establishing economic links with regions in other former Soviet republics. The president's representatives were widely viewed as an obstacle to the fulfillment of regional economic aspirations. Following the Donbas coal miners' strike in June 1993 and that summer's agitation for a national referendum of confidence in the president and Parliament, Kravchuk issued a decree granting greater autonomy to the administrations of certain eastern oblasts for a two-year period ending 31 December 1995.⁴⁷ The specific privileges granted to these oblasts included the right to manage and dispose of state property. This decree was widely interpreted as a means of countering separatist tendencies in the eastern oblasts.

Kravchuk's Impending Exit

As the 1994 elections approached, Kravchuk's grip on power waned. Popular discontent with the system of the president's representatives was universal.⁴⁸ Parliament took advantage of Kravchuk's weakness to pass the Law on the Formation of Local Government Bodies, which established an entirely new structure of local government.⁴⁹ The act undermined direct presidential control by eliminating the office of the president's representatives, effective 26 June 1994, the date on which new elections to local offices were to be held.⁵⁰ Far from bolstering regional autonomy, however, this act introduced a new system of subordinating representative bodies, in which oblast and raion councils were converted into adjuncts of Parliament. This set the stage for conflict between higher-level councils and their now-subordinate local councils, as well as

46. Law of Ukraine "On the Representatives of the President of Ukraine," 5 March 1992.

47. The decree was enacted on 29 November 1993; the eastern oblasts affected were Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia. See *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 19 December 1993; and *IntelNews*, 28 February 1994.

48. So frustrated with direct presidential rule were officials in the Crimean city of Sevastopol that, on 4 November 1993, the City Council asked the Ukrainian president and Parliament to recall the president's representative from the city. The council expressed its desire to manage and control local executive powers without interference from above. The council's letter to President Kravchuk indicated that, if it failed to receive a response from Kyiv, it would take preliminary steps towards regaining control of the municipal administration within a month. See *IntelNews*, 5 November 1993.

49. Law of Ukraine "On the Formation of Local Power and Self-Governing Bodies," 3 February 1994, VR-3917-12.

50. Will Ritter, "Elections to Local Radas Set for June 26," *IntelNews*, 6 February 1994.

between councils and state administrations at all levels. Matters had become worse.

To strengthen his support in the regions, in 1994 Kravchuk undertook two measures that were interpreted as preludes to a comprehensive restructuring of the state. In February he extended by decree the property and entrepreneurial powers of the four oblasts of eastern Ukraine that had been granted greater autonomy in November 1993.⁵¹ In March Kravchuk ordered the wholesale transfer of ownership of all state assets in housing and communal services, personal services, trade, public restaurants, urban roads, education, culture, fitness and sports, and health care and other social-welfare functions to the various oblast capital administrations by 1 July 1994.⁵² Oblasts were directed to do the same for their subordinate local governments by 1 September 1994, except in Crimea. Lists of the specific objects that were to be transferred were developed by the Cabinet of Ministers. This move was intended to improve the economic strength of subnational governments. Presidential Adviser Vasyl Rudenko described these actions as “serious steps towards decentralization and power-sharing between ministries and oblast administrations.”⁵³ The oblasts anticipated receiving real power. But this was not to be.

Kuchma Establishes Presidential Dominance

Kravchuk’s efforts to placate the regions were unsuccessful. In July 1994 former prime minister Leonid D. Kuchma, running on a platform of greater regional autonomy, closer economic ties with Russia, and a looser official-language policy, defeated Kravchuk’s bid for re-election. Both the new president and Parliament made control over local government an issue of ongoing contention, however. In the wake of the presidential election, in July the recently elected Parliament approved a new Law on Local Councils in its first reading. The act, which never became law, was an obvious attempt by the socialist plurality in Parliament to re-establish the former Soviet system of “rule by people’s soviets.” Kuchma responded in August, subordinating to the president all heads of oblast councils.⁵⁴ Acting during a parliamentary recess, the

51. Decree of the President of Ukraine “On Additional Measures for Delegating More Powers for the Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Luhansk Oblast Administrations in Managing All-State Property,” 21 February 1994. See also “Decentralization on the Way,” *IntelNews*, 28 February 1994.

52. Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the Strengthening of the Economic Basis of the Municipal Self-Government in Ukraine,” 12 March 1994. See the text in *Uriadovyi kurier*, 15 March 1994.

53. Victor Zubaniuk, “Kravchuk Signs Decentralization Decree,” *IntelNews*, 17 March 1994.

54. Decree of the President of Ukraine “On Ways to Ensure Appropriate Management of Local Structures of State Executive Authorities,” 9 August 1994. See also “Ukraine’s

president asserted his direct control over both the Cabinet of Ministers and all independently elected regional authorities.

To demonstrate openness on matters of regional concern and facilitate closer co-operation between his administration and regional leaders, on 20 September 1994 Kuchma established the Council of Regions composed of the heads of oblast councils.⁵⁵ This body was to serve the president in an advisory capacity on matters of regional concern.⁵⁶ But Kuchma soon became frustrated with the ability of the independently elected oblast council chairmen to stifle his efforts at economic reform, especially privatization. In December this moved the president to introduce a draft Law on State Power containing provisions that would clearly establish what he termed "the vertical structure of legitimate executive power."⁵⁷ Kuchma's draft would abolish the hierarchy of legislative authority, putting an end to conciliar power in Ukraine.⁵⁸ Kuchma's draft countered a parliamentary draft already in circulation that would remove executive structures from power altogether, emasculating the president in favour of consolidated "people's rule" at all levels, including at all enterprises.⁵⁹ The president and Parliament thus appeared headed for collision.

Impact of the Law on State Power

The "collision" resulted in the dramatic enactment of the Law on State Power on 8 June 1995. To consolidate his new powers, Kuchma quickly moved to appoint all chairmen of local councils to heads of their respective state administrations, effectively unifying regional legislative and executive powers under the president's overall direction. Kuchma issued two decrees in August, both subordinating local (city, raion, and town) councils to the president and asserting his right to dismiss council chairmen from their executive positions and

Leader Issues Decrees to Expand Hold on Parliament," *The New York Times* (Late New York Edition), 11 August 1994.

55. See *Holos Ukrayiny*, 23 September 1994.

56. Some saw the Council of Regions as a basis for the formation of an upper house in a new bicameral parliament. In fact, in the Draft Constitution of Ukraine that he submitted to Parliament on 17 November 1995, Kuchma did place the regional leaders at the core of the proposed "Senate."

57. For a chronicle of the evolution of the 1995 Law on State Power, see Viktor Tkachuk, "President Pushes for Real Power," *UPressA Weekly*, 6–12 November 1995.

58. Draft Law of Ukraine "On the State Powers and Local Self-Government," introduced 2 December 1994. See the text in *Uriadovyi kurier*, 6 December 1994.

59. Draft Law of Ukraine "On Local Councils of People's Deputies," 10 November 1994. See the text translated from *Kiev MOST*, 10 November 1994, in FBIS-USR-94-131, 5 December 1994, 34. According to the draft, enterprises were to be under the control of and accountable to the councils in the territory where they were located.

to call new elections if necessary.⁶⁰ But Parliament vetoed Kuchma's decrees in November on the basis that they contradicted existing law. Kuchma responded with a new decree that challenged Parliament's right to veto presidential edicts. His justification was that, in the absence of a constitutional court, the president alone was the "guarantor of the constitution."⁶¹ Again, things came to a standstill.⁶² In a further effort to strengthen the "vertical structure of power," on 4 January 1996, Kuchma declared that the executive powers of village, town, and city council chairmen were also subordinated to him.⁶³ Previously, these executive councils and their chairmen possessed no executive authority. Council chairmen at all levels were now accountable to the president.

Local Governance under the 1996 Constitution

In November 1995 Kuchma transmitted to Parliament a draft Constitution of Ukraine. The draft envisioned a two-house legislature: one-third of the upper house, or Senate, was to be represented by the heads of the regional state administrations (whom the president could dismiss under his decree of 21 August 1995). All but one parliamentary faction opposed Kuchma's proposal, which was rejected in favour of the unicameral legislature inherited from Soviet times.⁶⁴ After much

60. Decree of the President of Ukraine "On the Basic Organization and Functioning of State Power and Local Self-Government in Ukraine in the Period until Adoption of a New Constitution of Ukraine," 8 August 1995; and Decree of the President of Ukraine "On the Status of Oblast, Kyiv and Sevastopol, and Raion Government Administrations," 21 August 1995. The purpose of holding new elections in case of dismissal of a council chairman was to preserve the dual role of chairmen as also heads of local administrations.

61. Kuchma has referred to the president as the "guarantor of the constitution" on a number of occasions. For instance, see the text of his speech before the Ukrainian Association of Local and Regional Authorities on 19 June 1997 in *Uriadovyi kurier*, 21 June 1997, translated in FBIS-SOV-97-147-S. See also Kuchma's message to Parliament concerning his veto of the enacted Law on Local State Administrations, in *Uriadovyi kurier*, 14 August 1997, translated in FBIS-SOV-97-266.

62. Despite the conflict of laws, it seems that Parliament was more concerned that Kuchma's innovation might set a precedent for a new two-house parliament, with the upper chamber called the "Council of Regions" to be comprised of the elected chairmen of regional councils, but accountable to the president.

63. Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Delegating State Executive Authority Powers to Chairmen and Executive Committees of Village, Town, and City Councils Headed by Them" 4 January 1996. See "Kuchma Issues Decree Delegating State Executive Authority," INTERFAX Information Services, Moscow, 4 January 1996, translated in FBIS-SOV-96-004.

64. According to former President Leonid Kravchuk, Kuchma's bicameral legislature failed for two reasons. First, leftist forces feared that a pro-executive upper chamber would dilute their power. The Council of Regions was functioning at the time as an "embryo senate," with a pro-reform membership. Second, representatives from eastern

negotiation, the new constitution ultimately rejected the concept of federalism as an internal structure for Ukraine in favour of a unitary state.⁶⁵ Adopted on 28 June 1996, the constitution contained no provision for regional powers or prerogatives. There was no decentralization approach embodied in the letter of the law. Regional councils were granted relatively limited powers. Heads of state administrations no longer served in the second role of chairmen of the corresponding councils as they did under the Law on State Power. Actions of lower-level councils were still subject to reversal, if they contradicted the constitution or existing laws. But they could no longer be nullified or overturned by higher-level councils.

Clearly, the outcome of constitution-making has worked against the interests of the regions. As Birch and Zinko have observed, “the fact that Ukraine’s constitution-making process dragged on as long as it did probably benefited Ukrainian centralists.”⁶⁶ There can be no doubt about this. Kuchma continued to press for an all-embracing Law on Local Self-Government in order to clarify regional prerogatives and provide subnational bodies with well-secured revenue sources.⁶⁷ Passed in its second reading on 21 May 1997, the law, with its far-reaching amendments to the existing law, was endorsed by Kuchma despite some lingering objections to the lack of clarity in the assignment of expenditures and revenues to local government.⁶⁸ The new law established the legal status and competencies of local and oblast governments on a firmer basis than the 1992 law and guaranteed the exercise of self-government in accordance with the 1996 constitution.

Ukraine eventually withdrew support for an upper house, fearing that equal representation of all oblasts in the proposed Senate would shift dominance of national policy-making away from the east. In the end, the only faction that supported a two-chamber Rada was Statehood, a centre-right faction from western Ukraine. Kravchuk made his remarks to Dr. Taras Kuzio at the conference “Soviet to Independent Ukraine: A Troubled Transformation,” University of Birmingham, 13–15 June 1996.

65. An official English translation of the June 1996 Constitution of Ukraine was published in *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 52, nos. 2–3 (Summer–Fall 1996): 223–89. The text is also available in an official English translation at: <www.Rada.Kiev.UA/const/conengl.htm>, and in Ukrainian (CP1251 Cyrillic coding) at <www.Rada.Kiev.UA/const/const1.htm>. A broad overview of the highlights of the new basic law of Ukraine is provided in *The Ukrainian Economic Monitor* 3, nos. 8–9 (August–September 1996): 30.

66. See Sarah Birch and Ihor Zinko, “Ukraine: The Dilemma of Regionalism,” *Transition*, 1 November 1996, 24.

67. See Kuchma’s remarks before a meeting in Kyiv of the Association of Cities of Ukraine, “President Kuchma on Local Self-Government Law,” Kyiv UT-1 Television Network, 1900 GMT, 25 January 1997, translated in FBIS-SOV-97-017.

68. Law of Ukraine “On Local Self-Governments in Ukraine,” 28 May 1997, VR-280-97.

The 1997 law guaranteed budgetary independence and spending discretion, giving local governments a greater degree of fiscal flexibility, including the right to issue debt (Articles 16, 61, and 70). However, the law also contained an extensive list of “general and specific competencies (functions)” of local governments (Title II, Articles 25–41). But the principle of subordination of lower-level governments was maintained (Article 4). Central legislative clearance was provided for, insofar as the Ministry of Justice’s registration of local governments’ statutory acts could be refused on the basis of non-conformance with the constitution and laws of Ukraine (Article 19). Budgetary authority was shared with the central government, which would review local budgets to ensure that services are provided at least at the “minimum state social-standards level” (Article 61) on the basis of per capita “budgetary norms” (Article 62). Importantly, the central government guaranteed that all subnational governments would be provided with the funds necessary to achieve minimum spending levels (Article 62). Unfunded mandates were explicitly prohibited (Article 67), and local governments were given unrestricted use of their own off-budget funds (Article 68). Thus, budget-wise, the situation remained very much of a mixed bag.

Revenue assignment remained unclear under both the constitution and the 1997 law. Intergovernmental revenues were shared on a combined retention/subvention basis, just as in Soviet times. Many poor oblasts remained highly dependent on the central government for necessary revenues.⁶⁹ Budgetary decisions made in Kyiv had considerable effects on the oblasts and localities. In their turn, oblast governments continued to make decisions concerning the intra-oblast allocation of funds emanating from the centre (1997 law, Article 63), as well as the division of functional expenditure responsibilities among their subordinate governments. Consequently, oblast and local governments remained largely captive to budgetary politics at higher levels. Under current law, however, local governments have much greater flexibility to develop “own-source” revenues, levy and collect taxes, and control expenditures. These measures may have been too little, too late for many oblasts: by 1996 the combined effects of the devolution of functions from above and an eroding revenue base had reached rather dramatic proportions. During the six-year struggle to define the status of Ukraine’s oblasts, many of them became ever more fiscally dependent on the centre.

The Basic Structure of Subnational Finances

The consolidated budget structure of Ukraine incorporates the central government and all oblast and municipal (city, town, village, and raion) budgets.

69. See Robert S. Kravchuk, “The Quest for Balance: Regionalism and Subnational Fiscal Policy in Ukraine,” in *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, ed. Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D’Anieri (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).

As late as 1996, the assignment of expenditure responsibilities at various levels of government in Ukraine remained closely similar to that in the former Soviet Union. Under the 1996 constitution, Ukraine is a unitary state in which the central government dominates the intergovernmental fiscal system. Generally, the intergovernmental fiscal principle of subsidiary is followed. Analysts have observed that “the current assignment [of functions] respects to a large extent the basic principle of assigning expenditure responsibilities according to the benefit area for the public service.”⁷⁰ As we shall see below, however, this has been a shifting variable. Central government ministries tend to specialize in activities of national economic significance, defence, law and order, foreign relations, major public works, and unemployment and pension outlays. Subnational governments focus mainly on the social and cultural spheres (that is, health, education, sports, and recreation).


During the years 1993–96, in response to fiscal retrenchment at the centre, subnational governments increasingly assumed responsibility for “the social protection of the population” and other social-safety-net programmes in addition to providing the traditional mix of housing and communal services. Municipal governments also undertook many functions previously performed by enterprises. In preparation for privatization, many enterprises divested themselves of costs for activities that were unrelated to their core industrial functions.

In the 1990s the devolution of functions from above and below acted as a “vise” upon the increasingly meagre fiscal capacities of Ukraine’s subnational governments. To compound problems, the allocation of budgetary resources to oblast and municipal governments has fluctuated wildly throughout the decade. This complicated fiscal planning at the subnational level and, at times, threatened the solvency of oblast and municipal governments. Figure 5 depicts the changing share of local budgets in the consolidated state budget from 1992 to 2000.

Oblasts have tended to fund services whose impacts are primarily felt at the regional level. For instance, they are the primary providers of health, education, and housing and communal services. Oblast expenditures for social-safety-net programmes increased sharply (to sixty-five percent) in 1994, but this was owing mainly to increases in price subsidies rather than to direct transfers to individuals and organizations. Subnational governments thus accounted for a large share of price subsidies, but the apportionment between oblast and municipal governments varied broadly.

70. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Charles E. McClure, Jr., and Sally Wallace, “Subnational Fiscal Decentralization in Ukraine,” in *Decentralization of the Socialist State: Intergovernmental Finance in Transition Economies*, ed. Richard E. Bird, Robert D. Ebel and Christine I. Wallich (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1995), 290.

Figure 5
Local and Oblast Budget Shares, 1992-2000



Source: Fiscal Analysis Office of the Verkhovna Rada.

Individual oblasts have had wide discretion in reassigning expenditures among oblast, municipal, and raion (district) governments. There is no national standard, and this has resulted in a highly checkered pattern of subnational expenditure assignments across Ukraine. In 1995–96 oblast and lower-level governments accounted for over one-third of all spending on public administration, which was expected to rise with the devolution of functions from the centre. The share of subnational expenditures in other functional areas has been relatively low. As to their unique functions, despite improvements in the rate of privatization, oblasts and municipalities have owned and managed hotels and tourist camps, restaurants, and shops and provided other services that are typically owned and operated privately in market-based economies.

Municipal governments primarily serve the local population, providing public transit, primary education, basic health and medical care, communal services, and sanitation. In addition, devolution of new functions from above has been quite extensive since 1993. Starting with the 1994 budget, oblast and municipal governments became responsible for certain expenditures that were previously the functional responsibility of the central government, including those for the “social protection of the population” (child allowances, bread allowances, and housing), “the social safety net” (retirement homes, aid to families with blind and disabled children, additional allowances for families with children), and items as disparate as school lunches and housing construction.

Problems with Expenditure Assignments

There have been several shortcomings in Ukraine’s assignment of expenditure responsibilities. First, a fragmentation of functions produced inefficiency and unevenness across oblasts, militating against effective administration. Second, the central government shifted expenditure responsibilities to subnational governments on a fairly ad hoc basis, with little long-term planning. This resulted in a third problem; namely, that social-safety-net programmes, a national responsibility in most market-based economies, have been funded since 1994 on a highly decentralized basis. Fourth, as a consequence of the above conditions, the system has not served expenditure equalization objectives. Fifth, the continuing devolution of expenditure functions from both above and below (from enterprises to their respective oblasts or localities) has worked against effective budgetary planning in the oblasts. Finally, the legislative basis for oblast and local fiscal management has been unstable, internally contradictory, and subject to selective implementation.

In general, throughout much of the 1990s, expenditure needs and responsibilities at the municipal and oblast levels increasingly exceeded the available resources. One indication of the desperate subnational fiscal situation was that, despite shifting expenditure functions to lower-level governments, the subnational share of public expenditure shrank in real terms, owing to both the 1993–96

inflation and falling tax receipts. Consequently, due to the dwindling real value of budget resources transferred from higher-level governments, cities and towns have been under considerable pressure to maintain service levels.

Revenue Assignment among Levels of Government

In the 1990s, due to the sharp deterioration in their fiscal circumstances, fiscal independence from Kyiv became a critical objective for oblast and local governments. The need to develop own-source revenues was argued vociferously by President Kuchma's former regional policy adviser, Vladimir Grinev, who has viewed "serious and profound financial-budget reform in general and taxation reform in particular," as "certain preconditions" for regional political and economic development.⁷¹ There have been several noteworthy problems with the basic framework and operation of the system as it evolved:

- unclear distinctions between national ("regulating") and subnational ("fixed") revenue sources;
- continually shifting tax-sharing rates complicating oblast and municipal fiscal planning;
- fluctuating budgetary transfers to subordinate levels; and
- deteriorating oblast revenue structures throughout the years 1992–2000.


Budgetary relations between the central government and oblast or local governments have involved a somewhat complex system of tax-sharing and revenue-retention mechanisms supplemented by transfers from higher-level governments. Intergovernmental fiscal relations in Ukraine have retained many vestiges of the former Soviet budgetary system, especially the distinction between "fixed" revenues and state "regulating" revenues.

Fixed or own-source revenues include taxes, charges, and fees that have been assigned by law to subnational governments. Regulating revenues are central government taxes that are shared with oblasts on a derivation basis: the varying rates of retention have been set according to the total anticipated tax in each oblast. Subnational governments have also received budgetary transfers from the central government. Local governments, in turn, have also been able to receive transfers from the oblast administration. These transfers varied considerably from year to year.

In an effort to rationalize the system and increase budgetary control over subnational expenditure, the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine (Chapter 2, Article 143) effectively reconfigured intergovernmental budget relations, as depicted in figure 6. In principle, a system of more formalized subventions replaced the

71. See the interview with Grinev in *Kyivska pravda*, translated as "Kuchma Aide Outlines Regional Policy Concept," FBIS-SOV-95-176, 7 September 1995, 1–2.

Figure 6
Simplified Budget Relations Under the Constitution of 1996
(Constitution of Ukraine, Chapter 2, Article 143)

**Key:**

- Direct Payments and Transfers
 - - - - Transfers to Superordinate Levels of Government in Support of Ongoing Programs (Exactions)

Note: Excludes “own-source” revenues of regional and local budgets.

Source: Adapted from Indiana University Ukrainian Parliamentary Development Project, Parliamentary Budget Development (Kyiv: Parliamentary Development Project, 1997)..

complex web of tax-sharing relations, with all state budget revenues transferred to the centre for redistribution among the regions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported in late 1997, however, that “the national government [still] has no effective control over local spending to ensure that budgetary spending requirements are being carried out,” because “local authorities are able to secure funds from the [local tax] offices before they are passed on to the national

administration.”⁷² This has precluded withholding resources from local authorities who do not spend in accordance with budget priorities and has fostered the buildup of arrears. According to the Budget Code of Ukraine, in the future, the State Treasury will have responsibility for tax receipts and disbursements of all levels of government. The new scheme depicted in figure 6 therefore awaits the full implementation of the State Treasury system.

Budgetary planning at the subnational level has been rendered all but impossible by the rather dramatic shifts in retention rates from year to year, especially for the value-added tax (VAT).⁷³ The VAT and enterprise income tax, which together accounted for between forty and sixty percent of total oblast revenues during this period, were subject to the widest variation in retention rates. This obviously injected great uncertainty and stress into the annual budget process at all levels of government and wreaked havoc on the efforts of oblast and municipal budget officials to pursue a consistent fiscal policy.

In addition to regulating revenues, the central government has provided budgetary transfers, or “subventions,” to the regions. In principle, such transfers are intended to promote revenue-equalization objectives. The evidence suggests that, in fact, subventions have been increasingly used for this purpose, becoming more selective (that is, targeted) over time. The level and pattern of subventions or exactions changed annually, however, reflecting the level of regulating revenues to be retained by the oblasts in each fiscal year. These differences have been of such magnitude that the potential beneficial effects of a derivation-based revenue system have been limited, necessitating supplementary transfers from the centre to the regions. In general, as Martinez-Vazquez and others have pointed out, the goal of revenue equalization has been “undermined by the lack of objective rules or principles for determining sharing rates and subventions.”⁷⁴ Absence of such rules has had the effect of placing oblast budgets at the mercy of political decisions made in Kyiv.

Increasing Oblast Dependence on Kyiv


The revenue structure of oblasts has fluctuated widely, but the general pattern has clearly been one of increasing oblast budgetary dependence upon the central government. Figure 7 indicates the degree of oblast dependency on state

72. International Monetary Fund, *Ukraine—Recent Economic Developments*, IMF Staff Country Reports (Washington, D.C.), no. 97/109 (17 November 1997), 42.

73. Other significant factors contributing to the oblasts’ fiscal planning difficulties have been the wild swings in basic tax rates, frequent redefinitions of the tax base, devolution of expenditure responsibilities from the centre to the subnational level, and Parliament’s consistent failure to pass the state budget until well after the start of the fiscal year.

74. Martinez-Vazquez, McClure, and Wallace, “Subnational Fiscal Decentralization in Ukraine,” 300.

Figure 7



Souce: Fiscal Analysis Office of Verkhovna Rada.

Table 1: Per Capita Local Expenditures, 1997–2001
 (in hryvnias, incl. targeted funds)


Oblast	Nominal Expenditures Per Capita			Budget 2001	Real Expenditures Per Capita			2001	Avg. Annual Change, %
	1997	1998	1999		1997	1998	1999	2000	
Crimea	214.5	257.0	320.2	421.2	310.5	214.5	223.9	234.0	149.3
Vinnysia	222.5	221.5	223.7	265.7	315.1	222.5	184.6	147.6	151.5
Volyn	226.6	242.0	270.0	318.7	348.5	226.6	201.7	188.8	167.5
Dnipropetrovsk	375.2	299.0	275.6	298.5	316.5	375.2	249.2	192.7	165.8
Donetsk	280.0	325.4	281.2	317.6	329.7	280.0	271.2	196.6	176.4
Zhytomyr	284.4	299.2	314.3	298.5	316.5	284.4	249.3	219.8	165.8
Zakarpattia	214.2	231.3	340.2	312.8	343.4	214.2	192.8	237.9	173.8
Zaporizhzhia	249.6	324.3	376.0	352.0	293.4	249.6	270.3	262.9	195.6
Ivano-Frankivsk	220.0	245.3	324.4	306.1	308.3	220.0	204.4	226.9	170.1
Kyiv Oblast	237.0	338.4	505.1	353.9	317.1	237.0	282.0	353.2	196.6
City of Kyiv	410.4	541.0	516.9	844.2	552.8	410.4	450.8	361.5	469.0
Kirovohrad	226.3	234.1	272.3	300.4	330.9	226.3	195.1	190.4	166.9
Luhansk	232.0	231.5	268.5	259.7	293.2	232.0	192.9	187.8	144.3
Lviv	211.7	232.4	291.9	305.5	348.8	211.7	193.7	204.1	169.7
Mykolaiv	280.6	331.4	307.3	299.6	319.0	280.6	276.2	214.9	166.4

Odesa	248.8	256.3	293.9	323.9	285.3	248.8	213.6	205.5	179.9	137.2	-13.83
Poltava	304.5	472.0	440.3	319.4	338.9	304.5	393.3	307.9	177.4	162.9	-14.47
Rivne	220.3	267.7	395.1	287.6	330.0	220.3	223.1	276.3	159.8	158.7	-7.88
Sumy	238.1	262.1	255.5	370.0	335.9	238.1	218.4	178.7	205.6	161.5	-9.25
Temopil	218.5	224.2	243.3	282.7	323.2	218.5	186.8	170.1	157.1	155.4	-8.17
Kharkiv	332.0	389.4	334.7	311.9	323.7	332.0	324.5	234.1	173.3	155.6	-17.26
Kherson	248.5	240.3	245.3	291.6	308.8	248.5	200.3	171.5	162.0	148.5	-12.08
Khmelnystkyi	231.6	260.3	269.0	272.0	304.7	231.6	216.9	188.1	151.1	146.5	-10.82
Cherkasy	273.8	302.9	335.3	301.9	314.3	273.8	252.4	234.5	167.7	151.1	-13.81
Chernivtsi	217.4	223.2	202.4	270.5	286.5	217.4	186.0	141.5	150.2	137.7	-10.78
Chernihiv	242.2	222.0	249.5	318.3	370.2	242.2	185.0	174.5	176.8	177.9	-7.41
Sevastopol	347.0	332.4	256.2	422.0	377.0	347.0	277.0	179.2	234.4	181.3	-14.99
Memorandum: CPI (1997 = 100) [Note 1]											
TOTAL	268.2	299.7	316.9	341.1	332.5	268.2	249.8	221.6	189.5	159.9	-12.13
Standard Deviation	2.8	77.7	78.0	109.5	49.7						

Note: [1] Index calculated on the basis of average inflation for the period, based on geometric average monthly price changes. Year 2001 inflation assumption is from the adopted budget.


Source: Fiscal Analysis Office of the Verkhovna Rada, "2001 Draft Budget Analysis: Local Budgets," *Budget and Fiscal Review*, October 2000 and March 2001.

Figure 8
Compound Annual Change in Oblast Real Per Capita Expenditures, 1997-2001



Source: Data are from computations in Table 1.

Figure 9
Budget Arrears as Percent of Oblast Budgets
(As of January 1, 1999)



Source: Fiscal Analysis Office of Verkhovna Rada.

budget transfers and subsidies in the 2001 budget. This is also reflected in the fluctuating share of consolidated (central plus subnational) government revenues going to subnational governments. As table 1 indicates, fixed revenues have been grossly insufficient to fill the gap left by falling regulating revenues, in that real per-capita expenditures fell an average of 12.1 percent per year from 1997 to 2001. No oblast has been spared a deterioration in real expenditure capacity. In fact, according to figure 8, the burden has fallen disproportionately on the more heavily industrialized oblasts of eastern Ukraine, particularly Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Donetsk.

This situation has placed oblast finances in a double-bind: even as the real value of the oblasts' share of regulating revenues and budgetary transfers has declined, their fiscal dependence on the centre has increased to more than half (measured as the proportion of oblast revenues constituted by regulating revenues plus budgetary transfers). Competition among Ukraine's oblasts for fiscal relief from the centre has become more intense, even as the real value of such relief has fallen. Further, the progressive redefinition of fixed revenues as state regulating revenues in 1994–95 meant that even the higher-income oblasts of eastern Ukraine, which in 1992 were relatively fiscally independent, by 1995 had approached or even exceeded the average budgetary dependence on Kyiv. This would imply that, by the end of this period, poorer oblasts such as Ternopil and Rivne had become utterly dependent upon the centre.

Other Oblast Budgetary Pressures

Oblast and municipal governments in the 1990s suffered from many of the same fiscal problems as the central government, some of them caused by the uncertain flow of resources from Kyiv. For instance, budgetary payments arrears as a percent of oblast budgets averaged 19.4 percent as of January 1, 1999, but was spread very unevenly across Ukraine. Figure 9 depicts the distribution of budget arrears across oblasts. In the case of these expenditure arrears, there does not seem to be any clear inter-oblast pattern from east to west. The magnitude of the payments arrears has, therefore, likely been a function of an oblast's individual circumstances and its own fiscal relations with Kyiv.

Tax arrears also varied considerably across the oblasts. Arrears as a proportion of total tax liability to the oblasts leapt rather dramatically in 1998, after three years of relatively modest increases. Tax offsets were also problematical for the oblasts, fluctuating between twenty-two and thirty-three percent of total tax revenues from 1996 to 1999. These had been merely 5.2 percent of revenues in 1995. Finally, respecting tax arrears, the VAT and enterprise income tax have been the main problems. These problems will be resolved only with the advent of comprehensive national tax reform. Unfortunately for the oblasts, formulation of national tax policy is a matter well outside of their cognizance.

The Movement to “Formula-Based” Fiscal Relations

The 2001 Budget Code of Ukraine opened a new chapter in intergovernmental fiscal relations in Ukraine. The new code superceded the 1996 Law on the Budget System and offered a practical mechanism for implementing the principle of fiscal decentralization. The code is the result of close collaboration among Parliament, the Cabinet, local-government officials, and academic experts. It stipulated for the first time that intergovernmental budget relations shall be based on “budgetary sufficiency standards,” which are in principle intended to equalize budget expenditures in different oblasts. Obviously, equalization of spending on necessary public services in Ukraine’s oblasts is an urgent fiscal-reform objective. The Budget Code also envisages a common approach to revenue allocation, one that provides greater predictability of revenue flows, which has been a key objective of local government officials.

The Budget Code has its origins in Articles 140 and 143 of the Ukrainian constitution and in provisions of the 1997 Law on Local Self-Government. The constitution enjoins raion, municipal, and oblast councils to carry out their service-provision responsibilities through a mixture of own-source funds, transfers from the state budget, and assignment of general taxes to their budgets. It also provides that any delegated powers be fully funded by the state. Further, expenditure norms are to be developed according to a new approach, based on relative oblast needs. Funding at the minimum level is to be guaranteed by the state.

The Budget Code enshrines the fiscal separation of oblast, raion, and municipal budgets, which are to be independent and separately developed. The state budget and oblast budgets are no longer to be connected to the budgets of cities and raions in any formal sense. Local government units are to have considerable discretion over the use of the budgetary resources at their disposal. However, budgetary discipline at all levels is to be strengthened by servicing budgets (that is, cash receipts and disbursements) through the State Treasury.

In addition to revenues specifically devoted to local budgets, personal-income tax proceeds are assigned solely to local budgets to be allocated as follows: one hundred percent in the case of the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol; seventy-five percent to the budgets of cities of oblast or republican subordination (in the case of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea); and twenty-five percent to the budgets of towns, villages, and smaller communities. Inter-budgetary transfers may take the form of equalization grants to assist in carrying out delegated functions; subventions to compensate for revenue losses in fulfilling their own functions (and due to changes in national legislation); targeted subventions for state-mandated social protection programmes and investment projects; direct transfers from the state budget for other purposes; and other grants. The most important of these are formula-based equalization grants. The amounts of grants

and other transfers will be provided directly in the state budget, thus greatly increasing transparency.

Equalization grants are intended to serve the dual purposes of providing sufficient resources for local budgets to fulfill their obligations and of equalizing the revenue capacity of local budgets possessing different-sized “revenue baskets.” Revenue baskets are comprised of the total proceeds raised by a local jurisdiction from the personal-income tax, land tax, stamp duties, licenses, trade patents, fees, and other revenues listed in the code. Seventy-five percent of the revenue basket is to be allocated to the budgets of cities and raions, and twenty-five percent to fund activities of oblast budgets and the budget of the Republic of Crimea. Raions are required to return at least twenty-five percent of the revenue basket collected in each town, village, or other settlement to those jurisdictions.

The equalization grant amounts are to be calculated on a formula basis as the product of the population and a percentage of the difference between a jurisdiction’s per-capita expenditure need, and its per-capita revenue capacity.⁷⁵ In general, the formulas specified for use are long, cumbersome, difficult to comprehend, and include certain extraneous items pertaining not to all but only some oblasts.⁷⁶ Undoubtedly these formulas will be subject to revision and improvement.

Certain benefits are expected from the changes that the Budget Code mandates in intergovernmental fiscal relations:

- increased certainty of revenue streams, with an accompanying improvement in budgetary planning and execution;
- enhanced transparency of state- and regional-budget decision making;
- more per-capita expenditure equity across oblasts;
- greater accountability of local governments; and
- improved incentives for local officials to economize on budget resources and mobilize local revenue capacities.

Conclusion

Deficiencies in administrative capacity have been one of the factors preventing effective economic and political reform in Ukraine. In the 1990s the country began abandoning the tools and instruments of the former Soviet regime. But

75. The set of formulas for calculating transfers is given in the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Procedure for the Calculation of Intergovernmental Transfer Volume,” no. 1932 (29 December 2000).

76. For more detail on the weaknesses of the initial set of formulas, see Fiscal Analysis Office of the Budget Committee of Verkhovna Rada, “Intergovernmental Reform in Ukraine: Promising Start in 2001,” *Budget and Fiscal Review*, June 2001, 1–38.


little else has been developed to fill the void left by the receding socialist state. Over time administrative reform has become even more imperative. Sacrifices made and hardships endured for little or no real improvement in the material quality of life will inevitably take their toll on the populace.

Clearly, there have been deep-rooted anti-market biases in Ukraine, vestiges of the former regime. Many people have viewed market forces and profit motives as unproductive and even predatory. A strong centralizing statist tradition has made it difficult to accept the state's new, more indirect role in economic management. The paradox for Ukrainian policy-makers is that reduced direct government control is called for precisely at a time when their socialistic instincts tell them that more controls are necessary in order to moderate, indeed to "humanize," the market. At the same time they know that reassertion of administrative control would only intensify the pain of transition, especially in the short run. In the long run, the development of Ukraine's capacity to govern is likely to be an intermittent and punctuated process, not a sustained, smooth, and steady improvement. The intensity of administrative development that is required varies directly with the level of capacity needed to achieve particular economic and social objectives. Building capacity takes time and effort and does not follow a smooth, upwards-sloping path. Reversals should be expected.

An appropriate communications strategy is an important ingredient in successful reform. To date, administrative reform has not been promoted actively as a public priority, nor have ordinary citizens had access to much information about reform measures. Of more pressing concern is the deep-rooted public cynicism about the possibilities and prospects of reform in Ukraine. Based on a nationwide poll in January and February 2000 on the public attitude towards administrative reform, the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies reported that most Ukrainians believed that reforms either will not be implemented at all or will be implemented with little positive result. Figure 10 provides the detailed results. Given the reform record to date, the public really cannot be blamed for its pessimism.

What, then, is to be done? It is, perhaps, clearer what ought not to be done. The objective of reform cannot be the consolidation and reorganization of departments and ministries. Procedural reforms are much more urgent. Changing the numbers of cabinet ministries has little effect. Changes to the Law on the Public Service to increase the criminal and administrative responsibility of the civil service would be more useful. A more complete legislative basis for reform would include an administrative-law code, an ethical code of conduct for all public administrators, and a raise in pay levels to decrease temptation to engage in corruption and other abuses. The first priority, of course, is the enactment of the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers in order to delineate clearly the Cabinet's role in governance vis-à-vis the president.

Figure 10
Public Opinion Regarding Administrative Reform in Ukraine
(Percent of Respondents; January 25-February 5, 2000)



Source: The Ukrainian Centre for Economic & Political Studies.

A stronger commitment in the government to reform may facilitate progress considerably. Commitment at the highest levels is essential. Furthermore, the government's commitment to reform must be clear and unambiguous. Greater clarity is needed concerning the new rules of administrative behaviour. Generally, the apparatchiks are skeptical about reform. Unfortunately, public policy is still viewed as the "assertion of particular interests" rather than "promoting the general welfare." Under these conditions, political discourse becomes charged with emotional rhetoric and lacks credibility. Solid, positive results can go a long way in convincing both officials and the public that reform is desirable and possible. The government's commitment, therefore, must be visible and consistently reinforced in order to be credible. In the absence of sufficient domestic impetus, the success of Ukrainian administrative reforms may well depend upon the pressures exerted on the regime by international lending institutions and influential aid donors, such as the United States and Canada.

The Economy of Ukraine after Ten Years: The Connection between Delayed Economic Reforms and External Assistance

King Banaian

Economic reforms in Ukraine have always taken a back seat to the issues of independence and nation building. The political decision to take Ukraine out of the Soviet Union was not born out of a desire to create a market economy. It was simply a desire to reclaim a nation that had been lost for centuries.

Yet no nation endures long without a functioning economy. “Market romanticism,” which claimed that Ukraine’s economy would be flourishing soon, was quickly dashed by the hyperinflation of 1993. While a few specialists still clung to market romanticism well into the mid-1990s, most observers thought Ukraine either would follow a unique model of economic development—infused with large doses of state control—or would need a long and sometimes painful period of adjustment and rebuilding before it could enter into closer ties with Europe.

One would expect that hyperinflation would have convinced most authorities that it was time to reform the economy towards a market orientation. What seems to frustrate most Western observers is that, even after ten years, substantial portions of the reform agenda have not been enacted. Property rights in many parts of the economy are still held by the state; pensions reform has not moved forward; and the macroeconomy began to grow again only in 2000. Stop-go reform efforts have accompanied a rapid turnover of prime ministers and cabinets.

Traditional economic-policy analysis treats such behaviour either as irrational policy-making, technical incompetence, or a rational, opportunist “waiting game.” If reform is costly, there may be an advantage in waiting for good times to take

on the difficult issues when the costs of reform may be lower. While such behaviour may explain the delay of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) in introducing the hryvnia until September 1996, most other reforms seemed to occur only after crises.¹

The purpose of external assistance to Ukraine has been largely to hold living standards constant while the economy underwent stabilization and structural adjustment. Programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) have been in place in Ukraine since 1994, but they too have had a stop-go pattern. The conditions of the loan programmes have been violated repeatedly. Tensions over meeting IMF conditions have led to the downfall of cabinet ministers. Since IMF funding is vital for financing government expenditures, the threat of suspending loan programmes has frequently led to crises within the government.

In this paper I attempt to explain and connect these two aspects of the Ukrainian economy. The reforms in Ukraine have not been completed to date because of continued fighting over delays. In the next section, I review the data on the Ukrainian economy over the last ten years. The slow turnaround in economic decline, I argue, is the result of the lack of needed deeper reforms. This lack is a result of continual battles over the distribution of the burden of reform between competing special interests or "clans." In the third section I review various economic theories that explain how this "war of attrition" is fought. Then I discuss how the IMF and other Western advisers have become a part of the battlefield on which the battle over who pays for reform is fought. Because the IMF uses a model for creating economic programmes that requires some fixed parameters and because during transition periods these parameters change frequently, the IMF continually revisits economic programmes. These renegotiations become the battleground on which struggles over the shares to be paid for reform are fought. And while the battle rages, the economy continues to struggle with uneven growth and for macroeconomic stabilization.

Macroeconomic Performance

As Fischer and Sahay have pointed out, the initial output declines Ukraine experienced are common to all transition economies.² Ukraine's decline has been worse than most: the drop in output from the 1989–91 levels has been over sixty percent. Only Moldova, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan have had as steep a decline

1. For a discussion of these issues and the operation of the currency reforms of 1996, see my book *The Ukrainian Economy since Independence* (Cheltenham, U.K., and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 1999).

2. Stanley Fischer and Sahay Ratna, "The Transition Economies after Ten Years," National Bureau for Economic Research Working Paper, no. 7664 (April 2000).

in output since the beginning of their transition. Meanwhile, Ukraine's hyperinflation in 1993 was greater than that in any of the successor states of the Soviet Union. The data appear in table 1.

The discussions surrounding transition during this early period concerned the sequencing of reforms. Reforms were understood to have three components. Since it was recognized that the removal of price controls would lead to inflation and the dissolution of the old means of acquiring inputs to production would cause large output disruptions, *macroeconomic stabilization* had to be a component of any reform effort. Also, there would need to be *privatization* of the resources of the economy, and this would have to include both the actual creation of property rights to resources and the legal and institutional structure for enforcing and adjudicating such rights. Finally, to bring the economy closer to the market system there would have to be a *liberalization* of the laws that controlled the distribution of goods and services, regulated wages and labour, and governed the use of the financial system.³


At the outset the Ukrainian government of Leonid Kravchuk was unwilling to undertake any substantial reforms. The moves in 1991 to lift the Ukrainian economy out of the Soviet sphere were initiated by the "industrial faction," which had controlled state enterprises in the Soviet economy. Kravchuk was opportunistic in using the severe disruptions of Gorbachev's perestroika to seize the reins of power in Ukraine. Maintaining the state's control of the economy (from Kyiv rather than Moscow) suited the industrial faction well.⁴

At the outset the disruptions of perestroika did not end with independence, however. Soviet fiscal policy consisted in large part of the ability of the state to extract, through a complex set of laws controlling the prices of inputs and outputs, all of the value added by enterprises. Tampering with these complex cross-subsidies began to unravel the controls and harmed Ukraine's fiscal balance. The budget deficit rose to thirteen and a half percent of GDP in 1992. Without access to foreign-credit markets and facing cash shortages of the Soviet ruble, the NBU was instructed to introduce a temporary currency (the karbova-

3. Examples of this debate include Phillippe Aghion and Olivier J. Blanchard, "On the Speed of Transition in Central Europe," in *NBER Macroeconomics Annual*, ed. Stanley Fischer and Julio Rotemberg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994); Olivier Blanchard, et al., *Reform in Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992); Guillermo Calvo and Jacob Frankel, "From Centrally-Planned to Market Economies: The Road from CPE to PCPE," International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 91/17 (Washington, D.C.); and Stanley Fischer and Alan Gelb, "The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5 (December 1991): 91-105.

4. Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 163-4.

nets) and print a sufficient amount to alleviate the shortage. Money growth accelerated rapidly during this period: according to the NBU's data, the stock of money grew by a factor of seventeen during 1992. As economists have always argued, there is a sure connection between inflation and monetary growth.⁵



As I have argued elsewhere, the hyperinflation forced Kravchuk's government to accept the necessity of reform, albeit too late to save it from losing the 1994 elections to Leonid Kuchma.⁶ Kuchma's government was immediately able to obtain loans from the IMF to relieve the need for inflationary financing of budget deficits. However, the decrease in budget deficits came not from reducing the role of the state but from increasing the share of official GDP taken in taxes. This is, no doubt, partly due to the increased size of the underground economy, but it is also symptomatic of the reluctance of even Kuchma's government to remove itself from control of vast areas of the (official) economy.

The IMF's focus on macroeconomic stabilization had several consequences for economic performance in Ukraine, not all of them positive. On the positive

5. See Oleksandr I. Petrik, "A Strategy for Controlling Inflation in Countries with Transition Economies," *Visnyk Natsionalnoho banku Ukrayiny*, 1996, no. 3: 55–61. English translation in *Russian and East European Finance and Trade*, May–June 1998, 20–37.

6. See my *The Ukrainian Economy since Independence*.

side, Ukraine's inflation performance has been relatively good. After the rate of growth in the money supply was slowed dramatically in late 1995, the inflation rate has come down to a level of fifteen to twenty percent per year. While one certainly could hope for something better, this rate compares favourably with that of other Soviet successor states. Driven in no small part by the need to service a much larger debt load than before, in 2000 the government managed to replace budget deficits with surpluses. For the first time output grew by 5.8 percent in 2000, by 9.1 percent in 2001, and by 4.1 percent in 2002. Real wages are finally beginning to grow again, including a rise of more than fifteen percent in 2002 alone.

On the other hand, there continues to be an unwillingness to deal with the serious issues of restructuring state enterprises. The stated level of capital assets in Ukraine is so high that investment appears unable to keep up with depreciation. This is not necessarily bad: the Stalinist system led to far higher savings and investment rates than one would expect, and there is likely too much dilapidated capital in Ukraine today. If this is so, that capital overhang will slow investment and hold back growth for a substantial period. With older capital, labour productivity will also lag.

Nearly half the enterprises are still unprofitable. The process of closing unprofitable enterprises has been slowed by the resistance of the Supreme Council, which is controlled by oligarchic elements of the former nomenklatura. Lunina and Vincentz document how the nature of subsidization of Ukrainian enterprises has changed. In 1992 it was more common for subsidies to be paid directly and openly to enterprises, and they amounted to 11.7 percent of the GDP. By 1997 they had fallen to 4.8 percent. But Lunina and Vincentz show that preferential taxes, the permission of arrears to the budget on social-insurance payments, tax write-offs, and other techniques have raised indirect subsidies to over ten percent of the GDP. "Ukraine has one of the highest levels of subsidies channeled to the production sphere among Central and East European transnational economies; [s]ubsidization is absolutely non-transparent, which has led to a complete loss of control over disbursements of public resources."⁷

Corruption has been considered rampant in Ukraine. Anders Åslund sees the Ukrainian economy as that of a "rent-seeking society." "The problem of the transition was a small Communist elite that wanted to make money on the transition."⁸ In 1998 Transparency International, which aggregates twelve different

7. Inna Lunina and Volkart Vincentz, "The Subsidization of Enterprises in Ukraine," in *Ukraine at the Crossroads: Economic Reforms in International Perspective*, ed. Axel Siedenberg and Lutz Hoffmann (Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, 1999), 129.

8. Anders Åslund, "Why Has Ukraine Failed to Achieve Economic Growth?" in *Economic Reform in Ukraine: The Unfinished Agenda*, ed. Anders Åslund and Georges de Menil (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), 263.

measures of corruption, ranked Ukraine sixty-nineth out of eighty-five nations by “cleanliness” of the government in its Corruption Perceptions Index. (Neighboring Poland ranked thirty-nineth and Russia severtysixth.) The government plays a major role in corruption. For instance, Bank Ukraina, the successor to the Soviet Agroprombank, was induced by the government to hand out loans at very low rates to its 290,000 business customers and then pressured not to force repayment of bad loans. The bank’s situation was sufficiently serious to jeopardize its solvency and ability to repay 1.7 million depositors. Attempts to restructure the bank—a condition of continuing loans from the IMF—have been embroiled in battles between the Kuchma government and the Supreme Council.⁹

Tensions among the Supreme Council and the president, prime minister, and Cabinet has been a constant of Ukrainian economic policy in the last ten years. Uncertainty in economic policy has been a leading cause of Ukraine’s slow progress to its pre-independence standard of living. Marek Dąbrowski argues that “the worst thing is that there are no guarantees that the crisis will not reverse and the situation will not worsen”¹⁰ at any time.

Explaining Delays in Reform

The lack of certainty in the reform process has been worsened by the frequent turnover of prime ministers. Typically, reformers have been not prime ministers but their deputies, yet the adoption of a reform programme has tended to bring down the whole Cabinet.

The history of the former prime minister (and NBU governor) Viktor Yushchenko’s departure is symptomatic of the continuous struggle between powerful groups seeking control of the Ukrainian economy. Yushchenko had moved to pay off inter-enterprise arrears and close the budget deficit, and this led to conflicts with the Supreme Council. Two groups in Ukraine prefer not to pursue the rest of the Ukrainian economic reform agenda. First, the Communists, who remained after the fall of the Soviet Union, continued to enjoy substantial political support, which was predicated on their ability to present the reform agenda as a failure in Ukraine. High wage arrears fomented discontent with reform. Second, industrialists or oligarchs were upset that they could not control the Yushchenko Cabinet. Lazarenko and Pustovoitenko had been friendly with these oligarchs and given them representation in the government. Taras Kuzio argues that these groups

9. See Tony Roddam, “Ukraine MPs Reject Ukraina Bank, Tax Plans,” Reuters, 12 July 2001.

10. From “Raczej czarny scenariusz,” *Rzeczpospolita*, 29 March 1999. Translation in *HIID/CASE Macroeconomic Policy Programme for Ukraine*.

prefer a political-economic model that lies between the Soviet command-administrative system and a market economy, where business interests have a clientelistic and rent-seeking relationship with the authorities. This corporatist model implies dominance of the political sphere by means of controlling and manipulating the media, civil society and political parties.¹¹

Arrayed against these two groups are those who favour reform for either economic or ideological reasons. Bankers have had a very difficult time making money in a country with high inflation, large amounts of financial repression, and occasional coercion to funnel loans to government-preferred enterprises. Although some members of the original Rukh independence movement did not support market reforms, a general consensus that an independent Ukraine needs a functioning economy seems to have evolved. There is a rising number of small entrepreneurs who are able to pay their taxes in a lump sum rather than face the dizzying array of tax rates on various types of economic activity. This group actually has more political power than one might expect, and Western voices for reform have curried favour with them.

Economists have begun to study models in which some groups delay reforms while they seek to impose the costs of reform on others. It is important to realize that even within the alliance that formed to oust Yushchenko there is conflict over the distribution of the costs of reform. Increasing budget arrears is one cost of delay; high inflation is another. There are several models that have been developed in recent years, and each one can give us some insight into the reform deadlock in Ukraine.¹²

There has been some discussion of whether the necessary technical expertise was in place in Ukraine. Most of its best experts had moved to Moscow to work at the all-Union level. Anders Åslund puts it this way:

Ukraine has a weak local elite, because the ambitious had made their careers largely in Moscow. The republic's state administration was poor, essentially carrying out orders from Moscow rather than dealing with its own policy making.... The knowledge of languages was very limited; Ukraine has suffered more severe repression than Russia, because the Soviet authorities rightly feared Ukrainian nationalism.¹³

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Åslund continues, the leadership focused on nation building, "largely disregarding economic policy and economic reform" for it believed Ukraine's economic difficulties were caused by Russia. But there


11. Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine: After Yushchenko," *Oxford Analytica: East Europe Daily Brief*, 2 May 2001.

12. For more on these types of models, see Allan Drazen, *Political Economy in Macroeconomics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

13. Åslund, "Why Has Ukraine Failed to Achieve Economic Growth?" 259.

were reformers even in the Kravchuk Cabinet, including Kuchma and Viktor Pynzenyk. Compared to the other explanations of rent-seeking behaviour in Ukraine (more on which below), the idea that Ukraine did not know how to manage her economy seems far-fetched. It seems more a question of the aims of economic policy than a question of technical knowledge of how to conduct policy.¹⁴

Ukraine's total international reserves



Source: National Bank of Ukraine

The theory of *optimal waiting* states that one might prefer to let a shock, such as a transition, to work through an economic system than to try to fight it with shock therapy, particularly, if the effects of policy occurred with a lag. If one believed that the transition would be relatively short, then macroeconomic stabilization policies might be better left untouched, since their effects would be felt after the shock had passed and they might prolong economic contraction. A variant of this is Orphanides' model, according to which currency stabilizations face the problem of having insufficient reserves if a speculative attack occurs.¹⁵ Therefore it makes sense to wait with reform until there is a cushion of foreign-currency reserves. I and Oleksandr Petrik discuss the level of support for instituting a currency target zone (maximum and minimum exchange rates for

14. This is not to say, however, that the Ukrainians understood the tools of policy or the effects of every policy action they took. For a look at difficulties in setting up effective bank supervision, for example, see Daniel Gros and Alfred Steinherr, "Banking Reforms in Eastern Europe with Special Reference to Ukraine," in *Ukraine at the Crossroads*, 193–216.

15. Aristotle Orphanides, "The Timing of Stabilizations," Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Series (Washington, D.C.), no. 194 (1992).

the hryvnia) after the hryvnia was introduced in September 1996.¹⁶ The data in table 1 show that gross international reserves had risen from less than two to nearly five weeks of imports. Introducing the hryvnia before 1996 would have been very difficult, unless one wanted it to float freely. The September timing also took advantage of the seasonal pattern of foreign trade and foreign exchange. Unfortunately, the amount of reserves on hand did not provide enough support against the speculative attack that followed the Russian default in August 1998. The hryvnia, which was introduced at the exchange rate of 1.7 to the American dollar, slid to over five hryvnias to the dollar, and it remains there today.

Another class of models, based on the work of Mancur Olson, posits that the delay in reforms is due to the continuous struggle between vested interests.¹⁷ Olson points out that in the Soviet period, when prices for most goods were controlled at levels below equilibrium, there were incentives for all parties to evade the law either by having consumers purchase goods on the black market (if too little was produced) or by avoiding production (if too much production was planned by the authorities). In either case, gains from trade were made by evading the plan, and some of the gains could be paid to corrupt authorities. Olson argues persuasively that the Stalinist system maximized wealth for the elite (more than in the period of the New Economic Policy) and, at the same time, increased savings, investment, and work effort.

The key to the gradual decay of Stalin's system under his successors was its dependence on the decisions of subordinates in the bureaucracy.... [T]he Stalinist system of implicit tax collection obviously had to limit markets more than any other societies have done. To maintain and increase investment after confiscating the capital stock, the Soviet-type regimes had to control consumption and saving decisions.... Thus a system of the type Stalin founded obviously must handle an awesome number of matters through its command and control system, and for this it had to rely on a vast army of *nomenklatura* and lesser administrators.¹⁸

16. King Banaian and Oleksandr Petrik, "Exchange-Rate Based Stabilization and Reform in Ukraine," in *Ukrainian Economy since Independence*, 108–16.

17. Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); idem, "The Devolution of Power in Post-Communist Societies," in *Russia's Stormy Path to Reform*, ed. Robert Skidelsky (Annapolis: The Social Market Foundation, 1999), 9–43, available also as IRIS Reprint, no. 84, from the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, February 1999; and idem, *Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

18. Olson, "The Devolution of Power," 29.

TABLE 1. MAIN MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS, UKRAINE 1991-2001

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Gross domestic product, UAH mil.	3	50	1483	12038	54516	81519	93365	102593	130442	172952	201927	192659*
Real GDP, percent change	-8.7	-9.9	-14.2	-22.9	-12.2	-10	-3	-1.9	-0.2	5.8	9.1	4.1
Consumer goods production, UAH mil.**	2	18	759	4450	19383	22939	22669	17538	20996	27935	33524	37933
Industrial production, UAH mil.	3.3	61	1773	13098	58824	73321	75061	82889	107537	144413	155891	171207
Capital investment, UAH mil.	0.5	9	293	2280	9378	12557	12401	13958	17552	19481	32573	19839**
Fixed assets, UAH mil.					843471	866439	823610	837446	...			
Investment as share of assets					1.5%	1.4%	1.7%	2.1%	...			
Change in real wages (from previous year)	...	-38.7	-51.5	-14.6	28.1	-13.8	-2.4	-12.9	3.4	n/a	4.6	15.6
Percent of unprofitable enterprises					9.5	8.3	11.4	22.2	43	45	54.5	37.7
											38.2	43*

Export of goods and services, mil. U.S. dollars	8045	7817	16641	17090	20346	20355	17621	16234	19522	2086	16618**
Import of goods and services, mil. U.S. dollars	7099	9533	18007	18280	21468	21891	18828	15237	18116	20473	15526**
Inflation (by consumer price index)	390	210	10260	50	280	39.7	10.1	20	19.2	25.8	6.1
Gross international reserves, in weeks of import			1.9	3.2	4.9	5.6	2.2	3.7	4.3	7.8	10.2**
As a share of GDP											
Consolidated budget revenues	24.6	33.5	43.5	38	37.1	30.1	28.2	25.3	27.7	26.7	28.2*
Consolidated budget expenditures	38.4	38.6	52.4	44.6	41.9	36.8	30.4	26.8	27	27.4	26.2*
Consolidated budget deficit	-13.5	-5.1	-10.4	-6.5	-4.9	-6.6	-2.2	-1.5	+0.7	-0.6	+2.0
Current account balance			-2.4	-3.2	-2.7	-2.7	-3	-3	4.6	3.7	7.5**

Source: National Bank of Ukraine

* data through November

** data through third quarter 2002

Aaron Tornell posits a model in which groups of nomenklatura bureaucrats have the sole ability to reform the economy and seize common property, like state enterprises.¹⁹ Reform takes the form of removing the ability to seize resources. If there are competing groups, however, one's decision whether to reform or seize resources depends on the actions of the other groups. Tornell shows that during good times one would not seize resources, for this would divert the elite's own resources into non-productive activities. But the opportunity cost of this action is less when the economy is in crisis. Readers of Ukrainian affairs are well aware of competing elites or clans centred on local government administrations and paired with enterprise managers or business owners. The main implication of Tornell's model is that no group will undertake reform, unless it sees reform as less harmful than the loss of monopoly privileges due to reform. Perhaps none of the clans yet feel in that position.

Alesina and Drazen claim that the argument is not over whether to have reforms, but who shall pay for them.²⁰ A battle between interest groups evolves into a war of attrition to get one group or another to bear the costs of reform. If the groups cannot agree on tax shares that will end high budget deficits, spending will be funded by a highly distortionary inflation tax. Each group can agree that the inflation tax should be replaced by less distortionary taxes, but each has an interest in waiting to see if another group will bear a greater burden. As long as each group can obstruct reforms, there is no reform. Only when every group realizes that the absence of reform is less advantageous to it will reforms occur.

A theme that runs through all these explanations is that reforms are only the result of economic crises. This may be because the different special interests do not know who will win or lose from reform, because the competing groups do not realize the severity of the crisis, or because they must realign themselves to give rise to a new coalition that can enact reforms. Ukraine has a great many political parties that, at various times, have formed different electoral and parliamentary blocs. Such reorganization takes time. It is quite clear that Ukraine, like most transition economies, was surprised by the severity of the transition shock. One could describe the first few years of Ukraine's independence as an economic-policy failure made plain by crisis. If this is true, Ukraine is one of many countries that have experienced policy failure. None of these failures were mitigated by the advice of Western advisers.

19. Aaron Tornell, "Reform from Within," National Bureau for Economic Research Working Papers, no. 6497 (April 1998).

20. Alberto Alesina and Allan Drazen, "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?" *American Economic Review* 81 (December 1991): 1170–88.

The Role of IMF Support²¹

The leading institution providing aid to states of the former Soviet Union is the IMF. Beginning in November 1994, shortly after the election of President Kuchma, four stabilization programmes were launched, and funds were provided by the IMF, the WB, and other bilateral and multilateral donors. All these programmes stemmed from a process that began with the drafting of a policy-framework paper with medium-term projections by the funds-seeking country and a letter of intent from the government stating how it will meet those projections.²² The projections of some of these programmes along with the outcomes are shown in table 2. The output declines discussed in the previous section continued to occur in greater proportions than envisioned in the loan programmes. While inflation was held largely in line and fiscal targets were met, output and consumption fell far below targets.

What underlies IMF support programmes at the stage of the policy-framework paper and letter of intent is financial programming. This makes it possible to connect the targets of the support programme with the policy variables under the government's control. Bruce Bolnick explains financial programming as the opposite of forecasting:

The programming analysis can be thought of as running a projection model in reverse. A projection model asks, "what macroeconomic outcomes will result from a given set of policies?" while a programming model asks, "what macroeconomic policies are required to achieve a given set of outcomes?" The specified outcomes include targets for inflation and foreign exchange reserves, consistent with a commitment to macroeconomic stability. Thus, a programming exercise starts with the objectives and derives the corresponding policies, with an emphasis on *consistency*.²³

Economists and policy-makers in transition economies have become exposed to financial programming in the process of initiating IMF programmes for macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization of the economy. Since the transition period is so short, there is a strong temptation to rely on simple rules in setting parameters. Key parameters in a financial programming exercise

21. This section incorporates parts of my paper "Transition in Ukraine: The Role of IMF Support," presented at the Western Social Science Association Annual Meeting, Reno, Nevada, April 2001. Available Online at <<http://coss.stcloudstate.edu/banaian/ukraine/wssa2001.pdf>>. The paper is a more formal treatment of financial programming in Ukraine.

22. Jacques Polak, The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality, Princeton University Essays in International Finance, no. 184 (September 1991), 13.

23. Bruce R. Bolnick, "The Role of Financial Programming in Macroeconomic Policy Management," Harvard Institute for International Development Discussion Paper, no. 720 (September 1999), 4.

Table 2. IMF Programmes: Targets and Outcomes

		IMF Programme Announcement dates				
		04-Apr-95	10-May-96	27-Aug-97	04-Sep-98	Actual
<i>GDP growth rate</i>						
1995	-10					-12
1996		-2				-10
1997			-3			-3
1998		0		0		-3
1999			3	1		-1
2000						6
<i>Inflation</i>						
1995	389					182
1996		42				40
1997			15			16
1998		12		29		11
1999			7	7		23
2000						28
<i>Fiscal balance (share of GDP)</i>						
1995	-3.3					-4.9
1996		-3.5				-3.2
1997			-4.6			-5.6
1998		4.5		-2.8		-2.7
1999				-1.5		-1.4
2000						2.4?
<i>Current account (share of GDP)</i>						
1995	\$1,335					\$ 1,152
1996		-3.2				-2.7
1997			-3.6			-2.6
1998		3.6		-2.8		-1.9
1999			3.5	-1.8		2.7
2000						n/a

Note: Current account balance in 1995 programme was expressed in millions of U.S. dollars

include the velocity of money, the money multiplier, the income elasticity of imports, and the effect of the real exchange rate on the balance of trade. Our knowledge of these factors is quite limited, so to use financial programming we must make some assumptions. Ukraine's Cabinet, the NBU, and the IMF agreed that in the short term both the velocity of money and the money multiplier (the

relationship between the central bank's assets and the money supply) would be roughly constant. These assumptions were the basis of the IMF stabilization programme for Ukraine in 1995.²⁴

Unfortunately, these assumption turned out to be wrong. In the first two years of the programme there was insufficient fiscal restraint in the IMF programmes, while in the later three years there was probably too much restraint. The introduction of the hryvnia eventually led to a recovery of money demand, and the development of the financial system allowed the existing stock of NBU assets to support a greater amount of money without creating additional inflation.

Ukraine has suffered from failures to meet its quantitative performance criteria, as well as failure to carry out certain benchmark actions included in its Extended Fund Facility programme. I do not claim that the instability inherent in the macroeconomy has caused Ukraine to miss those benchmarks. However, the financial programming framework relies on fixed parameters, and in the years 1994–98 the magnitude of fluctuations in money velocity and the money multiplier was such that any three-year plan that included performance criteria was bound to require renegotiation. The changes of plan contributed to a lack of coherence in the programmes and demanded further renegotiation. In turn, this encouraged delays in reform, as special-interest groups saw the arrival of each planeload of IMF advisers and negotiators in Kyiv as an opportunity to get a better deal on reform. Indeed, the IMF reacted to early difficulties in 1996 by sending missions to Ukraine more frequently. Each mission was an opportunity to rewrite the programme.

Conclusions: Deepening Reforms

Most of the West recognizes that reform in Ukraine is incomplete. The state's withdrawal from the economic sphere has been slowed by factional fighting within, and clan conflict outside, the government. Reforms that occur seem to result from crises. As Alex Sundakov correctly points out, “[m]any corporate and political managers around the world have found that the attitude of ‘I will deal with the medium term as soon as I put out this next fire’ is a recipe for disaster. The fires never go away, and the fundamental problems are never addressed.”²⁵

What would it take to stop the delay, the war of attrition, or whatever one wants to call the stalled reform efforts in Ukraine? According to most explanatory models, to move the reform process forward the conditions must be right for

24. Banaian, *The Ukrainian Economy since Independence*, chap. 4.

25. Alex Sundakov, “Transition Crisis: Is Crisis Management Delaying Reform?” in *Ukraine at the Crossroads*, 117.

each side to concede power. Each side needs to feel that it will be advantaged by the reforms.

One way to reach such conditions may be found in the recent work of Hernando de Soto.²⁶ The secret of the West's growth, he argues, lies in establishing property rights, in giving people legal title to land and buildings. These rights, according to de Soto, offer the following benefits: (1) they unlock the potential value of assets, (2) they integrate dispersed information in one system (a key feature of the market system is its ability to use prices to communicate the relative value of assets, and people have an incentive to do so only if they can earn profits by bringing that information to the market), (3) they make people accountable for the use of their assets (the problem of unprivatized state enterprises is that managers can use assets as they wish without bearing the costs of inefficient allocation), (4) they make assets fungible (easily transferable to uses with a higher return), (5) they network people by creating legal connections in the form of contracts and property relations, and (6) they protect these transactions through vital judicial reforms. In discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin, de Soto put the problem this way:

I told him that all capitalism is a legal framework. If you get it right, everything will fit together. But in fact, all countries start out the same way. All countries start out with a black market—until property rights are established. So the first thing we do when we go into a country is ‘measure it’ and tell the government where the problem is. It might be the mafias, because then someone else is making the rules. We show them how to go from a black market to a legal system.²⁷

Such advice seems not to be lost on reform advisers. At a World Bank conference on land policy, Emmy Simmons of the United States Agency for International Development stated:

The challenge is creating property rights systems in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Land privatization, titling and registration efforts are critical to establishing an infrastructure that supports the market-oriented growth path these countries have chosen. USAID has made significant investments in formalizing property rights in Albania, Moldova, and Georgia; we are poised to begin a broad effort in Ukraine.²⁸

Property rights could unlock the potential in the massive amount of capital in Ukraine. But to make property work, government has to have the power to protect

26. Hernando De Soto, *The Mystery of Capital* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

27. Georgie Ann Geyer, “Peruvian Excels in Analyzing Economies Worldwide,” *Universal Press Syndicate*, 12 October 2001.

28. Emmy Simmons, “Property Rights as a Basis for Growth with Poverty Reduction: USAID’s Perspective,” comments at the Joint World Bank-USAID Consultative Meeting on Land Policy and Administration, Washington, D.C., 24 April 2001.

rights. A professional independent judiciary is essential. To date, competing bureaucrats and clans have been able to repel reform efforts. Since nobody can predict who will win these battles, it is less costly simply to steal as much as one can right now. As Olson points out, there is no sense in leaving capital in place and providing incentives for it to grow as long as there is some probability that the special interest will not be able to gain the return from its investment.²⁹ Making banditry too expensive is the key; this will not happen until secure property rights are in place. Only then will there be the long-term investment that is the key to Ukraine's economic growth.

Will Ukraine choose this path? The early evidence is not hopeful. President Kuchma continues to believe that there is a third path of state-directed industrial policy mixed with protectionism for domestic producers and agriculture and a perfunctory nod towards the market. Social protection is vital to Kuchma's vision. But down that path lies only a continuation of stop-go reform as goals continually clash and are subject to political machinations. As Ludwig von Mises once stated, there is no alternative to the market or the state, unless one accepts chaos as a method of economic organization.³⁰

29. Olson, *Power and Prosperity*.

30. Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action*, 4th ed. (Irvington, NY: Foundation for Economic Education, 1996), 861.

A Perilous Way to Freedom: The Independent Mass Media in the Blackmail State

*Mykola Riabchuk**

Introduction

In the first half of the 1990s most observers in Ukraine and abroad believed that senile Soviet totalitarianism was dead once and for all and that sexy, young democracy would take over the post-Soviet space abandoned by the nasty Communist dragon. Neither despotic reincarnations of the former Bolshevik fiefdoms in Central Asia nor KGB-led military coups against democratically elected leaders in Georgia and Azerbaijan have disturbed Western politicians in any appreciable way. Perhaps nobody ever expected that democracy would be firmly established in those remote backward countries somewhere on, or beyond, the edge of the “civilized” world. “East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.”

Clearly, Russia was the major stake, although Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova were also of some concern. President Lukashenka, who usurped power in Belarus in 1995, has been condemned internationally and isolated politically, although his autocratic regime is much softer than that of the Uzbek Karimov or the Turkmen Niiazov, and probably not much harsher than that of the Azeri Aliev or the Georgian Shevardnadze, whose regimes have been admitted ultimately to the Council of Europe. Yet, by and large, wishful thinking predominated. Even Yeltsin’s shelling

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of Parliament in 1993 was treated rather benevolently as a young and vulnerable Russian “democracy” fighting the ugly relics of reactionary Bolshevism. Very few people dared to accuse the “democrats” of being not very democratic and to see the fate of Parliament as the prefiguration of many later developments.

The independent mass media have been like the display windows of the “emerging” post-Soviet democracies, seemingly a firm sign that important changes had really happened and the “transition” was proceeding in the right direction. Indeed, the post-Soviet governments have seemed to be rather unwilling or unable to interfere directly with the activities of independent media. In Ukraine these activities have been legalized by a number of laws, including the Law on Information (October 1992), the Law on the Print Media (November 1992), the Law on TV and Radio Broadcasting (December 1993), the Law on Copyright and Adjacent Rights (December 1993), the Law on State Secrets (January 1994), the Law on News Agencies (February 1995), and the Law on Advertising (July 1996).¹ Finally, the new constitution, adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament in 1996, firmly confirmed the standard package of democratic rights for Ukrainian citizens, including freedom of speech and of the mass media.²

In 1995 Ukraine was admitted to the Council of Europe under the condition that, within the next few years, a number of new very important democratic laws would be passed and substantial administrative and legal reforms would be implemented by the government.³ Interestingly enough, no media-related provisions were made at the time: clearly, Western observers who had monitored democratic reforms in Ukraine did not find the situation of the media disturbing. Nor did they notice any blatant violations of the public’s right to information during the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1994. Despite some serious drawbacks that had not been ignored by independent observers, the general performance of the Ukrainian mass media and government policy in the field were evaluated rather positively.

The situation deteriorated badly in the second half of the 1990s, particularly during the extremely dirty 1999 presidential election campaign, and culminated dramatically at the end of 2000, when the “tapegate”—a dreadful media-related political scandal—brought Ukraine and its rulers to the brink of expulsion from the

1. See “Ukraine,” chap. 14 in *Media in the CIS*, at <www.internews.ru/books/media1999/74.html>. For a detailed comparative analysis of media-related laws in Ukraine and Russia, see *Vse pro media regioniv Ukrayny* (Kyiv: Society Center, 2000), 142–9.

2. Articles 15, 32, 34, 41, 54, 85.20, 85.24, 106.13, 106.14. For the full text of the constitution and other documents that govern the activities of the Ukrainian mass media, see <www.ipc.kiev.ua/ukr/law>.

3. S. Vidniansky and A. Martynov, “Ukraina i svit,” in *Ukraina: Utverdzhennia nezalezhnoi derzhavy, 1991–2001*, ed. Volodymyr Lytvyn (Kyiv: Alternatyvy, 2001), 652.

Council of Europe and of international isolation.⁴ Since then, the plight of the mass media in Ukraine has become a major concern of many international organizations, including the Council of Europe, which has strongly urged Ukrainian authorities to bring their policy on the mass media into line with Ukrainian laws and international obligations. They have imposed on Ukraine a close monitoring of further developments in the fields of human rights, freedom of speech, and the protection of journalists.⁵

In this context, the central problem that emerges lies in the complex relations between the authoritarian state and the independent mass media. This does not mean that other important aspects of the very broad topic of the functioning and development of the mass media in Ukraine during the last decade will be omitted, but only that the topic will be analyzed primarily within the conceptual framework of the protracted struggle between the crypto-Soviet authoritarian state and the emerging civil society.

To make this analysis as informative and comprehensive as possible, I shall first outline the general structure of today's Ukrainian mass media and the main changes they have undergone in the last decade. Then I shall apply the notion of "triple" (or, as Taras Kuzio insists, "quadruple")⁶ transition, which has been underway in post-Soviet Ukraine, to the controversial processes in the mass media and beyond. In particular, I shall employ Keith Darden's notion of Ukraine as a "blackmail state" to reveal the various ways in which the government pressures and manipulates the mass media. By way of conclusion, I shall try to point out some internal and external factors that so far have saved the Ukrainian mass media (and civil society in general) from complete domination by the state. I shall argue that these factors, if properly husbanded, can alter the current tendency of authoritarian (re)Sovietization of Ukraine in the Belarusian way to a more promising tendency of "Central-Europeanization" on the model of Poland and Lithuania.

Structural Changes in the Media

In June 1990 the Law of the USSR "On the Press and Other Mass Media" lifted official censorship, thus legalizing de jure what had emerged in the country de facto thanks to Gorbachev's policy of glasnost and perestroika. The notorious Committee for the Protection of State Secrets in the Mass Media was disbanded, opening the path to the eventual dismantling of the Communist Party and the entire USSR. These

4. For a brief, yet comprehensive overview of the events, see *UCIPR Research Update* 7, no. 4 (22 January 2001), at <www.ucipr.kiev.ua/update>.

5. "Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and Ukraine: 'Sentence' Suspended," *UCIPR Research Update* 7, no. 19 (7 May 2001), at <www.ucipr.kiev.ua/update>.

6. Taras Kuzio, "Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?" *Politics* 21, no. 3 (2001): 168–77.

developments affected not only freedom of speech but also the whole question of the media's role in society.

The dramatic changes that followed can be summarized briefly in two points. (1) The post-Soviet mass media in Ukraine became increasingly diversified in every aspect. By and large they became like the Western media: their structure, content, appearance, system of genres, prevailing approaches and discourses, and way of production and consumption increasingly resembled the Western models. (2) Freedom from party and state control meant also "freedom" from cheap resources provided by the hated political master. Both the old media, which have been privatized since 1991, and the new outlets, which have appeared (and disappeared) in the last decade, have faced the problem of economic survival, something their Soviet predecessors had never encountered. Management, advertising, promotion, grant-seeking, and many other suspicious words that had seldom, if ever, been used in the USSR suddenly acquired broad currency alongside notions that looked even stranger, such as libel suit, tax evasion, legal protection of the media by professional lawyers, and lobbying of legislators by media lobbyists. In the economic realm, however, the convergence between the Ukrainian mass media and their Western counterparts remains rather superficial because of the grievous peculiarities of post-Soviet "capitalism." Although these peculiarities are my main concern here, a concise survey of the different Ukrainian mass media will lay the ground for their analysis.

Print Media

Of all the Soviet mass media, newspapers, journals, and magazines proved to be the most active and courageous during perestroika. They embraced the policy of glasnost in a way that was rather impossible for the electronic media, which were strictly controlled by the Party or state virtually till the end of the USSR and even afterwards. It is hardly surprising that the heavily centralized, hierarchical Soviet media system began to crumble at its weakest points. The first periodicals that questioned Leninist dogmas and came out in favour of ideological emancipation were literary journals and newspapers owned by the Writers' Union. They were followed by Komsomol periodicals and publications that technically belonged to various councils of peoples' deputies and other "civic organizations," which until 1989–90 had been purely decorative bodies. The majority of newspapers, however, belonged to Communist Party committees of various levels. In the Soviet hierarchy these papers represented the "mainstream," which had to be carefully protected from the slightest ideological contamination.

Apparently, the stronger the civil society in a region, the faster the emancipation of mass media advanced. In Ukraine the processes of emancipation had been largely contained by a hard-line Brezhnevite regime headed by the orthodox Communist first secretary Volodymyr Shcherbytsky. His dismissal in September 1989 encouraged the growth of civic organizations and the emancipation of the media throughout Ukraine,

but primarily in Kyiv and in the least Sovietized western part of the country. Within a year the circulation of the Writers' Union weekly *Literaturna Ukraina* approached 200,000, while the circulation of *Komsomolskoe znamia*, a daily owned by the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Komsomol, exceeded one million. Still, even the most popular Ukrainian periodicals fell far behind the leading Moscow newspapers and magazines with a multi-million circulation, twenty-five to thirty percent of which was printed and sold in Ukraine.

In 1991, after the failed coup in Moscow, the Ukrainian Parliament banned the Communist Party of Ukraine and nationalized its vast property, including major printing houses, editorial offices, and other premises. The highly conservative Communist newspapers (*Pravda Ukrayiny*, *Radianska Ukraina*, *Silski visti*, *Robitnycha hazeta*) were initially banned, but were eventually re-registered as the private property of the editorial staff, which basically had not changed. On the lower levels of the oblasts and raions, where the local Communist newspapers had been owned jointly by the Party and the respective local councils and their executives, the periodicals were simply re-appropriated by the councils and their executives.

Since then the total number of state-owned publications has not changed significantly. Officially, in 1992 over 1,000 newspapers were owned partially or wholly by the state; in 1995, 966,⁷ and in 1999, 673.⁸ Most of them are oblast or raion poor-quality four-page newsletters, supported financially by local councils and usually published weekly in a print run of a few thousand copies. The number of such publications declined owing to financial constraints. But some new state-owned publications appeared, mostly in Kyiv, where different branches of government launched their own outlets (for example, *Prezydentskyi visnyk* and *Visnyk podatkovoi administratsii*).

While the state-owned media have gradually declined, the private media have steadily grown. By May 1992 the State Committee for the Press and its oblast boards had registered 1,869 privately owned periodicals. By May 1995 their number had increased to 3,263; and by January 1999, to 7,623.

The fastest growth (486 percent) was recorded in the sales of popular magazines, among which the women's monthly *Natali* grew by almost 1,000 percent, from 75,000 to 700,000 copies, within four years (1996–99) and captured half of the women's-magazine market. Newspapers proved to be less successful: their circulation increased by only eighty percent, while the specialized advertising periodicals grew by 140 percent within the same period. The only category of periodicals that declined was the business newspaper: the number of titles fell by

7. Valerii Bebyk and Oleksander Sydorenko, *The Mass Media of Post-Communist Ukraine* (Kyiv: Innovation and Development Centre, 1998), 22.

8. "Ukraine," chap. 14 in *Media in the CIS*.

almost fifty percent, and the circulation, by fifty-three percent.⁹ These paradoxical developments probably mean that, in the first half of the 1990s, the prospective demand for business newspapers was overestimated, while the demand for other types of periodical was underrated.

Since the Ukrainian media market, like the national market in general, is not transparent, this market's parameters should be accepted with reservation. For example, experts point out that virtually no Ukrainian periodical has published its true circulation figure. No reliable data are available on how many copies of a paper were printed, how many were sold, and how many were written off for recycling. Some periodicals seem to have reported a circulation up to ten times higher than the real one. Also, the total number of registered periodicals does not necessarily coincide with the number of periodicals really in print. In some regions up to fifty percent of the registered periodicals have played a role similar to Gogol's "dead souls."¹⁰ Some of them have never seen the light of day, while others came out briefly and disappeared forever.

Ukrainian sociological surveys have proven that eighteen percent of respondents read newspapers daily, thirty-six percent read them two to three times per week, and the other twenty percent read them "occasionally." Only fourteen percent have reported that they do not read newspapers at all. This means that, in spite of the huge growth of the electronic mass media in Ukraine in the last decade, business and political advertisers still have a prospective readership of ten to thirty million people.

Radio and Television

In contrast to the print media, which, by the end of perestroika, were largely independent from the state, radio and, especially, television have remained under the strict control of the state. Although the 1990 Soviet law "On the Press and Other Mass Media" permitted non-government broadcasting, the registration and operational requirements for independent mass media remained under the full control of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting (Derzhteleradio), a Soviet-style institution that, oddly enough, combined the functions of a ministerial body and a state-owned broadcasting company. It was only in 1994 that a separate body—the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting—was established to license both private and state-owned broadcasters, presumably on an equal, competitive basis, and supervise their activity. The body was designed to balance the interests of the Ukrainian legislative and executive branches of power: four members of the council were appointed by the president, and four by Parliament. In practice, however, the president's supporters have had an overwhelming majority.

In January 1995 the President's decree "On the Improvement of Ukraine's Television and Radio Broadcasting Management System" divided the functions of

9. *Vse pro media regioniv Ukrayiny*, 12. See also <www.obriy-marketing.kiev.ua>.

10. Bebyk and Sydorenko, *The Mass Media*, 21.

the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and assigned some of them to the new National Television and Radio Company. Eventually, the committee was combined with another governmental body—the State Committee for Printing and Publishing (Derzhkomvydav)—and, in 1996, upgraded to the Ministry of Information. Two years later it was downgraded to the State Committee on Information Policy, and in 2001 it was transformed into the State Committee on Information Policy, Television, and Radio Broadcasting. Although the changes in the electronic media have not been as rapid and deep as in the print media, they bear the same features—decentralization and diversification. In the USSR the rigid hierarchy of the central, republican, and regional mass media was reflected in the technical organization of signal transmission. There were only three TV channels in the USSR, of which only Channel-1 covered the whole territory of the country. The signals of the second and third channels were confined to a given republic and region respectively.¹¹ Channel-1 broadcast almost exclusively Moscow programmes with some input from the republics. Channel-2 broadcast republican programmes, but also many Moscow programmes, and Channel-3, where it existed, broadcast some regional but mostly central and republican programmes.

Ironically, this system was not changed in independent Ukraine until 1995. The most powerful Channel-1 remained under the exclusive control of the Moscow Ostankino company, which was traditionally much better staffed and equipped than any republican counterpart. It is hardly surprising that this channel remained the most popular channel in Ukraine, much more popular than the National TV Company and numerous private companies, whose signals were typically limited to a city.

Although the Ukrainian authorities were not happy with Russian dominance of Ukrainian television space and, particularly, with the volume of anti-Ukrainian propaganda transmitted from Moscow, they seemed to be neither competent nor politically ready to solve the problem. The solution came unexpectedly in 1994, when the allegedly pro-Moscow, Russian-speaking President Kuchma replaced the Ukrainian-speaking (and therefore reportedly “nationalistic”) President Kravchuk. Leonid Kuchma embarked on the so-called re-switching of channels (*perekomutatsiya kanaliv*), which resulted in (a) transferring the technically most powerful Channel-1 to the National Television Company of Ukraine (NTKU) and (b) eventually granting the two remaining nationwide channels to private companies—Channel-2 to Studiia 1+1 and Channel-3 to Inter. Studiia 1+1 was registered in 1996 as a Ukrainian-American joint venture embarking on the modernization and Westernization of backward Ukrainian TV; Inter was registered in 1995 as a Ukrainian-Russian joint venture possessing, in particular, the right to transmit the most popular Moscow

11. There was also a Channel-4 designed for local, mostly educational, programmes in some big cities like Moscow.

programmes to Ukrainian Russophones and, thus taking the place of "subversive Ostankino."

Both projects proved to be quite successful. Although Moscow channels are still widely available in Ukraine through satellite and, especially, cable transmission, Inter and Studiia 1+1 have firmly established their absolute leadership in the Ukrainian TV market. According to the joint Ukrainian-Italian company AGB-Ukraine, which since 1997 has provided audience-measuring data for broadcasters and advertisers, Inter's rating in 2001 was as high as 3.1, and Studiia's 2.9. In other words, the two channels have attracted nearly half of the average Ukrainian viewing audience and, therefore, at least half of the advertisement market. In 2001 Studiia 1+1 had 21.9 percent of the audience, while Inter had 23.7 percent.¹² The audience share of the National Television Company of Ukraine was much smaller—just 3.9 percent, despite the fact that its signal covers virtually all Ukraine and in some rural regions it is the only channel available. This humiliating rating is the result of the company's unreformed, Soviet-style profile—its profound dependence on government financing and its pro-presidential servilism and unscrupulous propaganda.

Because of serious technical constraints, the numerous private companies that emerged since 1991 have mostly only local influence.¹³ In the last few years, however, three private companies—ISTV, STB, and Novyi Kanal—have challenged the dominance of Inter, Studiia 1+1, and NTKU. They use satellite transmission and network co-operation with regional companies to set up extensive broadcasting in most urban centres. Besides popular films and music, they produce their own daily-news and weekly-analysis programmes. Their advertising rates are much lower than those of established companies. STB's audience share grew from 2.2 percent in 1999 to 3.7 percent in 2001; ISTV's from 3.7 to 5.8 percent within the same period; and the Novyi Kanal's from 1.3 to an impressive 7.8 percent. Consequently, the audience share of the three major companies declined gradually in the same two-year period: NTKU's by two percent and Studiia 1+1's by 0.2 percent, while Inter's fell drastically by 10.4 percent.

As for radio broadcasting, privatization has led to "FM-ization." The great majority of the private radio companies that emerged since 1991 operate in the higher FM range of ultra-short waves (100–108 MHz), which had not been used in the USSR. The significant decentralization of radio broadcasting has not yet led to any worthwhile diversification, however. Virtually all FM programmes consist of

12. Ievheniia Blyzniuk, "Peredil ukrainskoho teleprostoru," *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, 29 September 2001, at <www.zn.kiev.ua>.

13. The number of private companies in various regions varies greatly from thirty-four in Kyiv and thirty-two in the industrial, densely populated Donetsk oblast, to a mere three in the rural, sparsely populated oblasts of Rivne, Volyn, and Chernihiv. Yet they exceed the state-owned companies virtually everywhere both in number and duration of broadcasting at the avarage rate of 3:1. See *Vse pro media regioniv Ukrayiny*, 126–7.

popular music, advertising, and brief information blocks of international, national, and local news. In this context the state-owned National Radio Company of Ukraine (NRKU) has largely retained its leading position in the market. This is attributable to a number of factors. First, the NRKU inherited the nationwide system of cable transmission, which had been the mainstay of the USSR broadcasting system, with links to virtually every household. Second, the Presidential Administration has paid less attention to radio than to TV. As a result, NRKU programmes, with some exceptions, have been more independent and pluralistic than NTKU programmes. Finally, NRKU programmes have offered a much greater variety of genres, topics, and approaches than the extremely primitive FM studios.

Even in big cities, where the FM programmes are rather popular, especially, among drivers and young people, none of them has exceeded the popularity of the good old *brekhunets* ("little liar," as Ukrainians years ago, with mixed feelings, called their home-wired radio). Cable seems to be NRKU's major asset. This can be proved indirectly by the fact that the two other NRKU programmes, although of better quality, have been less popular because they are broadcast on medium waves. This is also true of the Moscow programme Maiak and of the Radio Liberty and BBC programmes, which have been broadcast since 1992–93 on medium waves from Kyiv.

Although radio has been far less popular than television, it has remained an important medium for nearly half the population. Moreover, approximately one-third of Ukrainians have reported that they get their important political information from radio. This is half the number of those who rely on TV for important information, but roughly as many as rely on newspapers.¹⁴ The latter fact is odd, since newspaper readership in Ukraine is reportedly eleven percent larger than the radio audience.¹⁵ One may assume that for many people radio is a more informative medium than newspapers; however, additional research is needed to prove this result as a fact or to disprove it as a sociological or psychological aberration.

The Internet

The Internet is a relatively new medium in Ukraine. It has been accepted by some people with great enthusiasm and turned down by others with dreary skepticism. The pessimists emphasize that, in a country where the average salary is

14. "According to the data of numerous polls, 54 percent to 62 percent of Ukraine's citizens received socio-political information from television, 29–31 percent from newspapers and magazines, and 28–35 percent from radio programmes" (Bebyk and Sydorenko, *The Mass Media*, 37).

15. Another sociological survey carried out in the same year (1996), indicated that eighty percent of the respondents watched TV more or less regularly, forty-five percent listened to radio, and fifty-six percent read newspapers (*Politychnyi portret Ukrayiny. Bulletin of the Democratic Initiatives Foundations*, no. 17 [1996], 78).

about fifty U.S. dollars per month, a computer and on-line service are luxuries for the vast majority of the population, half of which does not even have a home telephone.¹⁶ Indeed, the development of the Internet in Ukraine has been badly hampered by many factors, including the weak development of the telecommunications infrastructure, which has accounted for the frequent delays and breaks in the line; the limited number of direct channels that can be used to access the World Wide Web; the high tariffs for Internet use; and the restricted amount of information resources on the Ukrainian part of the Internet.¹⁷

The optimists, however, claim that, all these difficulties notwithstanding, the Internet is the most dynamic part of the Ukrainian media market, with an average annual growth rate of forty to forty-five percent and an aggregate volume of services worth forty-eight million dollars. They also point out that at least five percent of Ukrainians are doing well enough to afford such "luxuries." This is confirmed indirectly by the rapid growth of the mobile-phone market: in 2001 there are five different operators in Ukraine providing services to 1.6 million customers.¹⁸ The number of Internet providers in Ukraine has grown from 103 in 1997 to 280 in 2001. The competition has led to a significant decrease of tariffs, from \$1.5–3.0 per hour in 1998 to \$0.4–0.6 in 2001. Some companies have offered unlimited on-line service for just \$30 per month. Of course, this price has been beyond the means of most Ukrainians, even of those who can purchase a second-hand computer for the price of a TV set. However, it has been affordable for private companies, institutions, NGOs, Internet cafes, and other collective users. As a result of these factors, the number of regular Internet users in Ukraine in 2001 approached 300,000 people or, according to other sources, 750,000.¹⁹ (The precise figure is not available because many providers have understated the real number of users to avoid heavy taxes.) Half of the users reside in the capital city of Kyiv, although there are significant numbers of them in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and other big cities.

A sociological survey carried out by the GfK–USM company revealed that 5.4 percent of Ukrainians have some access to the Internet: 1.1 percent at home, 1.9 percent at the office, 0.1 percent at school, 0.6 percent at university, 0.2 percent by mobile phone, 0.7 percent in Internet cafes, and 1.6 percent elsewhere (at a friend's

16. Ukraine has 0.21 phones per person. See Oleg Shevchuk, "Budushchee Ukrayiny: za razvitiem noveishikh informatsionnykh tekhnologii," *Pravda.RU*, 24 September 2001, at <www.pravda.ru>.

17. "Ukraine," chap. 14 in *Media in the CIS*.

18. Shevchuk, "Budushchee Ukrayiny."

19. Compare *Vse pro media regioniv Ukrayiny*, 19; and Shevchuk, "Budushchee Ukrayiny."

or relative's place).²⁰ This means that the potential Internet audience is not that small; it certainly exceeds two million people. This audience consists predominantly of young, educated people, students, and professionals who have or will have an influence on public opinion or decision making in business, administration, and other spheres.²¹

Ukrainian Web sites, according to the Europemedia newsletter, fall into the following categories: business—47 percent, news and information—16.6 percent, entertainment—14.8 percent, and research and education institutes—4.4 percent.²² Of all Ukrainian on-line newspapers, the most visited have been *Ukrainskyi finansovyi server* (www.ufs.kiev.ua), *Ukrainska pravda* (www.pravda.com.ua), *ForUm* (www.for-ua.com), *Korespondent* (korespondent.net), *part.org* (part.org.ua), *Kyiv Post* (kpnews.com), *Media International Group* (mignews.com.ua), *Elektronni visti* (elvisti.com), and *ProUa* (proua.net). Many printed newspapers and magazines have added on-line versions in the last few years. The broad spectrum of such periodicals has ranged from analytical papers like *Krytyka* (krytyka.kiev.ua), *Dzerkalo tyzhnia* (zerkalo-nedeli.com), and *Den* (day.kiev.ua) to numerous tabloids like *Fakty i kommentarii* (facts.kiev.ua), *Segodnia* (segodnia.kiev.ua), and *Vechernie vesti* (vv.com.ua). A growing number of periodicals has been interlinked with the information portals www.ukrop.com, uaport.net, avanport.com, uatop.com, and media.topping.com.ua. Major TV and radio companies (with the significant exception of the state-owned NTKU and NRKU) have provided current news and commentary on their Web sites, which have also included video and audio resources.

No Ukrainian Internet publication, however, has had more than 100,000 visitors monthly. This is comparable with the audience of all but a few major Ukrainian newspapers. Yet, it falls far behind the audience of the major Russian news sites, such as *lenta.ru* (1.3 million visitors monthly) or *gazeta.ru* (1 million). Nevertheless, Ukrainian users have spent at least as much time on Ukrainian sites (thirty percent) as they have on Russian ones. They have spent the other forty percent of their time on sites from the rest of the world.²³

20. *Den*, 7 August 2001, at <www.day.kiev.ua>.

21. Some analysts argue that the Internet in underdeveloped countries like Ukraine or Russia has little chance of becoming a means of mass communication in the foreseeable future. Instead, it can and should be used effectively as a means of group communication, targeting relatively small groups with a specific interest. See, for example, "Internet po FEPu," *AIN*, 27 August 2001, at <www.ain.com.ua>.

22. "Internet Grows Slowly in the Ukraine," *Europemedia*, 2 August 2001, at <www.europemedia.net/showfeature.asp>.

23. Ibid. According to statistics provided by the major Ukrainian surfing system Meta <www.meta-ukraine.com>, which receives half a million requests monthly, the most popular key word is *Ukraina* ("Ukraine") (13,700 searches per month). The second most popular word, *referat* ("research paper") lags far behind (5,140 requests), followed by

So far, the Internet has been the most independent mass medium in Ukraine, partly because its spread and impact have been largely underestimated by the authorities and partly because it has not been clear how to control it effectively. A few years ago the Ukrainian authorities, mimicking their Russian twins, prepared a draft law aimed at, in their clumsy bureaucratic words, “the further improvement of national communication systems and development of the Internet in Ukraine.” The pompous Soviet-style document, which outlined the shining path of Ukrainian communications to the glorious future, contained a short paragraph that, apparently, was the essence, the *raison d'être*, of the entire document. It stipulated that every local Internet provider should give the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), as well as other personnel with KGB backgrounds, access to any transmitted information. Moreover, providers themselves were supposed to contribute to the eavesdropping on their clients by purchasing the necessary technical devices. The law was not passed at the time because of strong national and international protests. In 2000, however, the idea was revived with the founding of the Department of Special Telecommunications Systems and Information Protection within SBU.

The growing political pressure on the independent mass media has forced more and more journalists to resort to the Web in order to express their opinions freely. In contrast to democratic countries, political Web sites in Ukraine have become more popular than entertainment sites.²⁴ On-line newspapers have mushroomed in Ukraine (and in Russia) in a rather unusual way—as purely electronic projects without a printed version. The on-line newspaper *Ukrainska pravda*, edited by the late Heorhii Gongadze, topped the list of the most popular Ukrainian sites after its editor disappeared on 15 September 2000. The subsequent “tape scandal” that implicated the Ukrainian president and his aids in masterminding Gongadze’s murder dramatically boosted the development of political and informational Web sites. It was primarily such sites that made it impossible for the authorities to suppress the whole affair.

In April 2001 President Kuchma responded with a decree “On Regulating the Production, Acquisition, and Use of Technical Equipment for Recording Information from Communication Channels.” Its main contractor was the SBU, whose head, Volodymyr Radchenko, suggested a few months later that all Ukrainian Internet users should be registered. On July 20 the National Security and Defense Council (RNBO) recommended the firing of the head of the State Committee on Communications, Oleh Shevchuk, after he criticized Radchenko’s idea. On July 23 the president replaced him with Stanislav Dovhy, reportedly an

“map,” “Kyiv,” “job,” “Ukrainian,” “porno,” “system,” “law,” and “bank.” See Natalia Trofimova, “Shcho my shukaemo v Pavutyni?” *Den*, 13 July 2001.

24. See Oleh Shevchuk’s comments, in Olha Dmytrycheva, “Virtualnomu prostoru—virtualnyi kontrol,” *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, 10 November 2001.

SBU agent.²⁵ Three months later, on November 28, Dovhy's Committee established the Ukrainian Network Information Centre (UNIC) to administer the national dot-ua domain and, in particular, to control distribution of subdomain names. "Providers will have to pay a fee of \$10,000 to become a member of UNIC. Other overheads are expected to arise from the installation of recording and on-line control equipment at servers, something the SBU has been lobbying for in the last two years. Owners of subdomain names will have to go through a repeat registration process to confirm their legal right to operate."²⁶

Ironically, the anti-terrorist campaign launched by the United States and its allies after the dramatic events of September 11, 2001, has given numerous authoritarian regimes around the world a free hand to crush any political opposition in their countries and to place severe restrictions on political rights and freedoms. In Ukraine the RNBO escalated its protracted offensive against the Internet. On October 31 the council adopted a document called, whimsically, "On Some Measures to Improve the National Information Policy and Protect the Information Security of Ukraine." In particular, it stated that the "state institutions in charge of information security have not done enough to prevent threats to information and their negative impacts on the political, social, and spiritual spheres"; "Internet subjects, primarily the Internet medium, have been functioning in Ukraine outside any legal framework"; and, therefore, "the national information space has been used sometimes for information-propaganda aggression, for discrediting the Ukrainian state and public institutions, and for attempts to destabilize the social and political situation and harm the international image of Ukraine."²⁷

25. In more detail, the problem is covered by Iurii Radchenko, "Iak nad namy buduiut 'kovpak,'" *Dzerkalo tzhnia*, 28 July 2001. See also "Ukraine: Security Services Strengthen Control Over Telecommunications Sector," *FBIS Media Analysis*, 7 August 2001.

26. Jim Davis, "Click Here for Restriction of Internet Communications in Ukraine," *Kyiv Post*, 13 December 2001, at <www.kpnews.com>. "It seems," the author comments, "the government's attempts to gain control of Internet operations in Ukraine are motivated largely by its desire to place all communications firmly under political control and to ensure the profits of state-owned companies like Ukrtelekom. The timing seems to be related to the parliamentary elections."

27. As quoted in Sofiia Leonovich, "Iak pozbavyty zonu svobody slova Svobody," *Grani-plus*, no. 23 (November 2001), at <www.grani.kiev.ua>. See also experts' critical comments on the RNBO recommendations in *Dzerkalo tzhnia*, 10 November 2001. In particular, the chief editor of *Ukrainska pravda*, Olena Prytula, has opined that "the very fact that the issue of the Internet media has been considered in such a way by the RNBO is a serious blow to the nation's image." Political analyst Dmytro Vydrin has said that the document reveals the Soviet mentality of the Ukrainian elite, which has always suspected some national and international conspiracy by unspecified enemies. Yet, today this elite

On December 6, 2001, President Kuchma endorsed a decree aimed at the practical implementation of the RNBO's recommendations. In particular, he ordered all Internet providers in Ukraine to be licensed (the necessary amendments to the existing laws are yet to be passed) and be required to preserve their records of Internet traffic for at least six months. The decision was made despite the protests of civic organizations and activists, particularly the Internet Association of Ukraine, which assessed the government's policy as incompetent, harmful to the development of civil society, and a threat to civil liberties.²⁸ The most disturbing paragraph of the decree states that "the Security Service should submit proposals within the next two months for improving measures to counteract information aggression and special information-propaganda operations against Ukraine by foreign special services." In the peculiar Ukrainian political context, the latter euphemism is seen as referring to Western security services, primarily, the CIA.²⁹

While the SBU prepared "proposals" on measures to counter information aggression, some observers pointed to suspicious "technical problems" experienced in October 2001 by the major Ukrainian Internet provider Golden Telecom, whose servers were down for a few days ("Error 415") and some of whose customers—a number of on-line newspapers—lost their archives.³⁰ This may have been an accident, but endemic accidents of this sort in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and other authoritarian states have raised doubts about the prospects of Ukrainian political Web sites. Nevertheless, the Internet will certainly be the last independent medium to submit to government control.

Mass Media and the Quadruple Transition

The decade after 1991 proved to be a sufficient time span for substantial changes to the structure of the post-Soviet mass media to occur. Still, their apparent Westernization and noticeable modernization have not led to a profound emancipation from the authoritarian state. Although not everybody would share the radical view that today's "situation concerning freedom of speech and freedom of information is much worse than in the last five years of the Communist regime,"³¹ virtually everybody would agree that freedom of speech in Ukraine, granted under perestroika, has not been transformed into a full-fledged freedom of the press or, as a specialist in the field, the vice-director of the Kyiv Institute of Journalism, Oleksandr Chekmyshev, had to admit that

skillfully and cynically uses the international situation for its own ends.

28. "Internet: pohralysia—ta i hodi?" *Dzerkalo tizhnia*, 15 December 2001.

29. Jim Davis, *Kyiv Post*, 13 December 2001.

30. Anton Serhiienko, "Narodzhenyi vilnym," *Dzerkalo tizhnia*, 20 October 2001.

31. Viktor Shyshkin, *Demokratichna Ukraina*, 27 April 2000.

“During these ten years, independent mass media have not emerged in Ukraine.”³²

In essence, as an important part of the nascent civil society the post-Soviet mass media have faced the same problems as the entire society vis-à-vis the post-Communist reform-proof state. “Unfinished revolution”³³ best describes what happened in Ukraine in 1991: “a number of pre-existing states, such as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, became independent, changed their names, assumed certain new functions in areas like foreign relations and military affairs, but retained mostly the same structures led by mainly the same people, doing basically the same things as before.... The only basic change was that the Party and Central Committee apparatus was replaced by presidential representatives and the Presidential Administration.”³⁴

To put it differently, the protracted struggle unleashed by Gorbachev between the decrepit authoritarian state and nascent civil society was not over by 1991. In Ukraine it is still going on, and its outcome is hardly predictable. The mass media are still a major player and a major prize in this contest. In a more detailed analysis I shall examine different segments of this battle within the conceptual framework of the “quadruple transition,” that is, within the correlated processes of democratization, marketization, state building, and nation building.

Such a framework, elaborated in a number of articles by Taras Kuzio, provides greater insight into dramatic developments in post-Soviet states than the traditional framework of post-authoritarian transitology based largely on the experience of some Latin American and South European countries. The essential difference between these two types of transition stems from the fact that the post-Soviet states have faced not only post-authoritarian problems of democratization and marketization, but also post-colonial problems of state building and nation building: they have been coming “to terms with fundamental questions of stateness, nationality, the relationship to the former ruling ‘other’ and national minorities.”³⁵

32. Oleksandr Chekmyshev, “ZMI iak akhilesova piata ukrainskoї demokratii,” in *Rol ZMI u spryianni ievropeiskii integratsii*, ed. Viktor Zamiatin and Inna Pidluska (Kyiv: Ievropeiska komisiia, 2001), 5.

33. See Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: The Unfinished Revolution*. Vol. 16 of *European Security Studies* (London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1992).

34. James Mace, “Ukraine on the Threshold of the New Millennium,” in *Towards a New Ukraine: Meeting the New Century*, ed. Theofil Kis and Irena Makaryk (Ottawa: Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, 1999), 11, 20.

35. Kuzio, “Transition in Post-Communist States,” 174. See also Taras Kuzio, “Introduction: The ‘Quadruple Transition,’” in Paul D’Anieri, Robert Kravchuk, and Taras Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 3–6.

The only reservation I have about the concept of quadruple transition pertains to the overused notion of transition, which is hardly applicable to the majority of the post-Soviet states. The term, as some transitologists caution, “linguistically implies a smooth, evolutionary and rather unproblematic, i.e., basically ‘technical’ shift from one type of societal organization to another.” Such a shift had occurred in Chile, Spain, Portugal, Greece and, later on, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia, and some other Central East European countries. Ukraine, however, belongs to a larger group of post-Communist countries that have been “characterized by the total lack of a clear vision of transformation strategy” and have been “suffering from an inadequate leadership incapable of handling the task of transforming social, economic, and political institutions as well as the cultural system of the society.”³⁶

Volodymyr Polokhalo and some other scholars have argued that the lack of systemic changes in post-Communist countries like Ukraine has been the result not of the local elite’s inability to carry out such changes, but rather of its profound unwillingness to introduce any changes that might threaten its Soviet-style political, economic, and cultural dominance.³⁷ The system it has built is neither communist nor capitalist. It resembles, essentially, the patrimonial system of absolutist monarchies in which the “first estate” (the oligarchs) enjoys a relative independence from the “patron” based on relations of “mutual courtesy,” that is, on “a clear understanding that loyalty gets protection and protection gets loyalty.”³⁸

Still, there is a substantial difference between the premodern patrimonial states and the post-Soviet oligarchies. The latter have legitimized themselves as democratically elected, Western-oriented regimes by employing a whole set of liberal-democratic rhetoric and sophisticated methods of power retention based largely on their control of the mass media.

Potemkin Democracy

Most scholars have tended to define the post-Soviet regimes of the Ukrainian and Russian type as semi-authoritarian. These “regimes have adopted the institutional forms of democracy, including regular elections, yet they manipulate the political process and the degree of political liberty sufficiently to ensure that

36. Pavlo Kutuev, “Development of Underdevelopment: State and Modernization Project in the Post-Leninist Ukraine,” in *Thinking Fundamentals*, ed. David Shikiar, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences, vol. 9 (Vienna: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, 2000), 2–3.

37. See Volodymyr Polokhalo, et al. eds., *The Political Analysis of Post-Communism* (Kyiv: Political Thought, 1995).

38. Michael Herzfeld, *The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the Symbolic Roots of Western Bureaucracy* (New York and Oxford: Berg, 1992), 175. Cited by Kutuev.

their basic hold on power is not threatened. They are trying to carry out a political balancing act: allowing enough democracy to gain international legitimacy and to relieve domestic political pressure, but keeping hold of the levers of political power to a sufficient degree to maintain their power indefinitely. They typically permit some space for civil society to organize and operate,” but have taken utmost care to keep it weak and underdeveloped, without “any realistic chance of changing the basic power structures.”³⁹

Post-Soviet mass media have had no obligation to follow any strict ideological line or to propagate certain political views. As a rule journalists have been able to tackle any topic, including the private life of top politicians, which under the Soviet regime was sacred and off-limits to the press. They have been able to criticize the government and bash Parliament, rail at unnamed greedy oligarchs who fleece the country, and divulge the secret that the media are not free. Today such secrets are disclosed by the Ukrainian president himself so that even the most ardent opponents of his regime can hardly add anything to president’s bold revelations:

Ukraine needs an efficient, non-partisan, truly free press. So far, it has been difficult to create the national information space because ... some media pursue the goal of satisfying the interests and ambitions of the clans rather than informing the public. The peculiar sources of media financing often determine the biased, partisan character of their activity. Such media often act unscrupulously, ignoring legal and moral norms.⁴⁰

This statement raises a question that can never appear in any mainstream media—the issue of the president’s personal responsibility for the situation he so frankly described. The paper that published this “sincere confession” is the biggest Ukrainian tabloid owned by the president’s son-in-law and a major post-Soviet oligarch, Viktor Pinchuk. It has not exactly been an exemplary non-partisan publication promoting legal and moral norms.⁴¹

This authoritarian system has not cared about ideological purity, because it has not been based on the power of ideas. What it has cared about are concrete persons, because it has been based on the power of such persons, primarily the

39. Thomas Carothers, “Western Civil-Society Aid to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,” *East European Constitutional Review* 8, no. 4 (Fall 1999): 61.

40. Leonid Kuchma, *Fakty i komentarii*, 8 July 2000.

41. A reader who knows that for many years Anatolii Halytsky was and still is Kuchma’s leading economic adviser and that Andrii Derkach is one of the major Ukrainian oligarchs who owns media and PR companies may raise many more questions of this sort after reading, for example, the former’s courageous and very competent article “Oliharkhizatsiya” (*Den*, 7 December 2000) and the latter’s strong and well-grounded indictment of the dishonest media and PR industries, which cynically manipulate public opinion, “Obretenie svobody” (*Kievskii telegraf*, 3–9 December 2001).

president and members of his entourage. The area closed to the post-Soviet mass media has been relatively small and almost imperceptible to an external observer. At first glance, Ukraine's mass media have looked pretty much as free and diverse as their Western counterparts, especially in comparison to the flagrantly biased Soviet media. But in reality, they have had a very important ideological function—to (mis)represent the weird process of oligarchic transformation as a promising, however painful, process of democratic transition. In other words, they have created a rhetorical smokescreen of democratization and marketization behind which the real processes of the ultimate degeneration of the basically unreformed Leninist system can go on.

In state-owned media this propagandistic goal has been clearly visible; in private outlets, it has been pursued in more subtle and varied ways. First of all, a great many journalists have been truly committed to liberal-democratic, Western values, and have promoted them in their writings. This has created the impression that such a discourse prevails in Ukrainian society and, in particular, among the ruling elite. "Europe is our ultimate choice," claims the president of Ukraine, and his men have never stopped stressing their commitment to democracy, the free market, and the rule of law. Yet, in the past decade none of these things have emerged in Ukraine. Therefore, journalists have been obliged to take a second step—to explain the nearly complete failure of broadly trumpeted democratization and marketization. A set of rhetorical strategies has been applied depending on the forum, audience, and individual preferences of the author. On the one hand, some "achievements," such as nuclear disarmament and the shutting down of the Chornobyl nuclear plant, have been mentioned. On the other hand, various obstacles have been pointed out, including Moscow's political and economic blackmail (in the Ukrainophile discourse), insufficient Western assistance and bad advice (in the Russophile discourse), a corrupt and incompetent elite (in the populist discourse), profoundly Sovietized and demoralized masses (in the elitarian discourse), and so on.

Only the role of the president in all these processes has been taboo: he cannot be held responsible for the authoritarian system he has created, and the essential nature of the system cannot be exposed. The taboo, however, cannot be airtight: first, because the regime has sold itself internationally as an "emerging democracy," it has had to pretend to be absolutely open; and second, because it has had to channel popular dissatisfaction into some firmly controlled and easily manipulated forms of expression. The difficult problem of permitting what is taboo to be questioned while preserving it from serious challenge has been solved by granting the license of unrestricted criticism only to those whose extremely negative public image render their criticism harmless. The ingenious manipulative mechanism was acutely described by Serhii Taran in his analysis of post-Soviet authoritarianism:

The dependent media are to create the image of enemies who transgress the taboo but, as absolute evil, are doomed to defeat. The structure of such a myth resembles the structure of a children's tale in which the bad guys are dreadful but basically harmless because they can never win. There is little difference between the educational effects of children's tales and the methodology of contemporary propaganda. In both cases the suggestive power of myth is employed, the roles of the good and the bad guys are strictly assigned and adjusted according to the proper convention, and the ultimate goal of myth is pursued—to foster obedience to good parents and elders or, in fashionable political slang, to the "boss" or the "godfather," who is always right.⁴²

Predictably enough, the role of the bad guys has been assigned to the Communists who have received the license of "official opposition" (the "only opposition," as the president designated their exclusive task). Any other opposition—the center-left Socialist Party or center-right Fatherland, for example—has not been recognized as real or civilized. Typically, it has been silenced or demonized as non-human (*neliudy*, as President Kuchma politely characterized his major non-Communist rivals during the 1999 presidential elections). Only the Communist quasi-opposition has been permitted some access to the media, and as a rule, only its obsolete views have been presented as an alternative to the president's policies. The pro-presidential mass media has thereby killed two birds with one stone: they have contrived a peculiar kind of pluralism for both national and international consumption and have limited any possible criticism of the system to primitive, backward, and rather unpopular Communist propaganda.

Silencing or discrediting the regime's real opponents has been only a small part of the pro-presidential mass media's role in manipulating public consciousness. Again, the difference between the state-owned and private (oligarchic) media has been rather significant. The former still try to spread Soviet-style bureaucratic optimism, while the latter have effectively distanced themselves from such old-fashioned quasi-civic enlightenment and have propagated, instead, a non-civil and rather anti-social worldview. Their main message, however hidden, has been that "the whole world is plunged into rubbish and excrement, and life is basically the same everywhere, so it makes no sense to squirm; one had better enjoy one's small piece of cake, leaving the large pieces to those who have already got them. It would suffice to have a look at some popular tabloids like *Fakty i kommentarii*, *Segodnia*, or the 'renewed' *Kievskie vedomosti*, let alone *Bulvar*, to see their main message."⁴³ In fact, the oligarchic mass media

42. Serhii Taran, "Avtorytarne suspilstvo ta ioho vorohy," in *Presa i vlada: Khronika protystoiania*, ed. Alla Lazereva et al. (Kyiv: Instytut masovoi informatsii, 2001), 55. Also available in French: *Presse et pouvoir: Chronique des conflits* (Kyiv: Institut des Mass Medias, 2001).

43. Serhii Hrabovsky, "Ukraina nasha sovkova," *Krytyka* 3, no. 9 (September 1999):

have offered a false alternative to the establishment and rather skilfully simulated an ostensible pluralism in the country. Their profound impact on society has been highly destructive: they have not merely exploited, but strengthened the predominant post-Soviet cynicism and popular distrust in public and state institutions. In effect, they have helped to keep people alienated and atomized, scared of any social conflict and suspicious of any social change, ambivalent in all their social feelings and attitudes, undecided on social issues, and hence highly susceptible to political manipulation.⁴⁴ By and large, this has fitted in with the main goal of the ruling elite—to preserve the post-Communist status-quo, that is, to prevent the emergence of civil society, which, ultimately, would threaten the political and economic dominance of the post-Soviet oligarchy.⁴⁵

A “non-civil,” “scavenger” society is a rather suffocating environment for an independent mass media. “Material problems draw people’s interest farther and farther away from political developments in the country,” Iryna Bekeshkina, a sociologist, claims. “Moreover, they drive Ukraine farther and farther away from establishing a civil society.”⁴⁶

The average Ukrainian does not have any special demands in regard to freedom of the press and the mass media. Neither does he have any clear desire to realize his political rights in practice. The average Ukrainian ... has a non-civil mentality, that is, he does not need to realize his political rights at all. He is a conformist who has adjusted to the authorities and suppressed his own civil

6. One can compare this statement with a similar observation by a Russian analyst: “The public sphere, the daily rhetoric of the media are typically overwhelmed with belief in total corruption and cruelty, nihilism, obscene language, and cynicism” (Borys Dubin, “Ekspansia zvychnoho,” *Krytyka* 5, no. 6, [June 2001]: 7, at <www.krytyka.kiev.ua>).

44. For a comprehensive analysis of the ambivalent consciousness, see a number of books and articles by Ievhen Holovakha, in particular *Suspilstvo, shcho transformuietsia* (Kyiv: Demokratychni initiatyvy, 1997) and “Osoblyvosti politychnoi svidomostsi: Ambivalentnist suspilstva i osobystosti,” *Politolohichni chytannia*, no. 1 (1992).

45. Some Ukrainian scholars have defined contemporary Ukrainian society as non-civil. See, for example, Volodymyr Polokhalo, “Political Studies of the Post-Communist Societies in Ukraine and Russia,” *Political Thought*, 1998, no. 2: 8–22. They seem to believe that it is a new, peculiar post-Soviet phenomenon. An American scholar, however, described this phenomenon long ago as a product of an old, degraded Leninist system: “When Gorbachev came to power, a parasitical Leninist party operated a booty (not planned) economy, and ruled (not governed) a scavenger (not civil) society” (Ken Jowitt, “Really Imaginary Socialism,” *East European Constitutional Review* 6, nos. 2–3 [Spring–Summer 1997]: 46).

46. See Natalia Trofimova, “Ukraini ne zahrozhui sotsialnyi vybukh,” *Den*, 19 January 2001. A public opinion survey carried out by FFK-USM in June 2001 revealed that only 2.59 percent of the respondents fully trusted, 19.44 percent “somewhat trusted,” and one-third distrusted the mass media, while nearly half (45.62 percent) were undecided (*Den*, 16 August 2001).

interests, first of all, in the freedom of speech. The average Ukrainian does not need a civil identity ... since the election results, regardless of the number and quality of alternative candidates, depends not on his will and choice, but rather on the power of the “administrative resources” of the ruling elites. He understands that on this score the mass media can neither influence the political course nor change his low living standard, that is, they [the mass media] are too remote from his mundane, bread-and-butter problems.⁴⁷

These observations have been summarized rather frivolously by a tabloid journalist, who cynically explained that people

need their wages to be paid on time, rather than to enjoy freedom.... They would like to read *SPID-info* and *Interesnaia gazeta* [popular tabloids—M.R.] rather than *Grani* [an oppositional weekly—M.R.] and opposition leaflets. They would rather work their vegetable patches than attend political meetings called by radicals. Or, if they do attend, to do so only for a proper remuneration.... You say people are dissatisfied with Kuchma? Well, they are always dissatisfied with authorities. If somebody were to tell them that he [Kuchma] molests babies, they would overthrow the “crowned pedophile.” But as for the journalists, they can be butchered regularly every week, the people won’t give a damn.⁴⁸

A Poltergeist Economy

Marketization has been another “transition” myth promoted by post-Soviet regimes and supported by numerous transitologists. In fact, the notorious transformation of post-Soviet economies has had little to do with a market-oriented transition, but quite a lot to do with the degeneration of socialist economies under an entrenched nomenklatura-cum-oligarchy leadership.

In both Ukraine and Russia, the actual economic situation is characterized by a high level of government interference, a corporate merger of political and economic elites, and a lack of the rule of law. The ruling elites are strongly interested in preserving the status-quo. Thus, any radical economic reforms are hardly probable in the near future, despite the high-flown rhetoric about this (especially in Ukraine).⁴⁹

Max Weber’s classic work on *Economy and Society* provides students of post-Communism with an illuminating outlook on the patrimonial systems they are dealing with. Such a system

gives free rein to the enrichment of the ruler himself, the court officials, favorites, governors, mandarins, the tax collectors, influence peddlers, and the great merchants and financiers who function as tax-farmers, purveyors, and

47. Volodymyr Polokhalo, interview in *Den*, 16 August 2001.

48. Aleksandr Chalenko, “Dozhdetsia li Iuliia liubimogo?” *ForUm*, 27 September 2001.

49. Gerhard Simon, “Transformatsia v Rosii ta Ukrayini pislia padinnia komunistychnoho rezhymu,” *Politychna dumka*, 2000, no. 4: 7.

creditors. The ruler's favor and disfavor, grants and confiscations, continuously create new wealth and destroys it again.... With the development of trade and of a money economy [and this is exactly what happened in post-Soviet Ukraine —M.R.] the patrimonial ruler may satisfy his economic needs no longer through the *oikos* but through profit-oriented monopolism.... In the course of financial rationalization patrimonialism moves imperceptibly toward bureaucratic administration, which resorts to systematic taxation.⁵⁰

Probably no one would deny that any major post-Soviet business “differs radically from the rational management of an ordinary capitalist large-scale enterprise and is most similar to some age-old phenomena: the huge rapacious enterprises in the financial and colonial sphere and occasional trade.” The only difference is that post-Soviet businessmen have looted not colonies, but their own countries and siphoned wealth overseas to off-shore banks. Post-Soviet marketization has not led to a free full-fledged market, let alone investment in the country and economic growth. “Traditionalism and arbitrariness affect very deeply the developmental opportunities of capitalism. Either the ruler himself or his officials seize upon the new chances of acquisition, monopolize them and thus deprive the capital formation of the private economy of its sustenance.... As a rule, the negative aspect of this arbitrariness is dominant, because the patrimonial state lacks the political and procedural predictability, indispensable for capitalist development.”⁵¹ In brief, Ukraine has not yet reached the stage of development when “production—not domination—leads to wealth.” As Heinzen has aptly observed, post-Soviet “businessmen” still “need to have friends at court to advance in life”; they do not “get there through independent economic activity.”⁵²

The first and most dramatic consequence that this economic decay has had for the mass media is that none of them has been economically independent. This has been the result not only of exorbitant taxes imposed by the “rapacious” state on all businesses and of the low purchasing capacity of the people and the poor advertising market (just thirty-five million dollars for all the major TV companies in 2000),⁵³ but primarily of the patrimonial system. Every business in post-Soviet Ukraine—and the media business is no exception—has first and foremost been a “court business;” its profitability and very existence has been determined

50. Quoted by Kutuev in “Development of Underdevelopment,” 8–9.

51. *Ibid.*, 9–10.

52. B. J. Heinzen, “Creating Open Societies,” paper delivered at the seminar on Strategy Development in Portoroz, Slovenia, November 1997.

53. This is the officially reported revenue subjected to taxation. See *Vse pro media regioniv Ukrainy*, 5. Some experts estimate real revenues up to \$200,000. See “Zrostaiut prybutky vid reklamy na ukrainskomu TB,” *Den*, 31 August 2001. This amount is still quite low for a country of fifty million people.

much more by proper contacts and personal arrangements at “court” (in the central or local “palaces”) than by efficient management and diligent work.

Indeed, any person or company can invest money in the media business, hire the best professionals, work as hard as possible, and achieve (or not) some positive results in a few years. The same results, however, can be achieved almost immediately by a smarter entrepreneur who has access to the “upper corridors” and can arrange tax relief and preferential duties, reduced prices for printing and utilities, government-subsidized distribution by the state-owned postal service, government-sponsored subscriptions for state-owned libraries, free paper from the government support programme for “national” periodicals, and solid cash “donations” from unspecified benefactors fond of the independent mass media.

Thus, the whole media system in Ukraine has not been politically independent and profit-oriented. Rather, it has played an auxiliary role in power games, providing logistic support for various oligarchic clans in their internecine wars and competition for the president’s favour.⁵⁴ This does not mean that the private owners have not been interested in profit or that they have not cared about their audience, that is, about the quality of their media products. The main difference between the private and state-owned media lies precisely in their quality: private owners cannot afford to waste money on dull propaganda and inefficient staff. The more popular a medium, the higher the revenue it brings, not so much from retail sales and advertising as from political “wholesale,” that is, from influence with the president and his circle as well as with the electorate.⁵⁵ The problem is not in these goals per se (they are basically the same everywhere), but in their perverted hierarchy: political “business” is more profitable than genuine

54. The same phenomenon can be noticed in Russia. The number of media outlets there has been much higher than consumers and the size of the advertising market require. Corporate owners have been willing to subsidize loss-making media indefinitely because they have used them primarily for political purposes. See Laura Belin, “Bias and Self-Censorship in the Media,” in *Contemporary Russian Politics*, ed. Archie Brown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 328.

55. Serhii Hrabovsky seems to underestimate these factors when he blames Western experts for allegedly overestimating the importance of privatization. In his view, these experts dogmatically believe that the state-owned media are the main evil and that “freedom of speech would have been firmly established in a new independent state as soon as the mass media were privatized” (Sergei Grabovsky, “Ukrainskie mass-media: Gosudarstvennye, oligarkhicheskie, nezavisimye,” in *Svoboda pressy: Opyt Tsentralnoi i Vostochnoi Evropy*, ed. Olena Prytula [Symferopol: Krymskii tsentr nezavisimykh politicheskikh issledovatelei i zhurnalistov, 2001], 57). Of course, privatized media are not necessarily free and perfect but, as a rule, they are freer and of better quality than the state-owned media.

economic enterprise, and the personal opinion of the president is more important for media owners than all other opinions taken together.

Still, the varied, sometimes contradictory goals pursued by the media have called forth different, even incoherent editorial strategies, which leave some room for pluralism and journalistic professionalism, and even for some free-thinking (Studiia 1+1 was, perhaps, the best example of such a company until 2002). A set of clan-owned newspapers or TV programmes may provide intelligent readers or viewers with rather different information and approaches to a problem, enabling them to reconstruct the full picture. Moreover, although some names and events really are taboo in the mainstream media,⁵⁶ This taboo cannot be foolproof because these media must react to leaks of relevant information by non-mainstream independent newspapers, the Internet, Radio Liberty, the BBC, Deutsche Welle, and Russian papers and TV programmes. Despite its obvious partisanship and “counter-propagandistic” tenor, such coverage has provided competent readers and viewers with enough information to stimulate critical thinking and a search for alternative information sources.

Indeed, Western observers have concluded quite rightly that “full freedom of the press does not yet exist [in Ukraine] but pluralism has appeared.”⁵⁷ The problem with pluralism is that very few Ukrainians have been able to afford to purchase two or more newspapers. Independent periodicals like *Dzerkalo tyzhnia* or *Krytyka* have been more expensive because they enjoy no government-sponsored privileges and have had to pay full taxes and costs. People outside the big cities have been even less aware of oppositional outlets like *Svoboda*, *Grani*,

56. At the end of 2001, the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) put aside an enormous sum of money in Ukraine to support a fair coverage of the 2002 parliamentary elections and, in particular, to ensure equal access of all political parties to the media for political discussions. None of the submitted projects won grants because no TV company dared to guarantee that all party leaders would be granted access to open-air debates. See Dmytro Mazurin, “Vybir TB i vybory na TB,” *Den*, 30 November 2001; and “Ukrainski telekanaly: Koly ia im, ia hlukhyi i nimyi,” *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, 1 December 2001. In private talks, many journalists and programme managers admit that the most severely blacklisted individuals have been Oleksandr Moroz, the leader of the center-left Socialist Party of Ukraine, and Iuliia Tymoshenko, the head of the center-right Fatherland party, because they are the most ardent opponents of Kuchma’s regime. In 1999, during the presidential election campaign, Studiia 1+1 won a similar IRF grant but failed to meet its conditions, that is, to offer air time to some blacklisted candidates. Many observers believe that this failure was connected with the strange illness of Viacheslav Pikhovshek, the Studiia 1+1 project manager and moderator of the political debates. After the first debate, the thirty-three-year-old journalist was “hospitalized with ‘heart spasms,’ and the remaining four debates were cancelled.” (*Kyiv Post*, 22 November 2001).

57. Marta Dyczok, “Is the Mass Media in Ukraine Independent?” Paper presented at the 32d National Convention of the AAASS in Denver, Colorado, 9–12 November 2000.

or *Vechernie vesti*, let alone cable TV or the Internet. Most of them have consumed what the government has fed them through the state-owned TV-1 and tabloids—plenty of news devoid of any meaningful information.

The Blackmail State

Since 1991, *rozbudova derzhavy* (state building) has been the main slogan of the ruling post-Communist nomenklatura in Ukraine and many other post-Soviet republics. This slogan has suited the post-Soviet elite in two major respects. First, it has corresponded perfectly with its etatist values, beliefs, and subconscious inclinations. Explicitly, it has prioritized state building over any other aspect of the “quadruple transition,” and implicitly it has given the nomenklatura a free hand to further oppress and marginalize civil society. Secondly, the slogan has appeased the nomenklatura’s national-democratic allies, who have believed that national statehood was threatened by a revanchist Moscow and, therefore, that state and nation building should come first and political and economic reforms could be postponed for the sake of national unity and stability.

As a result, the nomenklatura has carried out “state building” after its own design with the assistance of either gullible or corrupt national-democrats. It is hardly surprising that in ten years no substantial political and economic reforms have been completed. All of them would have to be based on a radical change in the legal system, a change that the Council of Europe prescribed as early as 1995 when Ukraine joined the council. As of yet, the traditional rule through law has not been replaced with the rule of law. Ukraine adopted a new Criminal Code only in 2001, under threat of expulsion from the Council of Europe. But thorough legal reform is still delayed and sabotaged.⁵⁸

58. As the head of the Ukrainian Supreme Court, Vitalii Boiko, confessed before his retirement: “To complete the legal reform, the only thing left to be done is to institutionalize a jury system. And, to my mind, one more problem remains—how to ensure the independence of courts from executive bodies, that is, how to detach the practical maintenance of courts from the Ministry of Justice, which represents, because of its very position, the interests of the government.... There is only one way to detach the courts of all levels from oversight by executive bodies. This way has been accepted in the Russian Federation, this system has worked for two centuries in the United States.... In Ukraine, the government still has as many ways to influence justice as one likes.” As a result, Mr. Boiko continues, “at every step we face the problem that people do not believe a court decision can be just and impartial in such a situation” (*Kievskii telegraf*, 3–9 December 2001, at <www.k-telegraph.kiev.ua>). Public opinion surveys confirm the dramatic decline in people’s confidence in any state institution. According to the Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Studies, only 9.8 percent of respondents in one of the centre’s surveys in August 2001 confirmed that they have full confidence in the courts (*Den*, 6 September 2001, 2).

Ironically, the monstrous authoritarian state, firmly ruled by a Soviet-style “telephone law” and effectively terrorized by the KGB-like tax police, is still believed to be a weak state, “where weak describes not the power of the state relative to other states but the ability of the government to adopt a policy and implement it in the society.”⁵⁹ This erroneous belief stems largely from the early impression of many transitologists that “the disintegration of the Soviet state left an administrative and institutional void in Ukraine of magnificent proportions that has taken a considerable time to ‘backfill.’ The political transition thus involves not only development of civic organizations, a free press and media, political parties, and interest groups but also building the capacity of the ‘quasi-state’ inherited from the USSR to enable it to perform even the most minimal functions of modern governance.”⁶⁰

“Unfortunately,” a young Ukrainian scholar polemically comments, “the belief in the institutional weakness of successive post-Leninist states has become uncritically accepted as conventional wisdom among transitologists. It must be said that the Ukraine inherited an elaborate system of administrative institutions from its Soviet predecessor. Though not being an ideal of effectiveness and efficiency, it could have shown much better performance had the interests of policy-makers coincided with the pursuit of developmental strategies.”⁶¹

The dispute can probably be settled by distinguishing between weakness and dysfunctionality. The Ukrainian state has been dysfunctional, that is, it has been unable and rather unwilling to satisfy some basic needs of its citizens and get government institutions to function properly for the public good. This does not mean, however, that the Ukrainian government cannot adopt and implement a policy it really wants, a policy that benefits state officials and their “business partners.” The distinction has been perspicuously explained by a *Kyiv Post* journalist who exposed the government’s “weakness” as nothing but the reverse side of its perverted “strength” (and vice versa):

Under current leadership, Ukraine stands no chance of effectively fighting money laundering or arms trafficking. The fight against either would involve exterminating the corrupt relationship between business and government that prevails in Ukraine today. It is that relationship that got Kuchma re-elected in 1999, and it is that relationship that has enabled him to easily weather a series of scandals since. It would be political suicide for Kuchma to turn his back on such a system. But as long as the system remains in place, fighting money laundering and arms trafficking is doomed to be a selective exercise: Opponents

59. Paul D’Anieri, “The Impact of Domestic Divisions on Ukrainian Foreign Policy: Ukraine as a ‘Weak State,’” in *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, ed. Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D’Anieri (New York: St. Martin Press, 2000), 84.

60. D’Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine*, 5.

61. Kutuev, “Development of Underdevelopment,” 10.

of the regime can expect to feel the full wrath of any new legislation; supporters can expect to be let off the hook.⁶²

Keith Darden provides an illuminating analysis of the nature of the state built by the nomenklatura:

The Ukrainian state, and the presidency in particular, is not weak, but ... many of its capacities are exercised through informal mechanisms of control that have until recently been hidden from view.... The new evidence suggests that pervasive corruption, combined with extensive surveillance and the collection of evidence of wrongdoing by the state, provided the basis for the Ukrainian leadership to use blackmail systematically to secure compliance with its directives. Corruption, rather than a sign of state weakness, is an essential element of the informal mechanism of presidential control in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states⁶³

His final conclusion seems to be even more insightful, however dismal:

Once set in place, this type of corruption becomes particularly difficult to undo, as those who are in a position to alter this mechanism are precisely those who derive the most benefit from it. The president and his team gain power, the oligarchs gain wealth, the press is controlled, and the masses are threatened, fragmented and repressed.... Ironically, currently popular efforts to “strengthen” the state in order to eradicate corruption and lawlessness will likely have the opposite of their intended effect. Harsher laws, in the absence of rule of law, only make selective enforcement.... This system of rule is likely to be sustainable, and ... without pressure from the international community to divide rather than concentrate the powers of the state, it will be difficult for opposition forces in Ukraine to cast off this system in the foreseeable future.⁶⁴

The practical implications for the independent mass media of state blackmail have been minutely described by Serhii Taran in his brilliant and courageous article “Authoritarian Society and Its Enemies.” He rightly points out that post-Soviet authoritarianism, in contrast to its Soviet predecessor, has been rather “shy”—it has tried to repress its opponents by methods and bodies that would not clearly colour the case with political meaning. Tax policing and fire inspection, the procuracy and numerous bodies established to license and supervise the *economic* activity of companies and individuals have been widely used for *political* repression. Misrepresenting political reprisals as merely “economic problems” not only circumvents the international criticism and

62. “The End of an Era?” *Kyiv Post*, 25 October 2001.

63. Keith A. Darden, “Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine under Kuchma,” *East European Constitutional Review* 10, nos. 2–3 (Spring–Summer 2001).

64. Ibid. See also Darden’s paper “The Dark Side of the State: Formal and Informal Mechanisms of State Supremacy,” presented at the conference on State Building in Post-Communist States: Toward a Comparative Analysis, Yale University, 27–8 April 2001.

sanctions that the post-Soviet regimes have definitely deserved, but also effectively conceals the problem of political freedoms from the eyes of the public at home by subsuming it under the more general and, for most people, more tangible problem of economic decline. An extremely corrupted economy and a highly intricate legal system have provided the post-Soviet regimes with a perfect minefield on which any prospective opponent can be easily trapped and destroyed. As Taran comments,

It is no secret that Ukrainian law, in fact, does not permit one to operate legally. Every business would go bankrupt as soon as it followed all the rules.... Everybody knows that the economic regulations are very defective, and the authorities tend to look through their fingers at various transgressions. But their benevolence comes to an end as soon as the subject comes under suspicion of political disloyalty.... The major advantage of such a method of economic influence [i.e., blackmail] is its wide applicability: it can be applied not only to the opposition media but also to any of its business partners.... For instance, it would suffice to “recommend” to major companies not to buy their advertising from some channels or, in a similar way, to “suggest” to printers not to print a “disloyal” newspaper. More often than not they would do as they were told to avoid any trouble.⁶⁵

The last observation suggests clearly that even the media that have strictly followed all Ukrainian laws and regulations with the help of the most qualified lawyers and bookkeepers have had little chance of surviving, simply because all their business partners can be intimidated and their whole business environment destroyed. An independent mass medium would face insurmountable problems in getting advertising, renting space, printing and licensing, subscriptions and distribution, access to newsstands, accreditation of journalists, libel suits and fantastic charges, and so on and so forth.

It is hardly surprising that virtually all independent mass media in Ukraine have existed largely thanks to international grants and moral support, or else have played the minor and marginal role of a formally legalized *samizdat*. Even such powerful companies as BBC and Radio Liberty had an opportunity in 2001 to assess the inventiveness of the blackmail state during the “tape scandal,” which the journalists of their Kyiv offices covered with uncompromising honesty. BBC was punished by the revocation of the license of its Ukrainian partner, Radio Kontynent, which retransmitted BBC programmes throughout Ukraine.⁶⁶ Radio Liberty fell under much stronger pressure, perhaps because it covered the event far more extensively. Its journalists were intimidated by unidentified “hooligans,” while the director of the Ukrainian section, Roman Kupchynsky, was reportedly blackmailed by two individuals who introduced themselves as

65. Taran, “Avtorytarne suspilstvo ta ioho vorohy,” 59–60.

66. “BBC zaklykaie perehlianuty rishennia Natsrady,” *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, 14 April 2001.

Ukrainian security-service officers.⁶⁷ Earlier, a similar problem befell the publisher of the English-language newspaper *Kyiv Post*, Jed Sunden, whose visa was simply cancelled upon his arrival at Boryspil Airport near Kyiv.⁶⁸

Defiant Ukrainian citizens have been punished much more severely, as the case of Heorhii Gongadze tragically illustrates. According to different sources, eighteen to thirty-one journalists have been killed in Ukraine within the last decade, most of them since 1997. Many more journalists, editors, and media owners have been beaten, threatened, and intimidated. The authorities have typically denied any political motivation in all these incidents that could point to their own involvement. As a rule, they have treated all of these cases as mere “hooliganism,” “accidents,” or, sometimes, “suicides.” This kind of misrepresentation has replaced a very concrete and pressing political problem —the persecution of journalists—with the more general social problem of rampant criminality in an allegedly weak state and deflected responsibility from the authorities.

Here again, the Gongadze case serves as the most graphic example of twisted official demagoguery. A whole team of pro-presidential scribblers and talking heads has suggested that Gongadze, who had mysteriously disappeared on his way home on 15 September 2001, was a suspicious individual with an adventurous past, a murky present, huge debts, and a clear intention to escape from his creditors, preferably abroad and probably with forged documents; that he was virtually a nobody, his work was poor, and his Internet newspaper was absolutely unknown; and, finally, that dozens of people disappear every day everywhere, so why make a tragedy out of the disappearance of this one guy?

These clumsy arguments seemed to work at home but proved to be indigestible internationally when, in October 2001, President Kuchma came out with his most outrageous argument after a Russian airliner with Israeli passengers was shot down accidentally by a Ukrainian missile: “We should not make a tragedy out of something if it was a mistake. Bigger mistakes have been made.”⁶⁹ This cynical statement infuriated the international community, and Kuchma finally had to apologize. But anything can be cooked up for internal consumption, even a remark as shameless as that made by the interior minister, Iurii Smirnov, that eighty percent of the allegedly killed journalists actually “faced quite a natural death due to alcoholic intoxication.”⁷⁰

67. See “Chronique des conflits entre les medias ukrainiens et les autorites du pays,” in *Presse et pouvoir*, 91.

68. Ibid., 92.

69. *Kyiv Post*, 11 October 2001.

70. See Olha Dmytrycheva, “Zelenyi ZMII,” *Dzerkalo tizhnia*, 13 October 2001.

Since 1997 and 1998 a number of national and international NGOs have been monitoring the media situation in Ukraine.⁷¹ They have reported regularly on all sorts of pressures on the mass media, including unannounced tax inspections or fire and building-code inspections, arrests and assaults on journalists, the freezing of bank accounts, and criminal and civil libel trials used to punish critics with enormous fines,⁷² imprisonment,⁷³ and even bans on practicing journalism.⁷⁴

Again, in most cases the authorities have justified their actions by claiming that everything has been done according to law and that the issue is purely legal, not political. They have never mentioned, however, that the law in Ukraine is applied selectively—in the strictest and harshest way against the regime's opponents and in the gentlest (if any) way against its supporters. Some examples of such selectivity are rather anecdotal. While a number of independent radio and TV companies have lost their licenses owing to some minor irregularities, the most "loyalist," pro-presidential NTKU has operated without a license because,

71. See, for example, the Committee for the Protection of Journalists at <www.cpj.org>, the European Institute for the Media at <www.eim.de>, IREX ProMedia at <www.ipc.kiev.ua>, the Institute of Mass Information at <www.imi.com.ua>, the Kharkiv Civil Rights Group at <www.khpg.org>, and The Communications Law in Transition Newsletter at <pcmplp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/transition>. Media issues are extensively covered also by Radio Liberty at <www.rferl.org>, Transition On-Line at <www.tol.cz>, the nascent Ukrainian on-line magazine *Telekrytyka* at <www.telekritika.kiev.ua>, *Ukrainska pravda* at <www.pravda.com.ua>, and many other periodicals.

72. The case of the popular daily *Vseukrainskie vedomosti* has perhaps been the most notorious. In March 1998, on the eve of parliamentary elections, the newspaper was shut down after losing a controversial libel case to a government-tied sports organization and ordered to pay \$1.8 million in "moral damages." Another popular daily, *Kievskie vedomosti*, was bankrupted in a similar way and ultimately acquired by a "loyalist," pro-presidential oligarchic group. See 1998 *World Press Freedom Review*, at <www.freemedia.at/wpfr/world.html>.

73. Perhaps the most dramatic accident happened to Oleksandr Horobets, the chief editor of *Pravda Ukrayny*. In early 1998 his newspaper was suspended by the Ministry of Information under the pretext of some mistakes in the registration documents. The suspension was illegal per se because only the court can pass such a decision. After Mr. Horobets won his suit against the Ministry of Information, he was arrested as a common rapist for allegedly assaulted an employee. In May 1999, having spent eight months in prison, he was acquitted. By that time, however, his oppositional newspaper had been successfully brought under control by pro-presidential forces, and Mr. Horobets lost his job. See 1998 *World Press Freedom Review* and *Presa i vlada: Khronika protystoiannia*, 31–2.

74. For the most notorious case, that of Oleh Liashko, see "Two Steps Backward," *Kyiv Post*, 21 June 2001.

as its newly appointed director, Oleksandr Storozhuk, confessed, the license had expired long ago.⁷⁵

A more dramatic example is provided by the story of the struggle with the opposition newspaper *Silski visti*, which supported Kuchma's major and most hated rival, the Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz. The authorities faced a hard task because the newspaper was popular, especially in rural regions, influential, and economically self-sufficient, and because Moroz was, and still is, one of the few Ukrainian politicians with an indisputable reputation for honesty. Nevertheless, an ostensibly legal way of shutting down *Silski visti* was found.⁷⁶ Tax inspectors discovered that in 1992 the newspaper privatized some premises and facilities of the former Communist Party publishing house and did not pay taxes. The legal issue is rather obscure and as yet has not been resolved in court. But the practical strategy of the authorities was clear. First, they used the tax administration rather than the courts to freeze the newspaper's bank account and paralyze its publication. Whatever the court decision may turn out to be, the newspaper will be heavily damaged, financially and morally. And secondly, the authorities never touched a number of other newspapers that had belonged to the same publishing house and were re-registered in the same way in 1991, after the Communist Party was disbanded. These newspapers probably privatized the Party premises and facilities in a similar way without paying taxes. Actually, nobody investigated this issue or even bothered to answer the question raised in many newspapers, not necessarily oppositional ones.⁷⁷ The answer, however, is clear if one notes the general pattern of selective law enforcement: of all the periodicals in question, only *Silski visti* happened to be critical of the president. Indeed, all media in Ukraine are equal before the law, but some have clearly been much more equal than others.

Statistics have shown that the opposition media and journalists have been objects of the authorities' "special control" measures:⁷⁸ virtually all victims of

75. See Olha Dmytrycheva, "Zmina dekoratsii," *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, 24 November 2001.

76. For a detailed account of the *Silski visti* affair, see the on-line bulletin of the International Media Institute at <www.imi.com.ua/strk/19/index.htm>.

77. For example, in his article "Parlamentske dvovladdia" (*Den*, 20 October 2000, 4), Andrii Tychyna wrote: "Is it only *Silski visti* that has not paid taxes and can't sleep peacefully now, or can others be recalled? Who else was there in 1991, among those who seceded from [the Communist Party publishing syndicate] Presa Ukrainy?"

78. In fact, conclusive proof of the government's thorough and perverse pressure on the mass media has been provided by Major Mykola Melnychenko, an officer of the president's bodyguard who fled to the West and revealed very incriminating conversations between President Kuchma and his aides, allegedly recorded in the president's office using a hidden digital recorder. Although Mr. Kuchma and most of his visitors deny the authenticity of the tapes, the way in which the authorities have handled the issue, let

selective law enforcement and a great majority of victims of “hooligans” belong to a tiny minority of writers and companies who strive to be independent from the authoritarian state.⁷⁹ For this reason, the scrupulous monitoring of all such cases by Ukrainian and international NGOs is of paramount importance for the survival of at least a few shoots of independent journalism in Ukraine. Still, the ultimate fate of the Ukrainian mass media depends primarily on Ukrainian society, which, so far, has been neither a society nor Ukrainian.

Nation Building or Nation Destroying?

Nation building seems to be the most complicated, disputable, and confusing part of Ukraine’s “quadruple transition.” While the great majority of transitionologists used to completely ignore this aspect, some authors have insisted on its paramount importance for the post-Soviet states. In particular, they have argued that “a state and nation more often than not had preceded the creation of democracies and market economies,” that “successful democratic transitions are improbable when national revolutions are incomplete,” and that “a rapid break with the past was only possible in areas with robust national identities”:

The greater the degree of cultural, linguistic and religious pluralism in the immature state, the more complex will be the democratic transition. This does not rule out creating cosotional norms (e.g., in Ukraine between Ukrainian and Russian speakers) but this takes up energy and time which could have been

alone the well-known situation in Ukraine, leaves little doubt about who has been the master and key manager of the blackmail state. In particular, there are three fragments in which President Kuchma allegedly talks to Nikolai Azarov, the head of the omnipotent National Taxation Service, about how to destroy *Silski visti*. In the first two fragments Kuchma, using characteristically obscene language, inquires why the newspaper is still being published despite his clear order to crush it completely. Azarov explains that he did his best to freeze the newspaper’s account, but “that stupid Oleinik” (director of the printing plant) has printed it on credit. “Stupid Oleinik” seems to have ignored Azarov’s threats; instead, he appealed to the State Committee on Information Policy. His disobedience (“stupidity”) infuriated the president. In the third fragment he insists that Oleinik should be “fucked” (“I’ve told you fuck him”), and blames the deputy prime minister for humanitarian issues, Mykola Zhulynsky, for what he believes to be sabotage: “Look, this son of a bitch Mykola Hryhorovich, I would tear off his head. I’ve told him, ‘Look, why should we tolerate this bloody *Silski visti*?’” But minor faults cannot undermine Mr. Azarov’s self-confidence. He knows perfectly well how the whole system works: “The court of arbitration rescheduled its judgment from yesterday to tomorrow. I’ve talked to the proper people, including the city [judge?]. They will pass the right judgment.” See Iaroslav Hrushevsky, “Faktor storonnoi liudyny,” *Grani-plius*, no. 20 (October 2001): 3.

79. See, for example, Volodymyr Denysenko, “Khuliganska tendentsiia,” *Den*, 30 August 2001. According to the same newspaper, 417 professional journalists were assaulted within less than a year (*Den*, 4 September 2001).

devoted to political-economic reform.... Many citizens in post-Soviet states exhibit multiple identities (linguistic, regional, inter-cultural and Sovietophile) that compete with the allegiance requested from them to their new national states.⁸⁰

In practical terms, this means that “mobilization in support of political and economic modernization is less likely if civic nationalism is not present.”

Nationhood generates collective power, creates a “we” (unity, legitimacy, permanence), enables mobilization and representation and produces people who are ready to make the highest of sacrifices for a political community that is both modern and based upon some ethnocultural and historical factors.... Without a common identity and group solidarity, which presupposes trust, societal mobilisation for the goals of political-economic modernisation is not possible. An atomised population, regionally divided, cynically disposed in their ability to affect change and lacking trust with other citizens in the same country are unlikely to generate either a vibrant civil society or societal mobilization towards stated goals.⁸¹

Clearly, Ukraine fits the latter pattern: neither civic nor national consciousness have developed sufficiently, except in western Ukraine and the capital city of Kyiv, to facilitate the processes of democratic transition. And what makes the task of civic mobilization even more difficult is the internal division of the titular nation itself.

The Ukrainian mass media have largely reflected this and many other divisions of Ukrainian society, its general atomization, and its ambivalence. Many media have contributed to this ambivalence and atomization, supporting the dubious post-colonial status quo and impeding the development of a civil society and a civic nation in Ukraine.⁸²

To analyze the dominant attitudes of the mass media towards the nation-building project, I shall divide the latter into four different groups: state-owned, oligarchic, independent, and partisan. The project itself has been never un-

80. Kuzio, “Transition in Post-Communist States,” 169. Kuzio cites the example of Belarus, where transition has failed because “the weakness of the national idea has directly contributed to the consolidation of an authoritarian, neo-Soviet regime” (*ibid.*). Two more graphic examples can be added: the Moldovan secessionist Transnistrian Republic and the Crimean Autonomous Republic within Ukraine.

81. *Ibid.*, 170, 173.

82. “Under the Communist and any other dictatorship, including today’s Ukrainian ‘anonymous undemocracy,’ nation building is distorted, retarded and, sometimes, subverted” (Serhii Chaly, “Iakykh mukh naivsia Rukh?” *Svoboda*, 11–18 December 2001). The analyst aptly remarks that, in contemporary Ukraine, “the process of nation building and establishing democracy is threatened not so much by the former empire but, rather, by the Ukrainian leaders themselves, who have discredited Ukraine and all things Ukrainian” (*ibid.*).

equivocally defined by the authorities and accepted with a clear consensus by the majority of the population.⁸³ Three different nation-building projects can be roughly defined as Ukrainianophile, “Creole,” and Sovietophile. Each of these projects has a wide range of ideological nuances within itself, but for all practical purposes this can be ignored here.

In brief, the Ukrainianophile project is the project of the Ukrainian political nation (“citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities,” as the Ukrainian constitution of 1996 defines it) with a Ukrainian cultural and linguistic core (as the statement “The state language of Ukraine is Ukrainian” in the constitution implies). This project has had a long history—it began with the emergence of modern Ukrainian nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century—and is associated today primarily with the Ukrainian national-democrats and their major political party, Rukh. Ukrainianophile partisan periodicals (*Chas, Ukrainske slovo, Narodna hazeta, Samostina Ukraina, Literaturna Ukraina*) have been the most ardent promoters of this project, but they have been rather marginal, even in western Ukraine. The project has also been supported to varying degrees, depending on the region, by the state-owned media, the majority of the independent media, and even by some oligarchic media.

The Sovietophile project has very little to do with *Ukrainian* nation building, since traditionally it has been aimed at the Russification and assimilation of Ukrainians into the imperial Soviet (or East Slavic) nation with an essentially Russian cultural and linguistic core. This project has been promoted primarily by the Communist Party of Ukraine, which is still a rather influential political force but possesses virtually no influential media: its major newspaper *Kommunist* reportedly has had a circulation of 70,000 but has hardly been able to attract any readers beyond the sectarian group of orthodox Sovietophiles. In southeastern Ukraine, however, the Sovietophile project has had some currency in the non-Communist milieu and has been vociferously articulated in some “anti-nationalist”-cum-Ukrainophobic-cum-Russian-chauvinist local newspapers.

The most interesting, although least elaborated, has been the “Creole” project of Ukrainian nation building promoted primarily by the oligarchic media and partly by the state-owned and independent media. The project has been based on the same assumption as the Ukrainianophile one—that the Ukrainian nation should be built as a political community united by civic rather than ethnic nationalism. However, the crucial issue of the cultural and linguistic core of this would-be

83. The 1991 referendum almost unanimously endorsed Ukrainian secession from the USSR. On the same day, however, only one-third of the people who supported Ukrainian independence voted for anti-Communist presidential candidates, that is, for a definite break with the Soviet past. Two-thirds supported the ex-Communist leader, Leonid Kravchuk, that is, they voted essentially for the continuity of independent Ukraine and the Ukrainian SSR.

nation is resolved in the Creole project rather differently. In its more radical form, the Russian language is claimed explicitly to be more promising and suitable for modernization and nation building in Ukraine. In its predominant moderate form, however, the Russian language and culture are prioritized implicitly by conceding a symbolic role to Ukrainian and reserving Russian for all other practical purposes. While the Ukrainophile media have insisted on some governmental protection for the Ukrainian language and culture—a kind of “affirmative action” in a post-colonial country, the “Creole” media have called, in a more “liberal” way, for formal equality and laissez-faire competition.

The government has tried to follow a middle line among all these demands, giving each side different concessions and promises and effectively manipulating them to its own benefit. The ultimate goal of these efforts has been to keep the “scavenger society” as divided and mutually alienated as possible, for only such a society will accept the corrupt, incompetent, post-Soviet elite as the “lesser of any other evil,” the saviour from inter-ethnic conflicts and civil war, and a poor but the only available mediator among the quarreling scavengers. In fulfilling this role the government has followed a two-pronged policy. First, through the state-owned and government-controlled media, it has successively substituted the issue (and slogan) of state building for the more complicated and controversial nation building. Thus, it has appeased the Sovietophiles’ fetishism in regard to the strong state; flirted with the Ukrainophiles, who, having belonged to a stateless nation, will accept any “Ukrainian” statehood as a dream come true; and, finally, given a pittance of hope to the “Creoles” by leaving the question of the cultural and linguistic core of the nation unanswered.⁸⁴ Secondly, any concessions the government has made (usually to the Ukrainophiles, politically the most active and strategically the most important group) have been symbolic rather than practically oriented. Thus, numerous laws and regulations allegedly designed to protect the Ukrainian language and promote Ukrainian culture have not been applied simply because there have been no legal mechanisms for their practical implementation.

The notorious Law on Languages is perhaps the best example of a symbolic gesture, although there are many other laws designed in the perfectionist style of Stalin’s Constitution, that is, with no practical consequences. For instance, Article 8 of the Law on TV and Radio Broadcasting stipulates that a minimum of fifty percent of programmes of any company in Ukraine should be aired in the state language, that is, in Ukrainian. Virtually nobody has taken any notice of this

84. “The slogan of ‘state building’ is an excellent invention of the nomenklatura. It has been building a state for itself, but has never said this openly, stating instead ‘What kind of opposition could be over here if we are building a common state?’” (Volodymyr Polokhalo, *Vechernie vesti*, 27 August 2001).

requirement, because products in Russian have been more available and cheaper and the Russophone audience have been larger and better off (the latter has been an important consideration for advertisers).⁸⁵ But the main point is that neither this nor any other law has provided any punishment for transgressors. "There is no law in Ukraine to protect somehow the interests of a national information producer."⁸⁶ "In our country no law in the information field works properly."⁸⁷ As a result, in 1999 only eighteen percent of all TV broadcasts in Ukraine were in Ukrainian. The same tendency can be noticed in radio (nearly all FM stations broadcast in Russian) and print media, where the percentage of newspapers printed in Ukrainian has fallen from 68 percent in 1990 to 39.6 in 1998 and the percentage of Ukrainian-language magazines has dropped even more dramatically, from 90.4 to 11.5.⁸⁸

Of the top thirteen newspapers that have had the largest circulation in Ukraine, all but a few have been published in Russian, including the leading Ukrainian tabloid *Fakty i kommentarii*, which reportedly is owned by Kuchma's son-in-law, the metal-exporting tycoon Viktor Pinchuk. Five ostensibly Ukrainian newspapers (highlighted in the following table) have simply been local printings of their respective Moscow counterparts. Another four have had separate Ukrainian and Russian (U & R) editions, and the remaining three have been published in Ukrainian only:⁸⁹

<i>Fakty i kommentarii</i>	1,019,000	R
<i>Silski visti</i>	474,000	U
<i>Izvestiia-Ukraina</i>	272,000	R

85. In a politically correct form, these arguments have been expressed by Oleksandr Zinchenko, president of the most influential Ukrainian TV company, Inter: "Unfortunately, the information resources in the Ukrainian language cannot compete as yet with the resources in Russian. If we restrict our informational space to the national framework or limit it to the Ukrainian language, we will end up in informational isolation....The compulsory fifty percent of national production and of the Ukrainian language [in TV programmes] is a norm that may legalistically stifle any further development of our TV space" (*Den*, 25 October 2000). Thus, seventy to eighty percent of the programmes broadcasts by Inter have been in Russian. This fact is typical rather than exceptional. What makes it really peculiar is that the person who, in this particular case, has violated the law is not just a businessman but also a member of Parliament and, moreover, the head of the parliamentary Committee on the Mass Media and Freedom of Speech.

86. Natalia Lihachova, "Profesionalizm potriben skriz," *Den*, 20 October 2000.

87. Valerii Ivanov (president of the Academy of the Ukrainian Press), *Kievskie vedomosti*, 22 November 2001.

88. "Factors in the Russification of Ukraine: Changes and Influences since 1991," *Romyr Report*, no. 5 (Winter 2000).

89. *FBIS Media Analysis*, 8 December 2000.

<i>Trud (Ukraina)</i>	185,000	R
<i>Holos Ukrainy</i>	179,000	U & R
<i>Komsomolskaia pravda v Ukraine</i>	130,000	R
<i>Uriadovyi kurier</i>	121,000	U
<i>Argumenty i fakty v Ukraine</i>	110,000	R
<i>Kievskie vedomosti</i>	110,000	R (daily) & U (weekly)
<i>Ukraina moloda</i>	107,000	U
<i>Moskovskii komsoomolets v Ukraine</i>	100,000	R
<i>Robitnycha hazeta</i>	96,000	U & R
<i>Den</i>	62,000	U & R

The influence of Ukrainian papers, as the same source comments, may be even less than this table suggests, since three of Ukraine's largest papers—*Holos Ukrainy*, *Uriadovyi kurier*, and *Robitnycha hazeta*—are government papers whose print runs are boosted by the official readership.

Laissez-faire capitalism does not necessarily mean fair competition. In the sphere of culture and the media, formal equality has usually benefited the player with the stronger starting position. Some critics have rightly compared the free flow of information with the free movement of a fox on a chicken farm. Not only ardent Ukrainian nationalists, but also liberal Ukrainian Russophones have recognized that

whatever we say about the urgent need of the Ukrainian media to become normal competitors with the Russian media and thereby protect the interests of the national information space and change the priorities of Ukrainian citizens, everybody still feels that, in reality, the weaker player (in this case, Ukraine) will never overcome the informational dominance of the former metropolis unless it resorts to protectionism on behalf of the national producers of information. This is all the more true in a country where Russian has been the first or “second native” language for the great majority of the people. And the economic aspect is even more pressing, since Ukraine gets no money from the advertisements placed in the Moscow media but distributed in Ukraine. Thus, it would be more reasonable to model Ukrainian-Russian relations in the field of information on the policy of Western European nations that have striven to protect their cultures and identities from American expansion.⁹⁰

So far, nobody has been concerned about a really effective, coherent, and unambiguous policy of protectionism on behalf of the Ukrainian language, which has been socially marginalized by centuries of colonial subjugation. Instead, the whole issue has been articulated in terms of the “informational security of Ukraine,” which allegedly needs to be protected by some restrictive measures. Although the anti-Ukrainian Moscow media have undoubtedly been subversive, the emphasis on restricting unspecified “hostile” media is very dangerous. Rather

90. Lihachova, “Profesionalizm potriben skriz,” 6.

than embark on the development of independent media as a part of the project of civil-society and civic-nation building, the Ukrainian government has actually sacrificed the building of a modern nation to the building (or rather preservation) of an authoritarian state.⁹¹

To confuse and corrupt its potential opponents, the regime has often used another kind of symbolic concession: it has appointed symbolically important but incompetent Ukrainophiles to top positions in symbolic institutions like the Ministry of Culture. In 1993 and 1994 the ministry was headed by a prominent literary critic, Ivan Dziuba, and in 1999 and 2001, by a prominent actor, Bohdan Stupka. From 1999 to 2001 a prominent poet, Ivan Drach, presided over the State Committee on Information Policy. These appointments have been of little, if any, practical consequence. As Ivan Drach confessed, his presumably powerful state institution has been virtually powerless to protect the Ukrainian language and culture: “The committee … can only give signals about what is going on in the information market. Then the public prosecutor, the customs and tax services, and other state institutions, which are supposed to respond to our signals, should intervene. We are like a nerve, we merely reveal what hurts. Yet the official reaction to our signals has been rather negligible. It seems we are crying in a wilderness.”⁹²

Natalia Lihachova, a leading Ukrainian TV critic, has wondered whether Drach and his committee were not craftily exploited “to discredit utterly the Ukrainophile policy in the informational and political fields and skilfully create a favourable public opinion paving the way for the ecstatic reunification with mother Russia.”⁹³ Alternatively, Lihachova has suspected that the “Ukraino-

91. “In Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries the nascent democracies have declined eventually. Authorities looked for ways to legitimize the restrictions on and control of the media. National interests and security became a convenient argument.... The former Communist nomenklatura accommodated the statist rhetoric to its own needs, first of all, to legitimize its dominance” (Ihor Slisarenko, “Praktychnye vtilennia ta rozuminnia ‘svobody slova’ na postradianskomu prostori,” in *Rol ZMI u spryianni evropeiskii integratsii*, 36–7).

92. *Den*, 21 August 2001, 4. In his earlier interview for a Canadian newspaper, Ivan Drach recognized that “We are more inundated with Russian culture and language today than we were even in Soviet times. Russian mentality is dominating our media. They all present the Russian viewpoint on the Chechnia war, for example, even though Ukraine has a different viewpoint on the war” (Geoffrey York, “Ukraine Looking to Canada in Fight to Protect Culture,” *The Globe and Mail*, 3 July 2000).

93. Lihachova, “Profesionalizm potriben skriz.” Another Ukrainian journalist has commented on the same developments even more sarcastically: “Last time, the new talks began with resistance to Russification. Scholars hold conferences, officials make statements. The National Council for Television and Radio has already announced a dozen times that every TV and radio company should broadcast over fifty percent of its

phile” Committee may have been used for another “dirty job”—to punish, under the pretext of protecting Ukrainian culture and language, some disobedient Moscow-based media for their “improper” coverage of Ukrainian events. It was probably no coincidence that Moscow programmes disappeared from the Ukrainian cable network immediately after they strongly criticized the mendacity of Ukrainian authorities who denied that Ukrainian armed forces shot down a Russian passenger aircraft.⁹⁴ Furthermore, Moscow newspapers printed in Ukraine encountered serious problems with (re)licensing as soon as they gave broad coverage to the “tapegate.” In both cases the law was applied correctly, but selectively. No one paid much attention to irregularities until a political reason emerged.

Laws and rules that are not applied or are applied arbitrarily degrade the state and demoralize society, giving rise to legal nihilism and social cynicism. But this seems to be exactly what the ruling elite wants—to convince everybody that life is still governed by the spoken, rather than the written, law and that the government is still the main “speaker,” that is, the interpreter of written law. Everyone is to understand that it is the president and his men who decide whether laws are applied, and if they are, then which laws are applied, how, and when.

Nation building is one more field in which the regime has used its blackmail strategy. Both Russophones and Ukrainophones have been given the same message: there are many symbolic laws in our country that can be applied selectively and to better or worse ends depending on your behaviour and the behaviour of your parties and media outlets.

Conclusion

The semi-authoritarian blackmail state, which has been fully established in Ukraine as well as in some other post-Soviet republics, has tended to be quite a stable, albeit stagnant, phenomenon that can persist for a long time. Since those who are best positioned to change the system are those who are most interested in preserving it, a vicious circle that is very difficult to break has taken hold. It

programmes in the ‘state language.’ In the light of previous discussions of this sort, the very fact of new talks on the language issue can evoke only deep concern. In fact, it is only Moscow propagandists who benefit greatly from these talks. Any statement on the topic endorsed by a Ukrainian official provokes a storm of various protests and infuriated reports from Russian politicians and journalists. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian language is still barely heard on FM, at pop concerts, in state offices, and in the armed forces” (Roman Kulchynsky, “Chym bilshe rozmov tochysia navkolo zakhystu ukrainskoi movy, tym menshe shansiv v nei vyzhyty,” *Polityka i kultura*, 21–7 November 2000, 11).

94. See the extensive analytical commentary on the issue by Sofia Leonovich, “NTV plius Rabinovich, abo Svoboda v sharovarakh,” *Grani-plius*, no. 22 (October 2001): 4–5.

can only be broken by a strong civil society, but the regime has done its best to arrest the development of civil society. Nevertheless, there are some signs that the situation is not completely hopeless.

First, the authoritarian regime in Ukraine, however despotic, has not been totalitarian. It has left much room for different views, ideologies, and even for some political and economic freedom. Although private mass media have largely depended on the blackmail state, they have been of better quality, more pluralistic, flexible, and diverse. A civil society (and independent media), however weak, oppressed, and marginalized, has already emerged in post-Soviet Ukraine and now has to be defended and developed.

Secondly, the authoritarian regime, however unified by corporate interests, has not been monolithic. It has consisted of competing clans that have their own economic interests and political preferences, their own media, and their own pragmatic relations not only with the state but also with some segments of the emerging civil society. Moreover, since Ukraine's natural resources are rather limited, its stagnant economy has been unable to sustain an elite that is growing in number and consumer needs. While the dominant parasitic clans have remained rather satisfied with looting capitalism, "inner dissidents" will inevitably emerge within the ruling elite and, sooner or later, bring about a kind of Khrushchevian thaw, Gorbachevian perestroika, or Ataturkian revolution.

Finally, Ukraine's size and geopolitical position has made it a major object of Western attention and influence. In regard to the mass media Western aid has meant primarily the monitoring of numerous violations and exerting international pressure on the Ukrainian government to bring it into compliance with its international obligations. Grants for the independent mass media, education of journalists and media managers, support for civic organizations that promote professional solidarity among journalists and provide legal protection—all these have been important parts of Western aid.⁹⁵ As the example of Yugoslavia shows rather dramatically, more sticks for the authoritarian government and more carrots for various agents and institutions of the nascent civil society may well bring about some positive results.

The post-Soviet regimes have had a vested interest in good relations with the West. Very few post-Soviet oligarchs would be willing to live in a closed society like Belarus or Turkmenistan. They need Western banks to safeguard their money, respectable Western universities to educate their children, and luxurious Western resorts to enjoy *la dolce vita* and bolster their self-esteem. All along,

95. The issue was covered in detail by Marta Dyczok in her paper "Is the Mass Media in Ukraine Independent?" See also Stephen Holmes, "Can Foreign Aid Promote the Rule of Law?" *East European Constitutional Review* 8, no. 4 (Fall 1999): 68–74; and Thomas Carothers, "Western Civil-Society Aid to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union," in *ibid.*, 54–62.

Western governments have had a powerful lever to influence the post-Soviet elite, but they have rarely used it. As a Russian analyst has aptly remarked (and the same can be said about Ukraine), “the looting of the Russian economy would not have been possible without the enthusiastic collaboration of Western banks and trading houses, and the money went to fuel Western stock market and real estate booms from which the West in general has benefited. If the Yeltsinite elite had the morals of whores, then the West certainly provided their pimps.”⁹⁶

If the anti-terrorist campaign launched by the international community in September 2001 expands beyond military operations, it will certainly affect the post-Soviet elites, their shadow businesses and their traditional schemes of money laundering via Western banks and offshore companies. These elites will have little choice then but to invest in their own countries and therefore establish rules that are more or less fair. In Ukraine this could provide the much needed impetus that would help to transform an ambiguous “transformation” into a dynamic “transition.”

96. As cited by Anatol Lieven, “Poltergeist Economics,” *The National Interest*, no. 64 (Summer 2001): 132.

The Dilemmas of Civic Revival: Ukrainian Women since Independence

*Alexandra Hrycak**

Motherhood, full-time work, and active citizenship—these were the three social roles the Soviet state officially expected women to perform. In practice, however, that state encouraged women in Ukraine to put motherhood above career advancement and permitted them to engage only in officially condoned civic causes. The late 1980s initiated a broad-based civic revival that provided many women opportunities to develop new political skills that enhanced their ability to contribute to their communities. However, the first ten years of Ukraine's post-Soviet existence profoundly challenged their capacity to ensure the carrying out of the political and social reforms women activists sought during glasnost. This article examines some of the ways in which Ukrainian women have altered their orientation to motherhood, work, and citizenship in response to the tumultuous changes of the last decade. I begin by exploring some of the broader problems that have led to declining women's health, socio-economic status, and political influence. I then evaluate in detail the causes of recent shifts in household composition and family structure. Next I analyze the factors that limit women's ability to improve their position in the labour force. I conclude by examining women's influence over politics and public life during the Soviet era and the first years of Ukraine's independence.

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Introduction

Soviet women first began entering public life in large numbers during the political upheaval of the late 1980s. Small networks of Ukrainian women became involved in initiating movements for freedom of conscience, religious tolerance, and national rights. The first distinct women's groups to form—soldiers' mothers committees—protested military hazing, and helped organize a draft-resistance campaign that succeeded in profoundly weakening the Soviet armed forces. In the following years, a variety of federated grassroots women's organizations urged women to come together as mothers to pursue broad-based moral reform and cultural revival. At the local level, numerous small-scale mothers' groups were established to provide assistance to children, in particular, to young victims of the Chornobyl nuclear-power accident. Large numbers of women also participated actively in environmental protests and demonstrations in support of religious freedom. Most of these early public women's groups justified their civic involvement using a language that exalted women's capacity to mother and sought to extend the maternal values of care, nurturance, and morality to society as a whole.

What followed this important period of civic revival was a transition more dramatic and more wrenching than even the most radical of these maternalist women's groups had envisioned. Single-party rule, five-year plans, collective farms, and similar Soviet institutions have been abolished. Ukraine has been declared independent. In contrast to the past, women are not prohibited from openly expressing their views and pursuing their group interests even when these interests diverge from state policies. Control over the government lies with elected officials who have been chosen in relatively free elections. There are alternative sources of information to which citizens have access, including a wide variety of new women's advocacy groups, political associations, and policy-research centres.

Ukrainian independence raised hopes of continued increases in civic engagement. Instead, it was followed by a noticeable decline in public participation in grassroots women's federations and other large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and an increasing professionalization of women's-rights work in the hands of a small, closed elite.¹ Foreign observers have presented a grim picture of growing gender inequality in the broader population. International human-rights organizations have reported that post-Soviet women workers have been treated as expendable and that women have accounted for over eighty percent of

1. For discussions of the numerous political obstacles that have hindered civic engagement and slow Ukraine's progress toward democracy, see Adrian Karatnycky, "Meltdown in Ukraine," *Foreign Affairs*, May–June 2001, 1–14; and Nadia Diuk, "Sovereignty and Uncertainty in Ukraine," *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 4 (2001): 57–64.

the unemployment created by economic restructuring.² Surveys of women's rights have found that violence against women has been increasing but has been unreported because authorities have failed to investigate rape and domestic-abuse complaints.³ Examinations of sex trafficking have found that criminal networks have duped up to four hundred thousand Ukrainian women into working abroad as prostitutes.⁴ These problems will only be addressed when newly established professional women's-rights advocates build coalitions with grassroots women's federations.

Diagnosing Ukraine's Crisis

Discussions of women's issues in post-Soviet Ukraine have frequently cast women as victims of a conservative state that has robbed them of the economic, social-welfare, and reproductive rights they enjoyed under Soviet rule. Most of the discriminatory practices that are now represented as new sources of gender oppression originated decades ago in Soviet policies that were intended to increase the birth rate and encouraged politicians, employers, and husbands to treat women primarily as mothers who should be more committed to their families than to their work or civic responsibilities.⁵ Soviet policies introduced a patriarchal division of labour that strengthened traditional gender roles while compelling women to shoulder many additional responsibilities, including full-time work. Arguably, it has been this conservative gender regime, not a new conservatism of the present transition, that has led politicians, legislators, and

2. See, for example, Ralph E. Regan, *Russia: Neither Jobs nor Justice. State Discrimination against Women in Russia* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995).

3. For examples of exposé-style discussions of rights violations, see Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project, *Too Little, Too Late: State Response to Violence Against Women* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997); and United States Department of State, *Ukraine Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2000* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the United States Department of State, February 2001). International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, *Women 2000: An Investigation into the Status of Women's Rights in Central and South-Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States* (Vienna: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights and International Helsinki Federation Research Foundation, 2000) provides a more balanced discussion.

4. Policy experts agree that no reliable numbers on trafficking exist. See Melanie Ram, *Putting an End to Trafficking of Women in the NIS and CEE* (Washington, D.C.: International Research and Exchanges Board, 2000).

5. Although there are many other ways of conceiving of the status of women, discussions in post-Soviet societies have tended to focus primarily on the role women as mothers play in the life of the broader community. See Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, *The Politics of Gender after Socialism: A Comparative-Historical Essay* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 15.

employers in Ukraine to make discriminatory decisions about how women should prioritize domestic duties, paid work, and public activity.

State efforts to reinforce traditional gender roles in Ukraine began many decades ago. Catastrophic population losses during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s led the Soviet state to introduce policies that both encouraged fertility and strengthened the nuclear family, in large part by restricting divorce and abortion. Soviet policies also reinforced traditional gender roles that excluded women from influence over public life and management of the state and the economy, and confined their authority to matters of private life and issues related to children and the family.⁶ Although restrictions on abortion and divorce were relaxed after the Second World War, state ideology, disseminated through the media and educational literature, continued to treat childbearing and child rearing as a woman's primary mission in life.

Party ideologues consistently depicted the USSR as the first country to emancipate women from traditional forms of exploitation. Ironically, in practice the Soviet gender regime reinforced a division of social life into male and female spheres, a split that feminists and socialists have long considered to be a principle source of male hegemony. Men came to be seen as leaders of public activities and productive institutions (which became the focus of considerable state intervention), while women came to be seen as caretakers of the private world of family life shielded (or somewhat shielded) from the state and the Party. Nowhere was this gender hierarchy more evident than in the conservative family-planning policies the Soviet state developed.

Throughout the postwar era, Party leaders sought, with little success, to encourage population growth by appealing to women to view motherhood as their sacred patriotic obligation. While women who bore ten or more children were given mother-heroine awards and publicly lauded, maternity benefits were insufficient, and virtually no investment was made in family-planning programmes that provide scientific knowledge about birth control and reproduction and facilitate access to non-surgical contraception methods. Declining birth rates in Ukraine and other European republics led Party leaders to increase maternity benefits and build more kindergartens in this part of the USSR to encourage Slavic fertility, but they made no investment in primary reproductive health care that would reduce infertility and allow parents to plan families rationally.⁷ Soviet

6. For excellent discussions of Soviet policies toward women, see Mary Buckley, *Women and Ideology in the Soviet Union* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989); Mary Buckley, ed., *Perestroika and Soviet Women* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Wendy Goldman, *Women, the State, and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917–1936* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

7. For a thorough discussion of relevant glasnost policy debates, see Buckley, ed.,

schoolchildren and students were encouraged by population-growth campaigns to marry young, but they never learned about contraception and reproduction, which continued to be treated as private matters. Abortion remained the only widely used method of birth control. Frequent abortions led to widespread infertility and physical and psychological stress.

Some of Gorbachev's "radical" reforms were also intended to encourage women to have more children. As Gorbachev put it, "many of our problems ... are partially caused by the weakening of family ties and a slack attitude to family responsibilities. This is a paradoxical result of our sincere and politically justified desire to make women equal with men in everything." It was time, he said, to curtail Soviet women's employment and public activity so as to "help make it possible for women to return to their purely womanly mission."⁸ Such pronouncements led to public debates about what needed to be done to correct the "damage" done to the Soviet family by women's "overemancipation."

Gorbachev's deeply conservative population-growth campaign encouraged public discussion of the man-made famine, the Chernobyl accident, and Russification in the hope that women would do their share to prevent Ukrainian "ethnocide" by bearing more children. The Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring (Rukh) strove to offer a more progressive solution: equal parental responsibility for child-raising. Its charter stated that Rukh supports *equal* parental responsibility for the family. Nonetheless, a more traditional, conservative approach to the family was brought up alongside this new doctrine of equal parental responsibility in the charter's section on ethics, which stated that "Rukh is cognizant of the important role of the family as a biological and social unit of society, in which the spirituality and future of the people are formed. Rukh upholds the comprehensive improvement of family life, equal parental responsibility for raising a morally healthy and nationally conscious generation, the rebirth of the traditional status of the Ukrainian family with mutual dignity and respect toward parents and toward the maternal role of women and their role in the creation and protection of the family hearth."⁹ In keeping with longstanding Soviet gender ideology, no further concerns about women's status were expressed in the Rukh charter. Nothing at all was said about what role women should play outside the family or how Rukh might help women to better define their interests in the workplace.

Perestroika and Soviet Women.

8. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 102.

9. The Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring, *Programme and Charter* (Kyiv and Ellicott City, Md.: Smoloskyp, 1989), 32.

Since independence, conservative, Soviet-style discussions of the decline of motherhood and the crisis of the family have continued to dominate media discussions of women. Newspaper stories about *women* have tended to focus almost exclusively on abandoned *children* (for example, orphans and street children) and on the reasons why mothers abandon or neglect their children.¹⁰ In interviews, prominent female politicians have been asked how they care for their children, and their policies and achievements have often been cast in a negative light. The media has rarely devoted serious attention to women in business.

In post-Soviet Ukraine, a conservative Soviet legacy also has continued to define the government's treatment of women's issues. Government leaders turn their attention to women twice a year—on International Women's Day and Mothers' Day, when they express gratitude to women as wives and mothers, *berehyni* who act as guardians of the hearth and of national values.¹¹ On such days, the president grants St. Olha medals to women who have given birth to many children or have worked with orphans. On other occasions, most politicians, like their Soviet predecessors, mention women only when they discussing measures to promote population growth.¹²

Women's NGOs have supported equal-rights legislation and broad-based state funding of reproductive health, with particular attention to rational family-planning methods and increased access to non-surgical contraception. The population-growth policies that both rightists and leftists have supported have provided meagre Soviet-style benefits to mothers (a practice that is still referred to as "supporting motherhood," even though families on subsidies often live well below the official poverty level).¹³ A small minority of centrist politicians

10. Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, *Gender Monitor*, September 1997, no. 1: 2; and *Gender Monitor*, October 1997, no. 1: 3.

11. Marian Rubchak, "In Search of a Model: Evolution of a Feminist Consciousness in Ukraine and Russia," *The European Journal of Women's Studies* 8, no. 2 (May 2001): 151.

12. See, for instance, Tamara Melnyk, *Henderna polityka v Ukrainsi* (Kyiv: Logos, 1999); or V. S. Vlasenko, Z. D. Vinogradova, and I. V. Kalachova, eds., *Gender Statistics for Monitoring Progress in the Area of Equality between Men and Women* (Kyiv: V. M. Koretsky State and Law Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2000).

13. There are some real differences between how rightists and leftists "support motherhood." Communist Party head Symonenko has referred to recent years of negative population growth as a period of "genocide," for which President Kuchma should be put on trial. He has blamed population losses on the influence of the West and its colonialist policies and supported a restoration of the Soviet Union. By contrast, rightists (who also have often said that they "support motherhood") have echoed glasnost-era discussions of women as the nation's *berehynia*, guardian of the hearth and mother of the nation. When rightists discuss women, they typically express concern about the role women play in transmitting Ukrainian culture.

affiliated with oligarch parties has given support to equal-rights legislation. However, parliamentarians, including prominent women deputies, have ridiculed this notion, claiming that women in Ukraine are already equal. Some have even continued to insist that women are overemancipated and need to devote themselves more to motherhood.¹⁴

As a result of these somewhat contradictory pressures, government policy-making has followed an ambiguous course that seems to respond to all of these recommendations but without strengthening the institutions through which social policies and programmes are implemented. Policy-makers have appeased leftists and some rightists by continuing Soviet-style maternity and child-welfare benefits. They have introduced fees for formerly free abortions and begun a national family-planning programme that is intended to promote population growth by reducing infant mortality rates and abortion-related health problems. Policy-makers have even responded to the women's-rights lobby by adding a guarantee of gender equality to the new Constitution of Ukraine, which now states that "equal rights of women and men are ensured ... providing for women equal opportunities with men."

Nonetheless, the government has consistently undermined not only Soviet-style efforts to improve maternal and child welfare through subsidies, but also newer Western-style programmes to promote family planning and gender equality. Just as in the past (when single mothers receiving maternity benefits often lived below the poverty line), state programmes to promote family and child welfare have remained underfinanced, and have been implemented through weak administrative channels run by patron-client networks that have never been accountable to the needy populations they are expected to serve.

A catastrophic decline in the living standards of needy families has resulted. In 1998, for example, when the official poverty level ranged from twenty to thirty-seven U.S. dollars per person, needy families received roughly nine to ten dollars per month in subsidies, while disabled children received roughly \$1.20 per month. In more recent years, women on maternity leave have received a subsidy of roughly five dollars per month, the equivalent of 10.9 percent of the average monthly wage of fifty-five dollars.

Today, budgets are probably the single greatest obstacle to administrative reform of state welfare programmes. Most state agencies receive less than fifty percent of their already meagre operating-budget funds. Developing a capable,

14. For a balanced discussion of the politics of gender in Ukraine during glasnost and the first years of independence, see Solomea Pavlychko, "Between Feminism and Nationalism: New Women's Groups in the Ukraine," in *Perestroika and Soviet Women*, ed. Buckley, 82–96; and idem, "Feminism in Post-Communist Ukrainian Society," in *Women in Russia and Ukraine*, ed. Rosalind Marsh (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 305–14.

accountable government social-services agency out of a post-Soviet bureaucracy requires considerable resources for retraining personnel and making basic infrastructural improvements. Meanwhile, the 1998 state budget for the Family Planning Programme was roughly U.S.\$333,000. This was far less than was needed to run this programme using existing resources. Available funds that reached clinics and hospitals were rarely adequate to make basic improvements. The daily medicine budget per person at Kyiv Gynecological Hospital 25 was \$0.20, while many gynecological clinics elsewhere in the country received little or nothing to purchase medicine. Because of meagre clinic budgets and considerable wage arrears, many gynecologists and obstetricians have expected patients to buy their own medication and pay extortionate fees for medical treatment. As a result of the current economic crisis, most people of reproductive age still cannot afford to pay for non-surgical forms of contraception.

Budgetary shortfalls have also undermined programmes promoting economic opportunities. While the 1997 National Plan of Action Aimed at the Improvement of Women's Status was promised nearly a million dollars, little of this budget was in fact disbursed, and the state organization that was to implement the plan was dissolved in 1998. This and many other new programmes sought to devote government resources to eliminating older forms of gender discrimination by guaranteeing women long denied political and economic opportunities. However, because of decades of conservative Soviet gender policies, Ukraine's politicians have not yet decided to commit sufficient funds to make such progressive new programmes work and have continued to view women as *berehyni*, romanticized maternal figures without ordinary human needs.

Women and the Changing Structure of the Ukrainian Family

For more than a decade, it has been argued that Ukraine's birth rate is declining because of "ethnocide" and that young people (women in particular) need to place greater priority on children in order to bring Ukraine out of a demographic crisis. Indeed, Ukraine has seen a considerable decline in population in the past decade. However, to a great extent, today's low birth rate is, in a broad sense, "normal" and represents a continuation of long-standing trends that began decades ago in nearly all industrialized countries in response to improvements in public health and education: a characteristic series of changes called the demographic transition that describes how the populations of Europe and North America have arrived at near zero population growth.¹⁵

15. The demographic transition has three main phases. Before the transition, both birth and death rates are high and the population growth rate is zero or close to it. In the second or transitional phase, the birth rate remains high while the death rate declines due

The population of Ukraine began the demographic transition prior to Soviet rule.¹⁶ Population growth had been strong for several decades in the nineteenth century, despite very high infant mortality and very low life expectancy. At the time of the 1897 Russian imperial census, the Ukrainian provinces of the Russian Empire had one of the highest fertility rates in Europe—7.5 children per woman—and one of the lowest life expectancies at birth—thirty-six years for men and thirty-seven for women.¹⁷ Low life expectancy, high levels of maternal, infant, and child mortality, and the added potential labour that came with each child compelled women to spend much of their life pregnant or nursing. Girls were rarely sent to school, and the literacy rate in 1897 was substantially lower among women (11.2 percent) than men (34.2 percent).

During Soviet rule, fertility and mortality declined and life expectancy and literacy increased. By the final decades of Soviet rule, Ukraine had completed the demographic transition by arriving at near zero population growth. Most parents now express a desire for two children, but delay a second child because they lack necessary resources, principally, adequate housing. According to the 1989 census, over half of families with children under the age of eighteen had only one child, fewer than forty percent had two, and roughly eight percent had more than two.¹⁸ More than half of urban families and just under half of rural families had only one child.

Since independence Ukraine's low birth rate has often been spoken of as a crisis of the family, in particular, of motherhood. However, similar trends can be observed in Western countries, where the population is living longer and so the proportion of child-bearing adults is declining. Indeed, the size of the Ukrainian


to better public health-measures, such as immunization and expanded food production because of improved agricultural methods. The decreased death rate at first leads to a high growth rate. But then, as the demographic transition progresses, the birth rate begins to decline thanks to better education, better family planning, more career options for women, and reduced infant mortality. Altogether this reduces the desire for large families. The population growth rate declines eventually to zero.

16. For the most complete discussions of demographic trends in Ukraine, see Ansley J. Coale, Barbara A. Anderson, and Erna Härm, *Human Fertility in Russia since the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); and Wolfgang Lutz, Sergei Scherbov, and Andrei Volkov, eds., *Demographic Trends and Patterns in the Soviet Union before 1991* (London: Routledge, 1994).

17. These figures on the pre-Soviet period are drawn from A. Perkovsky and S. Pirozhkov, "Population of Ukraine," in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, ed. Danylo Husar Struk, vol. 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 149.

18. These and the following population statistics and discussion are drawn from "Health as a Factor in Providing for and Achieving Gender Equality," *Gender Analysis of Ukrainian Society* (Kyiv: United Nations Gender in Development Bureau, 1999), 1–31; and Vlasenko, Vinogradova, and Kalachova, eds., *Gender Statistics*, 36–7.

Figure 1. Gender and Age Ratio of the Population of Ukraine, 1998 (in thousands of persons)



Source: United Nations Gender in Development Bureau, *Gender Analysis of Ukrainian Society* (1999)

family has not changed in the past decade.¹⁹ What, then, is the nature of Ukraine's current demographic crisis? Demographic trends suggest that since independence, young adults have delayed major transitions in their life course, such as marriage and parenthood, until economic conditions improve. Because of decisions to delay family formation, the overall marriage rate has continued to decline and the birth rate has fallen. The absolute number of births declined from 631,000 in 1991 to 389,000 in 1999. The birth rate fell from 12.1 to 7.8 during this period. Between 1990 and 1999 the marriage rate per one thousand persons fell from 9.3 to 6.9. The divorce rate has started to stabilize after several years of steady increases. Divorce rates rose from 3.7 in 1990 to 4.2 in 1993 before gradually declining to 3.5. Relative to the 1970s and 1980s, adults of child-bearing age now remain single somewhat longer, and their marriages produce fewer children and are somewhat more frequently dissolved through divorce.

As figure 1 shows, Ukraine's age structure itself has contributed significantly to lower birth rates. For several decades prior to independence, adults minimized the size of their families by delaying marriage, divorcing, or bearing fewer children than earlier generations did. Consequently, recent cohorts of adults aged twenty to thirty (the age when most Ukrainian women have their children) have been considerably smaller relative to older cohorts. As members of the all older cohorts age and their children mature and move away, the prevalence of childless and one-child families has increased, particularly, in urban areas. Steady increases in life expectancy throughout the post-war era has also contributed to increases in the prevalence of older households. All of these trends have resulted in decreased birth rates that have been consistent with demographic shifts that have occurred in other industrialized countries as public health improves.

Nevertheless, demographic trends in Ukraine have diverged from Western norms in certain alarming respects.²⁰ First, life expectancy has dropped since 1990 by almost five years for males and three years for females. Ukrainian male

19. The average size of Ukrainian households has not changed significantly in recent decades. It has hovered near four persons for more than five decades. The age composition of households has shifted upward.

20. A more complicated question to answer is why Ukraine passed through the demographic transition without experiencing the "baby boom" that took place in the West. This was, of course, not simply because women were "emancipated." Catastrophic population losses during the Ukrainian-Soviet and Ukrainian-Polish wars of 1918–20, collectivization, the Stalinist Terror, and the Second World War amounted to many millions. The total population contracted in the 1930s and 1940s. Although the collectivization-related famine of 1932–33 and deportations to Soviet Asia affected entire families, mortality rates were disproportionately higher among men and created significant disparities between the number of adult men and women, which are still evident in older cohorts today (see figure 1).

and female life expectancy lags ten and fifteen years respectively behind that of Japan, the country with the highest average life expectancy, and has fallen to the level in developing countries such as Iran and Algeria. Secondly, rates of maternal and infant mortality remain among the highest in Eastern Europe. Although recent years have shown some improvements, public-health advocates aim to achieve further reduction in maternal and infant mortality rates through public-health campaigns, particularly, the Children of Ukraine National Programme and the National Plan of Action for the Period of 1997–2000 Concerning the Improvement of the Status of Women and Enhancement of Women's Roles in Society.²¹ Thirdly, although abortion rates have declined (from eighty-three abortions per 1,000 women aged fifteen to forty-nine in 1990 to fifty-two in 1996), abortion has been much more prevalent and family planning services have been scarcer than in the West. Women and their children have experienced abortion-related health problems more frequently than their counterparts in industrialized countries. These problems have clearly resulted in large part from poor public-health and social-service sectors, which have deteriorated even further when government budgets were slashed after independence. Women's health problems have been exacerbated by the consequences of misguided Soviet era population-growth policies, an absence of domestic contraceptives, a need to rely on expensive foreign products, and prejudiced attitudes towards non-surgical contraceptives.

As has been noted above, it has not been uncommon for public discussions of Ukraine's population decline to question the devotion of young women to their children and family and accuse them of preferring a career instead. Such approaches have oversimplified or mischaracterized the many factors that contribute to the country's low birth rate. Arguably, it is men who have been the less committed parents. While women have devoted nearly as many hours to their family each week as they have to their jobs, research has shown that men have spent very little time on household tasks and have contributed to the family primarily as breadwinners. This role structure originated in Soviet policies that *challenged* traditional gender roles regarding mothers' participation in paid employment, but *reinforced* traditional gender roles regarding early motherhood and women's almost exclusive responsibility for the family. Women have adopted new economic responsibilities outside the home, but have continued to perform their responsibilities as mothers. Men, by contrast, have long had relatively few responsibilities as fathers and husbands. Perhaps as a result, predominantly male policy-makers and political commentators have failed to

21. However, given the Soviet practice of registering infant deaths, infant mortality is in fact substantially higher than published statistics indicate. For a detailed analysis of recent demographic trends, see *Gender Analysis*.

make it a priority to invest in the kind of basic infrastructural improvements that would reduce infant and child mortality and prevent infertility. Instead they have reduced the question of population growth to a matter of women's devotion to their children.

Women in the Transition Economy

Since independence, privatization has diminished economic opportunities for women in Ukraine and created pressures that, arguably, require not only a restructuring of household roles but also new kinds of government programmes to protect women from economic discrimination. Labour laws have established the legal equality of men and women, including equal pay for equal work. While this principle has generally been observed in the public sector, occupational segregation has long been pervasive and remains an unacknowledged source of considerable wage and income inequality.²²


Because their heavy domestic responsibilities have coded them as unreliable workers, women have long been concentrated primarily in low-status, unskilled, low-paying jobs in manufacturing, agriculture, and retail. During the Soviet era men held nearly all managerial positions, even in these predominantly female occupations. Prior to independence, women, although generally better educated than men, received roughly twenty-five to forty percent less pay than men. Even educated, highly skilled women were concentrated in lower-status professions, such as education, culture, the public sector, and health care, which were lower-paying than predominantly male professions.

Recent structural changes in the economy have had a devastating effect on women, particularly, unskilled low-wage workers. The transition from a full employment economy has necessitated a considerable reduction in the number of unskilled workers at most large enterprises. Soon after Ukraine's independence, textile mills and light-manufacturing enterprises, which employed a predominantly female workforce, stopped paying wages, closed their doors altogether, or dismissed many of their workers. The prospects of privatization have also led many agricultural and retail enterprises to stop issuing wages and

22. Studies have shown that employers have developed different expectations regarding the nature of men's and women's commitment to work, a practice that is also referred to as "statistical discrimination." Women, regardless of their marital or family status, have been automatically considered potential "working mothers" who would be discontinuously engaged in the labour force, and when working would give priority to their domestic duties. For a further analysis of occupational gender stratification in the USSR, see Gail Lapidus, *Women in Soviet Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); and Michael Paul Sacks, "Women, Work, and the Family in the Soviet Union," in *Understanding Soviet Society*, ed. Michael Paul Sacks and Jerry G. Pankhurst (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 71–96.

to dismiss many of their low-skilled workers, most of whom have been women. Highly educated women have also been affected, for instance, by the dismantling of Party-related research institutes, administrative units, and academic departments, but less dramatically than unskilled or low-status workers. Indeed, in some skilled occupations, since independence women have entered administrative and managerial positions vacated by men who have been dismissed or gone on to better-paying private-sector work.

Figure 2. Percentage of Women among Unemployed Persons



Source: United Nations Gender in Development Bureau, *Gender Analysis of Ukrainian Society* (1999)

New labour-market conditions have reduced the value of public-sector wages and increased the likelihood of unemployment and informal economic activity for all workers. They have pushed women—whom managers have always considered “mothers first” and hence “unreliable” workers—out of public-sector jobs into private or informal economic activity more quickly than men (see figure 2). As a result of the absence of economic opportunities for low-skilled workers in the private sector, many more women than men remain unemployed, cultivate private subsistence plots, and have difficulty finding new jobs. The percentage of women among the unemployed was highest just after independence, when it reached a peak of over eighty percent. Since 1992 it has decreased slowly. In 1995 seventy-three percent of those registered as unemployed were women. Since 1998 the percentage of women among the unemployed has remained stable at sixty-two percent. Inadequate unemployment benefits, which are roughly equivalent to twenty U.S. dollars per month (just above the official poverty line for one person), have placed unemployed women with dependents at great risk of poverty. Many women have had to devote more and more of their time to producing food for their family and have been unable to develop the skills needed to work in new, market-oriented enterprises.

Table 1. Official Wages of Women and Men, 1997 (in hryvnias)

Branch of the economy	Women	Men	Percent of women's wages to men's wages
Manufacturing	130.64	202.54	64.50
Communications	178.57	249.72	71.51
Science	151.64	195.46	77.58
Trade	109.15	137.05	79.64
Culture	89.12	111.52	79.91
Management	183.25	228.32	80.30
Education	119.87	146.01	82.10
Construction	142.39	173.03	82.29
Public catering	66.92	79.93	83.72
Transportation	153.26	172.97	88.60
Retail	159.28	172.73	92.16
Forestry	105.38	113.80	92.60
Agriculture	95.59	101.98	93.73
Health	121.83	129.76	93.89
Average	131.83	181.94	72.47

Source: State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine, *Labor in Ukraine in 1997. Statistical Collection* (Kyiv, 1998), 183–4, cited in United Nations Gender in Development Bureau, *Gender Analysis of Ukrainian Society* (1999).

Long-standing economic disparities, in particular, lower wages for predominantly female occupations, such as health (seventy-nine percent female), retail (seventy-four percent), education (seventy-three percent), and culture (seventy-two percent), have continued to put women at a considerable disadvantage in the workplace. In the public sector, women workers have earned on average roughly twenty-five percent less than men (see table 1). Gender-based wage disparities have been greatest in high-paying and predominantly male occupations. In communications, the ratio of women's to men's wages is 72:100. In manufacturing, the wage ratio is 65:100. Wage disparities have often been smallest in low-paying, predominantly female occupations where all workers receive below-average wages. In health and education, for example, the average wage in 1997 was almost ten percent below the cross-occupational average for all women and nearly thirty-three percent below the average wage for all men. Women workers have earned less whether they work in "male" or "female" jobs.

Even though most Ukrainian politicians have asserted that there is no need for further equal-rights legislation, gender- and occupation-based wage disparities in the public sector have been significant and systematic. Gender-based wage

Table 2. Ratio of Women's to Men's Real Income

Age	Percentage
15–19	63.4
20–24	60.8
25–29	50.0
30–34	80.0
35–39	61.3
40–44	81.4
45–49	57.9
50–54	108.3
55–59	61.2
60–64	48.4
65–69	83.2
70–74	64.5
75+	60.0

Source: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, cited in United Nations Gender in Development Bureau, *Gender Analysis of Ukrainian Society* (1999).

disparities, largely unacknowledged among a population that grew up believing that women and men had achieved equality under Soviet rule, have been evident in both “male-dominated” and “female-dominated” occupations. Women working in communications in 1998 received an average monthly wage of 179 hryvnias, roughly equivalent to fifty-four U.S. dollars. Meanwhile, men working in communications received on average about seventy-five dollars per month. Although women and men working in agriculture earned similar average wages, twenty-nine to thirty dollars, this was not that far above the official poverty level for one individual.

As a result of these gender-based wage differentials, gainfully employed women with children or other dependents have faced difficulties in buying basic necessities such as milk and eggs. A single mother with two children employed in the relatively high-wage communications or management sector of the economy fell below the official poverty level in 1998 even if she received an average family welfare subsidy of nine to ten dollars. The same was true for a single mother who worked in agriculture if she had only one child.

Although most people have been unaware of the extent of discriminatory practices, women's socio-economic status has lagged behind men's at almost every stage in life. Women have tended to receive not only lower wages but also lower pensions. Moreover, when enterprises have reduced staff, women have been released without a pension more often than men (eighty percent of women but only twenty percent of men). Low official wages and pensions, together with

the rising cost of living, have compelled nearly all adults to supplement their earnings through private plots and other forms of economic activity in the private sector. Women, particularly if they are older than thirty, seem to have been at an even greater disadvantage in the private sector than in the public sector. They have been substantially less likely to be hired by new private firms, except as poorly paid secretaries.²³ Women in the private sector have tended to be self-employed petty traders who work in open-air markets. Although in the first years of the transition such petty traders were able to earn considerably more than they would have earned at public-sector jobs, in recent years their profits have declined as larger-scale retail enterprises have edged them out.

In general, men seem to enjoy significant socio-economic advantages over women in the second economy. Studies of real income have demonstrated considerably greater gender disparities than state statistics on official public-sector wages (see table 2). Women have reported substantially lower incomes than their male counterparts at all ages except for the first years of their retirement at age fifty. This suggests that pensions are briefly able to equalize gender disparities, but that other government subsidies fail to do so and that men's higher pensions recreate gender-based economic disparities that began with wage discrimination. Moreover, the low income reported by women in their twenties (the age when children are likely to be born) suggests that single-parent families with small children have been at a substantially greater risk of poverty than multiple-income families. In a low-wage transition the welfare of the entire family is in jeopardy when even one of the parents earns an inadequate wage.

Since independence, unacknowledged stereotypes that have long coded women as mothers first and workers second have exacted a tremendous toll on families. Women have been more likely than men to remain unemployed or receive inadequate wages when working full-time. As a result, women have been more likely than men to leave their families for economic opportunities abroad. Once abroad, they have often worked in poorly paid menial jobs that native women shun. This has been not only a great waste of human capital. It may also have long-term demographic consequences. Although women have gone abroad temporarily, mainly to send cash home, many undoubtedly will not return, particularly, if opportunities in Ukraine fail to improve or if long absence removes these women from the career ladders that typically lead to better jobs. What is more, women who have left behind young children to be raised by relatives, as well as young women suspected of working as prostitutes, are likely to face reintegration problems upon their return. Although they have worked

23. See Tatiana Zhurzhenko, "Ukrainian Women in the Transitional Economy," *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe*, no. 60 (November 1998): 55–68; and International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, *Women 2000*.

abroad primarily because they have had no other way to support their families, their friends and families may reject them, forcing them to go abroad again and remain there permanently.

Programmes to improve economic opportunities for women in Ukraine are likely to influence migrants' decisions. But they are not enough. Heavy household responsibilities have long been and, in the new market economy, continue to be significant obstacles to women's occupational advancement. The patriarchal family role structure inherited from Soviet years has also led to continuing romanticization of the family and the neglect of its real problems. If men and women shared domestic duties more evenly, perhaps serious attention would be paid to the material conditions of the family and also to the public-health and social-service infrastructure.

Women in Politics

Policies to create economic opportunities for women and improve social services depend on changing policy-makers' and voters' perceptions of both women's and men's roles and priorities. Challenging gender discrimination in Ukraine will require considerable work.

Women are at a serious disadvantage in politics. During the Soviet period they rarely occupied positions of real political influence. In the early years of Soviet rule, the Zhenotdel (Ukrainian: Zhinvidil), the Women's Department of the Communist Party, became a channel for women to influence policy and enter positions of leadership. But in 1930, after women led a series of local revolts against collectivization, the Zhenotdel was abolished.²⁴ While continuing to claim that women's rights were an important state goal, Party functionaries gradually created a large administrative apparatus devoted primarily to increasing population growth and encouraging women's participation in low-wage, low-prestige jobs. Relatively few women advanced in the Party. Those who did were excluded from most decision-making and agenda-setting positions, and were put in charge of maternal and child welfare, the only policy sphere that Party leaders considered relevant to women.

The dissolution of the Zhenotdel, the only sanctioned Soviet organization devoted to women's political advancement, made it hard for women to mobilize as a group. The Soviet state's promotion of its "pro-women's rights" agenda also obscured the nature of women's grievances. There were no alternative sources of information accessible to Soviet citizens that might help them determine the extent and nature of gender (in)equality. They could see that women were integrated into a wide variety of official associations, such as the Komsomol, the

24. Mary Buckley, ed., *Soviet Social Scientists Talking: An Official Debate about Women* (London: Macmillan, 1986); and Goldman, *Women, the State, and Revolution*.

Communist Party, and unions. Even if women rarely became leaders, the percentage of Party members in local organizations who were women rose very gradually to one quarter by the late 1970s. Quotas also ensured that by the 1980s women held about one half of the seats in Ukraine's local and oblast soviets and a third of the seats in the republic's Supreme Soviet. Official claims that Soviet women had attained full political equality with men were exaggerated, but Party quotas and its monopoly on the exchange of information made it difficult to represent women as an aggrieved or excluded group. Nonetheless, the absence of women from positions of real influence and the lack of an organizational centre for women's-rights activists made it difficult to mobilize women and continued to hamper women's influence on public policy.

Because of their long-standing exclusion from genuine political authority, women in post-Soviet Ukraine have also had little political power. Relatively few women have entered national politics. In 1990, after the demise of gender quotas, the percentage of women in the Supreme Council declined from one-third to 2.9 percent. Subsequently, it has increased slightly to 4.6 percent in 1994 and eight percent in 1998. More women have been elected officials in local politics. Women deputies constitute up to a third of the members of oblast and city councils and the majority in village councils. However, at present local councils still have little real power. Most legislation is introduced at the centre by the president. Nearly all taxes are sent to Kyiv, and local councils receive virtually no resources.

Women play a minor, but not insignificant, role in political parties. Several parties have a sizeable female membership. In 1999 women comprised forty percent of the Popular Movement of Ukraine and the Liberal Party of Ukraine, forty-five percent of the Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Green Party of Ukraine, and nearly fifty percent of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Women also head oblast party organizations (for example, the Lviv oblast Sobor). At the national level, women have led eight of Ukraine's one hundred and thirty political parties. Three of these—the All-Ukrainian Party of Women's Initiatives, the Women of Ukraine party, and the All-Ukrainian Union for the Future of Women—are politically insignificant women's parties with no parliamentary representation. The other five parties, however, are of considerable political significance: the Agrarian Party of Ukraine (formerly led by Kateryna Vashchuk), the Democratic Party of Ukraine (led by Hanna Antonieva), the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (led by Iaroslava Stetsko), the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (led by Nataliia Vitrenko), and the Fatherland party (led by Iuliia Tymoshenko).

By assuming leadership of opposition parties, several women politicians rose in the late 1990s to positions of national importance and engaged in high-profile duels with President Kuchma. Nataliia Vitrenko received considerable popular support when she ran against Kuchma in the 1999 presidential election. Iuliia

Tymoshenko, as a key member of Viktor Yushchenko's Cabinet, successfully took control of the energy sector away from Kuchma's cronies. After her dismissal, she became a leader of the anti-presidential National Salvation Forum and formed an electoral bloc. In an effort to discredit or disqualify her in advance of the March 2002 parliamentary elections, supporters of President Kuchma brought fraud and bribery charges against Tymoshenko in both Ukraine and Russia, had her repeatedly imprisoned, and subjected her to smear campaigns in the media.

Although individual women have begun assuming greater authority as opposition leaders within Parliament and the party system, women's issues have remained marginal to the concerns of leading politicians. Political parties have rarely defined any explicit policies that would advance women's economic or social rights. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (led by the émigré Iaroslava Stetsko), has been the only party to state explicitly that it "strives to have laws and state social programmes adopted that will guarantee that women and men receive equal pay for equal work." Vitrenko's and Tymoshenko's parties, however, have made no explicit proposals regarding women's economic rights, even though both Vitrenko and Tymoshenko have privately expressed support for increased attention to such questions. The Liberals' and the Agrarians' platforms state that these parties oppose gender discrimination, but they do not indicate what concrete measures will be taken to promote equal opportunity. The Agrarian Party's platform, for example, simply indicates that the party supports state policies "promoting child-bearing."

Several attempts to establish women's parties have been made, but their election efforts have failed, as have their campaigns to attract public support to gender issues, such as legislation that would protect women from discrimination in the workplace. Increases in the number of women parliamentary deputies have not created effective support for gender-equality legislation or even for more adequate maternity- and child-welfare benefits. Unfortunately, with the notable exception of Vitrenko and Tymoshenko, women parliamentary deputies tend to be treated as they were in the past. Just as in the Soviet era, they have been put in charge of underfinanced, low-profile government structures associated with the family or children. Severe budget constraints have limited the effectiveness of such programmes, and those associated with them have been powerless to make effective changes on their own. As Tymoshenko's example suggests, women develop greater agenda-setting power only when they control significant state resources.

Recent attempts to protect women against employment discrimination have also faltered, because Ukraine has inherited a weak state that is ill-equipped to challenge new business interests. Relative to the Soviet era, women's-rights organizations now have better information regarding the extent and nature of gender discrimination. However, they have had few allies in positions of

authority, in part because so many policy-makers have continued to believe Soviet-era claims that women and men have long been equal, and in part because there have been no parliamentary committees or state offices concerned with women's labour or civil rights. As a result, there has been relatively little institutional support for women's occupational advancement. Gender-based discrimination cases cannot be actively pursued through the state because, while the state guarantees gender equality, it has provided no means for prosecuting infractions. It is no exaggeration to say that considerable legislative and judicial reform will be required before existing labour legislation inherited from the Soviet period becomes a usable tool to defend women's economic and social rights. Furthermore, because there has been considerable corruption in the court system, business interests are, at present, perceived as unbeatable. Reforms will only come when the wider public comes to see these problems as ones to be solved.

Women in Associational Life

In time women's associations may become important channels for persuading the broader public that women's economic rights deserve serious government attention. However, Ukraine's women's organizations remain weak as well as divided on whether the government's treatment of women needs to be challenged.

Official Soviet women's organizations were toothless and limited their activity to traditional women's causes. During the Second World War Soviet women were mobilized into anti-Fascist committees that directed relief work among orphans and wounded soldiers. These became the basis for the Women's Soviet, a centralized federated women's organization which came to be called by its Russian abbreviation, Zhensoviet. The Zhensoviet continued to exist on and off after the war, but it was politically insignificant in Ukraine. In 1987 Gorbachev authorized the Zhensoviet to be revived, but the rapid expansion of the organization was conducted in a formalistic "top-down" manner typical of Soviet mass-mobilization campaigns. After Gorbachev's speech reviving the Zhensoviet, a directive was issued stating that women in every major workplace had to join.²⁵ By year's end, official announcements claimed that nearly half a million women belonged to Ukraine's women's councils, organizations that existed mostly on paper, had no budget, and were never heard from again.²⁶

25. Pavlychko, "Between Feminism and Nationalism," 90.

26. Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Political Communities and Gendered Ideologies in Contemporary Ukraine*, Harvard Papers in Ukrainian Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 1994), 20-1.

Since 1990 a variety of women's associations has formed. Most of them have been concerned with women in their capacity as mothers. The Union of Ukrainian Women, a patriotic federation founded in 1991, lobbied for Mothers' Day to be declared an official holiday and assists orphans and gifted children. The Organization of Soldiers' Mothers of Ukraine is another federated association that represents the interests of mothers of conscripts and has chapters throughout Ukraine. Mothers and Sisters for Soldiers of Ukraine, a federation of theatre performers and artists founded in 1992, was concerned with inculcating national consciousness among servicemen and worked actively in army units during Kravchuk's presidency. The Olena Teliha Society, a patriotic federation formed in 1994, is also concerned with national revival. It has three thousand members organized into a network of local chapters that organize children's camps, competitions for gifted children, and concerts devoted to Olena Teliha's poetry and the work of other women writers. Mother 86, formed in Kyiv in 1990, is a small but active group of women environmentalists concerned with shielding children from the after-effects of the Chornobyl nuclear accident. It now has branches in several other cities and a total of fifty members.

A women's-rights orientation has been adopted by the Association of Women, the successor to the official Soviet women's organizations, and by the Women's Hromada, a federated organization that originated as the women's section of Rukh and split off in 1992. These two organizations have different political allies and have operated with somewhat different understandings of women's rights. The Association of Women, in keeping with the socialist tradition, has been primarily interested in improving women's employment opportunities. The Women's Hromada, by contrast, has been concerned more broadly with increasing women's political representation and raising their political awareness. Dozens of small women's associations that espouse feminism and support equal rights have also formed, primarily in response to Western assistance programmes. Unfortunately, they remain dependent on foreign grants, and many have pursued causes that are of little public resonance. In contrast to the maternalist groups that formed after independence, most new women's-rights NGOs have tended to be active only when they have grant support.

The women's-rights lobby has been a small and relatively new public interest group.²⁷ It has sought to promote a broader gender-equality policy that

27. Melnyk, *Henderna polityka v Ukrainsi*. For a good discussion of the equal rights campaign, see the proceedings of a 2000 conference devoted to equal rights that was sponsored by the UN Gender Bureau: Svitlana Kuzmina, ed., *Rivnist zhinok i cholovikiv v Ukrainsi* (Kyiv: United Nations Gender in Development Bureau, 2001). On the rise of women's associations and the contradictory nature of different conceptions of women's rights, see Pavlychko's three articles: "Between Feminism and Nationalism," "Feminism in Post-Communist Ukrainian Society," and "Progress on Hold: The Conservative Faces

would compel employers and the state to treat men and women as equally responsible for children. So far these efforts have failed despite considerable foreign support. Part of the reason for their failure is that the lobby has not yet built effective coalitions with other women's groups that have adopted more traditional causes. This is to the detriment of both types of groups. Traditional women's groups, which seek to help children and families, have had public legitimacy but have been woefully underfunded because their causes have not appealed to foreign assistance programmes. If both types of women's groups could unite, their coalition might begin winning public confidence in programmes that would advance broader women's rights.

Women in the general public have not yet recognized the nature and extent of gender discrimination. But they have not been categorically opposed to women's rights, and in time they might be convinced to support equal rights legislation. Indeed, although politicians like to thumb their noses at women's rights, studies have shown that over half of the women who turn to women's NGOs have sought help in protecting personal, work, or family rights.²⁸ At present, however, relatively few women's activists deal with such problems. Nationalist organizations, for example, have been concerned primarily with the patriotic upbringing of children, while the feminist groups that depend on foreign grants have focused on the priorities of their foreign donors. One such priority has been trafficking in women. The best-funded Ukrainian NGOs have in recent years focused on trafficking prevention to the exclusion of the problems that have compelled Ukrainian women to go abroad. Trafficking prevention is a valid cause, but donors should also support programmes focused on more basic issues.

Conclusion

Foreign and domestic observers have talked largely past one another when they have tried to help Ukrainian women cope with the transition. While foreign observers and foreign-financed groups have drawn attention to abuses of women's rights, the media and politicians seem concerned exclusively with promoting motherhood. As a result, women in the general public have failed to see their own economic and social welfare and their reproductive rights as real issues.

of Women in Ukraine," in *Post-Soviet Women: From the Baltic to Central Asia*, ed. Mary Buckley (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 219–34.

28. Olexandra Rudneva, "Ukraine Country Report," *The First CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) Impact Study* (Toronto: York University Centre for Feminist Research and the International Women's Rights Project, with the guidance of the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women and UNIFEM, 2000), 215–32.

The public understanding not only of women's rights but also of men's family responsibilities has to be changed. Declining public health and considerable gender differentials in unemployment rates, wages, and pensions prove not only that women in Ukraine today do not compete on an equal footing with men, but also that insufficient attention has been given to the state's responsibilities for family welfare. In the past, frequent official campaigns "promoting motherhood" engendered widespread stereotypes that population growth depended on women's devotion to housekeeping and maternal responsibilities over career advancement. This belief, of course, proved to be a significant obstacle to women's occupational advancement in the Soviet period, and today it continues to discourage women from defending their rights in the workplace and in public life. It has also perpetuated the problematic distinction between a private, predominantly female sphere of family relations, which does not call for high budget priority, and a public, predominantly male sphere of political and economic affairs, which is of greater policy concern.

The collapse of the Soviet state and the prospect of greater freedom of association has provided women's-rights activists with an opportunity to challenge the Soviet gender regime and fight for true equality and improvements in Ukraine's public-health and social-service infrastructure. At present, the women's-rights community is small and has yet to build effective coalitions with traditional women's groups that have greater public visibility and mobilize around family issues. Until such alliances develop, most authorities will probably continue to treat women in much the same way as they have in the past—as a politically insignificant group that makes no claims, receives symbolic recognition on holidays, and is easily ignored the rest of the time.

Nation Building and Nationalism in Independent Ukraine: Theoretical Perspectives

Glenn Goshulak

While the end of 1991 signalled the death knell of the Soviet Union, it also opened the door for extensive research projects in the former Soviet region. Among the numerous issues of post-Soviet political life in the newly emerging states was the question of nationalism as a factor in the state-building process. For some very compelling reasons, the Ukrainian state was seen to be especially vulnerable to instability and civil conflict. During the 1990s, the Ukrainian state has managed to maintain peace by settling conflicts with Russia over the Black Sea Fleet and by defusing a possible secessionist movement in Crimea. However, the continuing poor performance of the Ukrainian economy sustains the possibility of future unrest. An additional factor that several scholars have focused on is the potential threat of a Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Ukraine. They have been influenced by Rogers Brubaker's argument that most post-Soviet state leaders are promoting "nationalizing states": "These are states that are conceived by their dominant elites as nation-states, as the states of and for particular nations, yet as 'incomplete' or 'unrealized' nation-states, as insufficiently 'national' in a variety of senses.... Almost all of the twenty-odd new states of post-Communist Eurasia can be understood in this sense."¹ It has been argued on the basis of this model that there is a clearly defined conflict between those who are included in the "nationalizing state" (Ukrainians) and those who are excluded (especially Russians), a division that is reinforced in Ukraine on a regional, east-west basis.²

1. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 79.

2. The most direct influence of Brubaker's "nationalizing state" model is found in

Yaroslav Hrytsak observes that the study of Ukrainian nationalism has been unique in two important respects. He notes that the theoretical literature on nationalism has not been accompanied by adequate empirical research: "While this is true for the field as a whole, contemporary studies of identity formation in post-Soviet Ukraine display the opposite tendency: much of what has been written on the subject is rich in empirical findings but lacking in appropriate theoretical perspective."³ Hrytsak also points out that Ukrainian studies tend to contradict the approach of most theories of nationalism: "While most theories of nationalism emphasize the complex, multidimensional character of national identities that cannot be reduced to a single element, many researchers tend to determine national identities on the basis of ethnic and language criteria, the premise being that 'the private use of language is closer to the issue of [national] identity' than any other group indicator."⁴ Hrytsak's criticism of theoretical perspectives is certainly valid: as others have noted, assumptions regarding the nature of Ukrainian identity lack appropriate examination.⁵ However, it cannot be assumed that existing theories of nationalism are adequate for theorizing Ukrainian national identity.

This article is an attempt to fill a gap in the study of Ukrainian nationalism in the past ten years. Part of the problem is rooted in insufficient theoretical debate on the nature of nationalism in the Soviet and post-Soviet context. In many ways, existing theory offers valuable insights that can help us understand the dynamic process of nationalism in Ukraine today. However, there are also some inherent problems with transferring Western-based models to the Soviet context. Although Eric Hobsbawm's and Ernest Gellner's analyses of the Soviet context are based on assumptions opposite to those of Rogers Brubaker, they

Dominique Arel, "Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State," in *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 157–88. Some other approaches to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict include Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine, the (Former) Center, Russia, and 'Russia,'" *Studies in Comparative Communism* 25, no. 1 (Mar 1992): 31–45; and Ian Bremmer, "The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 2 (1994): 261–83.

3. Yaroslav Hrytsak, "National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk," in *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, ed. Zvi Y. Gitelman et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 263.

4. *Ibid.*, 263.

5. See Louise Jackson, "Identity, Language, and Transformation in Eastern Ukraine: A Case Study of Zaporizhzhia," in *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, ed. Taras Kuzio (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 102.

lead to essentially the same conclusion regarding the role of nationalism in post-Soviet states today.

The approach offered here rejects the essentializing nature of these approaches. I shall try to show why issues of national identity and state construction in Ukraine should be treated as a more complex process. One alternative approach is based on the state-in-society model. This approach allows for a more inclusive study of the complex nature of nationalism in Ukraine today.

Gellner and Hobsbawm: Modernism and the Post-Soviet State

One of the inherent weaknesses of theories of nationalism lies in their attempt to provide a global model for explaining nationalism. Given that these theories are based largely on the Western model, they tend to view all nationalisms according to that model, which links nationalism closely with the rise of capitalism.⁶ Hobsbawm and Gellner, two of the most influential theorists of nationalism, attempted to apply their theories of nationalism to the Soviet and post-Soviet situation.

Hobsbawm argued that nationalism was not a factor in the destruction of the Soviet state. Even though he viewed the Soviet experiment as a failure, he claimed that the successful suppression of nationalism was one of the greatest successes of the Soviet era:

Hence, as we can now see in melancholy retrospect, it was the great achievement of the communist regimes in multinational countries to limit the disastrous effects of nationalism within them.... The USSR's potential for disruption, so long kept in check (except during World War II), is now patent. In fact, the "discrimination" or even "oppression" against which champions of various Soviet nationalities abroad used to protest, was far less than the consequences of the withdrawal of Soviet power.⁷

Hobsbawm saw the resurgence of nationalism in the late 1980s as essentially "unfinished business" from 1918 and claimed that it was not the driving force behind the economic and political changes in the Soviet Union at the time, but rather their beneficiary.

6. Anthony D. Smith identifies this as the modernist paradigm, in which nations are viewed as both modern and constructed. See his *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).

7. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2d ed. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 180.

Hobsbawm's dismissal of nationalism can be attributed largely to his own ideological framework. For him, nationalism was the product of a particular stage of capitalism. As capitalism changed, nationalism's rationale did not remain the same. He argued that the rise of transnational capitalism weakened the ability of the nation-state to act in its own interests. This changing environment loosened the connection between nationalism and the principles of self-determination of the 1920s that offered statehood to all nations. As the rationale for a state became less certain, nationalism simply became one of numerous movements competing for resources, using exclusionary tactics to justify its actions. Hobsbawm identified this new form of nationalism as "*fin-de-siècle* ethnic nationalism."

What ethnic identity politics had in common with *fin-de-siècle* ethnic nationalism was the insistence that one's group identity consisted in some existential, supposedly primordial, unchangeable and therefore permanent personal characteristic shared with other members of the group, and with no one else. Exclusiveness was all the more essential to it, since the actual differences which marked human communities off from each other were attenuated.⁸

Ernest Gellner approached post-Soviet nationalism from a perspective that was different from Hobsbawm's, yet he arrived at a surprisingly similar conclusion. Gellner's approach to nationalism is based on the theory that modernizing states require a new type of citizenship. Thus, through educational and linguistic policies the modern state produces a "high culture" that both fulfills the need of the modern state and gives the new citizenry a common, egalitarian form of national identity.⁹

During the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Gellner briefly sketched out a framework for understanding nationalism from an "East European" perspective. He rejected the application of his "high culture" model to the Soviet case. Instead he offered a five-stage model for East European nationalisms and concluded that the post-Soviet states, which emerged in 1991, were essentially nineteenth-century "stage-two" nationalisms that had been successfully contained during the Soviet period. His fear was that these countries would go through stages three and four, as did other states during the course of the twentieth century, and suffer the same disastrous consequences.¹⁰

While these two approaches offer a more complex view of nationalism, their account of the role of nationalism within the post-Soviet context is quite

8. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), 428–9.

9. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

10. Ernest Gellner, "Nationalism and Politics in Eastern Europe," *New Left Review*, no. 189 (1991): 132.

different. They see post-Soviet nationalism as essentially a nineteenth-century form of primordial ethnic sentiment that leads to conflict rather than cohesion. In this sense, their approach to post-Soviet nationalism is surprisingly similar to the “nationalizing state” model.

Hobsbawm's and Gellner's claims that the nationalism in post-Soviet states essentially has a nineteenth-century form places nationalism outside the historical process. This is one of the problems with an approach that essentializes national identity. Identity becomes reduced to a limited set of characteristics, such as ethnicity or language, and is reified. An alternative approach locates nationalism within a particular historical framework and studies national identity as a more dynamic force embedded in a wider context of social and political changes.

The State-in-Society Model: An Alternative Theoretical Framework

The limitations of theories based on Western experience suggest the need for new theoretical perspectives for studying nationalism in post-Soviet states. A possible alternative that I suggest is a variant of the state-society approach. This approach draws upon the “state-in-society” model developed by Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue¹¹ on the basis of Migdal's earlier work, in which he began to formulate an alternative theoretical approach to the study of Third-World states in order to assess how effective post-colonial elites were in developing strong states.¹²

In *State Power and Social Forces*, Migdal modifies this theoretical approach by stressing the advantages of regarding the interaction between state and society as a symbiotic relationship. One aspect of the state-in-society approach involves “disaggregating” the notion of the state.

No state can monitor all its rules; each needs what Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman called “legitimizing universes,” a constellation of symbols justifying state domination. It is this need that lies behind the attempts by states to shape the moral or symbolic order of their populations.... It is the transformation of people as they adopt the symbols of the state and the transformation of the state as it incorporates symbols from society—both seemingly “non-political” processes—that an anthropology of the state can illuminate.¹³

11. Atul Kohli, Joel S. Migdal, and Vivienne Shue, eds., *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1.

12. Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), here 4–5.

13. Kohli, Migdal, and Shue, eds., *State Power and Social Forces*, 15.

This approach offers two significant advantages for studying nationalism. First, the examination of “sites of conflict” on the issue of identity highlights the embedded nature of nationalism. Rather than reduce nationalism to one particular struggle, this enables us to understand how the struggle over identity can involve a variety of ideas about the nation (the “national idea”). The struggles and accommodations over the “national idea” can take place in many areas, including historical symbols, ethnicity, language, territory, economic factors, and political power. The second advantage of this approach is that it helps to show how these struggles often lead to accommodation or coalitions among various state and social forces in order to solidify state power and create a greater sense of legitimacy. Often the accommodations involve a consensus on how the nation is defined and in whose interests. How these struggles take place and the nature of the resulting alliances and accommodations are important factors in understanding the development of nationalism.¹⁴

The National Idea: the View from Above

From a state-in-society perspective, the Ukrainian state is best studied as a post-colonial “transformative” state. According to Migdal, transformative states “go beyond trying to establish people’s personal identities; they aim to shape people’s entire moral orders—the content of the symbols and codes determining what matters most to them.... With only isolated exceptions, political leaders have sought to head a transformative state. They have seen it as an organization that can (or, at least, should) dominate in every corner of society.”¹⁵ In the Ukrainian case, both Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma have attempted to construct strong transformative states. In part, this helped to legitimize their positions both as leaders of the state and as symbolic figureheads of the “national idea.” Legitimizing the idea of a Ukrainian state entails providing some kind of rationale for the uniqueness of the state. In this sense, Kravchuk became a “Ukrainian nationalist.” He called for the restoration of the Ukrainian language and culture and promoted the adoption of Ukrainian historical symbols.¹⁶ Kravchuk emphasized that he was defending the interests of Ukraine, but he was careful about how he characterized its citizens. He referred to them in an ethnically neutral way as the “people of Ukraine” rather than the “Ukrainian people” to avoid offending ethnic Russians.¹⁷ In categorizing Kravchuk as a

14. Ibid., 23.

15. Ibid., 13–14.

16. Taras Kuzio, *State and Nation Building in Ukraine* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 127–8.

17. Alexander Motyl, “The Conceptual President: Leonid Kravchuk and the Politics of Surrealism,” in *Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership*, ed. Timothy J. Colton and Robert C.

nationalist, therefore, we need to qualify the national idea that he promoted. While utilizing symbols and myths from Ukrainian historical experience, Kravchuk emphasized from the very beginning that the new state was a state for all its citizens: "I have one great aim. I am not saying that in our generation we can create a complete and mighty Ukrainian power; rather, the great aim lies in creating, in laying the foundations of statehood, so that the people have a state of their own, their own native state.... Not Ukrainians, but all the people living in our land, Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Poles, Hungarians, everyone."¹⁸

In dealing with sensitive historical issues, Kravchuk avoided violating either the Ukrainian or Russian historiographic perspectives. When asked whether he thought Kyiv was the cradle of the Russian state, Kravchuk responded: "The matter is that Kyiv has never been the cradle of the Russian state. It was a cradle of the Kievan Rus', incorporating different lands. This is a historical fact which nobody calls into question. However, we don't make it a basic principle of our relations with Russia and Byelorussia. We refer to this fact as a purely historical one."¹⁹ In his speech to the World Conference in 1992, Kravchuk outlined the nature of the national idea that he envisioned for Ukraine:

With the recovery of statehood, the Ukrainian people, which was a persecuted and tortured national minority in its own homeland, has regained the national idea powerful enough to sustain the rebirth of the nation. The Ukrainian nation has outstretched its brotherly hand to other nations sharing a common fate on their way to the Temple of Independence.... We are fully aware that the content of the national idea is determined now by its correlation with the interests of national minorities. Therefore, Ukraine, with non-Ukrainians making up more than 25 per cent of her population, has embarked on the path of the construction of an independent, democratic, law-governed state, rather than a purely ethnic state. As a matter of fact, the three ideas—national, political, and social — have merged into one notion—that of "civil" principle.²⁰

For Kravchuk, therefore, state building was the most important task. The creation of a strong legitimate state required an inclusive form of national identity. When asked if he was a nationalist, Kravchuk emphasized that national interests and the interests of the state were the same.²¹

Tucker (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 115.

18. "Kravchuk Interviewed on Presidential Role," Ostankino Television, 11 February 1992, trans. in FBIS-SOV-92-029, 12 February 1992.

19. Kravchuk's interview with the newspaper *Repubblica*, 27 January 1992, in Leonid Kravchuk, *Our Goal—A Free Ukraine: Speeches, Interviews, Press-Conferences, Briefings* (Kyiv: Globus Publishers, 1993), 122.

20. Speech by Leonid Kravchuk at the World Conference "The Keeper of My Brother: Anti-Semitism and Prejudices of the World of Change," 7 June 1992, published in *Our Goal—A Free Ukraine*, 139.

21. Leonid Kravchuk, "How Shall We Live" programme on Moscow Russian

When we examine Kravchuk's and Kuchma's election platforms, the similarities between their understanding of the national idea become clearer. During an interview in March 1994, Kravchuk acknowledged that there was a special relationship between Russia and Ukraine: "I think that Ukraine must be together with Russia but not subordinated to Russia—that is all. I have a realistic view on facts, there is no way for Ukraine but be together with Russia. We have been together for 300 years and it is in our genes. We have had quarrels, weddings and unifications amongst our peoples and these relations cannot be broken."²²

While also calling for closer ties with Russia, Kuchma emphasized that the Ukrainian state had a separate path to take from its neighbours:

Because of its geographical position, historical past, and the entire spirit of the people Ukraine cannot play the role of "cordon sanitaire" between Russia and the remaining European countries that has been foisted upon it. Its historical mission is very different; Ukraine must become a bridge for the mutual enrichment of the civilizations of West and East.... Russia, with which we are linked by thousands of historical, economic, and cultural bonds, is especially important in this respect. The path of confrontation with it is quite disastrous for Ukraine and entails total collapse and the possible loss of statehood.²³

Shortly after his election to the presidency, Leonid Kuchma gave indications of how he viewed the relationship between the national idea and state building. In a speech to Ukraine's Supreme Council, while reaffirming his decision to grant the Russian language official status, he outlined his vision of a strong state that recognizes the uniqueness of Ukrainian culture, is inclusive of all national cultures, and is the common goal of all the inhabitants of Ukraine: "We should repay our debts to Ukrainian culture, while simultaneously creating the best conditions for the free development of the national cultures of all people who live on the territory of Ukraine. We should consolidate, not break up, society at this critical moment in Ukrainian history. To work honestly for the good of Ukraine, for the glory of Ukraine: this is the main demand, which should be put to all the citizens of the state."²⁴

Given the nature of Kravchuk's state-building project, the more moderate nationalist forces—Rukh in particular—were viewed as possible allies. In

Television, 18 June 1994, trans. in FBIS-SOV-94-118, 20 June 1994.

22. Leonid Kravchuk, "Conditions for Crimea's Economic Independence Set," ITAR-TASS, 26 March 1994, trans. in FBIS-SOV-94-059, 28 March 1994. See also, Viktor Demidenko and Mikhail Melnik, "Kravchuk Calls for Stronger Economic Ties with Russia," ITAR-TASS, 20 June 1994, trans. in FBIS-SOV-94-118, 20 June 1994.

23. "Kuchma Interviewed on His Election Platform," *TRUD*, 21 June 1994, trans. in FBIS-SOV-94-120, 22 June 1994.

24. Leonid Kuchma, "Speech to the Supreme Council in Kyiv," Radio Kyiv World Service, 19 July 1994, trans. in FBIS-SOV-94-139, 20 July 1994.

February 1992, Kravchuk addressed the third Rukh Conference in Kyiv and acknowledged the role of Rukh both in the movement for Ukrainian independence and in the future project of state building.²⁵ Later he met with Rukh leaders to discuss closer ties.²⁶ By assuming the role of nation-builder, promoting the Ukrainian language and an inclusive nationalist identity, and employing historical nationalist symbols and myths in his speeches, Kravchuk placed nationalist groups such as Rukh in a dilemma. They could not oppose Kravchuk on grounds that he was neglecting the interests of the Ukrainian state, as this would force them into a more radical nationalist stance. Yet, they were interested in promoting a leader from their own ranks rather than supporting an ex-Party apparatchik whom they did not fully trust. In an early 1992 statement, Viacheslav Chornovil, a former dissident and Rukh's presidential candidate, admitted that attacking Kravchuk on nationalist grounds would be difficult: "We are living today on the basis that Kravchuk defends the state's interests to a certain extent. That's fine, we back him in that. But when it comes to the economy, there is total disruption."²⁷

Kravchuk's and Kuchma's development of the national idea was conditioned by their desire to head a transformative state. The nature of such a state, however, required also a reorientation of other state forces. As part of the changing environment of the post-colonial Ukrainian state, social forces that had fought for Ukrainian independence were now being assimilated into state structures.

The political parties that grew out of former nationalist organizations needed to broaden their platforms, partly because of the changing nature of nationalism. In the Soviet period, it was primarily a defensive movement aimed at protecting Ukrainian national identity. After 1991, as nationalism became part of the state-building process, its purpose became radically different. In the process of developing a national idea, an accommodation of ideas took place on the right. Political organizations such as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN), while continuing to stress the rights of the Ukrainian nation, have become more sensitive to the multinational nature of the Ukrainian state. In 1993 Alexander Motyl claimed that such groups were capable of polarizing the political spectrum, because of their tradition of exclusionary nationalism.²⁸ However, the Melnyk faction of the OUN has

25. "Third Rukh Congress Opens in Kiev, 28 February," Maiak Radio, 28 February 1992, trans. in FBIS-SOV-92-041, 2 March 1992.

26. "President Kravchuk Meets with Rukh Leaders," Radio Rossii, 5 March 1992, trans. in FBIS-SOV-92-045, 6 March 1992.

27. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 31 January 1992, trans. in FBIS-SOV-92-022, 3 February 1992.

28. Alexander Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism* (New

attempted to distance itself from “nationalist extremism.” Already by 1994 the OUN described its philosophy as a “democratic nationalism” that rejects the chauvinism and xenophobia of more radical groups.²⁹ In an interview with the author in 1999, Mykola Plaviuk, the leader of the Melnyk faction, defined the nation in historical context and the development of the Ukrainian national idea as an inclusive process of state building.³⁰

Even in the most radical nationalist organizations, the changing nature of the state has led to a reorientation of goals and strategies. The most popular of these extreme nationalist organizations is the Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian National Self-Defense (UNA-UNSO). In 1989, known as the Nationalist Union and led by Oleh Vitovych, this organization espoused typically integral-nationalist slogans inspired by Dmytro Dontsov: “Ukraine … is capable of and can dictate its conditions to the world. The Ukrainian nation is chosen, and we should convince everyone of that.”³¹ Within this conception of the role of the nation, the group has espoused a national dictatorship rather than a democratic order. However, the transformation of Ukraine from a Soviet republic to an independent state has forced the group to reorient its philosophy. Initially the UNA, as it is called now, boycotted the political process and set up a paramilitary organization that sent forces to fight in the conflicts with Russia in Moldova, Georgia, and Chechnia. The organization has also revised its platform and is now advocating the creation of a Kyiv-based Slavic union. For this purpose, it organized a pan-Slavic conference in Kyiv in 1993, established contacts with other nationalist parties and organizations outside Ukraine, and even allowed the use of the Russian language in eastern Ukrainian organizations.³²

While the UNA’s reorientation has been minimal, its changes show that even the most extreme nationalist forces have been affected by the changing nature of the post-colonial state. The reorientation in goals and strategies that takes place within a transformative state does not mean that these political forces must abandon their visions of nationhood. However, a continuing emphasis on the

York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 94–6.

29. Viacheslav Shved, “The Conceptual Approaches of Ukrainian Political Parties to Ethno-Political Problems in Independent Ukraine,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 19, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 7.

30. Mykola Plaviuk, interview with author, Kyiv, 1 April 1999.

31. Oleh Vitovych, as quoted in Roman Solchanyk, “The Radical Right in Ukraine,” in *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 287.

32. Solchanyk, “The Radical Right in Ukraine,” 279–96; Taras Kuzio, “Radical Nationalist Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine before and after Independence: The Right and Its Politics, 1989–1994,” *Nationalities Papers* 25, no. 2 (June 1997): 211–42.

defense of the nation makes less sense in the context of state building, which requires a more positive, inclusive platform in order to broaden the base of support.

Taras Kuzio identifies the less exclusionary national idea as a “state nationalist” position. Within this category he includes groups ranging from the KUN on the right to the Socialist Party of Ukraine on the left. This does not mean that there is a consensus on all issues of identity among these parties. However, there is a minimal consensus among them based on a more or less inclusive notion of state identity. As Kuzio notes, this kind of consensus is consistent with most civic states:

All political parties from the Peasants/Socialists on the left to the centre right are state or civic nationalist because they support Ukraine’s independence. They differ though on their attitudes towards how the national idea is to be defined. As in all civic states, the attitude of political parties towards the ethnocultural context of the nation state varies. Centre-right parties are more supportive to giving greater prominence to ethnocultural features within the state. The fact that centre-right parties in *all* civic states place greater stress upon the ethnocultural definition of the state does not make them nationalists.³³

There has been a reorientation of state forces in political parties on the left as well. This was highlighted by their responses to Ukrainian Independence Day celebrations. During the 1995 celebrations the communist and socialist organizations ignored the celebrations, while centre-left parties staged protests against Ukraine’s isolation from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and against “nationalistic hysteria.”³⁴ A year later the Independence Day military parade was attended by President Kuchma, Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, and—significantly—Oleksandr Moroz, leader of the Socialist Party.³⁵

The movement of Moroz—and other members of the left bloc—towards a more “state nationalist” position was further demonstrated in the 1999 presidential election campaign. During the anniversary celebrations of Ukrainian independence in August 1999, a joint statement was issued in Kaniv—the burial place of the Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko—by four presidential candidates from the left, Oleksandr Moroz, Oleksandr Tkachenko, Ievhen Marchuk, and Volodomir Oliynyk.³⁶ This group of candidates, later known as

33. Taras Kuzio, “Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards a New Framework,” *Politics* 20, no. 2 (May 2000): 84.

34. “Opposition Parties Defy Independence Day,” ITAR-TASS, 24 August 1995, trans. in FBIS-SOV-95-165, 25 August 1995.

35. “Ukraine: Military Parade Marks Independence Day 24 August,” ITAR-TASS, 24 August 1996, trans. in FBIS-SOV-96-166, 26 August 1996.

36. Larisa Trilenko, *Vremia MN*, 15 October 1999, “Kuchma’s Opponents Settle on

the Kaniv Four, called for a new executive to rescue the state and claimed that the Kuchma administration was jeopardizing the sovereignty of the state and the unity of the Ukrainian people. The familial language they used in reference to Ukraine—"The Fatherland is in danger!"—is typical of "nationalist" leaders in other states. Their claim that they would unify the Ukrainian people suggests that they viewed the creation of a unified nation-state to be a crucial part of the state-building project.³⁷

The View from Below

One of the distinct advantages of the state-in-society approach is that it avoids the tendency to reduce complex social phenomena to simple ones. In studies of Ukrainian nationalism in the post-Soviet state, there has been a tendency to view national identity primarily as a struggle between the ethnic (or linguistic) Ukrainian and Russian communities in Ukraine, communities that are based in western and eastern Ukraine respectively. In the 1990s numerous survey studies were conducted in Ukraine to determine the self-identification of groups and individuals, their overall loyalty to Ukrainian independence, and the attitudes of ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians towards the other community. Some of them have attempted to reinforce this essentialized division. Let us examine the problem of essentializing identity and show how a state-in-society approach gives a better analysis of the problem and prospects of identity formation.

The main argument against constructing a bipolar ethnic division between the ethnic Russian and Ukrainian communities in Ukraine is that it is often difficult to establish a clear self-identification in each group.³⁸ Paul Pirie argues that intermarriage, urbanization, and Russification have produced a variety of self-identifications within both the Russian and Ukrainian communities.³⁹

Common Candidate," trans. in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 51, no. 41 (1999): 19–20.

37. Kuzio, "Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards a New Framework," 82.

38. Recent studies, especially from a quantitative geographical perspective, have included multiple factors in examining the regional issue in Ukraine. See John O'Loughlin and James E. Bell, "The Political Geography of Civic Engagement in Ukraine," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economy* 40, no. 4 (1999): 233–66; Peter R. Craumer and James Clem, "Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography: A Regional Analysis of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economy* 40, no. 1 (1999): 1–26; and Lowell Barrington, "The Geographic Component of Mass Attitudes in Ukraine," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economy* 38, no. 10 (1997): 601–14. However, essentialist approaches are still being offered. See Paul Kubicek, "Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 2 (March 2000): 273–94.

39. Paul S. Pirie, "National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no. 7 (November 1996): 1079–1104.

Essentializing an ethnic split therefore becomes problematic. Furthermore, it is assumed that ethnicity can be a factor easily mobilized into political attitudes and actions. Miller and Klobucar noted that political orientations in eastern Ukraine are more influenced by class, whereas in western Ukraine they are more influenced by ethnicity.⁴⁰ This suggests that even if identity could be essentialized, it is only one factor competing among others.

The language issue in Ukraine is especially problematic. Despite the official status of the Ukrainian language, its mandatory use in government, and the promotion of the Ukrainian language in the educational system, the Russian language appears to be maintaining its dominance in Ukrainian society. In the Ukrainian media, for example, the Ukrainian language has been marginalized: "Between 1990 and 1998, the proportion of the annual print run of journals in Ukrainian decreased from 90.4 percent to 17.5 percent; the corresponding figures for the single-issue print run of newspapers were 68 percent and 39.6 percent. Obviously, the Russian-language press accounts for virtually all of the balance."⁴¹ Surveys of the language issue lend support to claims that language is a divisive factor in Ukrainian society. However, it does not necessarily follow that there is a division in national identity. Yaroslav Hrytsak confirms that according to comparative surveys of Donetsk and Lviv between 1994 and 1996, the two communities have opposed attitudes on the status of the Ukrainian language. He notes, however, that this does not necessarily mean that language can be equated with national identity: "In both cases, it seemed that people were simply defending their right to speak publicly in the language they use at home. In these terms, the discrepancy is indicative of the different historical and political circumstances of the two regions rather than a conscious choice on the part of the population."⁴² According to Hrytsak, this finding suggests that the language issue is connected more closely with social status than with nationalism.⁴³ Language may be a divisive factor and may also be an important component of national identity. However, this does not mean that issues of

40. Arthur H. Miller, Thomas F. Klobucar, William M. Reisinger, and Vicki L. Hesli, "Social Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 14, no. 3 (1998): 277.

41. Roman Solchanyk, "Russians in Ukraine: Problems and Prospects," in *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Gitelman et al., 546. As far as higher education is concerned, Solchanyk notes that in the 1989–90 academic year, ninety-three percent of higher education was taught in Russian. In the following year the figure was eighty-four percent. By 1999 this had been reduced to between twenty-eight and thirty-four percent.

42. Hrytsak, "National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine," 270.

43. For a similar argument, see Roman Szporluk, "Reflections on Ukraine after 1994: The Dilemmas of Nationhood," *The Harriman Review* 7, nos. 7–9 (1994): 1–9.

national identity can be conflated with issues of language. The embeddedness of identity in a variety of struggles means that it cannot be reduced, as it is in the essentializing process, to one particular arena of struggle.

Social Forces in the Transformative State

An alternative explanation for the lack of an escalating Russian-Ukrainian conflict can be found in the nature of the transformation of Ukraine from a peripheral Soviet state to an independent one. Although the Soviet state effectively minimized any social organization, social movements emerged in the late 1980s. They were based on new issues, such as environmental protection, and became increasingly anti-imperial and pro-independence. With the creation of an independent state, most of these social forces modified their goals and strategies and transformed themselves into state forces that were assimilated into state structures, leaving Ukrainian society conspicuously devoid of social forces. One of the few remaining social forces from the Soviet era were the coal miners' organizations in eastern Ukraine. However, as Stephen Crowley observes, these organizations were not clearly defined along ethnic lines, nor were they clearly at odds with the state.⁴⁴ Ukrainian workers of various sectors were not united even along class lines. Divided interests have limited the appeal to linguistic or ethnic divisions, which were already confusing and fuzzy.⁴⁵

The clearest example of social mobilization in Ukraine took place in Crimea, whose struggles with Kyiv have been a severe test for the Ukrainian state. A separatist movement sprang up just before the Soviet Union disintegrated, and it continued to challenge the state-building project during the 1990s. However, in the past few years there has been increasing accommodation between Kyiv and the Russian-dominated Crimean government. In a sense the Crimean Russian organizations are slowly being assimilated into state structures.

The greatest potential for internal conflict lies in the Crimean Tatar community, whose organizations date back to the 1950s. The most serious problem is not the potential conflict between Russians and Tatars, but the nature of the compromise between Kyiv and Symferopol. The new Crimean constitution virtually lacks any guarantees of democratic representation for Tatars in the Crimean government.⁴⁶ Kyiv's accommodation of the Russian-led Crimean

44. Stephen Crowley notes that Ukrainian coal miners' interests were different than those in Russia. In effect, this meant that Ukrainian mines were dependent on the state to help correct the cumulative effects of growing neglect from Moscow during the 1980s. See his "Coal Miners and the Transformation of the USSR," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 13, no. 2 (1997): 184–5.

45. Stephen Crowley, "Between Class and Nation: Worker Politics in the New Ukraine," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 28, no. 1 (1995): 48–61.

46. Natalya Belitser, "The Constitutional Process in the Autonomous Republic of

government opens up a potential sore spot between the Tatars and the Ukrainian government. An increasing sense of political isolation could raise the level of Tatar desperation and lead to escalating conflict in the future.

National State or State-in-Society

These examples reveal the great complexity of the issues of nationalism and national identity in Ukraine today. Kuzio's concept of state nationalism is important in that it helps break down the false dichotomy that is often assumed to exist between a West European "civic" nationalism and an East European "ethnic" nationalism. However, the state-nationalist concept also has its limitations as a key to understanding the complex nature of nationalism. First, Kuzio's state-centred analysis does not address the question whether or not this national model has been successfully promoted. Secondly, it does not adequately explain how or why a state nationalist position has developed. Thus, while it is an important contribution to the civic-ethnic debate, it does not provide a comprehensive model for understanding the complex nature of nationalism in Ukraine in the 1990s.

The state-in-society model is a more comprehensive approach to understanding nationalism. It helps one to grasp the nature of nationalism in Ukraine today in three significant ways. First, by approaching the state as a transformative, post-colonial project, it reveals how the reorientation from nationalism *against* the state to nationalism as part of the state-building project has affected state leaders and political parties. Most political forces, desiring to lead strong states, have moved towards a national idea based on a combination of Ukrainian ethnic and historical values and the notion of a multinational state.

Secondly, the state-in-society approach studies not only the nationalizing state and state nationalism but also the struggles and accommodations among social forces. It recognizes that conflicts over language and ethnicity are important, but does not reduce national identity to these factors. It realizes that national identity is embedded in other areas of struggle, such as religion, class, and region. Viewed from this perspective, the Russian-Ukrainian dichotomy tends to break down, revealing a much greater diversity.

The third special aspect of the state-in-society approach is that it views the interactions between state and society as a symbiotic relationship. One of the unique aspects of the Ukrainian state as a transformative-state project is that while the state, unlike many Third-World states, is relatively weak, Ukrainian society is also relatively weak. Thus, even if divisions between Ukrainians and

"Crimea in the Context of Interethnic Relations and Conflict Settlement," paper presented at the Conference on Fuzzy Statehood and European Integration in Eastern Europe, University of Birmingham, England, 10 March 2000.

Russians in Ukraine are as distinct as some have argued, there is very little evidence of effective social mobilization in these conflicts. As I have observed earlier, this is partly due to the nature of the Soviet colonial state, in which civil society was virtually non-existent. While social organizations emerged in the late 1980s, many of them were assimilated into state institutions, leaving a vacuum in Ukrainian society. This also helps explain how, despite recurring economic crises, Ukraine has remained relatively peaceful. Thus, while the Ukrainian state can be studied as a type of post-colonial state, its peculiar features must also be recognized.

Although the state-in-society approach may prove to be insufficient for analyzing nationalism, it provides a theoretical framework for the investigation of Ukrainian nationalism. The substantial empirical studies of Ukrainian nationalism are invaluable for understanding the problems and prospects of state and nation building today. However, to better understand their significance we need some critical analysis of the theoretical application of their data. The study of the role of nationalism in Ukraine during the last decade requires a balance between the empirical and theoretical aspects of research in order to benefit from the broader comparative studies of nationalism in post-Soviet states.

Region, Identity, and Political Authority in Ukraine

Stephen Shulman

In the modern era almost all states strive to build a nation out of their citizens; that is, they seek to create a unified population that is the locus of political sovereignty. This nation-building process is multifaceted, but two elements stand out as central. First, the state tries to create a statewide or national identity among its people that is stronger than competing social identities. Secondly, the state tries to strengthen its political authority (legitimate power) to act on behalf of the nation in the face of other possible centres of political authority. These goals of identity and authority are closely interrelated. The more individuals in a state feel that they are indeed a single people, the more likely are they to be loyal to the state and to view its power to make laws and levy taxes as legitimate. Individuals who do not have this common statewide identity are unlikely to think of the state as theirs or as acting in their name; thus, the authority of the state is likely to suffer.

For both nation-building components—identity and authority—geographical considerations play a critical role. This is because the competition the nation-state faces in the sphere of social identity and political authority are often centred around regions or cultural groups whose geographical boundaries either transcend the nation-state or are constituent parts of it. Thus, powerful social identities may coalesce around provinces or territories in a state that have particular historical, ethnic, or cultural features. Or they may form around a whole continent or parts of a continent that are distinguished by some set of historical, ethnic, or cultural traits. Myron Weiner defines nation building or “national integration” as “the process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity.... National integration thus refers specifically to the problem of creating a sense of territorial nationality

which overshadows—or eliminates—subordinate parochial loyalties.”¹ Weiner’s conceptualization should be modified by adding that higher affiliations—to political or cultural communities that transcend the nation-state—should also be overshadowed by identification with the national community.

Like identity, political authority also may lie at the subnational level or at the supranational level, and nation building requires that the people in a nation-state desire the political power of the national government to exceed that of supranational or subnational governments. One issue area in which national over subnational authority is crucial is national territorial integrity: strong nationhood requires that particular regions in a state not have the authority or ability to secede. Maintaining the political unity of multi-ethnic states is perhaps the most basic goal of nation-building elites. Another goal is the development of the power and legitimacy of central government institutions so that public policy-making takes place primarily at the national level. For most nationalists a unitary state, in which regions mostly implement policies made at the centre, is the ideal. Nationalists only reluctantly accept a substantial decentralization of political authority in favour of the regions, as in a federal structure. This is because they fear that such decentralization may ultimately pose a risk to the development of national identity and unity. However, in some cases such regional devolution of policy-making power may be the only way to strengthen both national identity and authority: by surrendering power to regional governments in some spheres, the national government may acquire more legitimacy in other spheres and buy greater loyalty and attachment to the nation-state among the citizenry. Still, devolution is a second-best nation-building variant, pregnant with the possibility of backfiring, as was vividly demonstrated by the Soviet Union’s experience with federalism.

The process of strengthening national identity and political authority as part of nation building may be illustrated with reference to Europe from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. At the start of this period, both universal and local forms of identity and political authority were dominant. At the universal level, both the Roman Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire enjoyed considerable political authority. The authority of both was supplemented and, over time, to some degree supplanted by the rise of multi-ethnic empires, such as the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, Ottoman, British, and French empires, which incorporated culturally diverse peoples both on the continent of Europe and elsewhere. At the local level, political authority was based on a feudal system in which nobles, while theoretically vassals of a king or emperor, ruled autonomous principalities, dukedoms, baronies, and other fiefdoms. The

1. Myron Weiner, “Political Integration and Political Development,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 358 (1965): 53.

European nation-state emerged against these universal and local political communities by usurping the authority of both. The Catholic Church lost most of its political power, nationalism broke up large multi-ethnic empires, and feudal structures were absorbed by sovereign states that ruled not in the name of a king but of the “people.”² Identities also shifted concurrently with the increasing power and authority of the European nation-state. Whereas before the rise of nationalism in the late eighteenth century most people in Europe identified themselves primarily as Christians or inhabitants of a particular village, city, or region, by the twentieth century nation-state identities became dominant for most Europeans.

Thus, nation building depends in part on the degree to which identity and political authority coalesce around the nation-state as opposed to internal and external competitors. But it also depends on the degree to which regions within a nation-state are similar in their views on identity and authority. In addition to seeking the political unity of all members of a nation, nationalists try to build psychological unity and solidarity.³ Nation-states whose regions differ greatly in their patterns of social identification and views on political authority are unlikely to achieve such solidarity.

For independent Ukraine, questions of identity and authority and their relation to geography are central features of the current nation-building process. The territories of Ukraine have been incorporated into several empires and states over the course of many centuries: the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the Soviet Union. Most importantly, different parts of Ukraine were subjugated by different states. As a result, there are substantial historical, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and economic differences among the various regions of Ukraine. Among the myriad of regional divisions resulting from Ukraine’s turbulent history and geopolitical position at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, one division stands out as the most prominent one—the divide between east and west. In the western regions of Ukraine, where an agricultural economy dominates, the great majority of inhabitants are Ukrainian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians. They tend to be quite religious: the Greek Catholic and Orthodox churches are popular. In the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, where an industrial economy generally predominates, most inhabitants are Russian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians or ethnic Russians. Many are non-religious, and most believers profess Orthodoxy. For the most part, these

2. Hendrick Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

3. Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 75–6.

divisions are the result of history: the western regions belonged for a long time to Poland and Austro-Hungary, while the eastern and southern regions were for a long time part of Russia and the Soviet Union. The regional differences across Ukraine in history, ethnicity, language, religion, and economics are well known and do not demand elaboration here. The important issue is the political consequences of these differences.

Most previous studies of the political consequences of regionalism in Ukraine can be grouped into four categories. First, many scholars have sought to uncover the ways in which public opinion on a wide variety of domestic and foreign policy issues varies by region.⁴ Secondly, several studies have analyzed regional differences in voting behaviour, legislative behaviour, and party support.⁵ Thirdly, scholars have investigated topics related to the centralization of authority and power in Ukraine.⁶ Finally, a few scholars have analyzed the

4. Dominique Arel and Valeri Khmelko, "The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine," *The Harriman Review* 9 (1996): 81–91; Lowell Barrington, "The Geographic Component of Mass Attitudes in Ukraine," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 38 (1997): 601–14; Valeri Khmelko and Andrew Wilson, "Regionalism and Ethnic and Linguistic Cleavages in Ukraine," in *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, ed. Taras Kuzio (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998); George O. Liber, "Imagining Ukraine: Regional Differences and the Emergence of an Integrated State Identity, 1926–1994," *Nations and Nationalism* 4 (1998): 187–206; Arthur H. Miller, Thomas F. Klobucar, and William Reisinger, "Establishing Representation: Mass and Elite Political Attitudes in Ukraine," in *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, ed. Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zviglyanich (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); Stephen Shulman, "Asymmetrical International Integration and Ukrainian National Disunity," *Political Geography* 18 (1999): 913–39; idem, "The Internal-External Nexus in the Formation of Ukrainian National Identity: The Case for Slavic Integration," in *Nation-Building, Regionalism, and Identity in Ukraine*, ed. Taras Kuzio and Paul D'Anieri (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002); William Zimmerman, "Is Ukraine a Political Community?" *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31 (1998): 43–55.

5. Sarah Birch, "Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52 (2000): 1017–42; Peter R. Craumer and James I. Clem, "Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography: A Regional Analysis of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 40 (1999): 1–26; Sven Holdar, "Torn Between East and West: The Regional Factor in Ukrainian Politics," *Post-Soviet Geography* 36 (1995): 112–32; and Paul Kubicek, "Regional Polarization in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behavior," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52 (2000): 273–94.

6. Vicki Hesli, "Public Support for Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47 (1995): 91–121; Taras Kuzio, "Center-Periphery Relations in Ukraine: Regionalism, Federalism and National Integration," in *Federalism and Decentralization in Eastern and Central Europe*, ed. Jurgen Rose and Johannes Raut (Frankfurt and New York: Carl Lang, 2000); Taras Kuzio and David J. Meyer, "The Donbas and Crimea: An Institutional and Demographic Approach to Ethnic Mobilization in Two Ukrainian Regions," in *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, ed. Taras Kuzio,

strength of national identity and differences in such identity among regions of Ukraine.⁷

Most attention has been given to the first two categories—public opinion and political behaviour—and relatively little attention to topics related to authority and identity. Further, in the work on the centralization of authority, little attention has been paid to regions outside of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. There is also hardly any analysis of the potential subnational and supranational competitors to Ukrainian national identity or empirical assessment of the likelihood that national identity and central political authority will become stronger in the near future.

This article seeks to fill these gaps by asking four basic questions: (1) How strong is national identity in Ukraine compared with its subnational and supranational alternatives? (2) How much support exists for national political authority in Ukraine? (3) How do the regions inside Ukraine differ in their support for subnational, national, and supranational identities and for national political authority? And (4) what are the prospects for strengthening Ukraine's national identity and political authority in the future? In particular, is it likely that economic development and the replacement of older Ukrainians socialized in the Soviet Union by younger ones socialized in independent Ukraine will stimulate this process?

To address these questions, I shall analyze the results of a nationally representative mass public-opinion survey I wrote and administered to 1,500 respondents in face-to-face interviews.⁸ The fieldwork for the survey was conducted from 25 May to 7 June 2001 by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies. The results provide a rich portrait of the geographical dimensions of national identity and political authority in Ukraine approximately ten years after the achievement of statehood.

Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D'Anieri (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); Edward Ozhiganov, "The Crimean Republic: Rivalries for Control," in *Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives*, ed. Alexei Arbatov (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997); and Roman Solchanyk, "The Politics of State Building: Center-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46 (1994): 47–68.

7. Paul S. Pirie, "National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48 (1996): 1079–1104; and Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building* (London: Routledge, 1998).

8. The oblasts included in the sample were Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Zakarpattia, and Vinnytsia. The sample also surveyed the city of Kyiv and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

Table 1: National Identity versus Subnational Alternatives, by Demographic Characteristics (percentages)

Demographic characteristics		Ukraine	Region	City/Village
Total	(N=1468)	45	21	34
<i>Region</i>				
	West (N=275)	52	16	32
	Centre (N=352)	53	11	37
	South-East (N=679)	39	26	35
	Kyiv (N=83)	66	11	22
	Crimea (N=79)	13	62	25
<i>Age</i>				
	18–29 (N=379)	45	25	31
	30–50 (N=539)	46	24	30
	Over 50 (N=550)	45	17	38
<i>Household income</i>				
	<200 Hr. (N=428)	41	16	40
	200–399 Hr. (N=634)	50	22	29
	≥400 Hr. (N=269)	44	31	26

Identity and Region in Ukraine

This section investigates subnational, national, and supranational identification to discover the relative strength of national identity and the extent to which regions within Ukraine differ in their identities. The diverse histories and demographic characteristics of Ukraine's regions impede a strong national identity and common patterns of identification across these regions. On the other hand, Ukraine's borders have remained unchanged for nearly half a century, and as a Soviet republic Ukraine enjoyed at least the institutions and symbols of statehood long before independence. Additionally, the negative effects for identity of the different historical trajectories of the territories in Ukraine are mitigated to some extent by the division of the country into twenty-five oblasts. This hinders, for example, the development of strong Galician, Donbas, Left-Bank, and other broad regional identities. The survey results indicate how these competing centrifugal and centripetal forces have shaped levels of identification in Ukraine.

To find out the relative prominence of national versus subnational identities, respondents were asked:

Which one of the following population groups do you consider yourself to belong to first of all?

1. Population of Ukraine as a whole.

2. Population of the region where you live.
3. Population of the city or village where you live.

As can be seen at the top of table 1, out of the entire sample, forty-five percent chose a national identity; twenty-one percent, a regional identity; and thirty-four percent, a local identity. While the absence of comparable data from other countries hinders to some extent the interpretation of these figures, it would seem that subnational identities pose a considerable challenge to national identity in Ukraine. A majority of fifty-five percent of the population appeared to have stronger attachment to their region or locality than to Ukraine as a whole. A strong national consciousness would be reflected in a great majority in the preference for national identity. However, the fact that most of those who did not give priority to national identity felt closest to their city or village, as opposed to their region, attenuates to some degree the negative political consequences of their choice. That is because mass mobilization for the decentralization of political authority (in the sphere of decision making or secession) is usually centred on administrative or geographical regions, not on particular cities or villages.

It should be kept in mind that the survey question on national versus subnational identities cannot measure the absolute strength of each identity or determine the extent to which these identities may compete with or complement one another. The negative consequences for nation building of the fact that most respondents gave priority to regional or local identity would be lessened if the absolute level of national identification was strong. It may be possible for a strong regional or local identity and a strong national identity to coexist, despite the fact that the latter is weaker than the former. Thus, while the data showing the greater overall priority of regional and local identity to national identity reveal a substantial weakness in Ukrainian nation building, this may be partially ameliorated if national identity on its own is strong.

To investigate regional differences in support for national versus subnational identities, the sample was broken down into three large regions and two small ones. The major regions are the West, Centre, and South and East.⁹ This tripartite scheme provides a more subtle analysis than a simple bifurcation of the country into west and east. In addition to these major regions, it is necessary to analyze the city of Kyiv and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea separately. Previous studies have shown that public opinion in Kyiv tends to differ somewhat from that in the rest of central Ukraine, and given Kyiv's political importance, it merits separate analysis. As the only region in Ukraine lacking an

9. The oblasts in the sample were grouped into these regions in the following manner: West—Rivne, Lviv, and Zakarpattia; Centre —Kyiv, Vinnytsia, and Poltava; and South and East—Donetsk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa.

ethnic Ukrainian majority, Crimea should be distinguished from the rest of southern and eastern Ukraine.

Looking at the regional breakdown of support for national versus subnational identities, we find some substantial differences in the salience of national identity among the three main regions. Just over half of respondents in both the West and the Centre felt greatest attachment to Ukraine as a whole (fifty-two percent and fifty-three percent, respectively), while thirty-nine percent of those in the South and East did. The figure for the West is perhaps surprisingly low, given the stereotype of western Ukrainians as strong nationalists. The relatively modest difference of thirteen percentage points between the West and the South and East for this measurement also should be noted; a wider gap would be more troubling from the standpoint of nation building. The two smaller regions occupied the extremes, with sixty-six percent of Kyivans and just thirteen percent of Crimeans giving preference to national identity. Out of all the regions, the Crimeans, by far, had the greatest proportion of respondents with a preference for regional identity: sixty-two percent. Crimea's unique geography as a peninsula, late (1954) incorporation into Ukraine, and autonomous territorial-administrative status likely explain this finding.

In order to help predict whether the relative strength of national versus subnational identities will change over time, one can look at the role of two key variables: age and wealth. One impediment to national identification may be the residual effects of Soviet nation-building policies, which, despite the formal federal structure of the USSR, were designed to arrest the development of a separate Ukrainian identity. With independence, nation-building elites have been able to attempt to use the mass media and public education to instill a strong national identity in new generations of Ukrainians.¹⁰ If socialization policies in the last ten years have been effective in forging such a national identity, then young Ukrainians should be more likely than older Ukrainians to feel stronger attachment to Ukraine as a whole than to their region or locale.

Another impediment to national identification may be the poor performance of the Ukrainian economy. Many scholars have argued that this is indeed the case and that nation building will proceed at a quicker pace as the economy recovers and grows.¹¹ If economic prosperity is an important factor in Ukrainian nation building, rich Ukrainians should demonstrate stronger national identification than poorer Ukrainians.

10. See, for example, Nancy Popson, "The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing Children to the 'Ukrainian Nation,'" *Nationalities Papers* 29 (2001): 325–50.

11. See, for example, Taras Kuzio, "National Identity in Independent Ukraine: An Identity in Transition," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 2 (1996): 586; and Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 200–1.

Table 1 shows the national versus subnational identification of respondents divided into three age groups: eighteen to twenty-nine years, thirty to fifty years, and over fifty years. The youngest group, most of whom have attended school and reached political maturity during Ukraine's independence, did not exhibit a stronger preference for national identification than did older respondents. Using the full interval scale for age, we found that the average age of those placing priority on national identity was 44.4, while the average age of those who chose one of the two subnational identities was 45.1. A t-test of the difference of means between the two groups shows that this difference is not statistically significant. Age did show some weak relationship with the propensity to choose the regional over the local subnational identity, with younger Ukrainians professing the regional identity somewhat more often than older Ukrainians.

The wealth of respondents was measured by average household income. The table divides the respondents into three income groups, and again there did not appear to be a positive linear relationship between wealth and preference for the national over the subnational identity. While those in households earning 200 to 399 hryvnias a month were substantially more likely than households earning less than 200 hryvnias to have a strong national identity, those in the richest households (≥ 400 hryvnias) were less likely than the middle-income households to have such an identity. Using the full interval scale for household income, the average income for those choosing the national identity was 328 hryvnias, and the average of those choosing one of the subnational identities was 313 hryvnias. Again, however, a t-test indicates that this small difference is not statistically significant. On the other hand, income was substantially associated with preference for the regional versus the local identity, with the richest group more likely to choose the regional identity than the poorest group. Further investigation is required to help explain this finding. In all, the data for national versus subnational identities did not validate the argument that with time generational replacement and improved economic performance will enhance nation building.

Ukraine's national identity also faces potential competition from supranational identities. Here we compared the strength of national identity with four possible external competitors to Ukrainian national identity: Slavic, Orthodox, Soviet, and European.

The survey asked respondents the following: "Please tell me how often you think of yourself as Slavic [Orthodox, Soviet, European, Citizen of Ukraine]: 1—Very Often, 2—Often, 3—Sometimes, 4—Rarely, 5—Never." In contrast to the previous question on national versus subnational identities, this question permitted a comparison of the relative strength of all five national and supranational identities. Further, correlation analysis can uncover the degree to which the supranational identities compete with or simply complement national identity. Table 2 gives the percentage of the sample choosing responses on the

Table 2: Strength of National versus Supranational Identities, Total Sample (percentages)

Identity	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	Average	Rank	Supranational >National
Slavic (N=1417)	7	16	22	25	32	3.59	3	8
Orthodox (N=1429)	13	24	23	19	22	3.13	2	14
Soviet (N=1431)	8	14	18	18	41	3.70	4	10
European (N=1432)	2	7	14	22	55	4.20	5	3
Ukr. citizen (N=1467)	29	35	23	10	3	2.22	1	—

five-point scale for each question, along with average scores on that scale and the rank of each identity in terms of strength.

The first thing to note is that with a mean score of 2.22, national identity (“citizen of Ukraine”) was substantially stronger than each of the supranational identities. About eighty-seven percent of the sample identified with Ukraine very often, often, or sometimes, and only three percent never did. The next strongest identity was Orthodox, with an average score of 3.13. Thus, while the sub-national regional and local identities appear to pose a great challenge to national identity in Ukraine, the same cannot be said for supranational identities. Additionally, the absolute level of national identification seems strong, and this must be considered in evaluating the weakness described above in the prioritization of national versus subnational identities.

The weakest of all the identities was European. Just twenty-three percent felt themselves European very often, often, or sometimes, compared with forty-five percent who felt Slavic. Likely this is one reason why most Ukrainians have supported stronger integrative ties with Russia and the former Soviet Union than with Europe.¹² Whether the strength of the Soviet identity is considered high or low is very subjective. On the one hand, the average of 3.70 is the second highest of the group: this means that the Soviet identity is next to last in strength. On the other hand, given that the Soviet Union ceased to exist ten years ago, the forty percent of the sample who felt Soviet very often, often, or sometimes is quite a large group.

12. See my article “The Internal-External Nexus.”

Besides the first-place rank of national identity based on raw scores on the five-point scale, additional evidence of the strength of the national identity in comparison to the supranational identities comes from the last column in table 2, which shows the percentage of the sample whose Slavic, Orthodox, Soviet, or European identity was stronger than their national identity. These figures were calculated simply by comparing the score a respondent gave on the five-point scale for each supranational identity with the score he or she gave for the national identity. The percentage of respondents with a supranational identity stronger than the national identity was very low, ranging from fourteen percent for Orthodox to three percent for European. The supranational identity that many nation builders in Ukraine are likely most concerned about—Soviet—was stronger than the Ukrainian identity for just ten percent of respondents.

**Table 3: Strength of National and Supranational Identities,
by Region (averages on 5-point scale)**

Region	Slavic	Orthodox	Soviet	European	Ukr. Citizen
West (N=253)†	3.71	3.07	4.43	3.94	1.89
Centre (N=337)	3.95	3.31	4.00	4.31	2.39
South-East (N=669)	3.42	3.08	3.35	4.31	2.21
Kyiv (N=79)	3.46	3.11	3.61	4.09	2.10
Crimea (N=78)	3.28	3.06	3.11	3.81	2.81

† Since sample size for each region varies slightly for each of the five identities, the given figures are for the identity with the smallest sample size.

Table 3 breaks down the averages on the five-point scale for each identity according to region. To facilitate analysis of the raw regional data in table 3, additional tables were created to rank the identities in each region and the regions for each identity. Starting with table 4, we find that the rank of the strength of the five identities in each of the five regions was quite similar.¹³ For all the regions, the national identity was strongest, followed by the Orthodox identity. All but one region ranked the Slavic identity third, and all but one region ranked the European identity fifth. Thus, from the standpoint of national unity this basic similarity in the rankings of the identities is a positive sign. Further, in no region was there a supranational identity stronger than the

13. In deriving the rankings for tables 4 and 5 from table 3, average scores that differed by less than 0.10 point were considered equal. For example, in the South and East, the score for Soviet identity (3.35) and Slavic identity (3.42) differed only by 0.07. Table 4 thus considers these scores a tie.

Ukrainian identity. Thus, not only was the national identity much stronger than the other identities for the country as a whole, but its strength was robust across the entire country. Some other interesting findings are that the West showed a stronger Slavic identity than a European one, and that all regions but the West showed a stronger Soviet identity than a European one.

Table 4: Rank of National and Supranational Identities in Each Region

Region	Slavic	Orthodox	Soviet	European	Ukr. citizen
West	3	2	5	4	1
Centre	3	2	4	5	1
South-East	3-tie	2	3	5	1
Kyiv	3	2	4	5	1
Crimea	4	2-tie	2-tie	5	1

Table 5: Rank of Regions for Each National and Supranational Identity

Region	Slavic	Orthodox	Soviet	European	Ukr. citizen
West	4	1-tie	5	2	1
Centre	5	2	4	4-tie	4
South-East	2-tie	1-tie	2	4-tie	3
Kyiv	2-tie	1-tie	3	3	2
Crimea	1	1-tie	1	1	5

Table 5 ranks the regions for each identity. Reading vertically in the column “Ukr. Citizen,” we find that the West had the strongest national identity, followed by Kyiv, the South and East, the Centre, and Crimea. This rank is different from the rank resulting from the previous measure of the strength of the national identity in which respondents had to prioritize national, regional, and local identities. For the first measure Kyiv had the strongest national identity, while for the second measure the West did. Additionally, for the first measure the Centre and the West demonstrated roughly an equal strength of national identity, whereas for the second measure the West substantially outstripped the Centre. A particularly unusual finding with the second measure of national identity was the South and East’s stronger national identity than the Centre’s. This should caution scholars from simplistically assuming that all nation-building patterns follow a simple west-east cleavage.

Regarding the supranational identities, out of all the regions Crimea had the strongest Slavic, Soviet, and European identities. Why Crimeans demonstrate a

stronger sense of Europeanness than all the other regions, including the West, is a puzzle that requires further research. Crimea has never been incorporated into a European state, as western Ukraine has for centuries, and one would expect a European identity to be far stronger in western Ukraine than in any other region. One possibility may be that Crimeans conceive of themselves as very different from the rest of Ukraine, and by developing a sense of Europeanness they underscore their individuality vis-à-vis the rest of Ukraine, especially its southern and eastern regions. In any case, the data suggest that of all five regions, Crimea has the greatest extent of (multiple) supranational identification and the weakest national identification. Also noteworthy is the approximate parity in Orthodox identity in four of the five regions, including the West. Too often western Ukrainians are stereotyped as Greek Catholics, but the survey results clearly show that the Orthodox identity is no weaker there than in other regions. This Orthodox identity in Western Ukraine likely assists nation building, as many inhabitants of the West share the same religious identity as the people of other regions. Religious identity thus serves to mitigate the west-east divide. In all, while regional differences in national and supranational identification exist, the differences are not very large, as can be seen by referring back to the figures in table 3. If Crimea is excluded, the point difference between the region with the lowest score and the region with the highest score was 0.24 for Orthodox, 0.5 for citizen of Ukraine, 0.53 for Slavic, 0.63 for European, and 1.08 for Soviet. Considering the five-point scale used, these are modest differences.

Table 6: Correlation between Strength of National Identity (frequency of self-identification as a citizen of Ukraine) and Supranational Identities, by Region (pearson's r).

	Slavic	Orthodox	Soviet	European
Total	.18***	.18***	.09***	.10***
West(N=251)†	.22***	.07	.05	.326***
Centre (N=333)	.33***	.29***	.25***	.25***
South-East (N=667)	.10**	.18***	.12**	.00
Kyiv (N=79)	.39***	.43***	.17	-.02
Crimea (N=77)	-.15	-.12	-.03	-.24*

† Since sample size for each region varies slightly for each of the five identities, the given figures are for the identity with the smallest sample size.

* p = .05, **p = .01, *** p = .001

Having analyzed the level of national and supranational identification and the regional differences thereof, we wanted to know the extent to which national identity competes with supranational identities; that is, does identification with

the Soviet Union, Slavs, Europe, and so on come at the expense of identification with Ukraine? Correlation analysis reveals whether a strong supranational identity is associated with a weak national identity and vice versa. The first row of table 6 shows that for the entire sample there was a weak but positive relationship between each of the supranational identities and the national identity. Thus, these identities complement, not compete with, one another; for example, the more respondents felt themselves to be Slavic, the more they felt themselves to be citizens of Ukraine. Broken down by region, the data suggest that weak to moderate positive relationships between the supranational identities and the national identity exist for most pairs of identities in all regions except Crimea. There, all the relationships are weak and negative (and in three cases not statistically significant, although the small sample size must be kept in mind). Thus, with the exception of Crimea, the supranational identities seem either to complement, or to have no relationship to, the strength of the national identity. These supranational identities likely do have an effect on the content of the Ukrainian national identity, however. That is, they may affect one's conception of the traits or characteristics that unite the people of Ukraine into a nation and distinguish them from other nations.¹⁴

Table 7: Strength of National and Supranational Identities, by Age and Income (averages on 5-point scale)

	Slavic	Orthodox	Soviet	European	Ukr. citizen
<i>Age</i>					
18–29 (N=371)†	3.60	3.28	4.22	4.02	2.24
30–50 (N=522)	3.49	3.13	3.77	4.15	2.22
Over 50 (N=517)	3.69	3.03	3.27	4.39	2.20
<i>Household income</i>					
<200 Hr. (N=406)	3.67	2.94	3.53	4.49	2.25
200–399 Hr. (N=613)	3.59	3.17	3.71	4.16	2.15
≥400 Hr. (N=259)	3.44	3.17	3.82	3.92	2.23

† Since sample size for each group varies slightly for each of the five identities, the given figures are for the identity with the smallest sample size.

Finally, we can look at the effect of age and income on supranational and national identities to try to predict future patterns of identification (table 7).

14. For the distinction between the strength and the content of national identity, see my articles "The Cultural Foundations of Ukrainian National Identity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22 (1999): 1011–36; and "The Internal-External Nexus."

Again, young respondents did not have a stronger national identity than older ones. If anything, older respondents had a slightly stronger national identity. Those over fifty years old had an average score of 2.2, while those under thirty had an average score of 2.24 (although the difference is not statistically significant). However, there is a linear relationship between age and the European identity and age and the Soviet identity, with younger respondents slightly more European and substantially less Soviet than older respondents. Like age, income is not linearly and significantly related to the sense of being a citizen of Ukraine. But rich Ukrainians do seem to feel somewhat more European and less Soviet than poorer ones. Thus, while the data do not support the notion that generational change and economic growth will reinforce the national identity, there is some evidence that the Soviet identity will weaken and the European identity will grow stronger with time.


Political Authority and Region in Ukraine

This section analyzes the degree to which political authority in Ukraine is centralized in two basic issue areas: the territorial boundaries of Ukraine and the broad powers of decision making. In the early years of Ukraine's independence, there was concern among some observers that separatist sentiment in Crimea posed a credible challenge to Ukrainian territorial integrity. But in recent years the separatist movement in Crimea as an organized political force has abated dramatically. Likewise, elite political debate over whether Ukraine should move toward a federal system of government was common in the first five years of Ukraine's independence, but few political leaders, even in the South and East, currently demand a federal system.¹⁵ Still, many leaders have demanded greater political and economic autonomy for their oblast or region within a unitary state framework. And regardless of what political elites think, at the mass level the questions of separatism and the degree of centralization in decision-making authority remain important for the process of nation building. To the extent that the public believes that regions have the right to secede from the state and should have more powers than they currently do, national integration is attenuated.

To discover mass attitudes toward regional self-determination, survey respondents were asked the following:

What do you think, should Ukraine always remain a united country, or should certain regions have the right to secede from Ukraine? Give your answer on a five-point scale where "1" corresponds with the first statement and "5" with the second.

15. See Kuzio, "Center-Periphery Relations in Ukraine."



Note that the question did not ask whether respondents thought a given region should secede, but whether some regions should have the *right* to secede. By offering a range of options on a five-point scale, this question permitted respondents to express the degree of their support for the centralization or nationalization of political authority on the issue of territorial integrity versus regional self-determination. The top of table 8 gives the results of this question for the sample as a whole. The overwhelming majority of respondents supported the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian nation-state, with eighty-six percent selecting "1" or "2" and the average score on the five-point scale being just 1.49. Whatever other difficulties in nation building Ukraine faces, centralizing political authority in the sphere of boundary preservation does not seem to be a major problem. Also very positive from the standpoint of nationhood was the strong similarity of answers given in the West, Centre, South and East, and Kyiv. The average scores from these regions all fell between 1.14 and 1.54. Thus, even in the heavily Russified South and East, the belief in the right of regional self-determination was very weak. Only in Crimea did this right have substantial support, but even here the average of 2.63 was below the mid-way point on the scale. Just twenty-eight percent of Crimean respondents placed greater emphasis on the right of regional self-determination than on national territorial integrity (that is, answered "4" or "5").

While the level of support in the country for national territorial integrity is already very high, the data on age and income did not give any indication that this level will increase in the near future. Respondents from eighteen to twenty-nine years of age were not more supportive of territorial integrity than those from thirty to fifty and were actually somewhat less supportive than those over fifty. Using the full interval scale for age, we found that the correlation (pearson's r) between support for territorial integrity and age was slightly *positive*, 0.05 and not statistically significant. Similarly, the three-point ordinal scale for income indicated that not only were the relatively well off not more supportive of territorial integrity than the relatively poor, they were actually less supportive. The correlation between the interval scale of family income and support for territorial integrity was negative and small at -0.04 (again, not statistically significant). In all, the data on the right of regions to secede from Ukraine gave a positive picture of national integration, despite the lack of evidence that support for territorial integrity will increase in the near future.

In order to assess the public's views on the proper locus of decision-making authority in Ukraine, the survey asked respondents:

In regard to the division of political and economic power in Ukraine between the central government and the regions, which of the following variants do you prefer most:

1. More power should be given to central organs.
2. We should keep the current division of power.
3. More power should be given to the regions.

The top of table 9 indicates that twenty-four percent of the total sample wanted more power for the centre, twenty-seven percent wanted to keep the current division of power, and forty-nine percent favoured giving more power to the regions. That about half of the sample wanted the regions to have more political and economic power is a sign of considerable dissatisfaction with the national government. While about a quarter of the sample supported greater centralization, the political authority of the unitary political system cannot be said to be strong, since a much larger portion wanted decentralization.

Table 8: Support for National Territorial Integrity versus Regional Self-Determination on 5-Point Scale, by Demographic Characteristics (percentages)

Demographic Characteristics		1	2	3	4	5	Average on 5-point scale
Total	(N=1455)	80	6	6	3	6	1.49
<i>Region</i>							
West (N=277)		87	4	4	3	3	1.31
Centre (N=344)		81	8	6	1	4	1.38
South-East (N=672)		80	5	5	3	8	1.54
Kyiv (N=83)		88	10	2	0	0	1.14
Crimea (N=79)		41	1	30	10	18	2.63
<i>Age</i>							
18–29 (N=382)		77	7	7	3	6	1.54
30–50 (N=534)		79	5	7	3	6	1.53
Over 50 (N=539)		82	5	5	2	5	1.43
<i>Household income</i>							
<200 Hr. (N=426)		81	7	6	1	5	1.42
200–399 Hr. (N=625)		81	4	6	4	5	1.48
≥400 Hr. (N=267)		75	5	7	3	11	1.69

The breakdown of the sample by region shows substantial differences in attitudes toward the locus of decision-making power. Not surprisingly, Kyiv and the Centre showed greatest support for centralization, while the South and East showed greatest support for decentralization. In the South and East, the economic heartland of the country, sixty-three percent of the respondents supported political and economic decentralization. Particularly interesting was the greater tendency

of the West to support decentralization rather than centralization, with an average score of 2.11 on the three-point scale. Ethnic Ukrainian nationalist leaders in the West have generally placed great emphasis on a strong central government, so it is noteworthy that thirty-six percent of the respondents in the West wanted more power for the regions, compared to just twenty-five percent who wanted more power for the centre. Also unexpected was the large gap between the South and East and Crimea in support for more power to the regions: sixty-three percent versus thirty-seven percent. Why Crimeans were much more likely to be satisfied with the current distribution of power than those in the South and East is explained, perhaps, by the fact that substantial decentralization of political and economic power to the oblast level throughout Ukraine would undermine to some degree the position of Crimea as the only unit in Ukraine with a special territorial-administrative status.

Table 9: Support for Political Centralization versus Regionalization, by Demographic Characteristics (percentages)

Demographic characteristics		More power to centre (1)	Current division of power (2)	More power to regions (3)	Average on 3-pt scale
<i>Total</i>	(N=1240)	24	27	49	2.25
<i>Region</i>	West (N=213)	25	39	36	2.11
	Centre (N=282)	43	18	39	1.96
	South-East (N=601)	15	22	63	2.48
	Kyiv (N=70)	41	33	26	1.84
	Crimea (N=74)	14	50	37	2.23
<i>Age</i>	18–29 (N=320)	25	27	48	2.24
	30–50 (N=478)	22	28	50	2.28
	Over 50 (N=442)	27	24	49	2.21
<i>Household income</i>	<200 Hr. (N=353)	29	20	51	2.22
	200–399 Hr. (N=550)	23	32	45	2.22
	≥400 Hr. (N=231)	22	26	52	2.30

As with the other measures on identity and regional self-determination, analysis of the relationship of age and income to views on political and economic centralization can help discern whether generational replacement and economic growth will strengthen Ukrainian nationhood. The scores for all three age groups in table 9 were very close to one another, and while those of the eighteen-to-twenty-nine age group were slightly more favourable to centralization than those

of the thirty-to-fifty group, they were slightly less favourable than those of the over-fifty group. Further, the bivariate association (Kendall's tau-c) between age and support for centralization was 0.01 and not significant. As for income, the poorest group was slightly *more* likely to support centralization than the richest group, although again the association using the interval scale for income was not statistically significant. The survey data, therefore, did not indicate that the relatively rich and young were more likely to support national political power and, consequently, did not support the assertion that generational change and economic growth would result in the stronger authority of the national government.

In all, the data on national policy-making authority must be treated with care. While the ideal for nation building is overwhelming political authority at the national level, it is still possible that through devolution of power to regional governments a nation-state may buy increased legitimacy and identification. In a paradoxical way, the political authority of the Ukrainian national government may be improved by a substantial degree of decentralization to the regional or oblast levels precisely because this accords with the desires of so many Ukrainians. Still, the data suggest a substantial degree of alienation from the national government, and any moves toward decentralization of policy-making power risks encouraging disintegrative forces in Ukraine, especially in the sphere of national identity.

Conclusion

One goal of this article was to evaluate the degree to which subnational and supranational identities pose a challenge to the development of a Ukrainian national identity. This study has found that the national identity faces a considerable challenge from subnational identities, with a majority of citizens having a stronger local or regional than national identity. In contrast, the national identity is substantially stronger than all four of the analyzed supranational identities—Slavic, European, Orthodox, and Soviet. Just a very small proportion of respondents identified more strongly with these supranational entities than with Ukraine. For a new, post-colonial state, this is a significant accomplishment. Further, the supranational identities did not compete with the national identity. With the exception of the relationship of the Crimeans' national and European identity, there was no statistically significant negative correlation between the national identity and each of the supranational identities. Analysis of the nationalization of political authority also presented a mixed picture from the standpoint of nation building. Support for regional self-determination was very weak, but about half the respondents wanted political and economic power decentralized further to the regional level. This suggests that Ukraine's state boundaries have great legitimacy, but that its national government does not.

Another goal was to determine the extent to which regions differ in their patterns of identification and views on authority, since deep divisions on these

issues impede national unity and solidarity. In prioritizing national, regional, or local identities, there were modest differences between the three main regions (West, Centre, South and East), but Kyiv and Crimea represent extreme positions. By comparison, the set of questions on national and supranational identities showed a surprising degree of similarity among regions. All regions had a substantially stronger national than supranational identity, and the rank of the five identities was very similar for each of the regions. Further, the range of scores among the regions (with Crimea excluded) for each identity was not large. Attitudes to regional self-determination were also extremely similar across all regions, with the exception of Crimea; the vast majority of respondents in the South, West, South and East, and Kyiv did not support the right of regions to secede. In contrast, there were substantial regional differences on the centralization of decision-making authority, especially in the South and East compared to the Centre and Kyiv. So, one sphere of identity (supranational versus national) and one sphere of political authority (regional self-determination) displayed relatively low regional cleavages, especially if Crimea is excluded. And one sphere of identity (subnational versus national) and one sphere of political authority (centralization of decision-making) showed a relatively high degree of regional cleavage. Thus, the picture on regional differences was mixed from the standpoint of nation building.

Analysis of the bivariate relationship between age and income, on the one hand, and the measures of identity and political authority, on the other, does not support the idea that younger and richer Ukrainians have a stronger national identity or support national political authority more than their older and poorer counterparts. Neither of the two measures of national identity or of political authority showed a statistically significant positive relationship with youth or wealth. While prediction in political science is always risky, and certainly a more sophisticated multivariate analysis of the role of age and income on nation building is called for, there are no data in this article to support the argument that in the near future generational turnover or economic development will assist nation building. The empirical burden of proof rests on those who make such claims. The most that can be said is that younger and richer Ukrainians do seem to have stronger European and weaker Soviet identities than older and poorer ones. This may alter the content but not the strength of national identity over time.

The best evidence for the effect of economic performance and generational turnover on nationhood in Ukraine will come only with time. Ten years is perhaps too short a period for the socialization efforts by the government, media, and schools to strengthen national identity and authority among the youth of Ukraine. Additionally, in the last ten years the economy has performed dismally. Sustained economic development in the next decade may not only change people's assessment of the effectiveness and authority of the national government, but also begin to solidify national identity against subnational alternatives.

At present, however, the evidence examined in this article cannot be adduced in support of such possibilities.

Finally, the absence of comparable public opinion survey data from the early years of independence on geographically based patterns of national identity and political authority prevents an assessment of the degree and direction of change in these areas over the last decade. Thus, one survey can present only a static snapshot of the state of identity and authority, showing a mixed picture of strength and weakness in the Ukrainian nation-building project to date. This underscores the need for scholars of Ukraine to engage in periodic polling of the public using the same survey instrument not only to track trends in identity and authority (and public opinion more broadly), but also to uncover the causes of the detected changes. It is hoped that the twentieth anniversary of Ukrainian independence will witness just such cross-temporal analyses.

Serhii Plokhy and Frank E. Sysyn

Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine



For students of the interaction of state building, nation building, and religion, Ukraine constitutes one of the most important case studies at the dawn of the twenty-first century. With more than forty-eight million inhabitants, Ukraine is the second most populous state to emerge from the break-up of the former Soviet Bloc. Ukraine contains one of the largest Orthodox communities in the world. Alongside the millions of Orthodox faithful are more than three thousand Ukrainian Greek Catholic parishes, which constitute the largest Eastern Christian church in the world united with Rome.

Much of the analysis presented in the eleven essays that make up this book deals with the responses of Ukraine's Eastern Christians to the challenge of the national idea. The book places the history and current status of Ukraine's Orthodox and Greek Catholic communities into the context of the modern Ukrainian national revival of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the resurgence of Ukrainian national consciousness in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

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The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Beyond Brubaker*

Volodymyr Kulyk

Few aspects of Ukraine's post-Soviet transition have interested scholars as much as what most of them call nation building, and few aspects are as controversial. Disagreement over what is being "built," by what means, and with what result, is evident, in particular, in different treatments of Rogers Brubaker's popular concept of nationalizing state. While a number of authors studying ethno-national policies and identities in contemporary Ukraine embrace this concept as a valuable analytical instrument, others insist on its theoretical futility or inapplicability to the case of Ukraine. One obvious problem is that Brubaker's featuring of conflictual relations between the majority-dominated state and non-complying minorities stands in sharp contrast with the mostly peaceful development of post-Soviet Ukraine, which has been accompanied, moreover, by the marginalization of ethnicity as a factor in policy making. This article, therefore, aims not only at providing an overview of Ukrainian state policies with regard to major ethnic and linguistic groups and their responses, but also at suggesting more appropriate categories and directions of analysis. While seeking to explain to what extent Ukraine can be called a "nationalizing state," I also hope to demonstrate the limited analytical capacity of this concept. Accordingly, I shall begin with a brief presentation of Brubaker's and his critics' main terms and arguments, and then discuss their relevance to the Ukrainian context.

* I am grateful to Laada Bilaniuk and Roman Szporluk for their helpful responses to an earlier version of this article.

The Nationalizing State and Nation Building

For Brubaker a nationalizing state is “one understood [by its dominant elites] to be the state *of* and *for* a particular ethnocultural ‘core nation’ whose language, culture, demographic position, economic welfare, and political hegemony must be protected and promoted by the state.”¹ In other words, such states are conceived as nation-states even though their population is far from ethnically homogeneous and unequivocally loyal, and it is this heterogeneity and mixed and unstable loyalties that make the elites think of their newborn or reborn states as “insufficiently ‘national’ in a variety of senses.”² Developments in such states differ sharply from the inclusive nation building portrayed by modernization-inspired theories, according to which “[i]n place of a welter of more parochial loyalties and identities, the citizenry is progressively united, through the gradually assimilative workings of ... state-wide institutions, processes, and transactions, by a common ‘national’ loyalty and identity.”³ In contrast, the “nationalizing nationalism” of a state hosting a national minority runs counter to the strivings of the latter to assert its national (rather than just ethnic) rights, strivings that are instigated by the “homeland nationalism” of another state that sees the given minority as an inalienable part of its respective nation defined in ethnocultural terms. Nationalizing states, national minorities, and their external homelands (later renamed kin-states) are the three elements of Brubaker’s triad;⁴ given their largely antagonistic orientations, the relations between these elements are most likely to be conflictual. According to Brubaker, it is these relations that determine the ethno-political dynamics of the post-Communist space. He believes that dominant ethnocultural perceptions of nationhood inherited from the multinational Communist states (the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia), which institutionalized ethnicity on both the collective and the individual level, hardly make inclusive nation building in their successor states possible.⁵

1. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 103. Author’s emphasis. Hereafter I base my criticism of Brubaker’s theory on this book, which contains the articles, written in 1993–96, on which most interpretations of his theory have been based. In his later article, “Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism,” in *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 272–306, he develops some new arguments that partly undermine older ones and reveal his awareness of oversimplifications in the application of his model to the post-Communist countries. However, the key concepts remain intact.

2. Ibid., 79.

3. Ibid., 80.

4. Ibid., chap. 3.

5. Ibid., 104–6.

Brubaker's theory was enthusiastically embraced by a number of authors and came to inform Western thinking on the ethno-national problem in the post-Communist space, where almost all of the new states, in his view, "will be nationalizing states to *some* degree and in *some* form."⁶ But, as Taras Kuzio argues, "scholars have tended to utilise Brubaker's concept to make value judgements about policies they disagree with and thereby selectively choose to which countries they attach the label 'nationalising.'"⁷ In particular, the Russian Federation is not described as a nationalizing state, while policies of other post-Soviet states with a sizeable Russian minority are scrutinized for nationalizing tendencies, even if these states pursue rather liberal and inclusive policies on ethnocultural matters. Furthermore, states with sharply different ethno-political orientations (e.g., Latvia and Belarus) are lumped together in one category, while Western countries in which similar processes took place in the last few centuries and, in some cases, still persist or have emerged recently are not included.

Kuzio, so far the most resolute critic of Brubaker's concept, believes that these shortcomings disqualify it as an analytical instrument, all the more so because he does not find the contrast between "nationalizing" and "civic" states persuasive. All states, in his view, are nationalizing to some extent in that they are built on an ethnocultural core and seek to homogenize their population by promoting and implanting the culture and language of that core. Therefore it does not make sense to use terms other than "nation building," which denotes the only possible way to construct a cohesive society.⁸

Notwithstanding these well-taken critical points, one is tempted to conclude that the difference between Kuzio's concept of nation building and Brubaker's concept of the nationalizing state is mostly a matter of values. In the former case, the remedial promotion of the cultures of the titular groups by the new states is accepted as preferable to the preservation of the legacy of their multinational predecessors, which discriminated against those cultures. In the latter case, the new discrimination is believed to be less acceptable than the preservation of the status quo. Moreover, Brubaker and his followers, by constructing an ugly post-Communist "other" to contrast with the democratic states of the West, in my view, lend support to Hans Kohn's dichotomy between "civic" Western and "ethnic" Eastern nationalisms. In Kuzio's narrative, the post-Communist regimes' affirmative policies are legitimized by reference to similar practices by states that are known and widely respected as liberal democracies.⁹

6. Ibid., 106. Author's emphasis.

7. Taras Kuzio, "'Nationalising States' or Nation Building? A Review of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence," *Nations and Nationalism* 7, pt. 2 (April 2001): 137.

8. Ibid., 136–9.

9. It should be mentioned that Brubaker states that he does not support this

Keeping in mind that no scholarly analysis can be free of the author's ideological preferences, I shall try, nevertheless, to bring out the main *theoretical* weakness of the concept of nationalization. In my view, this weakness lies in the definition of the elements of Brubaker's triad, which virtually dooms them to conflict. To be sure, Brubaker claims that conflict is not inevitable. Moreover, a variety of possible developments within the triad seems to be natural in view of his insistence that all three elements are "not fixed entities, but variably configurated and continuously contested *political fields*."¹⁰ For example, a national minority should be thought of not as a unitary group, "but rather in terms of the *field of differentiated and competitive positions or stances* adopted by different organizations, parties, movements, or individual political entrepreneurs, each seeking to 'represent' the minority to its own putative members, to the host state, or to the outside world." The competition "may occur not only among those making different claims for the group *qua* national minority, but also between those making such claims and those rejecting the designation 'national minority' and the family of claims associated with it."¹¹ Two factors, however, make conflictual relations most likely.

First, Brubaker stresses that what determines whether a state is nationalizing or not is not its actual policies or articulated positions, but rather the perception of its policies by the minorities or kin-states.¹² In this situation conflicts become much easier to instigate: it will suffice, for example, for the authorities of the "external homeland" to embark for the purposes of their domestic or foreign policy on a propaganda campaign presenting the host state's policies as discriminating against the respective minority. As we know, some of the kin-states of Ukraine's minorities have resorted to such campaigns. Leaders of the minorities have also repeatedly raised the issue of discrimination to gain support from kin-states or international organizations, or concessions from Ukrainian authorities. But why should their presentations be more persuasive for the (putative) members of a minority than those of the host state, which are usually delivered through much more powerful and institutionalized channels?¹³ It seems that Brubaker, or at least those who apply his theory to various cases

dichotomy. ("Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism," 298). Kuzio argues that Brubaker's limiting the geographical scope of "nationalisation" to the post-Communist space nevertheless encourages scholars to follow in the Kohn tradition ("Nationalising States' or Nation Building?" 136).

10. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 60. Author's emphasis.

11. Ibid., 61. Author's emphasis.

12. Ibid., 63.

13. The strong impact of Russia's media, which are often of higher quality and much better understood than those of the host states, on the Russophone population of many post-Soviet countries is rather an exception.

without answering this question, presupposes that arguments of ethnically akin actors always prevail by the very fact of kinship. But that would mean that the minority encompasses not all people who share some socio-cultural characteristics that make them a battleground for “differentiated and competitive positions or stances” on the possible political implications of those characteristics, but only the “nationally conscious,” whose choice among those positions is thus predetermined.

My argument may sound essentialist to Brubaker and his followers, since it seems to imply the existence of a “fixed entity,” which they deny. I should, therefore, stress that I do consider the elements of the triad to be constructed by the competition of various stances. The crucial point, however, is how broadly the fields are defined. And here lies the second limitation of the fields, which is inherent in Brubaker’s theory and contributes to the conflictual nature of relationships within the triad. His definition of a nationalizing state as “a dynamically changing field of differentiated and competitive positions or stances adopted by different organizations, parties, movements, or individual figures within and around the state” limits the variety of actors and positions to those “seeking, in various and often mutually antagonistic ways, to make the state a ‘real’ nation-state, the state of and for a particulate nation.”¹⁴ In the case of the host state, unlike the other two fields, Brubaker does not admit even the possibility that competition could include actors who reject the prescribed nationalistic orientation. Nor does he define the nationalizing state simply as one in which “nationalizers” predominate. But then what about the actors that strive not for a nation-state, but a civic or, say, autocratic state? Either they are excluded from the state simply because of their “wrong” thinking, or there exist a number of “states” as dynamic fields of competitive positions within a limited scope. Now, if a nationalizing state encompasses only actors promoting a nation-state, then we need additional fields for other kinds of states. Hence the theoretical framework has to be expanded to include a much larger number of fields. This would make the theory much more difficult to apply in practice. Instead of complicating the framework, some scholars have misleadingly substituted the conventional notion of state for Brubaker’s state-as-field and deal with a simple framework. In my view, it is this substitution of the first concept for the second that has misled many scholars into applying it to various states and has severely undermined the analytical value of much of their work. With this substitution, the state (body politic) has to be dominated by “nationalizers” who seek to make it a state for the titular nation. The prescribed sense of “ownership” of the state by that nation is structurally fixed by the fact that the latter does not appear as a separate field in Brubaker’s theory, but is equated with the state

14. Ibid., 66.

itself. Therefore any participation in the state and any influence on state policies “from within” by a national minority is precluded. By the same token, the positions of the titular nation cannot include a call for the participation of national minorities in the state or for the state’s indifference to ethnocultural factors, to say nothing of support for the dominance of an “alien” language and culture or for the incorporation of the nation and its state into a larger entity. Similarly, the concept of national minority embraces only actors who seek to represent the group, not those who do not care about its cohesiveness or ethnocultural “essence.”

For some of the post-Communist states in which the ethnocultural sense of nationhood and hostility against minorities are deeply entrenched, any other stances may have been only theoretically possible. In other cases, however, other stances have been quite viable and more or less fully realized options. Ukraine certainly belongs in this category. Thus, when scholars consider whether to apply Brubaker’s theory to particular states, they must pay “sustained attention to their formative contexts,” which may differ sharply from those of the states he usually points to as illustrations (interwar Poland and the successor states to Communist Yugoslavia).¹⁵ In particular, the legacy of the Communist institutionalization of ethnicity should not always be taken as the primary determinant of the ideological positions and political influences of majority and minority actors, a step that dooms them to confrontation. Because of the inherent contradictions between territorial and ethnocultural components of ethnic institutionalization (ascribing nationality to both republics and persons who live outside those republics),¹⁶ as well as the increasing deviations from that institutionalization during the late Soviet decades, “nationalizing” attitudes in some successor states have been far from unequivocally shared or politically dominant.

Instead of making ad hoc corrections to Brubaker’s simplistic framework, one should view it as a specific case of ethno-political relations in the newly emergent states that arises from a particular formative context. In other cases, different formative contexts may require different theoretical frameworks for analyzing the relations they engender. At any rate, ethno-politics is part of a more general complex of societal relations that determines the nature of the state, the composition and attitudes of elites, and the identities of the masses.¹⁷ It is

15. On the weakness of Brubaker’s theory as an instrument for analyzing “formative contexts,” see Kataryna Wolczuk, “History, Europe and the ‘National Idea’: The Official Narrative of National Identity in Ukraine,” *Nationalities Papers* 28, no. 4 (December 2000): 675.

16. Brubaker is aware of these contradictions. See *Nationalism Reframed*, 36–40.

17. A similar approach is developed by Spyros Demetriou in “Rebuilding after Revolution: State Formation and the Politics of Identity in Ukraine and Tajikistan,” paper presented at the convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, Columbia

only by investigating this whole complex that we can estimate the degree of "nationalization" in state policies and the degree of "nationness" in the responses or challenges of (putative) minorities. It may be that other elements should be added to, or substituted for, the three fields suggested by Brubaker. For example, international organizations such as the European Union may be more important containing factors than the respective kin-states.¹⁸ Other minorities must be taken into account if they, no less than the state, determine the behaviour of the minority in question, as has been the case with the competing groups in Crimea. Moreover, the identities of the elites and masses may be influenced more by linguistic, regional, or other factors than by ethnic ones, and this would warrant a reshaping of the political fields along the respective lines. To be sure, "nationalizing" (or, better, simply nationalistic) actors and tendencies will still play an important role, but they will not necessarily prevail over all others.

In what follows, I briefly outline the Soviet legacy in Ukraine and the stances of rival Ukrainian elites on "the national question." Within this context, it will be possible to access the policies of the state, the preferences of the minorities, and the implications of these policies and preferences for the relationships within the respective Brubaker triads.

The Soviet Legacy in Ukraine

To recapitulate well-known facts, ethnic minorities¹⁹ constitute more than a quarter of the country's population of almost fifty million inhabitants, and there are ten groups amounting to more than 100,000 each.²⁰ While many of them have been living in the territory of contemporary Ukraine for centuries, the rapid growth of some others during the Soviet period was the result of the state policy of "the merger of nations." In particular, there was a massive influx of Russians,

University, New York, 13–15 April 2000.

18. Cf. Wolczuk, "History, Europe, and the 'National Idea,'" 676.

19. I shall use the term "minority" in the conventional sense of a "real" socio-demographic group, and then analyze stances within the group that determine its ethno-political meaning.

20. The nine groups at the top of the list based on the 1989 census (Russians, Jews, Belarusians, Moldovans, Bulgarians, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, and Greeks) should be supplemented by the Crimean Tatars, who began returning to Ukraine en masse after the census. When this article was being prepared for publication, the results of the first post-Soviet census of December 2001 were published. However, I have retained references to the 1989 data because it was this data that determined the ethno-political perceptions of the ethno-demographic situation in Ukraine during the period under analysis (the only exception being the strength of the Crimean Tatars). For the 2001 results, see the Web site of the State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine, <www.ukrstat.gov.ua>.

who by 1989 constituted 22.1 percent of Ukraine's population.²¹ Thanks to their being the "all-Union" nation, whose cultural demands were to be met in every part of the USSR and whose language was used as a lingua franca, the Russians usually had no incentives either to assimilate to the titular culture or to learn it at the basic level of everyday communication. In Ukraine, unlike in the non-Slavic republics, the similarity of the Ukrainian and Russian languages and the perceived Ukrainian-Russian ethnocultural kinship made inter-ethnic communication easier and, at the same time, facilitated the assimilation of ethnic Ukrainians to the Russian language and culture. Hence, a considerable number of people of the titular nationality regarded Russian as their mother tongue (12.2 percent in the 1989 census), and a much larger percentage spoke mostly Russian in everyday life. As later surveys of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology have shown, Russian has been the language of preference for roughly forty percent of ethnic Ukrainians and, thus, for more than a half (56.1 percent, according to the aggregated data of the surveys between 1991 and 1994) of Ukraine's population as a whole. In the east and south, the dominance of Russian has been overwhelming, with Ukrainian being the language of preference for only 18.7 percent of the respondents.²² In Crimea, which was transferred to Ukraine in 1954, a decade after the deportation of its indigenous people, the Crimean Tatars,²³ Russians have constituted a clear majority (sixty-seven percent in 1989), while Ukrainians (25.8 percent) have had virtually no Ukrainian-language institutions and thus have been subject to mass-scale Russification.²⁴ As for the other minorities in Ukraine, they have varied vastly

21. In contrast, the Polish and Jewish populations have decreased sharply during the twentieth century. For the changing ethnic composition of Ukraine, see Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 22. For a brief history of Russian settlement, see Neil Melvin, *Russians beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity*, Chatham House Papers (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), 86–7.

22. Dominique Arel, "Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State," in *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 169–70. The "language of preference" was defined as the language a respondent chose to use while talking to a supposedly bilingual interviewer. As critics implied, the above data might have exaggerated preference for Russian by neglecting a possible effect of perceived political correctness on the respondents' choice. See a discussion of their arguments in my *Ukrainskyi natsionalizm u nezalezhnosti Ukrayini* (Kyiv: Tsentr doslidzhen natsionalnoi bezpeky pry Natsionalnomu Universytetu "Kyivo-Mohylanska Akademiia, 1999), 8–9, n. 18.

23. Here indigenous people are not those living in a given territory "from times immemorial," but rather a group that, unlike ethnic minorities, has no external kin-state.

24. Volodymyr Yevtukh, "The Dynamics of Interethnic Relations in Crimea," in *Crimea—Dynamics, Challenges, and Prospects*, ed. Maria Drohobicky (Lanham: Rowman

in degree of linguistic assimilation. While those minorities living compactly in the countryside, such as the Hungarians and Romanians (who also had hundreds of schools in their respective languages in Transcarpathia and Chernivtsi oblasts during the Soviet decades), have overwhelmingly preserved their mother tongue, dispersed and mostly urban minorities, such as the Jews and Belarusians, have increasingly adopted Russian as their native language.²⁵

During the post-war decades, the Soviet regime encouraged the language shift towards Russian by promoting its prestige as the de facto official language of the USSR and the dominant language of the cities and by removing institutional barriers to assimilation into the Russian culture for the sake of social mobility. One of the most important measures that undermined the declared policy of institutionalized ethnicity was the principle of free parental choice of the language of instruction for one's children, which was legislated in 1958.²⁶ Together with some other measures promoting the use of Russian in schools and higher educational institutions, this contributed both to the demotion of the symbolic status of the Ukrainian language and to the undercutting of its communicative function in many areas of social life. These two factors, reinforced by a number of other linguistic practices, clearly undermined the ethnocultural sense of the nation being "built" in the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, the increasing centralization of Soviet political and economic life challenged the sustainability of "nation building" by promoting a competing project at the all-Union level.

The effect of these developments was far from a straightforward transition from Ukrainian to Russian ethnocultural consciousness. To be sure, the language shift contributed to the discrepancy between the individual's inherited nationality and subjective sense of identity. However, the language of preference did not become by any means the primary determinant of identity; hence, the division of Ukrainian society into Ukrainophones and Russophones (which post-Soviet defenders of the rights of the latter stress in order to deny any grounds and prospects for the nationalizing claims of the Ukrainian-speaking minority) makes no more analytical sense than its division into the titular nation and ethnic minorities. Even the typology based on a combination of language and ethnicity, which divides society into Ukrainianophone Ukrainians, Russophone Ukrainians and

and Littlefield, 1995), 72.

25. The only group with a large-scale assimilation to the Ukrainian language have been the Poles living mostly in western Ukraine, where Ukrainian has prevailed.

26. See my paper "The Legacy of Brotherhood: The Impact of the Soviet Nationalities Policy on Post-Soviet Nation Building in Ukraine," presented at the conference on Soviet and Post-Soviet Ukraine: A Century in Perspective, Yale University, New Haven, 23–4 April 1999.

(Russophone) Russians, seriously distorts the complicated structure of people's identities.²⁷

In this structure, ethnic identification is by no means limited to exclusive categories; instead, it consists of varying degrees of affiliation with two or more groups, as well as weak connections to any one group. According to a nationwide survey conducted in 1993 and 1994, as many as a quarter of all respondents declared themselves to be both Ukrainians and Russians. This share is much larger in eastern and southern Ukraine, first of all in the Donbas, where dual or marginal ethnic identification has been facilitated by a very high rate of intermarriage and urbanization. In a poll conducted in 1991 in Donetsk, more than one-third of the respondents declared a bi-ethnic identity, and more than a half considered themselves to have inherited both Ukrainian and Russian culture.²⁸ Moreover, there has been no clear linguistic divide, since many people do not equate the language they predominantly use in their everyday life and the language they call their mother tongue (there is a gap of roughly twenty percent between the respective strengths of each language group based on the different criteria). Although some authors view the mother tongue as a fictional indicator with little relevance for the actual linguistic profile of the country, its relative stability in the survey data of the last decade implies that it may shape an individual's identity to no lesser extent than the language of everyday use. Finally, a weak ethnic or linguistic identity or a contradiction between the two usually results in a preference for other forms of identification, most often a civic or territorial one. In the case of the Ukrainian SSR, besides the usual mixture of national and regional or local affiliations, there has also been an affiliation with the all-Union Soviet "nation," which has contrasted with the national or republic affiliation.

Varying relative strengths of ethnic, linguistic, and territorial identifications shape the multi-dimensional structure of individual identity; hence, a group defined in terms of any single factor will consist of very different subsets. The particular social, religious, and historical profiles of regions add to this diversity. It is widely acknowledged that Ukrainians in overwhelmingly Ukrainophone,

27. Andrew Wilson, while recognizing that "none of the three main ethno-linguistic categories can be considered a real social 'group,' with a clear identity and fixed boundaries," nevertheless believes that "it is still possible to write of the three as distinct entities" (Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s*, 23).

28. Paul S. Pirie, "National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no.7 (November 1996): 1087. Using the data of post-Soviet surveys to draw conclusion about (late-) Soviet identities is, of course, problematical, since the data also reflect the impact of the breakup of the USSR and of the policies of the independent Ukrainian state. I refer only to those indicators that, I believe, have not been significantly influenced by the transition.

largely rural, and traditionally nationalist Galicia are very unlike their ethnic “brethren” in the predominantly Russophone and heavily urbanized and Sovietized Donbas. However, the same can be said of the Russians of these two regions and even the Russians of two mostly Russophone parts of Ukraine, such as the Donbas and Crimea. During the late- and the first post-Soviet years, when mass identities began to influence political developments, the Crimeans had a clear ethnic consciousness, felt little connection to Ukraine, and identified strongly with both the USSR and Russia, while the Donbasers cared much less about their ethnicity and felt as much part of Ukraine as of the USSR.²⁹ Such diversity has virtually ruled out strong cohesion inside ethnic (or ethno-linguistic) groups and inter-group confrontation. Indeed, as Neil Melvin argues, “the particular configuration of linguistic, hereditary, cultural, and economic elements that constitute ethnicity in different forms across the country serves to reinforce diverse geographical identities more than genealogically defined ethnic ones. Regional competition rather than ethnic polarization forms the substructure of Ukrainian politics.”³⁰

Ukrainian Elites: “Nationalists” and “Statists”

In order to check Melvin’s conclusion on the elite level, we should look at how various groups that became salient in the political processes in the late 1980s and early 1990s and might initiate a “nationalizing” course viewed the Soviet legacy and the possible ways of dealing with it. In doing so, we have to keep in mind that the elites’ views were shaped by their experience within the Soviet system.

The elites of the Ukrainian SSR were products of the institutionalization of ethnicity to very different degrees and therefore evaluated ethnicity very differently. The humanistic intelligentsia, particularly the writers, whose very existence depended on retaining the ethnocultural foundations of the republic, resisted, as actively as was possible in any given period, deviations from what they portrayed as “the Leninist norms of the nationalities policy.” At the beginning of perestroika, these elites called for an end to practices that, contrary to the policy of institutionalization, undermined the prescribed correspondence between an individual’s ethnicity and language, such as the parental choice of the language of instruction, or between the territorial and individual “nationality,”

29. Compare the analysis of similarities and differences between Russians of the two regions in David J. Meyer, “Why Have Donbas Russians Not Ethnically Mobilized Like Crimean Russians Have? An Institutional/Demographic Approach” in *State and Nation Building in East Central Europe: Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. John S. Micgiel (New York: Institute on East Central Europe, Columbia University, 1996), 319–20.

30. Melvin, *Russians beyond Russia*, 80.

such as the large-scale immigration of non-Ukrainians to Ukraine.³¹ As the writers moved from appeals to the leadership of the Ukrainian SSR to unequivocal opposition, their discourse blended with that of dissidents, who joined them in a new popular movement called Rukh, and acquired elements of Western human-rights language. Still, Rukh's position on the nationality issue was oriented mostly toward "Leninist norms" of institutionalized ethnicity practiced in the 1920s. While propagating a "national revival" of Ukrainians and minorities, the "national-democratic" (i. e., anti-totalitarian and moderate nationalist) opposition aimed at establishing a national state in which the language and culture of the titular group would dominate in all areas of societal life and the minorities would "freely develop" their languages and cultures within regions of compact settlement and pursue some cultural activities outside such regions. To "restore" this nation-state norm, which had allegedly been violated by the Stalinist and later regimes, Rukh envisaged a "de-Russification" of Russophone Ukrainians and members of minorities.³² This nationalizing programme would require a "truly" Ukrainian state to implement it; hence, its proponents came to call for independence and the removal of the "pro-imperial" nomenklatura. This call could not be supported by the majority of Russian speakers, whose customary linguistic rights and identities were denied. Even for many Ukrainophones, a programme featuring one element of their ambivalent identity and suppressing or neglecting others was hardly attractive.

To the nomenklatura, the ethnocultural essence of the Ukrainian SSR or of the independent state that most of it finally came to support was not a crucial issue. First, its function as an elite was not limited to "its" republic, particularly since Khrushchev had promoted, alongside the rapid growth of the ethnic Ukrainian element in the Party and state apparatus of the Ukrainian SSR, the elevation of Ukrainian leaders to prominent positions in the all-Union power structures.³³ Secondly, the upward mobility of its members within Ukraine did not depend on their fluency in the titular language or even, at least as far as East Slavs were concerned, on their ethnic origin. Therefore, the Ukrainian nomenklatura became increasingly Russophone during the last few decades. Thirdly, its success depended on its ability to follow instructions from the centre and, at the same time, ensure stability in the territory it ruled, that is, its ability to take into account the interests of the local population. To be sure, most members of the

31. Volodymyr Kulyk, "Pysmennyske vidrodzhennia: Ukrainska derzhavna ideia v dyskursi 'opozytsii vseredyni rezhymu' pershykh rokiv perebudovy," *Suchasnist*, 1998, no. 1: 54–79.

32. Kulyk, *The Legacy of Brotherhood*.

33. Robert S. Sullivan, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917–1957* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), chap 7.

Communist Party and the state apparatus were not hostile to the Ukrainian language or to policies favouring it. Therefore they accepted Gorbachev's call for "respect for the national feelings of the Soviet people" without much difficulty, all the more so because this course helped to counter the opposition's claim to power and, at the same time, to wrest more power from the centre. The Ukrainian nomenklatura did not hesitate to follow the example of leaders in other republics in upgrading the official status of the titular language and in declaring Ukraine's sovereignty within the USSR and then her full independence.³⁴ However, instead of treating Ukraine's failure to meet the criteria of a nation-state as a *distortion* that had to be corrected, the ruling elite viewed it mostly as a *fact* to be taken into account in policy-making. The "multinational nature" of Ukrainian society became one of the most important postulates of the mainstream public discourse. This meant that one had to be very careful in trying to change the inherited ethno-linguistic profile or, according to many, give up such attempts altogether. While recognizing the state's obligation to enhance the role of Ukrainian as the state language and to support groups that had been repressed by the Soviet regime, such as the Crimean Tatars, the authorities nevertheless stressed that the state would treat all citizens equally and refrain from any forcible Ukrainianization. This sensitive approach was rewarded by overwhelming support for independence in the December 1991 referendum by members of all ethnic groups, including ethnic Russians who felt neither alien nor endangered in an independent Ukrainian state.³⁵

The presidency of Leonid Kravchuk clearly demonstrated this "non-nationalizing nationalism" of the former Communist nomenklatura. In securing equal social and political rights for all citizens, the Ukrainian state has fully kept its pre-referendum promises. Not only has there been no discrimination in granting citizenship³⁶ employment, and education, but the representation of

34. See the texts of the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Ukraine adopted in July 1990 and the Act of Proclamation of the State Independence of Ukraine passed in August 1991 in *Natsionalni protsesy v Ukrainskii: Istoryia i suchasnist. Dokumenty i materialy*, ed. I. O. Kresina and V. F. Panibudlaska, part 2 (Kyiv: Vyshcha shkola, 1997), 574–8, 603.

35. On the Russians' views, on the eve of the referendum, of independence, inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine and their place in a future state, see Evgenii Golovakha et al., "Russians in Ukraine," in *The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics*, ed. Vladimir Shlapentokh et al. (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 59–71.

36. Even a simplified procedure for former residents and their descendants who are willing to come back to Ukraine from other countries of the former USSR, which was introduced by successive amendments to the citizenship law of October 1991, has given no privilege to ethnic Ukrainians. See my *Revisiting a Success Story: Implementation of the Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Ukraine, 1994–2001* (Hamburg: Centre for OSCE Research, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, 2002), chap. 3. Available at

minorities in Parliament and local councils has been, in some cases, higher than their share in the population,³⁷ and non-Ukrainians have held prominent positions in the executive and judiciary. At the same time, the Ukrainian leadership has consistently avoided the ethnicization of politics, which, it has been believed, could impede social stability and integration. There has been no fixed representation of ethnic groups in the power structures,³⁸ and the law has prevented the formation of political parties based on ethnic (or regional) criteria. On the other hand, the state's attitude towards cultural diversity has been quite favourable. The law on national minorities, adopted in June 1992, has ensured them the right to national-cultural autonomy, including the learning of minority languages in educational institutions run either by the state or ethnic associations, as well as the funding of various cultural activities from the state budget. The law, which has been highly approved by Western experts, recognizes both the individual rights of citizens choosing to belong to non-Ukrainian ethnic groups and the collective rights of minorities. Despite insufficient funding and bureaucratic obstacles, the cultural life of many ethnic groups has expanded significantly, and the Ukrainian-Russian dichotomy of the last six Soviet decades has been replaced by something like the cultural diversity of the 1920s. Contrary to Brubaker's expectations, the state made virtually no attempt to impede minority contacts with their respective kin-states.³⁹

In search of political support for his institution-building efforts, President Kravchuk tried to make an alliance with Rukh and other moderate nationalist parties without allowing them to set the political agenda or giving them key positions in his administration, which he reserved for the old nomenklatura.⁴⁰ In particular, he took over much of Rukh's ethnocultural programme and offered

<www.core-hamburg.de>.

37. In this regard, minorities living compactly have been in a privileged position, while those dispersed often have appeared to be under-represented. See Viktor Stepanenko, "A State to Build, a Nation to Form: Ethno-Policy in the Ukraine," in *Diversity in Action: Local Public Management of Multi-Ethnic Communities in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Anna-Maria Biro and Petra Kovacs (Budapest: LGI Managing Multiethnic Communities Project, 2001), 335–6.

38. The only exception was granting quotas for the Crimean Tatars and other formerly deported ethnic groups in the 1994 election to the Crimean Parliament. In spite of resolute demands by the Crimean Tatar leaders, supported by some international institutions (most notably the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the OSCE), the quotas were not extended to the next elections. See my *Revisiting a Success Story*, chap. 3.

39. Ibid., sec. 1.4. Compare V. B. Ievtukh [Yevtukh], *Etnopolityka v Ukrainsi: Pravnychi ta kulturolohichnyi aspekty* [Kyiv, 1997], 42–50.

40. Compare Alexander J. Motyl, "The Conceptual President: Leonid Kravchuk and the Politics of Surrealism," in *Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership*, ed. Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 118.

executive posts to some prominent national-democrats to oversee its implementation. But he did not fully support their nation-building ambitions, the all-embracing realization of which might have provoked an inter-ethnic conflict. Most notably, Kravchuk refrained from rapidly introducing Ukrainian as the dominant language in all public areas. He did not even demand that state officials switch quickly to Ukrainian in their oral or, at least, written communication.⁴¹ Instead, he focused on promoting policies that would reinforce the state's independence rather than its ethno-national character. First of all, as Alexander Motyl argues, "Kravchuk quickly identified Russia as 'the other' against whom the inhabitants of Ukraine might define themselves as Ukrainian. Kiev's conflict with Moscow over the troops stationed in Ukraine, the Black Sea Fleet, the Crimea, foreign assets, and many other things, though above all a clash of two postimperial sovereignties, provided ideal opportunities for such nation building."⁴² To anchor this effort in arguably more substantial material, the president encouraged the elaboration and implanting in public consciousness of nationalist myths, traditions, and symbols, particularly those relating to the history of Ukraine in its allegedly incessant resistance to Russia's imperial policies and struggle for independence. While directed against Russian imperialism rather than the Russian people, this propaganda could not but affect the ethnic feelings of Ukraine's Russians, undermining their sense of belonging to the inclusive "people of Ukraine" (the formula used in official discourse in preference to the potentially divisive "Ukrainian people" favoured by nationalist parties).⁴³ Similarly, the widespread presentation in the state-controlled media of Russian-speaking Ukrainians as *perevertni* (traitors) and *ianychary* (Janissaries) weakened their support of the new state, while the discursive rejection of the Soviet past (although it was not matched by institutional changes) alienated even many Ukrainophones.

More nationalizing and, thus, provoking of anti-nationalist sentiment were two other endeavours initiated by the national-democrats and supported by Kravchuk. First was the attempt in June 1992 to establish a "national" church (using Ukrainian as the language of worship, autocephalous, uniting all of Ukraine's Orthodox believers, and hence state-favoured) by means of an administrative merger of the Ukrainian part of the Moscow Patriarchate with the newly "restored" Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. The attempt failed

41. Kulyk, *Ukrainskyi natsionalizm*, 30–2. Cf. Dominique Arel, "Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages?" *Nationalities Papers* 23, no. 3 (1995): 601–3.

42. Motyl, "The Conceptual President," 114–15.

43. Volodymyr Kulyk, "The Search for Post-Soviet Identities in Ukraine and Russia and Its Impact on Relations between the Two States," *The Harriman Review* 9, nos. 1–2 (Spring 1996): 21–2.

owing to the resistance of most bishops and clergy and the reluctance of many regional officials to follow the president's "unifying" line.⁴⁴ The campaign to bring the language of instruction in schools "into optimal concordance with the national composition of the population in each region,"⁴⁵ which was launched by the national-democratic leadership of the Ministry of Education in the fall of 1992, had an even greater impact on the people and was more disruptive of state cohesiveness. It was designed primarily to "de-Russify" education and therefore society. While it was quickly implemented in the western and central oblasts, it met with considerable resistance in the east and south, most of all in the Donbas, where virtually no progress was made.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the ministry's initiative was used as an important issue in an effort by the local elites to mobilize the population against Kyiv's "nationalist" policies, which were identified with Kravchuk.⁴⁷

These policies, which were portrayed as "forcible Ukrainianization" and the "breaking of economic ties" with Russia and other post-Soviet states, were directly opposed by the local elites and authorities of eastern and southern Ukraine. They called for granting official status to the Russian language, closer integration within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and greater autonomy for Ukraine's regions. These issues were prominent in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 1994 and played an important role in Leonid Kuchma's victory over Kravchuk. The geographical polarization of the Ukrainian electorate (the north and west voted mostly for Kravchuk and the south and east for Kuchma) led some foreign analysts to predict that the country might split in two and lose its independence.⁴⁸ Moreover, the survey-proven correspondence between the geographical and the linguistic polarization (Kravchuk was supported by an overwhelming majority of Ukrainophones and Kuchma by an even more impressive majority of Russophones) seemed to demonstrate the paramount importance of the above-mentioned tripartite division of Ukrainian society. Some authors took that division to prove Brubaker's

44. Viktor Ielensky, "Tserkva i polityka u posttotalitarnomu sotsiumi: Ukraina," *Prava liudyny v Ukrainsi*, no. 13 (1995): 46–7.

45. Decree of the Ministry of Education issued in September 1992. Quoted in Arel, "Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State," 174.

46. Ibid., 174–7; Jan G. Janmaat, "Language Politics in Education and the Response of the Russians in Ukraine," *Nationalities Papers* 27, no. 3 (1999): 482–7.

47. Meyer believes that it is legitimate to explain the developments in the Donbas by the mobilization effort by the local elites, since his research "discovered no evidence that grass roots mobilization has spontaneously occurred" ("Why Have Donbas Russians," 319).

48. See, for example, "Ukraine: The Birth and Possible Death of a Country," *The Economist*, 7 May 1994.

conflictual prediction, albeit for somewhat differently defined “fields.”⁴⁹ Little attention was paid initially to the fact that the elites that won the election, although overwhelmingly Russophone, perceived themselves as representing not the Russian-speaking population, but their respective regions, and wanted not to secede from Ukraine or even reunite it with Russia, but to build the new state according to their version of Ukrainian identity.

Their identity,⁵⁰ while similar to that of the part of the former nomenklatura led and exemplified by Kravchuk, was much more opposed to any “nationalization.” The administrative, economic, and cultural elites of the east and south had used mostly Russian throughout their lives and felt a rather strong attachment to Russia, where many of them either had been born or had close relatives, had obtained their higher education, had once worked, or had maintained business contacts. Even those who fully supported Ukraine’s independence saw their Ukrainian and Russian loyalties and identities as quite compatible and strongly disagreed with nationalists’ claims to the contrary.⁵¹ While they were not hostile to the Ukrainian language and culture, most of them had little knowledge of and respect for them and did not want to give up the more familiar and supposedly superior Russian language and culture. It is little wonder that they did not want to see Ukraine as a nation-state and opposed any signs of Ukrainianization, all the more so because Kravchuk’s nation-building effort and alliance with Ukrainian nationalists gave an advantage to Ukrainophones from the western and central oblasts, making the elites from the east and south, which traditionally prevailed in the leadership of the Ukrainian SSR, feel discriminated against. These elites were not ethnically divided or strongly attached to their respective “nationalities.” Nor, unlike the dominant Russians in Crimea, could they afford to mobilize the population in their regions with its ambiguous identities along ethnocultural lines.⁵² Instead, as David Meyer

49. For instance, Arel tried to apply Brubaker’s theory to the situation in Ukraine, arguing that the “nationalizing intent of the Ukrainian state” was directed against “the group that, irrespective of ethnic background, primarily identifies with the Russian language and culture” (“Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State,” 158–9).

50. Assigning those elites a single version of Ukrainian identity is, of course, also an analytical simplification, since identity varies across regions, elite groups, “nationalities,” etc.

51. Stephen Shulman, “Competing versus Complementary Identities: Ukrainian-Russian Relations and the Loyalty of Russians in Ukraine,” *Nationalities Papers* 26, no. 4 (December 1998): 620–4.

52. The data of a survey conducted in 1994 indicate that there was a considerable difference between the attitudes of ethnic Ukrainians and Russians within a given region towards independence. In contrast, language appeared not to be an independent variable influencing a respondent’s political orientation. See Lowell Barrington, “The Geographic Component of Mass Attitudes in Ukraine,” *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 38, no.

argues, they felt “a need to mobilize as a general political movement or as a region against another region and its political movement: the nationalist West and Central Ukraine.”⁵³ In the parliamentary election of March–April 1994, this mobilization featured leftist opposition to both “bourgeois” (that is, market reformist) and “nationalist” distortions of the alleged popular will, and the Communist Party gained a persuasive victory in the east and south. In the presidential campaign later that year, Kuchma combined calls for reform and the “restoration of broken ties,” the latter being more audible to his voters.⁵⁴ Having won because the leftists supported him as the “lesser of two evils,” the new president soon disappointed them with his approach not only to the economy, but also to “the national question.”

Kuchma’s failure to meet his electoral promises has been seen as a vivid demonstration of the inevitable nationalist or even nationalizing implications of the post-Communist state building. Indeed, while a lukewarm response to most integration initiatives by Russia or other members of the CIS can be explained by the natural desire of a leader of an independent state to retain as much power as possible, Kuchma’s reluctance to grant the Russian language official status seems to reflect just as nationalist a view of the state as Kravchuk’s. No wonder that many scholars, after initial predictions of radical changes, have been disappointed and pointed out “the large degree of continuity in the nation-building policies” between the two presidencies.⁵⁵ This view is supported by the continuous, albeit slower, progress in the Ukrainianization of education, as well as by the gradual progress toward the use of the official language in the (written) work of state institutions, including those of the predominantly Russophone regions. But perhaps the crucial nation-building achievement of the Kuchma regime has been the adoption, in June 1996, of the first post-Soviet constitution, which has confirmed the status of Ukrainian as the sole official language and other attributes of a nation-state (not merely its “nationalist” symbols but even the official division of “the Ukrainian People” into the titular nation, indigenous peoples, and national minorities, which many minority activists disagreed with).⁵⁶

It is no less important, however, to note a difference between the policies of the two presidents. Not only has nation building become less salient as a

10 (December 1997): 610–1.

53. Meyer, “Why Have Donbas Russians,” 327.

54. Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, “The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, 1 July 1994, 11–15; and Arel, “Ukraine under Kuchma: Back to Eurasia?” *RFE/RL Research Report*, 19 August 1994, 1–12.

55. Kuzio, “Nationalising States’ or Nation Building?” 140.

56. Kulyk, *Ukrainskyi natsionalizm u nezalezhnosti Ukrayini*, 52–3.

discursive concept under Kuchma, it has also ceased to be a political task valuable in itself and a precondition for viable statehood. Instead, nation building has become merely an instrument for achieving the president's main goal of building a strong state and consolidating his personal power. While it has used some nationalist myths and symbols to help legitimize Ukrainian independence, the regime has not hesitated to give up those motifs of its predecessor's propaganda that might impede state building by alienating sections of the population or elites or impair relations with foreign "partners." The above-mentioned anti-Russian and anti-Russophone propaganda has disappeared from the official discourse, and the Soviet past has been embraced as an "inseparable part of our history." Contentious issues have been largely avoided or presented in different ways in different regions of the country.⁵⁷ Moreover, even the mentioned moves, which were seen as continuing Kravchuk's line, have been partly or primarily elicited by imperatives other than those of nation building. As is widely believed, Kuchma has refrained from elevating the status of the Russian language, primarily in the hope of getting the nationalists' parliamentary support for his state-building and reform initiatives, which have been vehemently opposed by the leftists. Similarly, the adoption of nation-state provisions in the constitution was made possible not only by an explicit bargain between the pro-presidential forces and the leftists, but also by a tacit compromise between Kuchma and the nationalists, in which the president accepted the nationalizing aspirations of the latter to obtain their support for broad presidential powers. As soon as he secured their support, the president began to ingratiate himself with other parts of the population who wanted non- or even anti-nationalizing messages; for example, on the eve of the presidential election of 1999, he decided to allow entrance examinations to higher educational institutions to be taken in Russian as well as Ukrainian, and he appeared at the celebrations of the Day of the Russian Navy in Sevastopol beside Mayor Iurii Luzhkov of Moscow, a notorious anti-Ukrainian.

The deliberate ambiguity of the official discourse on ethno-linguistic issues, which has been, perhaps, best demonstrated by Kuchma's formulae "there is only one state language in Ukraine" and "the Russian language should not feel itself foreign here," has made it possible for the authorities to stress whatever they need in a given situation without evoking much protest on either side. To be sure, the regime's policies have given both the supporters of a Ukrainian nation-state and the champions of official bilingualism solid grounds for discontent. However, the ambiguity, moderation, and regional modulation (usually favouring a local majority) of these policies and their public presentations has confined consistent opposition to them to the ranks of nationalist parties and organizations.

57. Ibid., 48–50; Wolczuk, "History, Europe and the 'National Idea,'" 680–2.

Perhaps the best evidence for the non-conflictual relationship between the state and the two dominant ethnic and linguistic groups is the fact that the relationship became virtually a non-issue in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 1998–99 and the parties that raised it in their campaign scored very poorly.⁵⁸

The Minorities

Since members of minorities other than the Russian one have not constituted a significant part of the elites on the national level, it is appropriate in an analysis of ethno-political relations in Ukraine to treat these minorities as “outside” actors in their interaction with the state.⁵⁹ In this section, I will briefly outline the prevailing stances of several salient minorities that, supported by their kin-states, could render the relationship within their respective triads a conflicting one.

The Russians warrant a special approach, since they have lacked influential ethnic organizations and have promoted their interests (often not perceived in ethnic terms) through general, non-ethnic political and other institutions. The only exception is Crimea, where local Russian-dominated elites have managed to mobilize considerable support for their irredentist stance, which not only unequivocally excludes the peninsular Russians from the Ukrainian nation (however broadly defined) but also challenges their belonging to the new Ukrainian state. Supported (at least rhetorically) by the Russian Federation, the challenge has provoked the most serious (ethno-)political conflict in the first decade of Ukrainian independence. However, this has not been—at least, not primarily—a conflict between a (majority-dominated) government and a minority asserting its rights. Not only have the Crimean Russians not suffered any social or political discrimination, but they have been able to protect their cultural rights to a much higher degree than Russophone citizens in other parts of Ukraine. While Crimea’s territorial autonomy has few parallels among post-Communist states and could only be dreamed of by many minorities, for a long time the Crimean elites (lacking a clear distinction between Russians and Ukrainians) rejected autonomous status. What they have striven for is sovereign statehood similar to that attained by the Union republics of the USSR in the late 1980s.

58. Both the National Front coalition, which called for “truly Ukrainian authorities” for the Ukrainian state, and the Social-Liberal Association, which called for the preservation of the Russian language and culture in Ukraine, failed to clear the four-percent electoral barrier to Parliament. See Paul Kubicek, “What Happened to Nationalists in Ukraine?” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 5, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 29–45.

59. The Russian minority is an “inside” actor in relation to the state because Ukraine’s elite has included ethnic Russians who have seen themselves as representatives of regions or parties, not of their minority. It is in their capacity as members of the elite that they have influenced state policies.

Given that the demands of the regional elites enjoyed considerable mass support for some time and that Russia probably would have intervened had there been large-scale violence, the Crimean conflict would have proved Brubaker's worst predictions had the central authorities resorted to resolute measures to put an end to separatist activity (for example, in May 1992, when the Crimean Parliament declared independence). Instead, Kyiv has attempted to secure the rebellious elites' loyalty by giving them more powers and financial support from the central budget, hardly the actions of a nationalizing regime. When the attempt failed and the newly elected overtly separatist Crimean leadership began to threaten Ukrainian sovereignty over the peninsula in early 1994, the centre still preferred negotiations to force. Kyiv reasserted its control over Crimea only in spring 1995, when it was clear that Moscow would hardly take serious political, to say nothing of military, steps to defend the Crimean authorities who by then were split and had lost much of the initial support of the population. Although Kyiv's measures proved successful, the controversy over the delineation of powers was settled only after the separatists had been replaced by more pragmatic and less nationalist-minded politicians in the parliamentary election of spring 1998. Given the considerable ethnocultural alienation of most Crimeans from Ukraine, the potential for a nationalist mobilization and a Brubaker-type conflict remains. But it will hardly be realized unless Kyiv changes its non-nationalizing policy, which so far has allowed the peninsula to be, in effect, a Russian cultural domain in which there is discrimination against the Ukrainian language and culture.⁶⁰

A minority whose ethno-political preferences perhaps corresponded to Brubaker's patterns to the highest degree might have substantiated his expectations, but it was prevented from doing so by the lack of a kin-state capable of supporting its non-complying stance. Having suffered the most flagrant violation of the principle of ethnic institutionalization; that is, social discrimination on the basis of nationality and the abolition of "their" quasi-national republic, the Crimean Tatars returning to the peninsula after decades of deportation have been eager to get back what they believed had been taken from them. Their maximal goal has been the "restoration" of their "national" republic within Ukraine. In addition to institutions intended to meet the cultural demands of the Crimean Tatars, a political arrangement had to be made to ensure the domination of the "indigenous people."⁶¹ In view of the hostile attitude of the Russian majority in the peninsula and the Ukrainian authorities' usual siding with the stronger and

60. Kulyk, *Revisiting a Success Story*, chap. 2.

61. Andrew Wilson, "Politics in and around Crimea: A Difficult Homecoming," in *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland*, ed. Edward Allworth, 2d ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 281–97.

more dangerous (potentially destabilizing) group, the Tatars have been left with no special rights in autonomous Crimea. Moreover, they have been denied much of what others have possessed (citizenship, housing, jobs, schools in their native language).⁶² Therefore, they have had to struggle for equal social and political rights; at the same time, their leadership has pushed for the creation of institutions capable of “reviving” and sustaining their ethnocultural identity.

A very high level of political mobilization and an authoritative leadership have been important strengths of the Crimean Tatars and, at the same time, potentially conflictual factors in the ethno-political situation. So far the Tatar leaders have been able to contain that mobilization below the point at which a compromise with the state and the majority group would have become almost impossible. Although unequivocally loyal to the Ukrainian state in its conflict with the Crimean separatists, for a long time the Tatar leadership could not persuade the central authorities that Tatar returnees were Kyiv’s arm in the peninsula and deserved its support. The Ukrainian leadership has not only been afraid of provoking stronger opposition from the peninsular Russians, but also has not accepted the ethnicization of politics that the Tatars have suggested. Therefore, the main demands of the latter—guaranteed representation of the Tatars (and other formerly deported ethnic groups) in the Crimean Parliament and local councils, recognition by the state of the representative status of the Mejlis (a standing body elected by the Kurultai, the national assembly of the Crimean Tatars), and granting a status to the Tatar language in Crimea equal to that of Ukrainian and Russian—were ignored for a long time. It took Kyiv until 1998 to solve, at least partly, the pressing problem of the citizenship of the former deportees by concluding an agreement with Uzbekistan (where most of them had lived and automatically received citizenship after the break-up of the USSR) regarding a simplified procedure for changing citizenship. Lately, however, the Ukrainian authorities have been more inclined to meet the Crimean Tatars halfway, all the more so because the separatist mobilization of the Russians has virtually dissipated. With increasing support for the Tatars from international organizations, the preconditions for solving their problems are good,

62. Roughly forty percent of the Crimean Tatars returned to Ukraine after her citizenship law came into force in November 1991; hence, they have not been granted Ukrainian citizenship automatically. Not only has the restitution of the former deportees’ property been out of question, but also the authorities have raised numerous obstacles to their purchase of houses and grants of lots for building. The unemployment rate of the returnees has been several times higher than the peninsular average. Finally, there have been virtually no schools with instruction in Crimean Tatar (nor in Ukrainian, for that matter), even after it was declared one of the state languages of the autonomous republic, but without any rights of actual use being entailed by this status. See my *Revisiting a Success Story*, chap. 3.

although the current maximal goal of the Mejlis leadership—the legalization of the indigenous status of the Crimean Tatar people and, therefore, the institutionalization of their special rights—remains hardly achievable.⁶³

The two other salient ethnic minorities are the Hungarians and Romanians, most of whom have lived compactly in Transcarpathia and Chernivtsi oblasts. Notwithstanding their similar demographic parameters and ethno-political conditions at the beginning of Ukrainian independence, these groups have pursued rather different paths. The Romanian one has been much more conflictual mainly because, as Susan Stewart explained, the policies of their kin-state have been different from Hungary's. While Hungary has effectively co-operated with Ukraine on minority issues and rendered financial support for solving the problems of its diaspora, Romania has undermined inter-state and intra-state co-operation by failing to renounce unequivocally its claims to parts of Ukrainian territory and by charging Kyiv with discrimination against the Romanian minority. The minority activists of each group have also behaved rather differently: the Hungarians have set modest goals and looked for compromise with the Ukrainian authorities, while the Romanians have pursued maximal goals and interpreted the authorities' resistance as discrimination.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the potential for conflict in the Romanian case is rather low, since minority representation in the regional and local power structures has secured the necessary channels for co-operation with the state and the Ukrainian majority. Much depends on developments in Romania: her orientation towards European integration will encourage the authorities to follow the Hungarian pattern of dealing with the diaspora, while the strengthening of nationalizing tendencies will exacerbate Bucharest's conflicts with Kyiv and the problems of Ukraine's ethnic Romanians.

As for Ukraine's Russians, most of them have rejected not only the designation "national minority," but also the claims associated with it. They have not needed a fixed political representation, special media for the Russian audience, or the other things that minority activists are usually preoccupied with. Unlike other groups, the Russians have been confronted with the problem not of creating or expanding opportunities for reproducing their particular ethnocultural identity, but of retaining a vast array of such opportunities inherited from the Soviet period. At the moment, their exceptional position seems endangered primarily in education; hence, education has become the main focus of concern for Russian organizations in Ukraine and their supporters in the Russian

63. Ibid.

64. Susan Stewart, "Nationality Policy as a Means of Conflict Regulation: The Case of Ukraine," paper presented at the convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, Columbia University, New York, 13–15 April 2000.

Federation.⁶⁵ At the same time, defenders of the rights of the Russian minority face the difficulty of defining the object of their concern. As I have argued, a clearly ethnic Russian identity is rarely dominant in individual identifications, at least outside of Crimea. Therefore ethnic Russians cannot be distinguished sharply from Russophones and even from Ukrainophones who use mostly Russian in some social practices, such as the media. As long as the bilingual or mostly Russian-speaking individual with a vague or mixed ethnic identity constitutes the predominant type of Ukrainian citizen (re)produced by state policies, a conflict within the Russian triad is hardly possible.

Conclusion

The above analysis of the ethno-political situation in Ukraine demonstrates that avoidance of violent conflicts and majority-minority polarization has been possible mainly because of the non-nationalizing attitudes of the ruling elites. These attitudes have reflected both the Soviet formative context of the elites, among whom members of the former nomenklatura have been predominant, and their perception of the ethno-political preferences of the masses, which were determined by the ambiguous Soviet policies on the nationality question. By the end of the first decade of independence, a tacit consensus seems to have been reached, both at the level of the elite and of the population at large, that Ukraine cannot be a state “of and for the Ukrainian ethnocultural nation,” and most of those who had dreamed of such a state have accepted this fact. It is true that some political forces would like to have a “more Ukrainian” Ukraine, and their resoluteness and influence may increase as a result of their opponents’ attempts to establish a binational state in which the Russian language and culture, because of their privileged starting position, would actually dominate. However, even if

65. The national share of pupils in Russian-language schools dropped from fifty percent in 1991 to thirty-four percent in 1998. Still, this share remains much higher than the percentage of ethnic Russians in Ukraine’s population (22.1 percent in the 1989 census) and even somewhat higher than that of persons who declared Russian their native language (32.8 per cent). Moreover, instruction in Russian still predominates in the east and south. At the same time, the Russian language has strengthened its position in the media and book publishing during the independence decade. See Roman Solchanyk, “Russians in Ukraine: Problems and Prospects,” in *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*, ed. Zvi Gitelman et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 2000), 542–6. Nevertheless, Russian activists in Ukraine and politicians and officials in Russia have complained that the Russian language is being gradually forced out from Ukraine. Since Vladimir Putin’s election as Russia’s president in early 2000, Moscow has significantly increased its pressure on Kyiv to put an end to this policy and has used this issue largely as a means of wresting concessions from Kyiv on political and economic issues. For details, see my *Revisiting a Success Story*, chap. 4.

nationalizing tendencies re-emerge or grow more powerful as the political situation changes, they will not lead to discrimination against the minorities and will therefore not provoke mass protest. Most probably, the current ambiguous and inconsistent policy will persist, at least in the short run. While it contributes to social integration, this policy impedes the formation of a democratic state and society, because it discourages social actors from articulating specific ideological and political positions and fails to develop mechanisms for reconciling them. This problem is not limited to ethno-political relations, however: it is a general problem for contemporary Ukraine.

Culture as a Nation-Building Tool in Contemporary Ukraine

Oleksandr Hrytsenko

Under Soviet rule Ukrainian culture could not develop in a free, natural, and independent way. The Soviet regime tried not only to put Ukrainian culture wholly at its service, as it did Russian culture, but also to reduce it to the level of a provincial, inferior culture and, in the long run, to assimilate it within the broader framework of the so-called multinational Soviet culture.

Yet, this situation also had another, relatively bright, side. The Soviet regime was not really interested in “killing culture.” On the contrary, it regarded “the cultural revolution” aimed at “creating the new socialist man” to be one of its greatest achievements. A dense cultural infrastructure and broad, easy access to many basic cultural facilities and practices were always part of “the Soviet way of life.” Soviet artists enjoyed rather high social status and, provided they were loyal to the regime and not too avant-garde, were much better off than most people. This is not true of the Stalin period, of course, but only of the post-Stalin decades. To stay in the regime’s good graces Ukrainian and other non-Russian artists had to meet one more condition—they could not be “too national.”

As a result of Soviet “civilizing” cultural policy, a massive public cultural infrastructure was created in Ukraine. It was fully administered and funded by the Soviet party-state. After reaching its peak of development in the 1970s, this public infrastructure, or more precisely its pre-electronic sectors, such as performing-arts organizations, museums, libraries, heritage institutions, book publishing, and the press, began stagnating. There was practically no growth in Ukrainian book publishing until perestroika, while the Ukrainian-language press declined in the 1970s and early 1980s. The number of Ukrainian-made films may seem impressive in comparison to the production of other small national film industries, but in terms of cultural content these films, save for a few titles, were undistinguishable from the mediocre mainstream of Soviet productions.

The system of cultural administration in Soviet Ukraine and even in the USSR as a whole, including the Ministry of Culture and the state departments in charge of the mass media, did not make policy and was even unfit to do so. The task of policy-making, of setting goals and designing the means for realizing them, belonged to certain departments of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

With the loss of its short-lived independence in 1920, Ukraine never had a chance to set its own cultural policy. The moderate Ukrainization policy of the 1920s, the cultural pogroms of the 1930s, the sluggish Russification of the 1970s, and the implementation of Gorbachev's glasnost in Ukraine in the 1980s were local implementations of policy designed by the Communist leadership in Moscow. The cultural-policy vacuum in Ukraine, which became obvious even before independence and presented the Ukrainian cultural elite and policy-makers with a formidable challenge, was the inevitable result of the Soviet system of cultural administration.

In 1988 a prominent scholar and former dissident, Ivan Dziuba, published a seminal essay "Are We Aware of National Culture as a Totality?"¹ that gave rise to a vibrant discussion. He wrote:

What, after all, should be understood as Ukrainian national culture? What set of phenomena does it cover? Consciously or unconsciously, we often ignore this question as if it were raised by the devil. By Ukrainian culture we understand a mechanical sum of cultural facts present on Ukrainian territory. As a rule, this is what the mass media and, unfortunately, many critics of the contemporary cinema, theatre, television, and musical entertainment do. I learn from a monograph, for instance, that there are hundreds of Ukrainian fictional, documentary, and musical television films. But we know only too well that there is only a paltry number of them. Another publication names several "Ukrainian" theatres for children, and this brings a bitter smile to my lips, because virtually all of them are "Ukrainian" only according to their address, not according to language or artistic character.... The tendency to dissolve Ukrainian national culture in the stream of production put out on the territory of Ukraine, for example by the Odesa Film Studio or by a Kyiv printing plant, leads us to dismiss the question of the national quality of this culture, that is, the question of culture itself.²

But there is another extreme, in Dziuba's opinion:

equally unjustified and dangerous not so much in its social as in its artistic consequences.... What I have in mind is a kind of purism that carefully limits the sphere of Ukrainian national culture only to Ukrainian-language phenomena

1. Ivan Dziuba, "Chy usvidomliuemo natsionalnu kulturu iak tsilisnist?" in *Ukraina: Nauka i kultura*, vol. 22 (Kyiv: Akademiiia nauk URSR and Tovarystvo Znannia, 1988), 309–25.

2. Ibid., 314.

when dealing with the verbal arts (a criterion that is far from certain!) or to phenomena possessing obvious features of traditional national styles when dealing with non-verbal arts (a very doubtful criterion!). This leads to subjective evaluations, prejudice, intolerance, and even aggressive rejection not only of all novelty but also of anything that does not conform to one's restricted tastes or views. It even leads to a morbid view of such things as alien, as a part almost of some cunning international diversion against Ukrainian art.³

But what is (or was in 1988) Ukrainian national culture for Dziuba himself? He claims that

the cultural situation in Ukraine can be depicted in the form of three concentric circles. The first, with the largest radius, is all the cultural givens, the sum of cultural facts existing in Ukraine or coming to her from outside, and so on. The second circle, with a somewhat smaller radius, is all the culture that is created in Ukraine. The third, even smaller circle is Ukrainian national culture proper. In principle, the culture of every people has such a structure (particularly in multinational countries), for no people lives only within its own culture and no culture exists in isolation. What is peculiar to Ukraine is the special relationship among the areas of the circles and, perhaps, a greater vagueness in the borders among them.

To put it more pointedly, everywhere in Ukraine Ukrainian national culture functions today alongside Russian culture, is surrounded by Russian culture, and is in a dialectical interaction (which includes both collaboration and mutual assistance and struggle and competition) with it, including the Russian culture produced in Ukraine by both Russians and Ukrainians. Moreover, sometimes, particularly in large cities, the basic tenor of cultural life is determined by Russian, not Ukrainian, culture. This is the actual interrelation of their potentialities.⁴

So far, this sounds like a multicultural approach. But Dziuba is far from treating the Ukrainophone and Russophone traditions, which for him equal the Ukrainian and Russian cultures respectively, as legitimate elements of the complex whole that is the culture of contemporary Ukrainian society. Like another great Ukrainian cultural thinker, Dmytro Chyzhevsky, he regards Ukrainian national culture as a separate but "incomplete," system:

Today, Ukrainian national culture is a culture with an incomplete structure. This is so, first, because some of its branches have been weakened, while others are missing. Secondly, because the Ukrainian language does not fulfill all its social and cultural functions, but the national language is after all the backbone of any national culture, and even the non-verbal arts are linked through a number of mediations with language, with meanings shaped by language and even with the very sound of the language.⁵

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 315.

5. Ibid., 313.

The goal follows clearly: we should make Ukrainian culture “more complete” by strengthening its weak elements and expanding the sphere of the active use of the Ukrainian language to those cultural practices that use Russian. In 1988, when the Ukrainian SSR still lacked statehood, it was too early to instrumentalize these goals in terms of an official cultural policy. Hence Dziuba spoke about cultural Ukrainianization in terms of “aesthetic concretization” and “artistic mission”⁶

Here again I must speak about the need for a philosophical and sociological conception of Ukrainian national culture and its multifaceted aesthetic concretization, and about the necessity for all of us to learn to think not only in professional categories, but also in categories of the national culture as a whole, as a system; of the necessity of an appropriate self-consciousness and spiritual state that could be described as a thought-out and inspired patriotism combined with a broad, universally humanistic view.⁶

How can the goal of “making our national culture complete” be accomplished? In the early 1990s the task did not seem very difficult to those politically active Ukrainian intellectuals who later became known as the national-democrats. They believed that Russification in Ukraine was the result of long-term brutal measures by the Soviet regime. Hence, once the official pressure was removed, ethnic Ukrainians, who accounted for over seventy percent of the population, would return, perhaps slowly, not overnight, to their native Ukrainian language. To encourage this process, in October 1989 the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted the Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR, which is still in force. So far, however, there has been no resurgence in the use of Ukrainian. What happened under the new conditions of ideological freedom and market reforms was unexpected by the national-democrats: Russophone cultural industries, mostly in private hands, expanded. As the tables below show, participation in common cultural activities shrank in the 1990s, print runs of newspapers and magazines plummeted, and, even worse, the share of Ukrainian-language books and periodicals published in Ukraine declined. One reason for this was that domestic printed matter in Russian replaced publications printed in Russia. Another reason was that subscriptions to the Ukrainian-language press by public libraries and other institutions in eastern and southern Ukraine were cancelled. The Russian-language press made substantial gains after perestroika and has been read by both Russophone and Ukrainophone Ukrainians before and after independence. Something similar happened with pop music: Ukrainian musicians have had to fight for their share of a market already saturated with Russian and Western product.

During the 1990s a number of vibrant cultural industries evolved in the private sector of the economy, and this has led to a radical shift of the ratio between public and private cultural production. This has been especially visible in the electronic media. There are hundreds of private local TV and radio stations that have managed to get by

6. Ibid., 325.

on virtually no funding or investment from the state. Even the state-owned TV channels, UT-2 and UT-3, have leased prime programming time to private companies Studiia 1+1 and Inter, the two most popular channels in Ukraine. A similar situation can be seen in book publishing. There are now several hundred independent publishing houses in Ukraine. Since the early 1990s they have published more new book titles than the state publishers, and for the last two years they have also printed more books. Since independence, Ivan Dziuba's call for a "sense of the mission" among Ukrainian artists has been reinforced by the demand for a clear and effective cultural policy from the state. How has the state responded? Let us look at the figures.

Public Cultural Institutions and Cultural Participation in 1990s

	1990	1996	1996 as % of 1990
Public libraries, 1000s	26.6	23.6	88.7
Total library deposits, mil. vols.	418.9	356.3	85.1
Clubs & houses of culture, 1000s	25.1	22.7	90.4
Public theatres	125	130.	104.0
Theatre attendance per year (mil.)	17.6	6.8	38.6
Public museums	214	328.	153.3
Museum visitors, total (mil.)	31.8	16.5	51.9

Book Publishing and the Press in the 1990s

	1990	1993	1994	1996	1996 as % of 1990
Book titles	7046	5002	4752	6084	86.3%
Books, mil.	170	88	52	52	30.6%
incl. Ukrainian-language	95	40	21	31	32.6%
Magazine & journal titles	185	522	461	717	387.6%
Print run, mil.	166	33	19	20	12.0%
incl. Ukrainian-language	150	30	13	12	8.0%
Newspaper titles	1787	1757	1705	2206	123.4%
Single issue print run, mil.	25	40	21	23	92.0%
incl. Ukrainian-language	17	26	10	9	52.9%
Annual print run, mil.	4652	2843	1593	1544	33.2%

At first glance, the statistics suggest that Ukraine's cultural industries have been in total decline, but the reality has been more complex and controversial. On the one hand, traditional state-owned and state-funded cultural institutions have, for the most part, indeed declined economically and stagnated artistically. On the other hand, despite the lack of financial and institutional support from the state, private cultural and entertainment industries and cultural non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have slowly grown, although their growth may seem unimpressive compared to that in neighbouring Poland, Hungary, or even Russia. Perhaps the most striking indication of the weakness of the Ukrainian cultural market is the extent to which it has been dominated by imported cultural goods and services, including TV and FM-radio programmes, CDs, videos, and books. Judging by the few and mostly unsuccessful attempts to introduce effective protectionist policies to promote domestic cultural goods and services, the government has not seemed to regard this as an important problem.

This brings us to the subject of cultural legislation. The Foundations of Legislation on Culture has been the principal bill on cultural policy in the 1990s. It was adopted by the Supreme Council in February 1992, soon after the proclamation of independence, during the so-called state-building period. Its provisions are far from consistent or sound. In fact, it reflects its authors' post-Soviet bias and romantic post-independence expectations.⁷ For the most part, the principles of cultural policy and the goals and priorities the law set for the state fully correspond to modern democratic standards. But there have been some local peculiarities.

Article 2 of the Foundations of Legislation on Culture refers to the following principles: "The recognition of culture as a key element of the uniqueness of the Ukrainian nation and of the national minorities living in Ukraine; the consolidation of humanistic ideas and high morality in society's life; orientation toward national and universal humanistic values that are recognized as prior to political and class interests; [and] the promotion of cultural contacts with Ukrainians abroad so as to preserve the integrity of Ukrainian national culture."⁸ "Guarantees of artistic freedom, [and] non-interference of the state and political parties in creative processes" appear only later on. Rather odd principles are also included, such as "the combination of state and civil principles in promoting cultural development," which was probably included to encourage both public and private patronage of culture. But since the term "private" had negative

7. Actually, the term "foundations" itself was uncritically borrowed from Soviet law-making practice. The USSR, being formally a federal state, had a number of federal foundational bills, which were copied by all the Union republics.

8. *Osnovy zakonodavstva pro kulturu* is available at <www.rada.gov.ua>

connotations for Ukrainian deputies at the time, “civil” was used instead. Article 4, “Language in the Cultural Sphere” states that “the state shall care for the development of Ukrainophone cultural practices and guarantee equal rights and possibilities for the use of the languages of all national minorities living in Ukraine in the cultural sphere.”

Dziuba’s influence on this document is quite obvious. The cultural rights of non-Ukrainians (referred to as “national minorities”) are recognized and guaranteed, but these minorities are not recognized as a part of the Ukrainian political nation, and their culture is not seen as a part of Ukrainian culture. The general attitude is enlightened and moralistic, befitting what Raymond Williams calls the “paternalistic model of cultural communication.” This impression is confirmed by Article 3, which deals with “Priorities in Cultural Development.” It states that these priorities “are defined by special government programmes,” not by society or the artistic community. Nevertheless, some priorities are fixed in the article: “By way of priority, the state provides favourable conditions for the development of the culture of the Ukrainian nation and of the cultures of national minorities; [and for] the preservation and protection of the cultural and historical heritage.”

A closer analysis of the above Foundations would lead to a convincing explanation of the law’s ineffectiveness. Since this is not the place to do so, let me merely point out its main shortcoming. The Foundations are completely unsuited for a market economy because they do not envision any funding mechanisms for cultural institutions except the direct financing of public cultural institutions from state and local budgets. Nor is there any provision for state support of private cultural institutions.

If government policy has been inert and inconsistent, have other political forces offered anything better? Let us look at the positions of the major political parties on cultural issues. The absence of a broad consensus on the basic principles of cultural policy, it will emerge, is no coincidence. To simplify things, I shall talk about the left, the national-democrats, the liberal reformers, and the centrists, also known as “the party of power.” For all these major political groups, cultural issues are usually a means of achieving “more important” political goals, particularly those related to nation building or identity shaping.

National-culture issues have been especially prominent in the political programmes and actions of the national-democrats (labelled by some observers as “moderate” or “liberal” nationalists). They have called for the rediscovery of national cultural roots and the return to active use of neglected or even prohibited cultural traditions and have tried to establish the Ukrainian language in all the main spheres of public life. If these goals have not been fully realized, the blame, according to the national-democrats, falls on the state, which has not been firm and persistent enough in pursuing them. The government has not provided

enough money for Ukrainian film production and book publishing and the courts have not prosecuted the bureaucrats, broadcasters, and journalists who have ignored the Law on Languages and kept speaking Russian at work, publishing Russian books, or playing Russian music on the air. The root of the problem, according to the national-democrats, has been that the state is not really a Ukrainian state. Things will improve only when state leaders are “real Ukrainians” or, as Mykola Riabchuk put it, when Ukrainian leaders speak Ukrainian not only in front of TV cameras, but also to their children at home.

Ironically, the concrete measures proposed by the national-democrats (or carried out when some of them were in government) resemble to a remarkable degree the practices of the Soviet regime in its last, mellow phase. They consist mostly of paternalistic administrative “affirmative actions” aimed at Ukrainianizing public services, the media, and education. The national-democrats have also attempted to limit the impact of the free market on national cultural industries by introducing protectionist laws favouring domestic cultural products (films, books, and music, preferably in Ukrainian). They still regard the state budget as the main source of funding for the cultural sphere. Lately, they have realized the importance of the electronic media (traditionally, literature was the foundation of Ukrainian national culture) and have transformed their century-old slogan of cultural Ukrainianization into a more current one of protecting what they call the “national information space.” This means that foreign (specifically Russian) mass media are not supposed to play a key role in shaping Ukrainian opinion about world and, particularly, domestic events. Unfortunately, this is exactly what has happened in many regions of eastern and southern Ukraine, where Russian television and press are still a much more important source of information than Ukrainian media. The then chairman of the State Committee for Information Policy, Ivan Drach, argued in his speech at a conference on the Information Society in Ukraine (26 September 2000) that Ukraine is facing “informational and ideological aggression,” apparently from the Russian mass media. The situation has to be changed, according to the national-democrats, by civilized means similar to those used by the French government—higher tariffs for Russian TV channels, perhaps even an excise tax on imported books and periodicals (virtually all imported printed matter is from Russia), and tax incentives for Ukrainian publications.

Some of these measures have been put into practice. In the mid-1990s the Ukrainian state television network discontinued the retransmission of Russian public TV channels. Today Russian TV is available on cable or via satellite, but some private or local stations retransmit several programmes from Moscow (news, TV games, comic shows). This means that despite efforts to protect “our national information space,” the voice of Moscow is still very much available in Ukrainian homes.

Recently, the reputedly liberal TV journalist Mykola Kniazhynsky, who is a member of the National Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting and one of the top managers of ICTV, a private channel reportedly owned by an oligarchic group, offered an updated (and much more pragmatic) version of the national-democratic cultural-policy agenda. After evaluating the state's cultural policy in the 1990s as a total failure and a "cultural default," Kniazhynsky declared that "the key function of any country's cultural policy should be to promote the attractiveness of that country's way of life both among its citizens and abroad, for it is only through such attractiveness that political influence can be achieved." It is obvious that independent Ukraine does not look very attractive to either internal or external spectators. The reason for this, according to Kniazhynsky, is that "Ukraine, at the state level, has created neither mechanisms for protecting its own information space nor protectionist policies for developing its own culture. To provide these we must first answer the following questions: (1) how does culture shape national identity, (2) what is Ukrainian culture and in what language should it be produced, (3) how can we provide and protect a market for Ukrainian culture, and (4) how can we expand the influence of Ukrainian culture on other markets?"⁹

Kniazhynsky's ideas echo the twelve-year-old cultural agenda that Dziuba put forward, although they lack Dziuba's moderateness, tolerance, and idealism. In fact, Kniazhynsky verges on a position that Dziuba defined as "a morbid view of [non-Ukrainian cultural products] as alien, hostile, and perhaps part of some perfidious conspiracy against Ukrainian culture." In actual practice, however, Kniazhynsky is much more moderate. Hired a few months later as ICTV's top manager, he never objected to the Russian soap operas or Hollywood movies that have dominated in the channel's programming. This fact can serve as an example of a general cultural transformation in Ukrainian society, a transition from a romantic "sense of mission" to the pragmatic concern with marketing one's products.

Still, not everyone has shared this kind of pragmatism. The liberal reformers, who often act as the natural allies of the national-democrats against the left and sometimes even against "the party of power," have been quite indifferent to cultural issues. They seem to believe that free-market reforms will solve many of the problems of the culture industries and that increasing budget revenues will solve the problems of artistic institutions. They have no idea what these problems are and are uncertain whether a free-market democracy should meddle in cultural affairs at all.

It is widely believed today that taxes in Ukraine are too high and the taxation system should be reformed. In 2000 and 2001 a number of draft tax

9. Mykola Kniazhynsky, "Kulturnyi devolt Ukrayny," *Den*, 4 March 2000.

codes were proposed to Parliament, yet not one of them mentioned reducing tax rates on cultural products and services, a common practice in many European countries.

The left-wing parties (the Communists and their smaller allies) have traditionally raised a number of cultural issues in their political programmes. The most important among them have been the status of the Russian language and the notorious Western pop-culture invasion, which has “corrupted” the young and “undermined” society’s values. These parties have exploited for their own political purposes the nostalgia for the Brezhnev era among millions of older people, who remember the time when everything was cheap, when movies, books, and magazines were “nice,” and when “we” (that is, the USSR) were a superpower. This nostalgia has been instrumentalized as a pro-Russian political orientation, which turned out to be a mixed blessing for the left. Indeed, there have been strong Russophile sentiments in eastern Ukraine and especially in Crimea. These have been used during elections, but Russo-Ukrainian cultural proximity and recollections of a common past have not necessarily translated into readiness to sacrifice national independence in the interests of Russia. On the other hand, this orientation has accounted for the image of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) as an anti-patriotic political force and even a legalized fifth column of Moscow. This image has prevailed in western Ukraine and among the urban intelligentsia throughout Ukraine. It is not difficult to portray as anti-patriotic a political group that insists on recognizing a foreign language as the second official language of Ukraine and stubbornly opposes what it calls the “forced Ukrainianization” of schools, colleges, and the media. The fact is, after ten years of independence and allegedly brutal Ukrainianization, there are only a dozen or two Ukrainian schools in Donetsk oblast and only two or three in Crimea. Virtually all newspapers, radio, and TV stations in these regions use Russian.

A number of political groups, or rather business-administrative-political syndicates, with fuzzy ideologies and controversial public images, call themselves “centrists,” but they are often called “the party of power” by observers and journalists. Actually, the term “party of power” has usually referred to those centrist groups that are the president’s closest allies at a given moment. Their ideas about culture and its problems are as fuzzy and opportunistic as their political agendas. After the period of “cultural apathy” that followed President Kuchma’s famous remark that “the national idea did not work,” there has been a “new wave” of government interest in national culture inspired by the recent revival of Tudjmanesque nation building. The “new old approach” has been manifested by the increased number of folklore festivals, the restoration of several historic buildings, including two cathedrals in Kyiv that were demolished by the Soviets in 1934 and in 1941, and a number of new monuments to prominent national leaders of the past. A number of presidential decrees in

support of the arts and culture have been issued, but their concrete results have been, to put it mildly, of limited importance. There has been no marked increase in public spending on culture. Most of the major cultural institutions that have been promoted to national status by presidential decree now receive even less financial support from the state than they did earlier. In 1999, for instance, these institutions got approximately half of what was assigned them in the budget.

To sum up, the cultural policy agenda in contemporary Ukraine has been dominated by language issues, even if they have sometimes been disguised as something else. In treating these issues, there has been some confusion between the notions of the official state language and of the language of national culture. Traditionally, the Ukrainian language has been regarded as the pillar of the national culture and identity, as the essence of "Ukrainianness." On the other hand, linguistic Russification was a key element of the Sovietization of non-Russian territories in the USSR. Hence it is not surprising that not only outright nationalists but also the majority of anti-Communist and pro-Western political forces have favoured the Ukrainian language as the sole official language and the further Ukrainianization of the public sphere and cultural practices (although they have differed on the desirable or affordable extent of Ukrainianization). It is the left wing of the political spectrum that has usually favoured two official languages and defended the cultural status quo, in which the Russian language has virtually dominated everyday life in the big cities outside western Ukraine. If we add to this that, geographically, the right-wing Ukrainophones have been a majority in western Ukraine, while the left-wing Russophones have dominated in eastern Ukraine and Crimea, the country appears to be culturally, politically, and regionally split.

But this would be an exaggeration and an oversimplification. There have, in fact, been not only big pockets of Ukrainophone Communist supporters in impoverished rural central Ukraine and the anti-Communist big cities in the east, but also a large part of Ukrainian society (some scholars suggest, up to half of it) has been comfortably bilingual in its cultural life and politically quite opportunistic. Therefore, it is possible to divide Ukrainian society into three unequal parts: the pro-Ukrainianization right, the pro-bilingualism left, and the mostly silent majority that occupies the ideological and cultural middle ground, which has sometimes become the battlefield for militant groups. A few episodes of these culture wars can be mentioned.

In the spring of 2000 the governor of Lviv oblast in western Ukraine, Stepan Senchuk (a member of the pro-presidential Agrarian Party) issued a very controversial executive order to discontinue the retransmission of a Kyiv-based musical FM station, Nashe Radio, in Lviv oblast. Technically this was an easy task because the transmission facilities are municipal property. But legally it was a controversial move and, politically all the more so.

The reasons the governor gave for his decision were that Nashe Radio systematically violated the conditions of its broadcasting license and had broken the Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting by devoting almost all its air time to mere retransmission of the programming of the Moscow-based FM station Russkoe Radio, the top pop-music station in Russia. The crimes committed by Nashe Radio were numerous: it gave up its air time to a foreign programme, while the law stated that a radio station should devote at least fifty percent of its time to domestic programmes. Even worse, the foreign programme played only Russian pop songs.

A governor, however, has no power to grant or cancel broadcasting licenses. This authority belongs to the National Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting. But that council hardly functioned until May 2000: the president of Ukraine refused to appoint four of its eight members because he did not like the four members appointed by the Communist-dominated Parliament in 1998. Thus for almost two years no governing body was empowered to supervise and enforce laws concerning the mass media. Little wonder, then, that behaviour like that of Nashe Radio became widespread.

The loudest reaction to the governor's decision came, unsurprisingly, from Moscow. Several Russian papers covered the event under headlines such as "Russian Songs Banned in Lviv." The Ukrainian media, including the Russian-language media, reacted sluggishly, if at all. They probably knew that the effects of the decision would be short-lived and very modest. Observers in Lviv and Kyiv regarded Governor Senchuk's move basically as a public-relations action, since he must have known that Nashe Radio would go to court and probably win the case (as it did a few months later). But in the meantime the governor's popularity among conservative voters in the oblast would rise.

The impact this case had on music broadcasting in Lviv oblast was negligible. The market niche previously occupied by Nashe Radio was soon filled by another station in Kyiv devoted to Russian pop songs, Khit FM.

A similar incident happened in Lviv after the songwriter Ihor Bilozir was beaten to death by two drunk ethnic Russians who had objected to the Ukrainian songs he performed in a restaurant. On 5 July 2000 the Lviv City Council adopted resolution 311, On Protecting the Sonic Environment in the City of Lviv, which imposed "a temporary moratorium on the transmission and performance of foreign-language songs of immoral content and low aesthetic quality in the streets and in other public places." Soon after, other city councils in western Ukraine passed similar resolutions.

The phrase "foreign-language songs of immoral content" became the subject of numerous comments in the media. Did it cover any foreign song, including Western ones? But was not Ukraine heading towards Europe? And who was to decide whether a song is immoral? The police?

In August 2000 the prosecutor of Lviv oblast nullified the city's resolution as unlawful, but a month before his ruling the Lviv Oblast Council adopted another resolution On the State of the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language in Lviv Oblast, that had a wider scope and was better grounded from the legal aspect. It banned the use of Russian-language official forms, certificates, and commodity labels in the oblast and ordered all institutions and businesses to "take measures to insure the priority of the Ukrainian language on their premises, including their musical setting." Agencies that oversaw trade in the oblast were instructed to "bring to order" the retail trade in foreign-language (that is, Russian) printed goods sold in kiosks and on the street. This meant that sellers of Russian books would have to pay a local tax equal to fifty percent of their turnover, while publishers and sellers of only Ukrainian books renting municipal premises would get a ninety-nine-percent rent reduction.

Yet the practical impact of these measures outside central Lviv was very limited. While vacationing in August 2000 in the small resort town of Truskavets near Lviv, I heard a lot of Russian pop music in cafeterias and saw a lot of it for sale in the streets. Nobody seemed to mind. According to Lviv papers, the situation in Lviv was similar. In Ukraine's biggest tabloid, the Kyiv-based Russophone daily *Fakty*, its witty cultural columnist Andrei Arkhangelsky suggested that "thanks to the city council's decision, Lviv will become the music capital of the world" because all vulgar foreign music had been banned and only high-quality music was permitted. Lviv's lawmakers, he said, were "not extremists or nationalists, but typical nineteenth-century idealists who believe that it is possible to compel people to be less vulgar. That's awesome."¹⁰

I mentioned earlier that Ukrainian book publishing has been declining since the early 1990s. In 1995 the Cabinet adopted the Government Programme for the Development of Book Publishing until 2000 that was, in fact, a basically Soviet-type programme feasible only in a centrally planned economy. Understandably, there is little evidence than any government body ever tried to implement the programme. In the meantime, in 1995 the Russian government virtually exempted its book publishing industry from any taxes and Russian books became at least fifty percent cheaper than books printed in Ukraine. Within a year or two, Ukrainian book export to Russia almost disappeared, while imported Russian books flooded the Ukrainian market.

In September 1997 domestic book publishers were exempted from the value-added tax (VAT), but this was of little help to an industry that was already too weak to afford substantial price cuts in order to increase sales. By this time almost ninety percent of books sold in Ukraine were being imported from Russia.

10. *Fakty*, 7 July 2000.

More than two years later a previously unknown body called the Committee for the Protection of the Ukrainian Book published a report titled “The National Book: Its Current Predicament, What Caused It, and What Are the Prospects” in the literary weekly *Literaturna Ukraina* (16 March 2000). The committee argued that to save Ukraine’s book publishing industry the expansion of Russian publications must be stopped and that this could be done only by increasing tax incentives similar to or even greater than those in Russia. The committee’s report and many other articles on this problem in the spring and summer of 2000 blamed the Ukrainian government, not the Russians, for “our book catastrophe.”

As a result of the press campaign and the active leadership of the new head of the State Committee for Information Policy, the poet and national-democratic deputy Ivan Drach, a law increasing tax incentives for a number of publishing activities was drafted. The law provided reduced or zero-level VAT rates for Ukrainian-language publications except advertisements and “publications of an explicitly erotic content.” Russian-language publications were, of course, not eligible for these incentives. The proposal caused an angry outcry from Russian-language media in Ukraine and book publishers in Russia.

In September 2000, before the draft law came up for discussion in Parliament, the participants of the Seventh Annual Lviv Book Fair issued an appeal to the president, Parliament, and the Cabinet of Ministers arguing that the Ukrainian book is on the threshold of death and demanding not only more tax relief but also “temporary customs duties on Russian book imports” and “limits on the purchase of imported books of fiction by public libraries.” To justify these demands, it was pointed out that in 1999 Ukraine published only 0.4 books per capita, while Russia published 3.2 and neighbouring Poland 9.5. This put Ukraine among “the least informationally developed nations.” Actually, these statistics, however grim, only showed that Ukrainian consumers have tended to buy cheaper Russian books instead of supporting their own publishers. To cope with the alleged informational underdevelopment, the appeal proposed, in effect, to reduce book imports, thereby further diminishing the book supply. Perhaps, this would stimulate domestic production, but more likely it would increase book smuggling and black-market sales. In any case, these radical proposals came too late. Parliament adopted the draft law after watering it down.

The episodes I have described do not look like conflicts between nationalists and, so to speak, anti-nationalists (liberals, cosmopolitans, globalists). Both the pro-Ukrainianization side and the pro-bilingualism (or pro-status quo) side could be called nationalist according to Erica Benner’s notion of a core national doctrine, which consists of “a demand for a strong constant identity shared by all sectors of a society, both by the rulers and the ruled.”¹¹ The key difference

11. Benner’s lecture at the Central European University, Budapest, December 2000.

between the sides is in the kind of identity they have promoted. For the pro-Ukrainianization national-democrats and their allies, both moderate and extreme, it has been a traditional mono-ethnic, monolingual, early twentieth-century East European national identity that used to be “a minority faith” (to use Andrew Wilson’s definition¹²) in Ukraine outside Galicia. For their adversaries the desired shared identity has been Soviet identity fostered by several decades of “really existing socialism” and shaped by the Soviet schools, the Soviet army, and Moscow television. This identity is inconceivable without the Russian language and culture, both high and low. The core of this identity is not Marxism-Leninism, as some may suppose, but precisely Soviet culture “as a whole way of life.” It is quite possible to be an anti-Communist and, at the same time, a *homo sovieticus*, which means, among many other things, hating “those Ukrainian nationalists” while regarding oneself as Ukrainian. On the other hand, there is much in ordinary Ukrainian national culture of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that is shared by people with a Soviet identity, including traditional populism, anti-capitalist sentiments, and the enormous contribution of ethnic Ukrainians to Russian culture.

Thus, the inter-cultural border has been vague and this has made a symbolic Russo-Ukrainian cultural border all the more important. Language, which was chosen to serve as such a border, has only emphasized the symbolic character of this border. The two languages are quite close and mutually transparent, and virtually everybody in Ukraine can speak or at least read and understand both languages. As a result, neither the average Ukrainian nor the average Russian, not to mention the Russophone Ukrainian, has regarded the other’s language and culture as alien. As President Kuchma once insightfully said, “Although we believe that the Ukrainian language should remain the only official language in this country, we will never regard Russian as a foreign language.” It should be remembered, however, that during the 1994 presidential campaign that same Kuchma proposed that Russian be made the second official language.

This observation brings me to the issue of the role of “the party of power” in the “culture wars.” “The party of power” has not taken a proactive stand in any of the episodes described above. It has played the role of a wise and apparently impartial final arbiter. Although the ruling elite has understood the importance of a strong national majority identity, which has been lacking in Ukraine, it has obviously put a higher priority on social peace and stability and has tried to avoid potential conflicts. Therefore, it has not pushed the nation-building projects too hard. Instead, it has been the national-democrats who have usually initiated such projects and insisted on continuing them when the “party

12. Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

of power" has lost interest. Yet, they have seldom reached out for any policy instruments other than administrative ones. Therefore the most visible Ukrainianization policies are in western Ukraine, where the national-democrats have been in power since 1990, or in those sectors of national life where some of them happen to be in charge, such as public broadcasting during Drach's chairmanship of the State Committee on Information Policy. In the long run, however, they have been surprisingly unsuccessful in introducing effective protectionist laws to help the national cultural industries. There are still no reduced tax rates for cultural products other than books, no charity legislation, and so on.

Another problem with the national-democrats' cultural policy is that it has been based on the traditional siege mentality (identified by Ivan Dziuba many years ago), according to which Ukrainian culture is a besieged fortress that must be defended at all costs, be it at the expense of artistic quality or freedom of speech. The spread of Russian pop culture in Ukraine, as well as the effects of globalization, have been viewed as threats to Ukrainian culture rather than a challenge or opportunities for growth. The nineteenth-century notion of the Ukrainian nation as a monolingual, mono-ethnic community with a culture rooted primarily in folklore is still dominant in national-democratic thinking and it has alienated millions of urban Russophone ethnic Ukrainians, as well as many ethnic Russians who regard Ukraine as their homeland and increasingly see themselves as members of the Ukrainian political nation.

There has been an alternative vision of the Ukrainian nation as a basically bilingual and multiethnic community and a corresponding multicultural conception of a cultural policy. But these have not been articulated sets of principles promoted by any major political party or coalition; rather, they have been the inchoate conclusions from the slow, painful, and unfinished process of cultural conflicts and compromises, negotiations and concessions. Although only a few small groups of liberal intellectuals have embraced this vision of the Ukrainian nation, it is, I believe, the most feasible one for the current period of Ukraine's socio-cultural transformation.

Language and Language Policy in Ukraine

Maksym V. Strikha

General Notes

The term “language policy” usually covers several issues, such as the official language, the language of instruction in schools, and the rights of ethnic minorities to use their native languages. In the last decades the questions of the language of the mass media, of advertising, of technical documents, and so on have been added to this list. In its widest sense, language policy includes the goals and principles that define the standards of linguistic practices in different spheres of the state and society and the aggregate of legal, administrative, and economical mechanisms through which these standards are enforced.

The goals of language policy were different in different times. The earliest goal was to maintain social homogeneity. Language policy as it was applied in France from the end of eighteenth century, in Bismarck Germany, in the Russian Empire beginning with Peter I, and the Soviet Union was an instrument of centralization and of the struggle against local separatism. In multiethnic democracies, such as contemporary Switzerland, Canada, and Belgium, language policy has been a means of maintaining a harmonious co-existence of different communities. It has also been a way of guaranteeing the rights of recognized minorities.

In the twentieth century, language policy also became an instrument of cultural and ideological decolonization in countries that had gained their national independence. Algeria can serve as a classic example. There Arabic was introduced into common use in the 1960s; previously, the middle and upper classes spoke French. A similar processes has been under way in the post-Soviet Baltic states. Russophones there must learn the national languages in order to receive citizenship and conduct business.

In recent decades language policy has been used even in some linguistically homogeneous countries, for example, France, as a defensive device against globalization and American cultural imperialism. French legislation provides for sanctions against the use of English (American) words in advertisements and restricts the proportion of foreign songs that can be played on radio and television. Some Balkan countries have a similar policy: Slovenian law, for example, protects the national language against German influences.

In the twentieth century, language policy received international status. A category of “UN languages” (English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese, Russian) was introduced. On 5 November 1992 the Council of Europe adopted the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.

Contemporary Ukraine is a comparatively mono-ethnic country: Ukrainians account for more than three-quarters of its population (77.8 percent in December 2001, 5.1 percent more than in 1989). However, Ukraine is rather heterogeneous linguistically, culturally, and ideologically. At least one-third of ethnic Ukrainians are Russian-speaking. There are also many problems with the languages of Ukraine’s ethic minorities, such as the Crimean Tatars, who were persecuted in Soviet times.

The consequences of Ukraine’s long-lasting colonial status as a province of the Russian Empire and a “republic” of the USSR are still very visible.¹ Let me present only one example to illustrate this statement. There was no formal discrimination of ethnic Ukrainians in the former USSR. However, the state policy of Russification in the republics meant de facto discrimination. In 1990 only fifty-two percent of university professors in Ukraine were ethnic Ukrainians, while seventy-two percent of the population was ethnic Ukrainian. At the same time, ethnic Russians, who accounted for twenty-one percent of the population, constituted forty percent of the professors. This great imbalance was caused not by administrative discrimination against Ukrainians, but by educational policy. In all post-secondary schools in Soviet Ukraine, Russian was the language of instruction for all subjects except Ukrainian studies. This created a substantial language barrier for graduates of rural and small-town schools, who were mostly ethnic Ukrainians with a poor command of Russian. Obviously, under such conditions, many ethnic Ukrainians preferred to send their children to schools with Russian as the language of instruction.

1. For details, see Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (London: Macmillan, 1985); George Y. Shevelov, *The Ukrainian Language in the First Half of the Twentieth Century (1900–1941): Its State and Status* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1989); and my article “*Mova*,” in *Narysy ukraïnskoi populiarnoi kultury*, ed. Oleksandr Hrytsenko (Kyiv: Ukrainskyi tsentr kulturnykh doslidzhen, 1998), 397–427.

Generally, Ukraine's colonial heritage has not been limited to the fact that many Ukrainians still use Russian as the language of everyday communication and that in some spheres, such as business and the media, Russian dominates dramatically over Ukrainian. A more important problem is that very often Russian-speaking Ukrainians have mentally remained citizens of the former USSR and therefore often supported the Communists and pro-presidential parties and opposed any reforms and integration with Europe.

The influence of globalization processes in Ukraine is also a very important problem. Cultural products in Russian, and now also in English, have completely dominated Ukrainian mass culture. In this situation language policy should be a powerful instrument for consolidating Ukrainian society, supporting democratic reforms, and strengthening Ukraine's leanings towards Europe. However, language policy has been so controversial in Ukraine and within its mainly Russian-speaking political elite that one could say that there has been no official language policy at all.

Language Policy in Ukraine: Formal Aspects

Article 10 of the General Principles of the Constitution of Ukraine adopted in 1996 states:

The state language of Ukraine is the Ukrainian language.

The state ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.

In Ukraine the free development, use, and protection of Russian and the other languages of national minorities of Ukraine is guaranteed.

The state promotes the learning of languages of international communication.

The use of languages in Ukraine is guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine and is determined by law.

The official status of the Ukrainian language was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR on 27 October 1989 in the form of an amendment to the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR. At that time Ukraine was still part of the USSR, in which all the principal spheres of public life were administrated from Moscow using Russian as the medium of communication. Hence the official status of the Ukrainian language was a mere formality. However, the passage of the 1989 amendment was the first significant victory of the newborn national-democratic movement in Ukraine. It is worth noting that the first lawful public organization formed at the beginning of 1989 not by the Communist Party but by public initiative was the Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society. Its official aim was to support the Ukrainian language and culture. Somewhat later, in 1989 and 1990, the society became the umbrella organization under which many democratic political organizations, including the Popular Movement of

Ukraine for Restructuring (later known as the Popular Movement of Ukraine or simply Rukh), came into being.

On 28 October 1989, a day after adopting the constitutional amendment, Ukraine's Supreme Soviet passed the Law "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR." This law is still formally in force, although it was introduced when Ukraine was still a Soviet republic.

The law was a compromise between the hard-line Communists and those liberal Communists who were ready to conduct a dialogue with the national movement. Although it proclaimed Ukrainian to be the only state language in the Ukrainian SSR, it accepted Russian as "the language of international communication in the USSR." Thus it introduced, in fact, the parallel use of both Ukrainian and Russian in all spheres of public life under the jurisdiction of the republic government in Kyiv. It should be noted that the most important spheres, such as the military, state security, the defense industry, and railway and air communications, were administered directly from Moscow and remained totally Russian-speaking. The law guaranteed parents the freedom of choice in regard to the language of instruction for their children in secondary schools.² Formally the law made knowledge of Ukrainian compulsory for all civil servants, but it did not stipulate any sanctions against state employees who did not know the state language. It was impossible to dismiss such people from their positions for reasons of language. The law merely demanded that they learn the language sometime in the future.

Thus, although Russian was not proclaimed the official language *de jure*, *de facto* it had all the prerogatives of an official language. Certainly this compromise did not satisfy either the Ukrainian or Russian nationalists. However, it did gradually raise the status of the Ukrainian language. Previously, Communist propaganda had claimed that in the future only one nation—the Russian-speaking "Soviet people"—would inhabit the USSR. The language law also provided some legal room for the development of the Ukrainian language in many spheres from which it had been practically banned, such as scientific research, the post-secondary schools, and mass culture.

The proclamation of Ukrainian independence in 1991 did not basically affect this compromise. Subsequent laws passed in 1992 through 1996 on education, culture, television, and so on merely mentioned that questions of language are regulated by the Law "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR." Generally, they stated that education, culture, television, and so on are conducted in the Ukrainian language, but that Russian and other languages can also be used

2. For more details, see Maksym Strikha, "Kulturni aspekyt myvnoi polityky ta ikh pravove zabezpechennia," in *Kultura v zakoni: Stan ta problemy pravovoho rehuliuvannia kultury v Ukrainsi* (Kyiv: Ukrainskyi tsentr kulturnykh doslidzhen, 1998), 73–83.

without any restriction. At the same time, very liberal legislation on the rights of ethnic minorities, including language rights, was adopted.

The legal position of the Ukrainian language was somewhat strengthened only by the 14 December 1999 decision of the Constitutional Court, which gave the official interpretation of Article 10 of the Constitution. The decision stated that as the state language Ukrainian is the compulsory instrument of communication throughout the territory of Ukraine in the operations of the agencies of the state and local self-government (the language of official acts, work, official letters, documentation, and so on), as well as in other spheres of public life. It is also the language of instruction in state and municipal secondary and post-secondary schools. According to the decision, Russian and other minority languages can also be used by local authorities and in education as regulated by law, that is, by the 1989 law, since there is no other law on languages. Thus the decision of the Constitutional Court did not affect the compromise of 1989. However, it sparked a sharp reaction from Russia. On 28 January 2000 the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation protested the actions of the Ukrainian government aimed at limiting the use of Russian in Ukraine. In its reply Ukraine's Foreign Ministry stressed the remaining possibilities of getting an education in Russian in Ukraine and the unfair treatment of the five-million Ukrainian ethnic minority in Russia, which had no state schools at all with Ukrainian as the language of instruction.

On 24 December 1999 the Ukrainian Parliament ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Unfortunately, it did so in a way that contradicted Ukraine's Constitution. The leftist deputies drafted a bill of ratification that practically established Russian as an official language parallel to Ukrainian in all regions where Russians account for more than twenty percent of the population (the European Charter itself does not demand this). Therefore the bill was rejected by the Constitutional Court, and the charter has to be ratified again, this time in a way that is compatible with national legislation.

I should also point out that there were practically no attempts in Ukraine to support the Ukrainian language by non-administrative means. The only exception was the 1992 law on taxation, which provided some tax advantages for publishers of Ukrainian books. This step was justified by the fact that the book market had traditionally been oriented on Russian-language publications and Ukrainian books could not compete in it. The advantages, however, were abolished in 1993 by then Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma. As a result, Ukrainian-language books account for less than ten percent of the Ukrainian book market today.

The Language Situation in the Last Decade

The language compromise reached in 1989 was, to some extent, a success. It helped to keep tensions on the language question under control and to defuse

ethnic conflict. At the same time it permitted a substantial enhancement of the status of the Ukrainian language. Today practically all acts and documents of the central and local authorities are prepared in Ukrainian, even if state employees very often continue speaking in Russian. All signs and listings of institutions are also in Ukrainian. The Ukrainian language is used officially in scientific research, and doctoral dissertations have to be written in Ukrainian. Furthermore, the Ukrainian language has made some progress in the field of mass culture. Popular Western soap operas are broadcast in Ukrainian translation on Channel 1+1. Almost all Ukrainian popular singers perform songs in Ukrainian, although Russian songs still predominate on television and live performances.

Important changes have occurred in school education. In the 1999–2000 academic year about 68.3 percent of secondary-school students used Ukrainian as the language of instruction (compared to only 47.4 percent in 1988–89). This rate of Ukrainianization cannot be considered very high: in ten years Ukraine has simply returned to the level of Ukrainian-language instruction that prevailed in 1960–61 (68.7 percent), when the active process of school Russification had started. Moreover, the percent of pupils in the schools in which Ukrainian is the language of instruction is still very low in the south and east: seven percent in Donetsk oblast, ten percent in Luhansk oblast, and less than 0.1 percent in Crimea, where ethnic Ukrainians have comprised a quarter of the population.

The position of the Ukrainian language in the market sector, as opposed to the state-controlled sector, remains much more complicated. An unbalanced taxation policy has made Ukrainian books twice as expensive as comparable Russian ones. Therefore in 1999 the per capita production of Ukrainian-language books was 0.36. Practically all large commercial newspapers established in Ukraine in the last few years have been published in Russian.

The changes in the language situation in Ukraine during the years 1992–2000 can be outlined more precisely by using data collected by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.³ In 2000, 63.8 percent of all the citizens of Ukraine stated that their mother tongue is Ukrainian, and 35.1 percent stated that it is Russian. (The December 2001 census presents somewhat different figures in favour of Ukrainian over Russian: 67.5 percent and 29.6 percent respectively; the slight difference between the institute and census figures can be explained by the “official” status of the census.) In 1992 these figures were almost the same—sixty-two and thirty-five percent, respectively. However, according to the 2001 census only 39.1 percent of Ukrainian citizens speak Ukrainian at home (in 1992 thirty-seven percent did). Ukrainian speakers predominate in western Ukraine and outside the large cities

3. See Evgenii Golovakha and Natalia Panina, “Bilingvilizm v Ukraine: Deistvitelnaiia situatsiia i tendentsii,” *Rosiisko-ukrainskyi biuleten*, 2000, nos. 6–7: 142–7.

in central Ukraine. But the proportion of citizens speaking only Russian at home has increased from twenty-nine percent in 1992 to thirty-six percent in 2000. The increase has been especially marked in the eastern regions: there it has risen from seventy-one percent in 1992 to eighty-one percent in 2000. Russian is also the overwhelmingly preferred home language in the southern parts of Ukraine. The proportion of citizens using both Ukrainian and Russian at home, depending on circumstances, decreased from thirty-two percent in 1992 to 24.8 percent in 2000. The use of Ukrainian in the workplace is much lower than at home. Business in Ukraine is conducted almost totally in Russian.

There has been another trend that threatens the future of the Ukrainian language. The percentage of Ukrainian speakers has decreased steadily within younger age groups. Among people older than fifty-nine years in 2001, 45.6 percent spoke only Ukrainian and 29.9 percent spoke only Russian. By contrast, among people younger than twenty-two years, 29.9 percent spoke only Ukrainian and 47.4 percent spoke only Russian.

The regional differences in the use of Ukrainian have been dramatic. In western Ukraine, 86.6 percent of the inhabitants spoke only Ukrainian and just 2.8 percent spoke only Russian in 2001, while in the Donbas eighty-one percent spoke only Russian and no more than 5.5 percent spoke only Ukrainian.

The Language Issue in Public Opinion

As I have mentioned, the Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR was the result of a compromise between the hard-line, mostly Russian-speaking Communists and the liberal, mostly Ukrainian-speaking Communists and "democrats." The former won recognition of the de facto status of Russian as the second official language, while the latter achieved the de jure status of Ukrainian as the only state language in Ukraine. But the compromise did not satisfy everyone: the Russophones were particularly unhappy.

In the 1994 presidential campaign, one of Leonid Kuchma's key promises was to grant Russian the formal status of a second official language. As a result, his "nationalist" opponent, Leonid Kravchuk, won a rather narrow majority in the twelve western and central oblasts where Ukrainian speakers have constituted a majority, while Kuchma won an overwhelming majority in ten Russian-speaking oblasts in the south and the east. In the final count, Kuchma received fifty-two percent of the votes, and Kravchuk received only forty-five percent. After the election, Kuchma, confronted with sharp protests from the Ukrainian intelligentsia, abandoned the idea of formally recognizing Russian as an official language. The issue has not gone away, however.

An opinion poll conducted in 2000 by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences asked, "Is it necessary to give Russian the status of an official language in Ukraine?" The results were:

Region	Yes	No	Difficult to answer
Kyiv	27.3	55.6	17.2
North	30.8	46.2	23.1
Center	31.1	41.8	27.1
Northeast	53.7	25.3	21.8
East	77.0	10.5	12.5
Northwest	16.0	66.4	17.6
West	10.6	83.2	6.1
Southwest	18.6	61.4	20.0
South	57.6	17.5	24.9
Southeast	50.5	21.7	27.8
Crimea	85.7	1.1	12.2
Ukraine	44.3	36.4	19.4

The answers coincide closely with the proportions of Russian speakers in each region. The only exception is Kyiv: in 2000, sixty-seven percent of its residents reported Ukrainian as their mother tongue (compared to fifty-six percent in 1990). At the same time, only eighteen percent of Kyivites use only Ukrainian at home, while forty-eight percent use only Russian and thirty-four percent use both languages, depending on circumstances. Most Kyivites, however, did not support the idea of Russian as a second official language, probably because of the Western orientation of most of the capital's residents.

The figures above should be cause of concern for Ukrainian politicians and Ukrainian society in general, even though there are no mass protests by Russophones in favour of their language. The reason there have been no protests is that the problem of language has not been a priority in any region of Ukraine. The issues of jobs, wages, personal security, health care, and so on have been much more urgent. Another reason is that Russian has, in fact, flourished and even forced out Ukrainian in many spheres of public life. During the parliamentary election campaign of 1998, only twelve out of thirty parties and coalitions mentioned the language problem in their programmes.

The most aggressive stand on language has been taken by the Communist Party, which had promised not only to give equal official status to Ukrainian and Russian if it came to power, but also to "liberate the Ukrainian language from the influences of the diaspora," that is, to ban many features that distinguish Ukrainian from Russian, according to the old Soviet policy of "bringing the kindred languages closer to each another."

Some "liberal" parties oriented towards the voters of eastern and southern Ukraine, such as the Social Liberal Alliance (SLON) and the Regional Rebirth party, have proposed a more moderate solution: Ukrainian as the state language

and Russian as an official language (with the difference between these two statuses left unclear). However, the attempts to create a powerful pro-Russian, liberal, non-Communist bloc in Ukraine failed in 1998: conservative Russophones voted for the Communists, and each of the pro-Russian liberal parties captured less than one percent of the vote.

On the other hand, the national-democrats have not put any emphasis on their position on languages. Only Rukh has promised active support for the Ukrainian language. Even the National Front, which is more nationalist than Rukh, has preferred to speak about the Ukrainian nation instead of the Ukrainian language.

In the presidential elections of 1999 the situation was rather similar. The only non-Communist candidate who stressed the “defense of Russophones” as a main point in his platform was the leader of the Slavic Party, Oleksandr Bazyluk, who got 0.14 percent of the vote and came in twelfth out of thirteen candidates. Petro Symonenko, the leader of the Communist Party, and Natalia Vitrenko, the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, promised to make Ukrainian and Russian equal state languages. The other candidates preferred to avoid the language question, and it received relatively little attention during the campaign. On national television all the prominent candidates spoke Ukrainian but on the campaign trail they adapted to the audience, using Ukrainian in the western and central oblasts and Russian in the eastern and southern ones.

After the elections some attempt was made to strengthen the position of the Ukrainian language. Two prominent figures in Viktor Yushchenko’s Cabinet, Vice-Premier Mykola Zhulynsky and the head of the State Committee on Information, Ivan Drach, paid much attention to the problem of language in their public speeches. Government measures in support of the Ukrainian language, however, were completely ineffective, although they sparked a storm of protests from pro-Russian political groups in Ukraine and from Russia. In 1999 and 2000 an attempt was made to restore some rules of Ukrainian grammar that had been abolished as “nationalist” by the Bolsheviks in the early 1930s. This also failed because of criticism from the left and those Russophones who thought the proposed changes artificial and oriented to the diaspora in the West, as well as from many Ukrainophones who feared that the changes would complicate the position of the Ukrainian language by discouraging many people from using it.

Conclusion

The future of the Ukrainian language remains rather unclear. Although its official status was somewhat strengthened in the last ten years, it has not become the spoken language of the decision makers. The use of Ukrainian in official documents is still somewhat decorative, and Russian has prevailed almost completely in most spheres of life, including the mass media, business, industry, sports, and mass culture.

Different political forces have supported two opposite scenarios for the future development of the Ukrainian language. The national-democrats have believed that, eventually, its formal status will translate into a real one and Ukrainian will replace Russian as the language of everyday communication by Ukrainian citizens. By contrast, the Communists and the pro-Russian liberals have supported the idea of two equal official languages, as in Belarus, meaning that in practice Ukrainian would soon be replaced by Russian in the spheres where it is used now (the civil service, the schools, and the state-supported arts).

The actual balance of forces in Ukrainian society rules out both scenarios in their pure form. Ukraine will be bilingual in the next few decades, and the language problem will continue to be a subject of public debate. But the debate will not be as sharp as the debates on poverty and governmental corruption. Fluctuations in the use of Ukrainian will be closely correlated with the shifts and turns in Ukraine's political and economic orientation toward Europe or Russia.

The Canon Reversed: New Ukrainian Literature of the 1990s

Tamara Hundorova

“What we are experiencing now may be called the decline of the ‘poetry-as-opposition’ tradition,” Oksana Zabuzhko said in 1996. Indeed, in the Soviet period, literature served, on the one hand, as a vehicle of the official ideology by supporting the socialist realist literary canon and, on the other hand, as an aesthetic opposition to the totalitarian socialist culture and political society. With the collapse of the Soviet regime and the birth of the new independent Ukrainian state, Ukrainian writers, as well as writers of other nationalities, felt released from the pressures of ideology. Literature seemed to be a field of freedom, of the pleasurable, self-sufficient play of the imagination, and of individual self-expression. This sense of freedom predominated during the first half of the 1990s and was nourished by the idea of a national renaissance.

Ukraine’s period of national romanticism in the early 1990s coincided with an information revolution in which the intellectual elite and mass audience gained access to Western liberal ideas and to an enormous number of previously prohibited or inaccessible authors, books, theories, and interpretative strategies. This was also a time of heightened interest in non-official dissident and underground literature. In an atmosphere of newly found freedom, young writers and provincial literary centres, such as Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Zhytomyr, and Kirovohrad, assumed an important role, while the influence of the official Writers’ Union of Ukraine (SPU) declined.

This process of decentralization and generational change undermined the homogeneity and universality of socialist realist literature. The character of writing itself changed. Ukrainian writers became playful and subversive of cultural codes. They began filling the information vacuum and rewriting national

cultural narratives. The post-colonial condition of the time was a kaleidoscope of different styles and ideas, a world in constant transformation and creation.

In this situation a new literary consciousness was born. My purpose here is to describe the new paradigm of Ukrainian literature that was adopted in the 1990s and the main tendencies to which it gave rise. The character of the literature of this decade was determined by several waves of literary development and three cultural and aesthetic models. The literary consciousness of the first phase, covering approximately the first half of the 1990s, was defined by a new sense of freedom and the belief that in order to create a “complete” literary model consisting of compatible national, aesthetic, and modern ideals the official codes and populist tendencies of Soviet literature must be rejected. In the second half of the decade the conflict among the different literary groups, tendencies, and ideologies intensified, disappointment with postmodernism spread, and, as a mass audience emerged, the incentive to write didactic literature became stronger.

During these two phases, three cultural and aesthetic orientations played a significant role in Ukrainian literature; namely, neo-modernism, postmodernism, and neo-populism. Neo-populist writers avoided formal experimentation and sophisticated literary stylization. They wrote for a large audience, offering it mostly emotional depictions of past national tragedies—e.g., Roman Ivanychuk’s *Orda* (*Horde*) and Iurii Mushketyk’s *Na brata brat* (*Brother against Brother*)—or of moral decadence in contemporary society—e.g., Anatolii Dimarov’s *Zahublena dusha* (*Lost Soul*) and Volodymyr Drozd’s *Zlyi dukh. Iz zhytiiem* (*An Evil Spirit. With a Life*). Interestingly enough, even writers who used to represent the so-called intellectual tendency in the Soviet literature (Drozd and Mushketyk) have combined neo-populist ideology with slightly modernist forms in their most recent works.

But the more interesting development was the increasingly visible and productive opposition between the practitioners of neo-modernism and postmodernism. I shall deal mostly with these two literary orientations, which define the work of the two most productive generations—the “eightiers” and the “nineties,” and I shall pay special attention to their stylistic and ideological differences. My principal aim is to show how the rich diversity we observe in Ukrainian literature at the end of the twentieth century came about. Today Ukrainian prose embraces various discursive genres and styles, such as the feminism of Oksana Zabuzhko, the existentialism of Viacheslav Medvid, the apocalypticism of Oles Ulianenko, the bohemianism of Iurii Andrukovich, the porno-eroticism of Iurii Vynnychuk and Iurii Pokalchuk, and the metahistoricism of Vasyl Kozhelianko. In poetry the intellectualist tendencies of Ihor Rymaruk, Oksana Zabuzhko, and Natalka Bilotserkivets coexist with the melancholic and metaphysical works of Oleh Lysheha, Vasyl Makhno, Marianna Kyianovska, and Ivan Andrusiak. The mythological poetry of Vasyl Herasymiuk stands next to the

neo-baroque stylization of Iurii Andrukovich and the rock rhythms of Viktor Neborak's and Serhii Zhadan's futuristic metaphorics. The subversive tone of Oleksandr Irvanets's parodies contrasts with the prophetic pathos of Stepan Protsiuk's poems.

The Official and Unofficial Literary Canon

During the years of perestroika, literature seemed to be an integral part of the nation- and state-building process. Assuming their historic national mission, Ukrainian writers produced works that would satisfy not only aesthetic but also political, sociological, and cognitive needs. In the first years of perestroika the professional interests of Ukrainian writers coincided with the project of nation building.¹

Politically tendentious criteria were then dominant in literary criticism. But at the same time a new assumption about literature that reflected the bankruptcy of Soviet literature as politically engaged consciousness emerged. The ideological shift towards the ideals of civil society, nation building, and Western cultural tradition was evident in the literary discourse, redefining and illuminating its new cultural codes. Ukrainian literature began to be approached from the aesthetic rather than political viewpoint as literary critics and scholars began to talk about the author's creative self-expression. Courses on the history of Ukrainian literature at academic institutions, for example, stressed the aesthetic value of the texts besides filling the gaps in the previous literary canon.²

In the early 1990s the SPU supported the re-examination of literary history, and by articulating demands for the development of the Ukrainian language and culture as well as democracy, it had some impact on public discourse. But the relicts of totalitarian thinking and populist myth in the SPU's outlook eventually led to a conflict between the new aesthetic demands and the SPU's predominant patriotic ideology. As the stream of new writings grew from about the mid-1990s, the SPU became increasingly conservative in its aesthetic views. The rejection of stylistic innovation, mass culture, postmodernism, and Westernization was clearly articulated in the SPU's paper, *Literaturna Ukraina*. The image of the besieged fortress and anti-modernist and anti-Western rhetoric have since dominated its discourse. SPU members have been unhappy with their decreasing readership and the nature of contemporary literature, which has changed

1. For more on the political engagement of Ukrainian writers during the first years of perestroika, see Volodymyr Kulyk, "Pysmennyske vidrodzhennia: Ukrainska derzhavna ideia v dyskursi 'opozytsii vseredyni rezhymu' pershykh rokiv perebudovy," *Suchasnist*, 1998, no. 1: 54–79.

2. See V. H. Donchyk, ed., *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury XX stolittia v dvokh knyakh* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1993); and M. T. Iatsenko, ed., *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury XIX st. u trokh knyakh* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1995–7).

significantly under the impact of mass culture. They have stressed the danger of aesthetic anarchy and have called for a return to the moral values of traditional literature. Paradoxically, their appeal has been supported by not only older writers, but also by younger ones who have proclaimed the nativist ideal of literature as the expression of the “true” national spirit and see their vocation as serving God, not society.³ These authors want to see a “positive hero” embodying the “national character” in contemporary literature. They have discussed the question of patriotism and its representation and have demonized postmodernism, which, they stress, merely “amuses and entertains” the public.⁴

The concept of a “complete” literature and its role in the cultural sphere were the focus of intense interest in the early 1990s. Such a literature was seen as the answer to Ukraine’s post-colonial social and cultural predicament. It fitted into the vision of an innovative, highly-developed Ukrainian culture that was to arise under the new conditions of national independence and freedom.

In the early 1990s many Ukrainian scholars became acquainted with Dmytro Chyzhevsky’s works and his claim that modern Ukrainian literature was incomplete.⁵ Chyzhevsky had pointed out that the strong populist sense of “one family” that modern Ukrainian writers had expressed restricted their range of styles and genres. In his opinion this was due to the colonial status of Ukrainian culture in relation to the Russian imperial culture. Chyzhevsky had also pointed out that as a result of the alienation of the Ukrainian elite from Ukrainian culture, Ukrainian literature consisted mostly of the lower literary genres and was permeated with a populist consciousness. Hence the modernization of Ukrainian literature coincided with the decolonialization of Ukrainian culture. But the process of modernization was never fully completed, because the new Soviet ideology rejected the very notion of literary modernism. At the end of the twentieth century the thesis of incompleteness has been revised. In the new postmodern context the post-colonial feeling of resentment has redefined the idea of a complete literature.

It is worth noting that the notion of an incomplete literature was discussed largely during the second half of the twentieth century⁶ and stimulated modernist experimentation by Ukrainian writers at the cost of populist writing. Throughout the twentieth century many Ukrainian modernist writers strived to attain a

3. See Oleksandr Iarovy, “Virtualnyi vystup na zizdi pysmennykiv Ukrayiny,” *Literatura Ukraina*, 2001, no. 29.

4. See Orest Slyvynsky, “Zapiznila myt prozrinnia, Vitchyzna, 2002, nos. 5–6: 81, 82.

5. See Dmytro Chyzhevsky, *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury vid pochatkiv do doby realizmu* (New York: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 1956).

6. See George Grabowicz, *Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); and my article “Istoriohrafichna formula Hryhoriiia Hrabovycha,” *Suchasnist*, 2001, no. 6: 116–29.

literature with a complete European structure. Although many Ukrainian scholars in the 1990s did not accept the idea that Ukrainian literature is incomplete, they were impressed by this explanation of its inferiority.

In the process of reevaluating Ukrainian literary classics after the collapse of the Soviet regime, the appeal to a European-type modern Ukrainian literature was revived. It legitimated the repossession of the literary canon.⁷ This repossession consisted of filling in the “white spots,” that is, the blank spaces in texts made by the censors, as well as the gaps left in the literary canon by the Soviet regime’s ban on many authors and works. This operation required changes in the ideological presuppositions and reception frames of literary works.

The filling-in of blank spots in Ukrainian literature included not only the restoration of expunged works to the literary canon but also the reassessment of its populist and socialist realist codes. Before Soviet literature could be rejected, it was necessary to re-examine the populist conception of literature, since Soviet literature was a mixture of populist and socialist-realist elements, such as didacticism, peasant thematics, and sociologizing. Soviet literature also shared the ideal of the people’s poet, the patriarchal cult of tradition, and a conception of literary evolution that is sharply opposed to formal innovations. The codes of populist literature intimated, as one of the first Ukrainian modernist critics Mykola Ievshan noted, “the ceremony of public life,”⁸ or according to Ihor Kostetsky, who represented mature modernist thinking, they are based on the “liturgical style of traditional Ukrainian criticism.”⁹ Bohdan Rubchak has called it the reification of imagined traditional values embodied in the meta-narratives of populist writing.¹⁰

The revaluation of the cultural model of Ukrainian literature in the post-Soviet period also covers the idea of Europeanness. The myth of Europe continued to function in Ukraine in the early 1990s, when dissidents, young people, and intellectuals longed to “return” to Europe and wanted Ukrainian literature and culture to be recognized as European. This ideal of Europeanness served as a strong discursive strategy of alienation from the totalitarian and colonial reality of the past. The previous symbolic order of Soviet ideology was replaced with a sphere of mythological imagination and nostalgic ideals. The

7. See Marko Pavlyshyn, “Aspects of Literary Process in the USSR: The Politics of Re-Canonization in Ukraine after 1985,” *Southern Review* 24, no. 1 (March 1991): 22.

8. Mykola Ievshan, “Borotba generatsii i ukrainska literatura,” *Ukrainska khata*, 1911, no. 1: 35.

9. Ihor Kostetsky, “Stefan George: Osobystist, doba, spadshchyna,” in *Vybranyi Stefan George po-ukrainskomu ta inshymy peredusim slovianskymy movamy*, comp. Ihor Kostetsky and Oleh Zuiovsky, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Na hori, 1968), 129.

10. Bohdan Rubchak, “Avanhard dopomozhe ukrainskii literaturi pobuty v sviti, koly rozviie narodnytsko-prosvitianskyi tuman,” *Suchasnist*, 1996, nos. 3–4: 214.

myth of Europeanness nourished the Ukrainian cultural and literary elite during the first half of 1990s and was modified somewhat at the end of the decade, when the ideal of European identity was recognized as a nostalgic and mythical issue.¹¹

Another influential discursive idea of the 1990s is that of modernization, which has led to an emphasis on literary modernism. Several literary periods became very attractive to post-Soviet Ukrainian literary critics; namely, the baroque and the Soviet Ukrainian renaissance of the 1920s. During the Soviet period the most interesting and innovative literary forms and experiments that were not connected with realism or populism were off limits to literary researchers. Even whole periods of Ukrainian literature, for instance, the periods of literary modernism and the early twentieth-century avant-garde, were dropped from the literary canon. With the collapse of the Soviet system, these areas attracted a lot of interest from many Ukrainian scholars.

In the early 1990s many Ukrainian modernist writers were rehabilitated, and their works were republished. Thus, the new literary canon was greatly enriched with Mykola Khvylov's essays, Valerian Pidmohylny's novels, Mykhail Semenko's poetry, Ievhen Malaniuk's essays and poetry, Iurii Shevelov's literary criticism, the poetry of the New York Group (Bohdan Boychuk, Bohdan Rubchak, George Tarnawsky, Patrycija Kylyna), Emma Andriievska's poetry and prose, and Viktor Domontovych's experimental prose.

The ideology of the national renaissance of the 1990s called upon literature to enlighten popular consciousness and serve national goals. This led to a collision between the "populists" and the new avant-garde Ukrainian writers. On the one hand, postmodern writers began to play with cultural taboos and national narratives, trying to overcome cultural provincialism and populism. The literary establishment, on the other hand, embraced a populist ideology. For example, the Institute of Literature of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine republished the works of Serhii Iefremov, one of the leaders of the populist movement in literature at the beginning of twentieth century. The populist ideas that were expressed back in the 1960s by the current leaders of the post-Soviet national renaissance were re-examined. The rehabilitation of the "sixtiers" legitimized moderate ideals that were close to populism.

In the 1990s essays written in the 1960s by former dissidents such as Ievhen Sverstiuk and Ivan Svitlychny, as well as Ivan Dziuba's *Internatsionalizm chy rusyfikatsiia?* (Internationalism or Russification?) were recognized as the intellectual sources for defining Ukrainian cultural consciousness. The ideological

11. For more on this issue, see my "Nostalhia ta revansh: Ukrainskyi postmodernizm u labiryntakh natsionalnoi identychnosty," *Kurier Kryvbasu*, 2001, no. 144: 165–72.

climate of the early 1990s was grounded in the intellectual thought of the 1960s. Even today some people believe that the criterion of Ukrainian cultural identity has been unaltered since independence and is rooted in the ideals of the 1960s. But the young literary generation is increasingly skeptical about these ideals, particularly about their populist presuppositions, and is displeased with the leadership of former "sixtiers" who now constitute the official cultural elite (Dmytro Pavlychko, Ivan Drach, and Pavlo Movchan).

During perestroika Oles Honchar and his 1968 novel *Sobor* (The Cathedral), which had been banned for depicting the Soviet destruction of Ukraine's cultural heritage, were placed at the centre of the new canon. This interpretation reflected the values proclaimed by the dissident authors of the 1960s. But pointing to Honchar's didacticism and romanticism, some critics regarded his writing as an example of socialist realism and also called for an analysis of the very phenomenon of Soviet literature, something that so far had not been done.¹² Decreed by the government and supported by the Institute of Literature, the publication of Honchar's collective works in twelve volumes has commenced, but there has been no serious reassessment of his socialist-realism. With the publication of the poetry of Vasyl Stus, Ihor Kalynets, Ivan Svitlychny, and other persecuted writers of the 1960s and 1970s, dissident literature has been added to the official canon. Regardless of the proclamation of the aesthetic values of literature, political content has continued to be decisive in the reception of literary works. In his symbolic biography, the image of Stus as a victim of Soviet prison camps has overshadowed his image as an excellent poet.

Literary Generations

The new cultural criticism has focused on the image of the Ukrainian writer. Traditionally, the Ukrainian writer was defined by his mission as teacher and prophet, but today it seems he no longer articulates the message people want to hear. After 1991 many Ukrainian writers felt that the proclamation of independence had not released them from the duty of serving their country. Thus the patriotically oriented poet has retained a very prominent role in Ukrainian literature. But at the same time, the younger generation of writers has not felt bound by patriotic duty and has playfully mocked the image of the patriotic poet. These rebellious, anarchic writers have taken their subjects from private life, depicted bohemian behaviour, and stressed close human relations and authenticity in contrast to the hypocrisy of the social and cultural hierarchy they have carnivalized.

12. See, for example, Ivan Koshelivets, "Mozhna odverto?" *Suchasnist*, 1997, no. 10: 112–21.

The self-consciousness of literary generations has played a significant role in the literary process of the 1990s. The impact of generational change on literature has not been a subject of literary criticism. The “sixtiers” were writers who did not separate themselves from the writers of the previous decade. Their name refers to their otherness as the political and cultural opposition to the Soviet regime in the 1960s and to their more or less coherent cultural and political ideology and style of writing. The post-“sixtiers,” such as Mykola Vorobiov, Vasyl Holoborodko, and Mykhailo Hryhoriv, distanced themselves from the political engagement of their predecessors and, stressing individual autonomy, developed forms of modern metaphysical lyricism often grounded in Eastern philosophies.

In general, the literary situation of 1990s was determined by three literary generations. The first consisted of older writers who belonged to or were close to the “sixtiers” (Lina Kostenko, Valerii Shevchuk, Dmytro Pavlychko, Ivan Drach, Iurii Mushketyk, Volodymyr Drozd, and Volodymyr Iavorivsky), as well as dissident writers (Mykola Rudenko, Ihor Kalynets). The second encompassed authors who reached maturity and started to publish in the late Soviet period. They announced themselves as the “eightiers” and they include Ihor Rymaruk, Vasyl Herasymiuk, Oksana Zabuzhko, Liudmyla Taran, Natalka Bilotserkivets, Iurii Andrukhowych, Kost Moskalets, and Viktor Neborak. Their outlook was modernist, existentialist, and politically less engaged. Some members of the group have shared avant-garde and postmodern tendencies (Iurii Andrukhowych, Volodymyr Tsybulko, Viktor Neborak, Jurko Pozaiak). Others, Vasyl Herasymiuk for example, have demonstrated a deep interest in mythology as a vehicle for expressing the Ukrainian mentality. The first anthology of their poetry, *Visimdesiatnyky* (The Eightiers), was published by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies in 1990.

In the 1990s the next generation of writers, the “ninetiers,” asserted itself and defined its outlook in a number of anthologies: *Teksty* (Texts, 1995), *Molodevno* (New Wine, 1994), *Imennyk: Antolohia devianostykh* (Noun: An Anthology of the Nineties, 1997), and *Deviatdesiatnyky: Antolohia suchasnoi poezii* (The Ninetiers: An Anthology of Contemporary Poetry, 1998). These authors have rejected the melancholic and hermetic writing of the preceding generation as well as their irony, replacing them with aesthetic pluralism from classicism to the avant-garde and imitating and refiguring stylistic clichés. They like metonymy and have not been afraid to be tendentious. Serhii Zhadan, a poet whom critics have called the “Ukrainian Arthur Rimbaud,” could be taken as the leader of this generation. He has combined futurism, Che Guevarist militarism, and nihilism with meditative stanzas and psalms to express teenage rebelliousness and homelessness in post-totalitarian times. Zhadan has written ballads about the period in which young people drink Pepsi Cola (*Pepsi*, 1998) and juxtaposed Western slogans with mottos from the times of perestroika (e.g., *Balady pro*

viinu i perebudovu [Ballads about War and Perestroika, 2001]), while Ivan Andrusiak has analyzed the necrophilic mind of the contemporary world (*Otruiennia holosom* [Poisoning by Voice, 1996]). Taras Prokhasko has been attracted by the fragmentation of time and body and written auto-thematic prose about the process of writing itself (*Inshi dni Anny* [Anna's Other Days, 1998]). Marianna Kyianovska has tried to catch echoes of eternity in her sonnets (*Vinky sonetiv* [Garlands of Sonnets, 1999]). A recently published anthology, *Pozadesiatnyky-2* (Beyond-decaders-2, 2000) may be considered as an ironic response to this kind of generational self-definition and an appendix to the nineties.

These generations have had different literary icons in the literature of the 1920s. For the "eightiers" it was Mykola Zerov, the Ukrainian neoclassicist. The "nineties" have been fascinated by the so-called avant-garde and neo-realism of Maik Iohansen and Arkadii Liubchenko. The cultural establishment, on the other hand, has adopted an eclectic literary iconography in which even avant-garde works have appeared as acts of civic duty. The inversion of the official Soviet cultural codes has not made the alternative literary canon any more acceptable to the younger writers, whose rejection of populist premises has led, eventually, to an institutional rift with the writing establishment.

In 1996 some Ukrainian writers, mostly of the 1980s and 1990s generations, demonstratively resigned from the SPU in order to make a radical discursive break with the totalitarian past and to define themselves in opposition to "official," state-supported literature. They set up an alternative organization—the Association of Ukrainian Writers—and eventually acquired their own literary newspaper, *Literatura plus*. This breakaway group has been inspired by the ambition to create a new Ukrainian literature free of ideological pressure and opposed to the populist tendency of the SPU, which has been compromised by its links with the Soviet regime.

Historical Literature

The expectation that Ukrainian writers liberated from the ideological pressures of the Soviet regime would shower the reading public with masterpieces they could not have published in previous years because of censorship was disappointed. Former Soviet writers continued to follow the old, well-trodden path. Nor were all the former literary tendencies obsolete. The whimsical prose of Vasyl Zemliak and Volodymyr Drozd, the vigorous realistic prose style of Hryhir Tiutiunnyk, and the neo-baroque novels of Valerii Shevchuk had an impact on the literary situation at the beginning of the nineties. They represented mature and enduring literary forms. Some of them departed from the epic or heroic descriptions of peasant life practiced by writers such as Mykhailo Stelmakh, while others depicted urban reality in an ironic-mythological tone reminiscent of Latin-American magic realism.

The tradition of the short story (Hryhir Tiutiunnyk, Ievhen Hutsalo) with psychologically and socially marginal characters and a strong sense of human values often associated with a locality and a “natural” way of life was continued in the 1990s. Dealing mostly with peasant life, this prose examined cross-boundary conflicts in national and social consciousness and undermined the romantic view of the common people.

The prose of the early 1990s included also larger forms of interwoven narratives representing the history of a family or village. Volodymyr Drozd's novel *Lystia zemli* (Leaves of the Earth, 1991) is, according to the author, “a book of fates and days that have passed away.” It presents the historical drama of Pakul village under communism through the eyes of its inhabitants, who differ in gender and ideology. This genre conveys the sense of belonging to a small, tightly knit homeland in contrast to the universal communist utopia envisioned by the Soviet leaders.

There was a remarkable increase in the demand for documentary, non-fictional literature and biography in the 1990s. Drozd's novella *Muzei zhyvoho pysmennyyka, abo moia dovha doroha v rynok* (The Museum of a Living Writer, or My Long Road to the Market, 1994) is an ironic autobiography. Iryna Zhylenko's *Homo feriens* (2002) is a personal memoir of the 1960s generation. The diaries and memoirs of Iurii Sherekh (Shevelov), George Luckyj (Iurii Lutsky), Serhii Iefremov, Arkadii Liubchenko, Oleksandr Dovzhenko, and Nadiia Surovtseva were all published in the 1990s and have added considerable detail to the canvas of Ukrainian cultural life in the twentieth century.

As a genre, historical novels are not intended to be realistic and documentary. They fictionalize historical epochs by contracting historical time and heroically symbolizing them (e.g., Lina Kostenko's *Berestechko*, 1999) or convert the past into a parable of the present, as Valerii Shevchuk, one of the most prolific and prominent writers of the 1980s and 1990s, does in his historical novellas *Oko prirvy* (The Eye of the Abyss, 1996), *U cherevi apokaliptychnoho zvira* (In the Belly of the Apocalyptic Beast, 1995), and *Bis ploti* (The Devil of the Flesh, 1999). These works are of a melancholic, not a heroic, nature. Using baroque metaphors, quotations, and rhetorical devices, Shevchuk depicts the moral drama of reflective individuals trying to balance the demands of spirituality with the drives of sensuality. The main idea behind his metaphysical searching is not the ambiguous and demonic nature of so-called reality, but the possibility of redemption by accepting dread as a consequence of divine playfulness.

Besides writing apocalyptic historical prose, Shevchuk has depicted the life of the urban lower classes. His more popular characters are young men who first experience love, art, or monastic life. He is also interested in the collision between male and female attitudes to life and has used the baroque association of feminine seduction with the devil.

Besides Shevchuk's neo-baroque prose, historical fiction produced in the 1990s includes Roman Ivanychuk's and Roman Fedoriv's idealization of important events in Ukrainian history; Pavlo Zahrebelny's mixture of the historical, romance, and detective genres; Volodymyr Iavorsky's short-story cycle *Napivsonni lysty z Diamantovoi imperii i korolivstva Pivnichnoi Zemli* (Half-Dormant Letters from the Diamond Empire and the Kingdom of the Northern Land, 1999); and Oleh Hutsuliak and Volodymyr Ieshkiliev's novel *Adept* (The Expert, 1995), which combines history with fantasy.

The postmodern deconstruction of history has introduced new forms of meta-historical discourse and resulted in very different historical narratives that have inscribed Ukrainian life within the already written text of world history and served as a therapy for Ukraine's post-colonial national memory. For example, Vasyl Kozhelianko's *Defiliada v Moskvi* (Military Parade in Moscow, 1998) deconstructs the utopian discourse of Ukrainian *Historiosophie* in the twentieth century and the mythology of the Second World War. His multigenre novel mixes anecdotes and clichés of contemporary mass culture with textbook images of Ukrainian history.

Past Underground or Ironic Literature

In the late 1980s underground literature offered an alternative to the Soviet literary paradigm. Philosophically and aesthetically, this literature was influenced by high avant-garde culture, but it also practiced forms characteristic of mass culture. In contrast to socialist realism, this literature was often hermetic and reflected the quest for individual self-expression. Its reaction against Soviet reality sometimes led to escapism into aestheticism, metaphysics, or alcoholism. The authors who wrote underground literature in the 1980s published their works and became well-known in the 1990s. Among them, the poetry of Oleh Lysheha and Mykola Vorobiov is meditative and philosophical. Its dominant tone is a lyrical melancholy. Volodymyr Dibrova, Bohdan Zholdak, and Les Poderviansky explode ideological clichés and myths of the late Soviet period and paint a garish cultural collage using *surzhyk*. They use "socialist kitsch" to parody socialist realism by grotesquely distorting or ironically reversing it. The absurdities of the Soviet world have also been exposed in the anecdote genre, which was very popular in the 1990s. A sudden reversal of official discourse has shattered the totality of socialist ideology and broken its hold over the individual subconscious. A new sense of freedom has suffused banal Soviet reality and exposed the vulnerability of "little people" when a line sung by the Beatles is heard and repeated in Dibrova's collection of short story *Pisni Bitls* (Beatles Songs, 1991). Diverse languages and the polylogism of different consciousnesses in Dibrova's short stories undermine the monologism of Soviet reality, while his many-faced hero, Peltse, symbolizes the total Soviet man.

The violation of communicative space in totalitarian Soviet society is depicted by Poderviansky in *Heroi nashoho chasu* (Hero of Our Time, 2000) by mixing *surzhyk* and soldiers' argot. His "Gamlet, ili fenomen datskogo katsapizmu" (Hamlet or the Phenomenon of Danish Russophilism), "Pavlik Morozov," and other dramatized scenes from everyday life are examples of black humour from late Soviet times. *Surzhyk* has served to express the meanderings of a marginal subject that undermine Hamlet's lofty philosophical dilemmas. Zholdak's use of *surzhyk* in his collection of short stories *Ialovychyna (makabreska)* (Beef [Macabresque], 1991) imitates the spoken language and questions the current code of moral and social norms. Echoes of the Western literature of the absurd often reverberate in these forms of inverted discursive practice.

The tragicomic hero of Dibrova's novel *Burdyk* (1997) represents the so-called Soviet lumpen-intelligentsia, a lost generation destroyed by the sharp clash between ideology and life leading to cynicism and apathy. He is unfit for the Darwinian struggle for survival in Soviet society. In his collection of short stories *Zbihovyska* (Gatherings, 1999), Dibrova depicts the unavoidable chance encounters and conversations of the members of that society. The title itself hints at the senseless motion of atomized individuals, who, according to socialist slogans, are equal and identical but at the same time completely isolated. Their only chance of breaking out of the narrow confines of their collective existence and returning to a normal human life is to be recognized by the "other," in this case, the narrator who knows their real selves and can liberate them by his irony.

Dibrova's play *Dvadtsiatyi zizd* (The Twentieth Congress, 1994) is a fine example of a post-Soviet conceptualist pastiche composed in the ideological jargon of the Communist leaders. The clichés of Communist discourse, specially of Stalin's *Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)*, expose the mechanical, puppetlike nature of the leaders and the remoteness of their ideology from any reality.

Carnival as Ukraine's Postmodern Condition

In the early 1990s the notion of postmodernism appeared in the literary discourse in Ukraine¹³ and gave rise to a discussion on Ukrainian postmodernism and its authenticity.¹⁴ This was an attempt to redefine Ukraine's postmodern

13. See Natalka Bilotserkivets, "BU-BA-BU ta in. ukrainskyi neoavanhard: Portret odnoho roku," *Slovo i chas*, 1991, no. 1: 42–52; Marko Pavlyshyn, "Ukrainska kultura z pohliadu postmodernizmu," *Suchasnist*, 1992, no. 5: 117–25; idem, "Shcho peretvoruietsia v 'Rekreatsiiakh' Iuriia Andrukhovycha?" *Suchasnist*, 1993, no. 12: 115–27; and my, "Postmodernistska fiktsiia Andrukhovycha z postkolonialnym znakom pytannia," *Suchasnist*, 1993, no. 9: 79–83.

14. Oleh Ilnytsky, "Transplantatsiia postmodernizmu: Sumnivy odnoho chytacha," *Suchansnist*, 1995, no. 10: 111–15; and Marko Pavlyshyn's reply, "Zasterezhennia iak

condition as a post-colonial situation, in which the main question was the necessity to bridge the gap between the high and low cultures. Some critics have viewed the postmodern tendency in Ukrainian literature only as an esoteric amusement embraced by a national elite that has renounced any social ideals and responsibility. Others have seen it as a continuation of the literary avant-garde of the 1920s and called it a neo-avant-garde.

Some critics have defined two types of Ukrainian postmodern literature—that of the 1980s and that of the 1990s.¹⁵ Others have opposed Stanislaviv, that is, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Zhytomyr prose¹⁶ or have divided contemporary writing into Western- and native-oriented.¹⁷ The typology of the postmodern imagination in Ukrainian literature in the 1990s includes, according to Ieshkiliev, such metaphors as the “small apocalypse” of Iurii Izdryk, the “nostalgia for Vienna” of Halyna Petrosaniak, the “carnival” of the Bu-Ba-Bu group, the “rat city” of Iurii Vynnychuk, the “post-carnival syndrome” of Andrukhovych, and the “recombination” of memory of Taras Prokhasko.

Ukrainian postmodern writers have redescribed the national culture by going beyond the populist-modernist opposition. Although postmodernist discourse has been legitimized in Ukrainian literary criticism, it is still an object of controversy and misunderstanding. Frederic Jameson’s neo-Marxist view of postmodernism as the logic of late capitalism has influenced some Ukrainian critics ideologically opposed to postmodern anti-totalitarian practice.

The new postmodern writing in Ukraine has reflected what Umberto Eco calls “non-naïve” thinking. As a post-totalitarian phenomenon, it has revealed revenge and resentment by distancing itself from socialist realist and populist meta-narratives of the “azure commune” (*blakytna komuna*) and the national “ideal of the poet.” Postmodern authors have fostered the symbolic inversion of national cultural codes and testified to the transformation of post-totalitarian society into a spectacle society. By means of verbal play and carnivalization, they have subverted hegemonic notions of stable social and personal identity, gender, and language. This has led to a form of liberation from the totalitarian past. The post-Chornobyl syndrome has added an eschatological and ethical colouring to the postmodern consciousness.

New literary works, namely, Andrukhovych’s *Rekreatsii* (Recreations, 1992) and Zabuzhko’s *Polovi doslidzhennia z ukrainskoho seksu* (Field Research in

zhanr,” *Suchasnist*, 1995, no. 10: 116–19.

15. *Pleroma*, no. 3 (1998): 91.

16. Volodymyr Danylenko, “Zolota zhyla ukrainskoi prozy,” in *Vecheria na dyanadtsiat person: Zhytomyrska prozova shkola* (Kyiv: Heneza, 1997), 10–1; Natalka Bilotserkivets, “Literatura na rozdorizhzhii,” *Krytyka*, 1997, no. 1: 28–9.

17. Roksana Kharchuk, “Pokolinnia postepokhy (proza),” *Dyvoslovo*, 1998, no. 1: 8.

Ukrainian Sex, 1994) became the first examples of the Ukrainian bestseller and provoked a wide public discussion on the writer's right to violate taboos. Andrukhovych's text sharpened the concept of the national poet. Zabuzhko's work uncovered intimate feminine feelings and, through their prism, examined the illness of Ukrainian post-Communist society.

To many people who believe in the educational and civic mission of literature, the postmodern ideal looks dangerous. They want Ukrainian literature to inculcate pro-state thinking and patriotic feelings. Instead, the postmodern writer cultivates ambiguity and irony. His texts are not linear but multi-layered structures of different cultural codes, an intertext of national and international traditions. Generally speaking, Ukrainian postmodern writers have produced both elite and mass literature that has challenged the symbolic order of the national culture. They have tried to combine high genres with subcultural genres that inspire avant-garde practices and exploit forms of youth punk, the avant-garde, the neo-baroque, and modernism to convey the dynamism of reality. Mikhail Bakhtin's notion of the carnival as the symbolic inversion of a society's hierarchy of values has been employed in interpreting recent developments in Ukrainian literature.¹⁸

In 1985 Iurii Andrukhovych, Viktor Neborak, and Oleksandr Irvanets formed a writers' group, which they called Bu-Ba-Bu. The name stands for burlesque, bluster, and buffoonery, the chief literary tools of the group. As Neborak pointed out,¹⁹ they assumed postmodern masks and played the role of a gangster destroying the traditional populist understanding of literature as a vehicle for political ideas. Andrukhovych called it a bold rejection of the "bland, undereducated seriousness about all things Ukrainian" and noted that "literature tempted us with undomesticated nooks, empty spaces, and repressed taboos, and it was not we who created in this culture, but the culture created us."²⁰

The carnival became a metaphor of cultural reversal in post-totalitarian Ukraine. This metaphor applied not only to literature where the Bu-Ba-Bu and other avant-garde groups, such as LuHoSad in Lviv, Propala hramota in Kyiv, and Chervona fira in Kharkiv upset the public with their masquerades. It also represented the socio-cultural expectations and post-totalitarian euphoria of Ukrainian society in the early 1990s. From the perspective of the mid-1990s, as

18. See Alexandra Hrycak, "The Coming of 'Chrysler Imperial': Ukrainian Youth and Rituals of Resistance," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 21, nos. 1–2 (June 1997): 63–91.

19. "Z vysoty Litauchoi holovy, abo Zniaty masku: Rozmova z V. Neborakom," *Suchasnist*, 1994, no. 5: 57.

20. Iurii Andrukhovych, "Ave, 'Kraisler!' Poiasnennia ochevydnoho," *Suchasnist*, 1994, no. 5: 14.

Solomea Pavlychko pointed out, the preceding decade looked like “a turbulent and ultimately lucky adolescence.”²¹

Bu-Ba-Bu’s provocative stance relied on a series of cultural metaphors, in which the “Chrysler Imperial” occupied the leading position. It became an erotic symbol of the new mechanical age and singled out America as the world of contemporary popular culture that Ukraine was rushing to enter. The road chosen by the postmodernists ran through irony-land,²² not through the holy land of high art, and was unmarked by the road signs of traditional culture.²³

By the end of the 1990s the revenge of the literary carnival groups upon traditional culture came to an end. The years of youth had passed. The society of the spectacle was established and literature was different. Furthermore, it turned out that the most scandalous carnival of the Bu-Ba-Bu was narcissistic and had only one superhero—the bohemian poet. In tearing down the traditional image of the poet-prophet, the Bubabists replaced it with the image of their new superhero. The carnivalesque aesthetics of the Bu-Ba-Bu deconstructed national sanctities but preserved the idea of the superhero and gave birth to mass culture.

The most vivid expression of the Bubabist carnival were Andrukovich’s novels. In *Rekreatsii* he demystified the image of the Ukrainian poet, dividing him into a mask and a person (patriotic, erotic, historical) and immersing them in the atmosphere of the carnival celebration of the Resurrection of the National Spirit. The profane transformations of such a many-sided hero were supposed to symbolize the mystery of national unity, but in reality they demonstrated the power of imitation that suffuses all life. Behind everything one could sense the demonic hand of the stage director who easily transforms carnival into a putsch and vice versa.

Andrukovich’s next novel, *Moskoviada* (Moscowiad, 1992), which the author called a “novel of horrors,” was a collection of late-Soviet ideogems, discourses, and characters. Immersing his hero in the atmosphere of Moscow, the metropolis of the Soviet Empire, and employing the form of wandering, he turned the centre and periphery topsy-turvy and showed the necrophilic revenge of the post-colonial subject on the corpse of the dead empire. In his third novel, *Perverziia* (*Perversion*, 1995), in which the hero, a marginal man, wanders across Ukraine, Russia, and Europe, Andrukovich created a collage of various discourses and counterposed an almost romantic, Orphic-like erotic mystery of

21. Solomea Pavlychko, “Facing Freedom: The New Ukrainian Literature,” introduction to *From Three Worlds: New Writing from Ukraine*, ed. Ted Hogan (Boston: Zephyr Press, 1996), 18.

22. Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* Cambridge, U.K. and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 9.

23. Tamara Hundorova, “Bu-ba-bu, karnaval i kich,” *Krytyka*, 2000, nos. 7–8: 13–18.

Man and Woman to Western decadent, phallocentric culture rooted in classical Venice.

Post-Carnival Morphology

The postmodern carnival not only raised the lower burlesque style to a commanding position, it also decentralized the cultural space of Ukrainian literature by opposing, for example, Lviv to Kyiv and Zhytomyr to Ivano-Frankivsk. A new literary centre, called the Stansylaviv phenomenon (Andrukhovych, Izdryk, Prokhasko, Petrosaniak, and Mykytsei), arose at the periphery of the literary world.²⁴ The members of this phenomenon viewed themselves as the sole representatives of Ukrainian postmodernism and contrasted themselves with the Kyiv-Zhytomyr school (Pashkovsky, Ulianenko, Medvid, and Danylenko), accusing the latter of having a rustic-peasant syndrome. The new wave of postmodernists was interested mostly in the marginal individual, his existence at the boundary between the real and the unreal, between psychological normality and hallucination or illness. This kind of hero lives in a world on lost intimacy. Previously the carnival created an illusion of closeness; now the dematerialization and depersonalization of the individual interfere with relating to the “other.”

By the end of 1990s it became clear that Bu-Ba-Bu had ceased to exist and that the period of the carnival was finished. The new literary generation, the “ninetiers,” did not want to join the carnival. They had a different vision of reality. Instead of the heroic bohemian-Bubabist, the postmodernist “ninetiers” have created anew the schizophrenic consciousness of the marginal man who escapes into a new idealized empire, into hallucinations or intoxication. Other “ninetiers” have developed classical, refined writing and object-oriented poetry. These writers are fond of the sonnet form (Kyianovska), metaphorically textured prose (Andrusiak), and metaphysical (Iurii Bedryk) and modernist (Tymofii Havryliv) poetry.

The postmodern discourse of the late 1990s has reduced the playful impulse of the Bubabists and represented rhizomatic (Gilles Deleuze) structures of thinking. The works of Taras Prokhasko and Iurii Izdryk have combined and recombined fragments of reality, constructed landscapes of thought, and use the morphology of the human body for the topographic inscription of memory traces. For example, Prokhasko’s biomorphism inscribes within memory traces of reminiscences of architectural projects and microbiological schemes resembling tomograms of the brain or herbaria. An imaginary territory of dreams and

24. *Pleroma*, no. 3 (1998): 91. See also Volodymyr Ieshkiliev, “Tin stanislavskoho fenomena,” *Literatura plius*, 1999, nos. 9–10. Stansylaviv was the name of Ivano-Frankivsk under the Austro-Hungarian Empire and interwar Poland.

daydreams reminds us of the old villages and lost age of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The representatives of the “Stanyslaviv phenomenon” have tried to preserve or reconstruct the mentality of a long-gone period. Their characters feel lost and frustrated by being separated from Central European culture, and their texts are focused on mirroring this culture and searching for substitutes. Izdryk, Andrukhovych, and Prokhasko have provided a nostalgic model of the multiethnic society and culture of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and tried to restore it in the form of small narratives (a grandmother’s memories, an old map, a lost lover, an old architectural monument). To reappropriate Western cultural identity for them means to rebuild verbally using the surviving traces of the walls, loves, and dreams of the past.

The juxtaposition of the past and the present, the central and the peripheral, and the sacred and the profane has haunted Prokhasko’s and Izdryk’s protagonists. Their narrative depends on the verbal deconstruction that is a part of the transgression strategy of literary communication. The messages are tautological or disintegrate into fragments. Izdryk’s novellas such as *Ostriv Krk* (Krk Island, 1994), *Votstsek* (Wozzeck, 1996), and *Podviinyi Leon* (Double Leon, 2000) deal with the depersonalization of a character who lives in a Kafkaesque world of repetition and metamorphoses and who resists the sluggish flow of time. The substantiality of human existence shatters into microwaves of feelings, temporary sensations, and memory. Then a new living being is constructed by recombining the fragments left at the end or the periphery. Bio-genesis and morphology, life and death, mirror and replace each other.

This type of postmodern writing deals with the fragmented identity of the post-colonial Ukrainian subject fascinated with the dead culture of the Austro-Hungarian Empire or taking revenge on the now defunct Soviet empire. This kind of imagination intensifies the eschatological sense of the approaching end. All temporal things seem to be finished and fulfilled, and the present is only a reminder of them, a mere repetition or recombination of the past.

Gender-Oriented Literature

The literary workshop and the anthology *Psy sviatoho Iura* (The Hounds of St. George, 1997) brought together Iurii Pokalchuk, Iurii Andrukhovych, Viacheslav Medvid, Ihor Rymaruk, Vasyl Herasymiuk, Viktor Neborak, and Oleksandr Ivanets. They embraced the ideal of the “Christianized hero,” neopaganism, the struggle with “carnal evil,” and the affirmation of “all-conquering male power” as a spear that “pierces that which ‘is not’ and asserts ... that which ‘is.’”²⁵ Such heroism is connected with the masculine conquest of nature,

25. Iurii Pokalchuk, “Vershnyk letyt nad svitom,” *Psy sviatoho Iura: Literaturnyi almanakh* (Lviv: Prosvita, 1997), 15.

which is feminine. This trend is reminiscent of the reversal strategy introduced by Bu-Ba-Bu's superhero. In Ukraine a gender-oriented literature has taken shape. Iurii Pokalchuk, in his *Te, shcho na spodi* (That Which is on the Bottom, 1998), and Iurii Vynnychuk, in *Zhytie haremnoie* (Harem Life, 1999) and *Divy nochi* (Girls of the Night, 1991), filled in the gaps in the post-Soviet body of literature by developing Ukrainian porno-erotic prose. George Tarnawsky's collection of plays *6x0* (1998) displayed a strong avant-garde tendency. The author, who is a postwar émigré in the United States, deconstructs the feminine capacity to love by depicting it in grotesque and absurd images. To him the conflict between the sexes is the fate of modern life. Tarnawsky's mixture of postmodern intertextuality and mathematical structures represents another form of contemporary Ukrainian literature that is linked with the American tradition of the avant-garde.

In Oksana Zabuzhko's post-colonial feminist works, an intellectual style and autobiographical voice are combined with narcissism and eroticism. In her novel *Polovi doslidzhennia z ukrainskoho seksu*, the author presents a Ukrainian intellectual couple whose sexual life is distorted by the past traumas of Ukraine (whose nominal feminine gender is significant). The female heroine cannot find satisfaction in love and is tormented by her partner's sexual obsession. Like a little girl crying in the dark, she is lost in Ukraine's colonial past, which emasculated the men and forced the women to treat them as brothers rather than lovers.

Zabuzhko has employed the genres of Western popular fiction to produce a sophisticated form of a Ukrainian bestseller that would appeal to readers in every region of Ukraine. She has offered her reading public a non-science fiction novel *Inoplanetianka* (Woman from Another Planet, 1989); a Gothic-styled novella *Kazka pro kalynovu sopilku* (*The Tale of the Viburnum Pipe*, 1999); and a teenage lesbian's story *Divchatka* (Nice Girls, 1998), which explores the moral implications of betrayal and conformism. Zabuzhko's "new heroine" is a loveless rebel who strives for freedom, but in the demonic male society where she has to live she resembles a witch violating the limits of what is acceptable.

Women's space in Ukrainian literature of the last decade has been represented by Ievhenia Kononenko's unromantic female voice, Sofia Maidanska's intimate confidentiality, Liudmyla Taran's reversed personality, Natalka Bilotserkivets's poetic elegy, and Nila Zborovska's confidential gossip. They have displayed an openness of feeling and sensitivity to the feelings of others.

Halyna Pahutiak has produced women's metaphysical prose. A sense of loss and longing for utopia, for what does not exist, pervades her works. The utopian message is stated explicitly or conveyed by the language and style. The main character of Pahutiak's stories in *Zapysky biloho ptashka* (Notes of a Little White Bird, 1999) is an immature, speechless woman who has run away from the hypocritical world of culture to search for harmony between her self and words.

The female narrator speaks about women whose children have died or are yet unborn, and leads the reader into a strange world where language has failed and only imagery carries the thought forward.

The Post-Chornobyl or Post-Mortem Text

Many Ukrainian writers did not accept the postmodern and avant-garde groups' linguistic irony and cultural reversal. Ievhen Pashkovsky and Viacheslav Medvid, for example, defended the neo-modernist ideal of high literature, because only it, they claimed, could pierce the silence of human existence and lift it above the flux of time. According to them, literature has a higher purpose than amusing oneself and the public. These authors have developed modernist and neo-realist models of literature, taken a strong moral position, and practiced stream-of-consciousness forms.

Pashkovsky's novel-essay *Shchodennyi zhezл* (The Daily Baton, 1997) is part of the apocalyptic literature that developed in the late 1990s. It is reminiscent of the baroque preacher Ivan Vyshensky and his passionate denunciation of hypocrisy and secular culture. Pashkovsky has striven to restore the mighty power of the verbal spell and believes in the "archipelago of the book" and the authenticity of the literary art. The style in his novels *Bezodnia* (The Abyss, 1992) and *Osin dlia anhela* (Autumn for an Angel, 1996) is reminiscent of Old Testament prophets. It is even more threatening and commanding in his last novel *Shchodennyi zhezл*, for which was awarded the SPU's Shevchenko Prize. The novel is meta-fictional, encompassing many foreign voices, quotations, names, and associations. It is full of echos of twentieth-century Western culture. Accusing the West of repeatedly betraying Ukraine in the last century, the narrator creates a kind of museum of disasters: he writes letters to Salman Rushdie and recounts his meetings with Milan Kundera, Joseph Conrad, Marcel Proust, and James Joyce. Chornobyl becomes for him the new Rome, the saviour of Western culture, and his criterion is the moral responsibility of literature. In this post-Chornobyl text the narrator condemns the entire modern world of hypocrisy, carnivals, and games.

Viacheslav Medvid also fits into this prophesying mould. He experiments with the traditional stylistic devices of nineteenth-century literature about the peasantry and tries to construct a new metaphorical world that, according to him, is more natural for Ukraine than the postmodernist carnival. He intentionally imitates the style of Vasyl Stefanyk and Arkhyp Teslenko, early twentieth-century authors who focused on the psychology of their peasant heroes. Medvid seeks a new model of modernization for Ukrainian literature in a synthesis of modernist forms with peasant themes. Thus, he reverts to the populist conception of literature and tries to reformulate it in a more sophisticated way so as to "restore their true names and meanings to things and concepts."

Medvid's novella *Selo iak metafora* (The Village as Metaphor, 1986) is a stream-of-consciousness account of a boy's liberation from his fear of the female world and of his initiation into the male world. The village is a cultural universe divided along the male-female axis. A similar initiation is depicted in his novella *Lokh* (The Cellar, 1992), in which the dominant metaphor represents the womb of mother Earth and the underground of (male) civilization. Initiation endows the hero with his own language, which is closer to the language of Joyce's or Faulkner's characters than to that of a peasant boy. Nevertheless, it expresses the hero's distinctive features and his unique view of the universe.

Contemporary Ukrainian writers have often turned to the *topos* of childhood or youth. This interest reflects the condition of a new cultural consciousness that has arisen from the wreckage of post-Soviet Ukraine, where the people are mastering a language enabling it to come to grips with its past and overcome its anxiety about the future.

Oles Ulianenko's works also belong to this apocalyptic literature. His narrator often identifies himself with the angel of death and witnesses in his visions "the fall of man into the Great Black River" in which God and the devil, life and death, are inseparable. Ulianenko's characters are marginalized individuals doomed to an almost inescapable existential darkness. The heroes of his novels *Stalinka* (The Stalin District, 1995), *Bohemna rapsodiia* (Bohemian Rhapsody, 1994), and *Vohnenne oko* (The Fiery Eye, 1997) feel the vulnerability of homeless existence and must struggle to survive physically and morally. The demonic forces in Ulianenko's writings contrast sharply with the playful wanderings of Andrukhovych's heroes, and the horrors of death and degradation overwhelm the latter's enchanting eroticism. Ulianenko's naturalistic depiction of the lower depths of humanity has a characteristic post-Chernobyl tenor of the post-Soviet transition.

The Birth of Popular Culture

A new horizon of expectations has arisen among younger writers who have become disappointed with postmodernism. Oleh Solovei considers it no more than a "paradoxical verbal mixture," the "noise of postmodern buffoonery" devoid of "serious life experience."²⁶ Word play and clever intellectual acrobatics cannot conceal the reality that haunts the young writers and their readers. At the end of the millennium, the "ninetiers" see themselves as the generation of the "post-epoch" and of a "national depression,"²⁷ an allusion to their existential role in the revaluation of the ideals of national revival pro-

26. Oleh Solovei, "Tantsiuiucha zirka," *Literaturna Ukraina*, 2001, no. 29: 6.

27. Roksana Kharchuk, "Pokolinnia postepokhy (Proza)," 6–12; Volodymyr Danylenko, "Pokolinnia natsionalnoi depresii," in *Imennyk: Antolohiia devianostykh*, ed. Andrii Kokotiukha and Maksym Rozumny (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 1997), 248–62.

claimed at the beginning of Ukrainian independence. The “nineties” agree with the traditionalist writers and critics that the serious genres in Ukrainian literature are in crisis.

The carnival age, which ended in the mid-1990s, symbolized the end of the search for meta-narratives and a cultural hierarchy in Ukrainian literature. It was also a fitting conclusion to Ukrainian modernity, which began with Ivan Kotliarevsky's mock *Eneida* (*Aeneid*) in 1798, a carnivalesque inversion of high imperial culture. In the nineteenth century the burlesque style was viewed as a “lower” genre and was relegated to popular literature, while serious writing was reserved for the propagation of lofty romantic and populist ideals. The strict segregation of “lower” popular culture from “higher” elite culture has been characteristic of modern Ukrainian literature ever since.

The reversal of this hierarchy of values in the 1990s stimulated the development of literary forms suitable for mass culture. The postmodern subcultures of the 1990s, in which neo-baroque, avant-garde, modernist, and punk styles have merged, have generated a literature with mass appeal, such as Svitlana Pyrkalo's novel for young people *Zelena Marharyta* (Green Margaret, 2000); Liubomyr Deresh's *Kult* (Cult, 2001); Natalka Sniadanko's erotic novel for women *Kolektsiia prystrastei* (A Collection of Lusts, 2001); the detective stories of Leonid Kononovych, Andrii Kokotukha, and Irena Rozdobudko; and Ievheniia Kononenko's pseudo-detective novel *Imitatsiia* (Imitation, 2000); Vasyl Kozhelianko's meta-historical fiction; Vasyl Shkliar's action novel *Elemental* (2000); and the postmodern kitsch of Volodymyr Tsybulko's poetry collection *Main kaif* (My High, 2000).

The reverse canon of the 1990s embraced not only Ukrainian-language but also Russian-language mass literature. The preceding literary canon was monocultural and excluded works by Ukrainian authors written in Russian. In the 1990s Russian mass literature swamped the Ukrainian book market. By the end of the decade new printing houses and publishers had launched several fiction series, including Ukrainian detective stories, thrillers, science fiction, and romances. Some Russian-language authors, such as Andrei Kurkov and Marina and Sergei Diachenko, live and work in Ukraine and call themselves Ukrainian writers.²⁸

Conclusion

During the 1990s the character and functions of Ukrainian literature were transformed. Once it was freed from ideological controls, this literature could no longer be called “Party-minded.” Two parallel process occurred: the rejuvenation of the socialist realist canon and the creation of a new official (state-supported)

28. Inna Bulkina, “Maiemo shcho maiemo,” *Krytyka*, 2000, no. 6: 27.

national canon by institutions such as the SPU and the Institute of Literature of the National Academy of Sciences. This post-Soviet canon has consisted of a list of authors and works that have been included in various educational (school and university) programmes, and certain, mostly didactic patriotic and populist, ideas. At the same time, a certain official policy has been followed in awarding literary prizes. And yet, the process of decanonization has become increasingly evident and has been accompanied by the emergence of new canons—every anthology that came out in the 1990s represented a distinctive canon of contemporary literature. Eventually, by the end of the 1990s, the official literary canon had become broader and more diverse: it now encompassed writers of the 1980s, such as Ievhen Pashkovsky, Viacheslav Medvid, Ihor Rymaruk, and Vasyl Herasymiuk, who were awarded the Shevchenko Prize.

As Ukrainian writers gained access to new information sources and opened up to Western influences, they began to experiment with different genres and to reach beyond the traditional, well-established forms of Ukrainian literature. The new writing is an ambiguous mixture of high and low genres and is aimed mostly at a wide, not a hermetic, readership. It is quite diverse in subject matter, genre, and style and is rich in verbal masks, discursive hybrids, and marginal characters. Different verbal codes, such as *surzhyk*, slang, and argot, and a sprinkling of English, French, Polish, and Russian words and sentences create a colourful and dynamic texture. The heroic and epic narrative has been displaced largely by the subjective narrative of self-examination and self-construction, in which marginal characters play a prominent role. Both the neo-baroque stress on mortality and apocalyptic expectations fed by post-totalitarian anxiety enshroud the world in unrelieved gloom.

The hope that, under the new conditions, Ukrainian writers would create something similar to Latin American magic realism has not been justified. A mythological trend blending the past and the present in one synthetic vision has not appeared. Ukrainian authors have preferred to demythologize the grand narrative of Ukrainian history. The traditional Arcadia of Ukrainian literature has been replaced with a very different urban or intellectual topography.

Postmodern, neo-modern, and populist conceptions, which in some ways oppose one another, have nourished the new literature. The romantic idea of literature as the manifestation of the national spirit has been shaken, but there is still some faith in literature's healing and reforming power. The canon has been greatly enriched but is under constant challenge and highly unstable. The tension between unlimited freedom and the threat of resurgent totalitarianism is the hallmark of the post-postmodern condition of contemporary Ukrainian literature.

Ukraine and European Integration

Marko Bojcun

Introduction

From its inception in 1991 until 2000, the Ukrainian state pursued a broad strategy in its foreign policy to disengage from Russia and integrate with the core Western capitalist states. This meant, above all, economic integration through association with, and eventual membership in, the eastward expanding European Union (EU), as well as close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, by the end of the decade the Ukrainian state leadership was forced to accept the fact that the EU had ruled out Ukraine's membership for the foreseeable future. After NATO's intervention in Kosovo, the prospect of Ukraine's joining NATO became less attractive than it had seemed in 1997, when NATO and Ukraine signed the Special Charter. In the wake of renewed insecurity about Ukraine's place on the continent of Europe and Asia, the Ukrainian state leadership had to re-examine her relations with Russia. For a variety of pressing practical reasons it was forced to engage once again in a more intensive way with Russia. Finally, a relatively new idea, which served to alter the foreign-policy paradigm of previous years, gained currency in discussions among Ukrainian leaders and policy advisers in 2000 and 2001: that Ukraine's long-term integration into the EU might be achieved in concert with, rather than in opposition to, Russia.

The main purpose of this article is to evaluate the prospects and desirability of Ukraine's integration with the EU and NATO, the two main European institutions of the Western alliance. I shall begin by discussing contemporary European integration processes, and then explore the theses that Ukraine has no prospects in the medium term of acceding to the EU, that it has no clear desire to pursue a closer association with NATO than it already has, that it has turned once again to Russia and is fundamentally rebalancing its foreign policy, and that it may achieve closer association with the EU and, possibly, NATO sooner by co-operating with Russia rather than by counterposing its relations with Russia

to those with the West. In any event, it is impossible to evaluate the prospects of Ukraine's integration with Western European structures without considering the dynamic of Russia's relations with Ukraine and the EU.

The Contradictions of European Integration

The historical process of European integration, which the Ukrainian state has tried to be part of since the mid-1990s without success, includes several distinct tendencies. First, European integration has been fostered by the creation of a common market in commodities, labour, and capital across Western Europe in the postwar period, the protection of this market with a common external border that imposes customs, tariff, and immigration controls, and the redistribution of resources among member states through the Common Agricultural Policy and other joint funds (the structural, cohesion, and social funds). Second, integration has been furthered by the partial pooling of national state sovereignty in the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the European Central Bank and by the institutionalized intergovernmental decision making of the European councils. The latest addition to this tendency toward integration is the introduction of the Euro, a continental currency that, since January 2002, has progressively replaced the national currencies of the EU member states and *ipso facto* stripped them of control over domestic money supply, one of the fundamental attributes of national sovereignty. Third, European integration refers to the periodic geographic expansion of the EU, the most recent wave of which began in the 1990s and will extend the EU beyond Western Europe to encompass much of East Central Europe up to the Ukrainian border (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Estonia).

Besides these three tendencies, there is a fourth—the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was outlined in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and elaborated in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. The policy has been backed with new EU institutions (the Office of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, the EU Military Council, and others) and will be provided in 2003 with an implementation force—the EU Rapid Deployment Corps. This fourth, military, tendency of European integration is a direct response to the wars of Yugoslav succession, which the EU was unable to contain. Without some military capacity the EU cannot pursue economic or civic-institutional strategies for containing such wars and similar emergencies.

This account of European integration is not yet complete. The EU's real influence as an economic bloc and a force in international relations and security cannot be estimated unless we introduce a fifth contributing force of integration—the United States and the military-security institution that it dominates. NATO was the sole security institution of Western Europe throughout the Cold War (except for France's independent nuclear deterrent, which was built under the NATO umbrella). Contrary to widespread expectations, NATO did not dissolve

after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, but reinvented itself and expanded eastward into the former Communist bloc. Thus a strictly European collective-security system did not emerge. Today there seems to be some tension between European and American leaders over the elaboration and implementation of the CFSP, particularly, over the question of whether the policy might become an alternative to NATO in a larger Europe. This alternative is especially supported by the European countries that consider NATO's eastward expansion to be destabilizing for the region as a whole. Important constituencies in Ukraine also share this view.

The American contribution to Western European integration in the postwar period was not limited only to the military sphere. It included economic integration in the form of the Marshall Plan. The American economy benefited directly from West European recovery. Subsequently, the United States became locked in periodic disputes with the European Community (EC) or the EU over questions of trade and investment. In the 1970s the EC and the United States argued over the appropriate response to the oil embargoes and about policy towards the Middle East in general. In the 1980s, holding to different interpretations of the Helsinki Accords, they came into conflict over French and German agreements with the Soviet Union to exchange advanced pipeline technology for oil and gas supplies. Like their military concerns, their economic interests in Central and Eastern Europe increasingly diverged after the collapse of Communism. Nowhere is this more evident than in their treatment of Ukraine and Russia.

It should be noted at the outset of a discussion about Ukraine's prospects of being drawn more fully into the process of European integration that the process harbours contradictory tendencies and competing interests. There is more than one conception of European integration and of its desirable scope and goal. Should the process lead to a commonwealth of nation-states or to a federal union, to a new European superpower acting more or less independently in regional economic integration, the world market, and international security, or to a more reliable, co-operative, and better equipped partner of America in a Euro-Atlantic community? There is also the all-important question of whether the East Central European states, economies, and societies will be integrated into the EU and Western capitalism on the basis of equality, or whether they will be relegated to semi-peripheral economic and second-rate political status in the EU. Naturally, the range of possibilities affects the perceptions that Ukrainian policy makers have of their own country's participation in the process of European integration.

Ukraine and the European Union

In the 1990s Ukrainian foreign policy evolved into a multi-vector strategy aimed at balancing Russia in the east with the United States in the west. This was clearly expressed in the January 1994 tripartite agreement among Russia, Ukraine, and the United States, which guaranteed Ukraine's territorial integrity

and protected her from external force as an influence on her foreign policy. However, the east-west balancing act became increasingly biased in favour of a pro-Western orientation. This became explicit after Leonid Kuchma became president in 1994. That year Ukraine joined the Council of Europe and signed the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with the EU. In February of the same year she became the first country of the former Soviet Union to join the NATO Partnership for Peace. In 1997 Ukraine signed the Special Charter with NATO, which projected a more complex and far-reaching relationship than the Partnership for Peace, but fell short of accession to full membership in NATO. At the same time the Ukrainian leadership continued to rebuff all Russian attempts at drawing Ukraine into agreements requiring the pooling of sovereignty within the (supranational) Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The motives for Ukraine's westward drive in foreign policy during the 1990s were connected mainly with her international security and economic development. An abiding concern of the state leadership was to find a suitable counterweight to Russia's historical influence. The economic motive stemmed from the initial estimation in 1990 that Ukraine's economy and social structure were sufficiently developed for a successful transition to an effective national market economy that could compete with West European economies in a mutually beneficial way and, in the process, overcome Ukraine's strong economic attachment to Russia. Ukraine sought membership in the Council of Europe in order to be recognized as a democratizing state, to obtain the Council's assistance for democratic reform, and to legitimize her claim for eventual full membership in the EU.

During the 1990s Ukraine's relationship with the EU was beset with serious problems. The EU determined its orientation towards Ukraine in the light of its more important relationship with the Russian Federation. The EU leaders probably had no intention of offering Ukraine full membership in the EU. They anticipated, rather, that eventually Ukraine would be subsumed by Russia.¹ This became increasingly evident from 1998 on, when the Ukrainian leadership began calling for a signal from the EU that Ukraine had a chance of joining the Union. Meanwhile, the EU insisted that Ukraine first implement the terms of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement and create the necessary conditions for a free-trade area with the EU.

Ukraine's frustrations with the EU and the EU's growing irritation with Ukraine were rooted not only in different preconceptions about the long-term

1. "Ukraine has never been regarded as a potential EU member" (Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, *Annual Report for 2000*, 10). "A study produced in 1999 in the depths of the German and French foreign offices and published in 2000 ... said it would be desirable for the EU to deal with united political and economic systems of Ukraine and Russia, that is, the CIS" (*Zerkalo nedeli*, 14 April 2001).

objectives of their engagement, but also in Ukraine's domestic economic crisis, her failure to pursue market reform, and her unsatisfactory progress in foreign economic relations. In the background stood a steadily deteriorating domestic economy with declining production levels, the flight of capital and scientific-technical expertise, the erosion of labour skills, unemployment, and increasing social inequalities. This socio-economic degradation was arrested only at the end of the decade. Under such domestic conditions it would be difficult for any country to move forward in foreign economic relations.

In the 1990s Ukraine reduced the proportion of its trade with Russia from about eighty to fifty-five percent. But her trade with Central European countries that were acceding to the EU fell simultaneously from twenty to ten percent, while trade with countries of the EU rose from about six to twenty percent. Ukraine experienced an ongoing trade deficit with both Russia and the EU countries, a deficit that was reduced but not offset by its trade surpluses with other countries. The structure of her trade ties with the EU was unsatisfactory insofar as the EU protectionist regime prevented the importation of Ukrainian products in which Ukraine had a competitive advantage (steel, chemicals, foodstuffs, and textiles) and could have generated earnings for productive investment and the modernization of the Ukrainian economy. Moreover, the proportion of Ukrainian exports that fell under anti-dumping investigations grew in the 1990s from about a quarter to more than a third.²

The EU and Ukraine had damaging disagreements about the certification of product standards to cover imports from the EU (and other countries). During the 1990s about sixty percent of the retail-trade market in Ukraine was captured by foreign suppliers of surplus and second-rate goods, some of which could not be sold in their countries of origin. There was a dispute with the EU over Ukraine's granting preferential tax treatment to the Korean firm Daewoo, which committed itself to rebuilding the country's main automobile plant. Both sides were critical of the implementation of the Technical Assistance to the CIS programme, blaming each other for unspent, misdirected, and misappropriated funds and the lack of consultation or transparency. The closure of the Chornobyl nuclear-power station became a drawn-out affair that pitted powerful economic interests on the EU and Ukrainian sides over the issue of whether its generating capacity should be replaced by thermal or additional nuclear capacity. Finally, despite robust declarations of intent and detailed strategic documents, the Ukrainian side did not manage to establish a legal and regulatory framework that met West European expectations and would allow foreign capital to enter Ukrainian markets confidently. By March 1998, when the legislatures of the EU states had finally

2. Mykhailo Pashkov's comment in *Rozvytok ta rozshyrennia Ie.S. pid chas holo-vuvannia Frantsii: Perspektyvy dlia Ukrayiny* (Kyiv: Atlantic Council of Ukraine, 2000), 61.

ratified the EU-Ukraine Partnership and Co-operation Agreement and it was to come into full effect, it became clear that the free-trade area the agreement sought to foster was a long way off. The length of time it took for the EU states to ratify the agreement was itself a clear indication of their lack of enthusiasm for a closer engagement with Ukraine. By 1998 EU leaders also believed that the Ukrainian leadership lacked the political will to make the agreement work and the authority to compel the emerging oligarchic business groups to let European and Western transnational corporations to participate in the Ukrainian market. By 2000 Ukraine's relations with the EU were in crisis.³

Ukraine joined the Council of Europe in 1994 as part of her strategic orientation to enter the EU.⁴ But Ukraine's performance as a council member became increasingly contradictory: she willingly signed practically all of the council's charters and covenants but then violated them in practice. After a drawn-out struggle, Ukraine was compelled to impose a moratorium on the death penalty in March 1997 and then to abolish it in December 1999. The council also pressed Ukraine on its commitments to reform the system of criminal justice and guarantee fair elections and the rights of ethnic minorities, political parties, the press, and local government. In 1999 it initiated unprecedented measures to suspend Ukraine's membership.⁵ At the end of 2000 tensions between the two sides came to a head over allegations of President Kuchma's involvement in the disappearance and murder of the journalist Heorii Gongadze. In early 2001 Ukraine faced the prospect of complete expulsion from the council.

Ukraine and NATO

Ukraine's bid to establish a distinctive relationship with NATO through the 1997 Special Charter differed from its approach to the EU. The Ukrainian leadership never announced any intention to seek full membership in NATO, as it did with respect to the EU.⁶ The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but

3. For a critique of Ukraine's adherence to the economic clauses of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, see Fraser Cameron, "Relations between the European Union and Ukraine," in *Ukraine and Its Western Neighbors*, ed. James Clem and Nancy Popson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute; Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2000), 79–83.

4. The Council of Europe is not an EU institution, but it is important to those wishing to join the EU. It is a meeting point for EU members and EU applicants. It serves as a gatekeeper to the EU: its Parliamentary Assembly and European Court for Human Rights keep track of member countries' commitment to democratic and human rights which are part of the *acquis communautaire* to which all EU applicants must adhere.

5. See my *Ukraine and Europe: A Difficult Reunion* (London: Kogan Page, 2001), 24–51.

6. In March 2000, at the height of pro-NATO Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk's term

subsequent developments suggest a number of contributing factors. The most important factor was that the Ukrainian leadership throughout the later nineties understood that NATO expansion into Ukraine was bound to antagonize Russia in a way that EU enlargement did not. Many Ukrainian leaders preferred a pan-European security order that included both Ukraine and Russia, but NATO was clearly unsuitable for such an undertaking.⁷ On the other hand, NATO did not invite Ukraine to join as a full member. As a check on Russia in Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine was of considerable geo-strategic value to the United States, and this compensated for America's and the EU's relative lack of economic interest in her. Because of Ukraine's geo-strategic importance, she became the third largest recipient of American aid. At the same time, the United States urged its West European allies to "do more for Ukraine" in overcoming the barriers to her westward economic integration. Yet, this special treatment of Ukraine does not seem to have been intended to pave the way to her membership in NATO in the long run.⁸

There were also other reasons that made Ukraine's bid for full NATO membership appear premature or even ill-advised to both the Ukrainian side and NATO. Although the Soviet armed forces and security services on Ukrainian soil were appropriated by the Ukrainian state in 1991, these institutions have retained a myriad of inherited links with their Russian counterparts. The military-industrial complexes that supplied both countries have remained closely interwoven. The Ukrainian and Russian general staffs have come from the same academies, where they acquired the same ways of thinking. New perceptions of national interest and national loyalty, undoubtedly, drew them apart, but this was not necessarily true of their perceptions of security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO intervention in Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999 had the effect of undermining both popular and elite support for the alliance in Ukraine and bringing Ukrainian

in office, his press service chief, Ihor Hrushko, announced that "under certain conditions Ukraine might make an application to join the North Atlantic union" (cited in I. Melnychuk, "Perspektivy ukrainsko-rosiiskiykh vidnosyn u konteksti rozshyrennia NATO na skhid," in *Problemy prykordonnykh rehioniv u konteksti rozshyrennia NATO: Materialy naukovo-praktychnoho seminaru* [Chernivtsi: Bukrek, 2001], 61).

7. "The entry of the Russian Federation and Ukraine into NATO could be characterized as the optimal course of events for Ukraine, but it is also the least likely" (Melnychuk, "Perspektivy ukrainsko-rosiiskiykh vidnosyn," 55).

8. Only time will tell whether the NATO-Ukraine Charter was only intended to perpetuate some sort of distinctiveness about Ukraine or whether it was seen as a significant step for Ukraine towards membership in the transatlantic institution. Most evidence would suggest the former" (Jennifer P. Moroney, "NATO's Strategic Engagement with Ukraine and Central Europe on the East-West Frontier," in *Ukraine and Its Western Neighbors*, 100).

opinion, as a whole, closer to the prevailing anti-NATO trend in Russia.⁹ Jennifer P. Moroney, a NATO fellow, concluded on the basis of interviews with high-ranking Ukrainian officers in the autumn of 1999 that “there is resistance within the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and General Staff to developing closer ties with NATO” that, among other things, has to do with “habits of heart and mind (for example, still picturing NATO as an adversary).”¹⁰

Yet the Ukrainian military establishment’s resistance to NATO that outside observers could gauge seems less serious than that registered among the Ukrainian public in nationwide opinion surveys. On the basis of a survey commissioned in August 2001, the Razumkov Centre for Economic and Political Studies in Kyiv concluded that “nearly half of Ukrainians regard NATO as an aggressive bloc and are critical of the alliance’s eastward expansion.” The proportion of those surveyed who thought Ukraine should join NATO had dropped from fifteen to nine percent since the centre’s opinion survey in June of the previous year. These figures represented a sharply rising anti-NATO trend when compared to the results of a survey conducted in January 1997 by the Democratic Initiatives Fund, which found that only seventeen percent of surveyed Ukrainians considered the alliance an aggressive bloc. The Razumkov Centre’s analysts attributed the growth in such sentiment to several factors: NATO’s 1999 intervention in Serbia and Kosovo without United Nations’ approval, nostalgia for the Soviet past, NATO’s tense relationship with Russia over the issue of eastward expansion, and the strength of the Russian mass media in Ukraine.¹¹

The Razumkov Centre’s 2001 survey also asked respondents to choose between NATO and the EU’s military programme. It found that only seven percent chose the former, while thirty-six percent chose the latter. Yet a massive thirty-three percent did not know what to say. This demonstrates how little is known in Ukraine about the EU (and NATO, for that matter). Another twenty-

9. According to James Sherr and Steven Main, the NATO intervention created an impression among Ukrainians and Russians “that a kindred people have been attacked by a foreign people on behalf of an alien people” (“Russian and Ukrainian Perceptions of Events in Yugoslavia,” in *Actual Issues of International Cooperation and Security* [Kyiv: Atlantic Council of Ukraine, 2000], 17). “That’s when the tendency of mistrust towards NATO first appeared among ordinary Ukrainians.... Up to the point of the action in Yugoslavia the same people supported the movement of Ukraine towards Europe and NATO” (P. Kobelko, “Suspilna dumka v Chernivetskii oblasti shchodo problemy rozshyrennia NATO,” in *Problemy prykordonnykh rehioniv*, 41). The changing perception of NATO in the Ukrainian foreign-policy establishment is examined in Oleksandr Derhachov’s “Kosivskyi rubizh ievropeiskoi intehratsii Ukrayny,” *Politychnyi kalendar*, no. 4 (1999).

10. Moroney, “NATO’s Strategic Engagement,” 99.

11. See Leonid Poliakov and Mikhail Pashkov, “Ukraine-Europe: In Search of a Common Response to New Threats,” *Zerkalo nedeli*, 5 October 2001.

four percent chose neither NATO nor the EU. This result tends to confirm the existence of a strong isolationist trend in Ukrainian public opinion, which has been registered in other surveys as well.¹²

In the late 1990s public opinion on the broader issue of Ukraine's integration with European institutions appeared to be less informed and less sharply focussed than public opinion on NATO. Opinion surveys conducted over the 1994–2000 period showed practically no growth in the proportion of Ukrainians who favoured European integration (presented as integration with NATO and EU structures): the marginal rise was from fourteen to sixteen percent over this period. At the same time there was a decline from forty-one percent in 1994 to fifteen percent in 2000 in the proportion of surveyed respondents favouring integration with the CIS. Asked in 2000 about Ukraine's possible integration with the Russia-Belarus Union, twenty-three percent of respondents were opposed, but fifty-three percent were in favour. Those in favour were mostly in eastern Ukraine. With respect to the eastward vector of integration, there was a clear tendency in favour of economic integration with Russia or the Russia-Belarus Union over any kind of political-military integration with Russia, the union, or the CIS. A growing sense of isolationism is suggested by the proportion of those favouring reliance on one's own forces, which grew in the 1994–2000 period from thirteen to twenty-six percent. This tendency was especially marked in western Ukraine. Young and better-educated people favoured European integration in proportionally greater numbers than other age and education groups; for them the notion of integration was less of an institutional, state-to-state, geopolitical process and more of an individual opportunity for social mobility.¹³

Russia Turns on the Heat

By the end of 2000 Ukraine's pro-Western orientation had been eroded in a major way by the serious problems it faced in its relations with the EU, the Council of Europe, and NATO. On the basis of the EU's accession criteria of a stable democratic government, respect for democratic rights, and a domestic market economy capable of competing within the one European market, Ukraine had no chance of even beginning accession negotiations.¹⁴ Disappointment in

12. Ibid. When asked if Ukraine should "participate directly" in forming an EU rapid deployment force and take part in peacekeeping operations under EU auspices, fifty percent said yes, twenty-four percent said no, and the remainder abstained.

13. See Sergei Makeev, "Obshchestvennoe mnenie v Ukraine o perspektivakh integratsii v NATO i evropeiskie struktury," in *Rozvytok ta rozshyrennia Ie.S.*, 63–6.

14. The retreat from democratization has been amply documented in the monitoring reports and plenary sessions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. See also my *Ukraine and Europe*. For an analysis of the development of capitalism in Ukraine in the 1990s, see my "The Ukrainian Economy since Independence," *Working Papers in*

the meagre results of the pro-Western orientation should be borne in mind as we turn to the new round of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine that started in the very same period.

The year from mid-2000 to mid-2001 may well go down in history as the point at which Ukraine was forced to abandon its independent orientation towards the EU and its pro-NATO strategy and when Russia embarked on a new stage of integration with the EU, taking Ukraine in its wake. In that year President Putin made a determined drive to exploit the critical state of Ukraine's domestic economic situation and international standing and to exact the price of Ukraine's dependence on Russia's fuel and energy resources. In the course of the year he succeeded in securing several important new agreements with Ukrainian leaders: (1) a restructuring of Ukraine's gas debt to Russia over an eight- to ten-year period, which allows Russian firms to use part of the debt to buy shares in privatizing industrial assets (December 2000); (2) a fifty-two-point military co-operation accord signed by the respective defence ministers to co-ordinate policy in relation to the EU and to allow Russia to take part in planning all multinational military exercises on Ukrainian soil (January 2001); (3) a co-operation agreement between the respective heads of state-security services (February 2001); (4) co-operation agreements in the aerospace and aviation, shipbuilding, and electronics industries (February 2001); (5) an agreement to integrate the two countries' electric-power grids (February 2001); and (6) a protocol between the Russian Conventional Arms Agency and the Ukrainian State Committee for Industrial Policy on co-operation in the production of ammunition and conventional weapons on the basis of a single industrial policy (February 2001).¹⁵

These agreements were reached after intense negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow throughout 2000. In September, in the midst of critical negotiations over Ukraine's gas debt to Russia, Ukraine's foreign minister, Borys Tarasiuk, was dismissed at Moscow's insistence.¹⁶ He was replaced by the veteran diplomat

Ukrainian Studies, no. 1 (May 1999), at <www.unl.ac.uk/ukrainecentre>. The relationship between political power and capital accumulation in Ukraine was the main focus of attention of the Internet newspaper *Ukrainska pravda* <www.pravda.com> from its inception in April 2000. Its founder, Heorhii Gongadze, was murdered in September of that year.

15. The texts of these agreements were not made public. For press reports see Hanna Liuta, "Dosiahnuta pryntsypova domovlennist," *Dzerkalo tizhnia*, 2000, no. 47; *Ukraina moloda*, 21 February 2001; Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, *Report*, 2001, nos. 7 and 12 (February) and 2002, no. 7 (March); ITAR-TASS, 18 January and 14 February 2001; and *Financial Times*, 22 February 2001.

16. "Ukraina ta Rosiia domovylysia pro ostatechnu sumu ukrainskoho borhu za haz," *Ukrainska pravda*, 27 May 2000; "U Rosii ne duzhe vysoko otsiniuiut rezul'taty vizytu Tarasiuka do Moskvy," *Ukrainska pravda*, 30 May 2001.

who had held the foreign-ministry portfolio at the beginning of the 1990s, Anatolii Zlenko. Zlenko, it was feared, would give Ukraine's foreign policy an eastward tilt. An authoritative Kyiv think-tank, the Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy, concluded in its annual report for 2000 that what took place at this time was a cardinal change in Ukraine's foreign policy and in her military and political course, from the multi-vector policy of balancing Ukraine's interests between those of the United States and Russia to a single-vector policy aimed at Ukraine's reintegration with the Russian Federation.¹⁷ How did Putin persuade Kuchma to take such unprecedented steps in their mutual relations? Here we can identify a number of important developments in 2000 surrounding Russian gas supplies and the Ukrainian debt that reduced Ukraine's ability to manoeuvre between Russia and the Western alliance.

Russia has been the biggest supplier of natural gas to Central and Western Europe. It has provided about forty percent of their needs and will provide about sixty percent within ten years. Ukraine has been a major consumer of Russian and Turkmenistan gas, which has been delivered to Ukraine in a total volume of 60 bil. cu. m. each year by a Russian firm. These 60 bil. cu. m. have accounted for three-quarters of Ukraine's annual demand, the remainder being produced in Ukraine herself. Natural gas has fuelled about eighty-seven percent of Ukrainian households and generated over forty percent of her electricity (the rest has been generated by Russian and Kazakh oil and by nuclear fuel). But Ukraine has not just been a major consumer of Russian gas; it has also been the largest gas-transit country in the world. About 120 bil. cu. m., or ninety-four percent, of the Russian gas consumed in Central and Western Europe has been transmitted through her territory. The dense network—35,000 km—of pipelines has been the property of Ukrainian para-state firms. Ukrainian state and private participants in the transmission of Russian gas to European consumers have been paid in kind in the amount of 30 bil. cu. m. of gas each year.¹⁸

By the end of 2000 Ukraine was heavily indebted to Russia for the additional gas her para-state firms had drawn from the transit network each year to meet peak winter demand and sell for cash to Central European consumers. Throughput in the pipelines could not easily be monitored because the international transit lines have been intertwined with the Ukrainian domestic distribution network. Hence the amount of Ukraine's debt has been disputed, but it has ranged from \$1.4 billion to \$3 billion. There has always been a debate

17. Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, *Annual Report for 2000*, 7.

18. See "Ukraine at a Crossroads as Energy Uncertainty Prevails," *Gas Matters*, December 2000, 1–10; and Vasyl Rozgonyuk and Zinoviy Osinchuk, "Ukrainian Gas Transit System Expanding, Modernizing to Meet Demand," *Oil and Gas Journal*, 19 February 2001.

about who is responsible for the debt—the private side of the gas transit and trading firms or the state side, which has maintained the trunk lines and guaranteed the repayment of debts.

The transit and trade in Russian gas was an especially lucrative business in the 1990s. It was the initial principal source of the superprofits that served as the base of the diversified empires of today's five or six main oligarchic groups in Ukraine. These groups have made vast sums of money by turning Russian gas passing through the pipelines into hard-currency profits while dumping the costs of transit onto Ukrainian state institutions. Indeed, there has been close co-operation between state officials and private businessmen in the pursuit of this rewarding trade.¹⁹

In the second phase of their capital accumulation—roughly from 1996 to 1998—Ukrainian oligarchs began buying up such downstream and ancillary assets as provincial electricity-generating and distribution companies (*oblenenerho*) and pipe-manufacturing plants as they were privatized. They also created their own mass-media outlets and political parties and succeeded in gaining representation in the Supreme Council in the 1998 elections. They penetrated the entourage of President Kuchma, whose administration has practically sole decision-making power with respect to foreign policy. Having established this foothold, they aspired to take a more direct part in deciding who would occupy the chief executive positions in the country. They played key financial and organizational roles in Kuchma's re-election in November 1999. In return they expected to gain seats in the Cabinet of Ministers, from which they could more easily direct the final phase of privatization of the biggest and most important enterprises in the country.

Yet, Russian and Western transnational capital was also poised to take part in the final phase of the privatization of the whole fuel and energy complex in Ukraine. The prize asset was the gas-transit network. Both Russian firms, such as the giant Gazprom, and Western multinationals, such as Shell, were keen to take a substantial, if not controlling, interest in it. Backing the Western firms were the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU. The Russian state stood behind its own para-state and private firms, which, holding some of the greatest gas and oil deposits on the continent, now wanted to get hold of the distribution system that transmitted their oil and gas beyond Russia to former Soviet, Central European, and West European states. For Russian national capital, winning control of the gas-transit network stretching across Ukraine was one of the most important steps in attaining transnational status and transnational competition with the Western giants. The appointment in May 2001 of the former Russian

19. "Zuriadu Ukrayiny idut ostanni prykhlynyky zviazkiv z Rosiieiu," *Ukrainska pravda*, 25 May 2000.

prime minister and former head of Gazprom, Viktor Chernomyrdin, as Russia's ambassador to Kyiv and special presidential envoy on the development of Russian-Ukrainian trade and economic relations was widely interpreted in Ukraine and Russia as a calculated move to strengthen Russia's chances of winning this important Ukrainian asset.²⁰

The Ukrainian oligarchs and state institutions have not had sufficient resources to repay the gas debt to Russia and invest simultaneously in the maintenance and exploitation of the gas transit network for their own benefit. There was growing pressure from the EU, the Russian government, and major European energy companies to resolve the long-term question of security of supply across the European subcontinent.²¹ Ukraine's only options, therefore, were to grant a long-term concession to a foreign firm to exploit the network or to privatize it, partially or completely. For Ukraine it boiled down to the size of the stake in the network it could retain.²²

In the battle fought out through 2000 and into 2001, the Russian side had the advantage over the Western side: the Ukrainian oligarchs were already dependent upon Russian supply; the Ukrainian state owed the Russian side a gas debt that it could not repay in cash; and Russian private capital had already moved onto the Ukrainian market, was buying continuously into a wide range of manufacturing enterprises, communications, and mass media, and knew how to operate in

20. "Do nas pryikhav revizor," *Ukrainska pravda*, 23 May 2000; "Kredyty vid MVF mozhe dadut," *Ukrainska pravda*, 24 May 2000; "Ukraine at a Crossroads," 7–9. Gazprom has worked with the Russian government to acquire equity in the fuel- and energy-distribution systems of the Newly Independent States in exchange for their debts so that it can control energy transit and trade further afield in Central, Southern, and Western Europe. See Jan Kalicki, "High Stakes Hinge on Russia's Energy Choices," *Oil and Gas Journal Online*, 19 March 2001. On the occasion of Chernomyrdin's appointment to Kyiv, *Ukraina moloda* commented in its 2 May 2001 edition that "he will supervise Russia's participation in big privatization and gas-debt settlement. He will do everything to make Kyiv sell Russia part of its gas-transit pipelines."

21. "Ukraine at a Crossroads as Energy Uncertainty Prevails," *Gas Matters*, December 2000, 1; Darius Snieckus, "EU and Russia Seek Cooperation and Integration of Energy Markets," *Oil and Gas Journal Online*, 17 May 2001; "EBRD Calls for Gazprom Break-up," *Oil and Gas Journal Online*, 3 July 2000.

22. In an interview given to *Rossiiskaia gazeta* on 18 April 2001, President Kuchma acknowledged that "we will be seeking compromises ... we are ... ready to examine the question of whether the pipeline should not be solely Ukrainian and whether both Russian and even European partners should be allowed to participate." Foreign Minister Zlenko said in Brussels on 24 April 2001 that Ukraine sought to develop closer co-operation with the EU, including "the implementation of the European Union's energy strategy as an equal partner ... [and] the creation of an international mechanism for managing Ukraine's gas transportation system, and invited strategic investors to participate" (Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, *Report*, 21–7 April 2001).

the new conditions of the “wild east.” Both Ukrainian and Russian capital were determined to keep Western capital of any serious weight out of the picture until they had consolidated their own positions.²³

Two countervailing tendencies to Ukraine’s drift to a Russian orientation should be noted. There was an agreement between the two countries in 1994 quite similar to the gas-debt-for-transit-assets deal signed by Putin and Kuchma in December 2000. And it was rejected by the Supreme Council as too damaging to Ukraine’s strategic interests.²⁴ Ukrainian diplomats have said privately that agreements are initialled by the executive in the knowledge that the legislature will get them off the hook. Secondly, from early 2001 (possibly earlier) there was quite sustained pressure from the EU and the United States on Ukraine to keep its Western orientation.²⁵ But have these tendencies been enough to keep Ukraine looking westward given the important changes that have occurred in the overall international environment? Under Putin’s leadership Russia has embarked upon a more calculated reclamation of her sphere of influence in the former Soviet area. Ukraine’s room for economic manoeuvring vis-à-vis Russia has been reduced severely by the size of its Russian gas debt and the imposition of trade tariffs and quotas by Russia, the EU, and the United States. Ukraine’s international reputation has been damaged by the Gongadze affair and the Melnychenko tapes scandal. Ukraine’s relations with Central European countries have been

23. Russian companies with large shares or controlling interest in Ukrainian enterprises include Avtozaz, which bought the Zaporizhzhia Aluminum Plant; Lukoil, which bought the Odesa Oil Refinery, created a joint venture with the Kalush Refinery, and is planning to purchase a hundred Ukrainian gas stations; the Tiumen Oil Company, which purchased the Lysychansk Oil Refinery and a local television station; the metals conglomerate Russian Aluminum, which controls the Mykolaiv Aluminum Industrial Complex; Metals Russia, which invested in the Donetsk Metallurgical Industrial Complex; and the Alliance Group, Alfa Nafta, and Tat Nafta companies, which took part in the privatization of the Kherson, Nadvirna, and Kremenchuk oil refineries respectively. See *Ukraina moloda*, 21 February 2001; *The Baltimore Sun*, 29 April 2001; Moscow Interfax, 12 February 2001; and Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, *Occasional Report*, no. 7: 5. “The [Ukrainian] oligarchs do not need the West. They do not need it in terms of economics, as the overwhelming majority of money-making schemes are based on the Russian economic sphere.... [The Ukrainian oligarchs are] just intermediaries for Russian capital in Ukraine. Take all the recent examples of Russians privatizing Ukrainian companies—you will see traces of the lobbyists from the President’s entourage everywhere” (*Zerkalo nedeli*, 14 April 2001). “Prior to President Putin’s visit to Kyiv on 15–16 April [2000], Russia published a list of thirty Ukrainian enterprises of interest to Russian entrepreneurs” (Sherr and Main, “Russian and Ukrainian Perceptions of Events in Yugoslavia,” 12).

24. Paul D’Anieri, *Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 614–5.

25. Interfax Moscow, 12 February 2001.

stagnant (with the exception of Poland, but with a centre-left government in place, she may also follow suit). Ukraine's relations with the EU and the Council of Europe have been at their lowest point ever. The controversy over America's National Missile Defense project threatens to create an additional platform on which Russia and Ukraine could be driven together.²⁶ EU President Romano Prodi has tried to reassure Ukraine that she matters to the West.²⁷ But it remains to be seen whether Ukraine will try to maintain a European or a Euro-Atlantic orientation as an alternative to Russia, whether she will pursue a European orientation in concert with Russia, or whether she will simply drift from her pro-Western course in line with Russian foreign-policy moves.

The End of an Era

We are still too close to the developments described above to draw firm conclusions about what lasting changes have actually occurred in Russian-Ukrainian relations and their implications for both countries' relations with the EU. But what does seem clear, as we look back over the past decade, is that Ukraine will not join Europe or the Euro-Atlantic community in the way its leaders may have envisaged in the early and mid-1990s. Nor will Ukraine be able to live alongside Russia without coming to a mutually beneficial agreement to co-operate more closely than they have over the past decade. In a global market of labour, commodities, and capital, that can only mean some acceptable degree of economic interdependence, the retention of sovereignty over national territory, and the right to choose other, notably Western, partners. The long standoff marked by Ukraine's resistance to Russia's advances, her orientation towards NATO, and her intention to seek integration with the EU regardless of Russia's interests in European integration has ended. Even the most hard-working promoters of Euro-Atlanticism in Ukraine have realized that a new approach is needed.²⁸ In the next twenty years Ukraine may well join the EU (or a broader,

26. In "Russia's Strategic Priority: Building Allied Relations with Ukraine," Moscow Interfax, 14 May 2001, the Russian deputy foreign minister, Valerii Loshchinin, is quoted as saying, "Moscow and Kyiv, first of all, have similar views on strategic deterrence issues and in support of the 1972 ABM Treaty." Serhii Kichinin, editor of the Kyiv publication 2000, wrote on 11 May 2001 that American officials were seeking ways to immobilize President Kuchma in order to prevent him giving Russia access to the production facilities of Pivdenmash, the rocket-building complex once managed by Kuchma, which are crucial for Russia's response to the American National Missile Defense plans. "Without Ukraine's rocket plants, Russia would lag far behind the United States."

27. Goran Persson and Romano Prodi, "Ukraine's Progress Should Be a Priority for All of Europe," *International Herald Tribune*, 22 May 2001.

28. See Andrii Shestakov, ed., *Ukraina mizh Rosiieiu i Zakhodom: Stratehiia na*

transcontinental successor of the EU), but she will be valued by the West European members of the EU mostly as a participant in a single European market trading in energy resources and other strategic materials. Here she holds a trump card in the long-term game between energy-rich Russia and technology-rich Western Europe.

Nor has it been overlooked by the Ukrainian political establishment that the Euro-Atlantic community is divisible, that there are tensions and competing ambitions among its parts, and that the EU may well change from being an economic giant with feet of clay into an economic-military-political bloc in the coming decade.²⁹ NATO has continued to project its power eastward, taking advantage of the collapse of the bipolar order and replacing it with new kinds of polarities to justify its presence in Europe. Ukraine and Russia would find it easier to join a pan-European security system if both of them were included simultaneously rather than played off against one other.

Such possible approaches to European integration—in economic and security terms—may well bring Ukraine as a partner into the project of European integration. But that project itself may change its nature as time goes by, especially if the EU becomes a fully equipped superpower. EU leaders of the future may not insist nor ensure that Ukraine be a more robust democracy than it has managed to become so far, just so long as she delivers the oil and gas and is on the right side in the event of a conflict with another big power, such as the United States or China. Therefore, one should not expect that adhering to the project of European integration will automatically bestow on Ukraine those European values in the name of which she first turned westward in the 1990s. A commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law will come only from within.

pochatok XXI stolittia (Kyiv: Atlantic Council of Ukraine, International Institute of Humanistic and Political Studies, Institute of International Relations at Kyiv State University, and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2000). In his opening speech to the conference (pp. 7–8) whose proceedings are published there, the president of the Atlantic Council of Ukraine, Vadym Hrechaninov, called for restarting Ukrainian-Russian relations “afresh ... abstracting from previous failures ... seeking pragmatic, normalized relations” in view of “the real economic dependency of both sides.” “Both sides understand that their movement towards the West in economic and political terms is only possible as a common, interdependent, and mutually agreed one.”

29. See Volodymyr Horbulin’s speech in Shestakov, ed., *Ukraina mizh Rosiieiu i Zakhodom*, 21–8.

Defining and Sustaining Ukraine's Strategic Partnerships

Jennifer D. P. Moroney

Introduction

In the global environment as presently configured, not even the most powerful and influential state can fully secure its national interests and territorial integrity alone. Hence it is crucial for each sovereign state to choose its allies prudently on the basis of which particular economic, political, or military relationship will best serve its interests.

Over the course of the past decade, Ukraine has proclaimed that nineteen states are its “strategic partners.”¹ Such a policy of having many strategic partners fits well with President Kuchma’s declared “multi-vector” foreign policy, which sees the development of ties with the West (for example, with the United States, NATO, and the European Union), Russia, and key states and institutions in the region, such as Poland, GUAM, and BSECO,² as crucial to Ukraine’s ability to pursue her national interests and maintain her sovereignty and territorial integrity.

However, there comes a point at which giving equal status to too many different states and institutions becomes a quandary. Because of the sheer number and diversity of partners, many with conflicting political, economic, and cultural ideologies, Ukraine’s use of the diplomatic designation “strategic partner” has reduced it mostly to a political rhetorical device, which has no

1. These are, in no particular order, Russia, the United States, Germany, Poland, China, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Turkey, Canada, Hungary, Israel, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, Moldova, Slovakia, and Argentina.

2. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, and the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organization, respectively.

credibility with most of Ukraine's partners. Indiscriminate use of the phrase tends to lead to the devaluation of the idea and, more importantly, to fuel negative attitudes toward Ukraine in states that have maintained or intend to establish high-level bilateral relations with her.

Therefore Ukraine's leadership should clarify a number of rather basic questions: What does it actually mean by the term "strategic partner?" Is this an ally of Ukraine? Is it a state or institution that is of strategic importance for economic, political, or military reasons? Or does the term refer simply to a body with which Ukraine has established important or elevated diplomatic relations? Once this question is addressed, further ones naturally follow: Which states or institutions are of vital importance for Ukraine's national interests? Under what conditions, on what principles, and in what domains can true strategic-partner relations be established? What measures should be taken in the short- to medium-term to give real meaning to this label, and why is this important? Do Ukraine's declared strategic partners regard Ukraine in the same way?

Ukraine's "strategic partners" should also be asking some related questions. Is the enhancement of political, military, and economic ties with Ukraine imperative and for what specific reasons? Is Ukraine a credible partner? What other states or institutions are also considered to be Ukraine's strategic partners and is there a conflict of interests? What are the implications for scaling back political, military, or economic ties with Ukraine? And does the multiplicity of strategic partners reflect the ambiguity, uncertainty, or lack of consensus among the elite or the people over Ukraine's national or state interests?

These are some difficult and far-reaching questions that go to the heart of Ukraine's foreign policy over the past decade and reflect the elite's perceived level of internal and external threats to Ukraine's sovereignty. The Ukrainian government under presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma seems to have based the level of its strategic partnerships with other states and institutions on both the perceived ability of that relationship to enhance Ukraine's security and territorial integrity and on the perceived threat to Ukrainian sovereignty. Thus, if one subscribes to this argument, it is clear why Ukraine has sought to raise its strategic partnerships with NATO and other key Western states above its partnership with Russia and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

From a theoretical perspective, this article will first discuss the term "strategic partnership," that is, the parameters that generally elevate a normal "bilateral" relationship to this heightened level, such as shared attainable political, military, or economic goals. Secondly, the quality and quantity of Ukraine's political-military ties with her most prominent partners in the West, Russia, and in the region (Poland and GUAM) will be analyzed in order to draw some specific conclusions about Ukraine's foreign- and security-policy orientations over the past ten years. The article will conclude with a discussion and some recommendations about how the Ukrainian government should develop its political-military strategic ties in the

global arena, and shall pay particular attention to both Ukraine's opportunities and constraints that arise from her geopolitical position in Europe's security grey zone. The important argument I shall try to make is that Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma have favoured the West for security guarantees because they have viewed Ukraine's security as being integrally tied to the security relationships in Western Europe, particularly in recent times, when non-traditional threats to security, such as terrorism, mass immigration, and drug trafficking, have clearly been on the rise.

Defining Strategic Partnership

The meaning of strategic partnership in Ukraine's foreign policy has been unclear because the concept has been poorly substantiated in Ukrainian politics and its parameters in international law have been uncodified. However, several general characteristics can be defined. First, strategic partnerships can be built only after a state formulates its strategic goals and broader national security objectives. Secondly, a state should define perceived threats to its security: then it will be clear why one state is a closer partner than another state. Without clearly defined strategic goals and national interests, a state cannot properly select and prioritize its strategic partners. Thirdly, strategic relations between two entities presume a special type and status of bilateral relations in more than one domain. A strategic partnership, therefore, should not be formed simply on the basis of, for example, a shared political interest in joining the European Union (EU). Fourthly, strategic partnership is based on geopolitical interdependence and sometimes on the geographic and cultural-historical proximity of two countries, such as Ukraine and Poland. In some instances the search for strategic partners is conditioned by a state's inherent desire to become a regional or global leader. Russia, for example, has attempted to strengthen her international standing by deepening its relations with China and strengthening ties within the CIS.

In contrast to normal bilateral relations for the sake of tactical goals or co-operation in a specific field of activities, strategic partnership is geared to long-term strategic goals of vital importance to the partner countries that are attainable by significantly heightened bilateral co-operation. It is determined by shared economic, military, and political interests. Historical examples of strategic partnership include the relations between the United States and Japan, the United States and Israel, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and Russia and Belarus.

The depth of the relationship ultimately depends on several factors: (1) the continued political will of both states; (2) the availability of economic and human resources, assuming a strong correlation between domestic factors and foreign-policy priorities; and (3) external constraints and developments. True strategic partnerships should not be based primarily on subjective factors, such as the leaders' personalities and party politics, and thus be strongly influenced or even threatened by leadership changes in either state. The details of the bilateral relationship should be formally articulated in treaties, agreements, and memoran-

da, and mechanisms should be set up in the infrastructure of both states (for example, professional staff should be assigned to respective offices established in the executive and legislative branches, NGOs, the private sector, and the mass media) to ensure that the partnership develops in accordance with the bilateral agreements.

In order for the strategic partnership to be implemented, there must be shared goals, and they must be fleshed out considerably. Such goals and objectives must rest on the heightened bilateral relationship; otherwise, there would be no sense in calling it a strategic partnership. They might include stimulating the national economy; creating conditions in which both states could increase access to energy resources or new technologies; resolving shared transnational security problems, such as organized crime, drug trafficking, and illegal migration, or more immediate problems, such as an ethnic uprising; and helping one of the states to modernize in such a way as to attract foreign interest (for example, Poland's mentorship for Ukraine).

The analysis that follows employs several principles to analyze the extent to which Ukraine's strategic partnerships are useful in promoting Ukraine's, as well as its partner's objectives. The following factors are crucial in terms of giving content to the concept of strategic partner:


- shared interest of the partners in fruitful co-operation, with bilateral recognition of the strategic nature of the partnership;
- partners' readiness to consider mutual national interests and compromise for the purpose of attaining common strategic goals;
- equality of strategic-partner relations, although, in the broader context of global relations, one partner could be more powerful than the other;
- the long-term character of partner relations, since the strategic partnership should be established and then fixed in bilateral documents;
- availability of mechanisms for the practical implementation of the strategic partnership, such as involving all branches of government, NGOs, the private sector, academia, the mass media, and the wider public;
- legal fixation of the essence and mechanisms of the strategic partnership in bilateral documents: declarations at formal meetings are not enough for a long-term commitment to the relationship;
- discipline, consistency, and their degree of influence on international developments, or a common ideology; and
- high efficacy of strategic-partner relations; that is, the two sides should be engaged in some kind of project or multiple projects in various sectors that will serve to solidify their relations.³

3. Some of these principles were mentioned in the journal of the Ukrainian Center for

Ukraine's Key Strategic Partners


Ukraine has declared, either formally through treaties or agreements, or through diplomatic channels and meetings, that nineteen states are its strategic partners. Below is a timeline of when some of these state partnerships were concluded.

- Canada: on 31 March 1994 the Joint Declaration on Special Partnership between Canada and Ukraine proclaimed their “intent to develop their relations as friendly states based on strategic partnership.”
- United States: in September 1996 the United States-Ukraine declaration established the United States-Ukraine Binational Commission (a.k.a. the Kuchma-Gore Commission) and referred to both sides as strategic partners.
- Poland: on 21 May 1997 the joint declaration of the presidents of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland “Towards Accord and Unity” stressed that “Ukraine and Poland are sovereign states, good neighbours, strategic partners.”
- Russia: on 31 May 1997 the Ukrainian-Russian Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Partnership was signed. Article 1 states that Ukraine and Russia, being “friendly, equal, and sovereign states, base their relations on mutual respect and trust, strategic partnership, and co-operation.”
- Uzbekistan: on 19 February 1998 the preamble of the Peace and General Co-operation Agreement between Ukraine and the Republic of Uzbekistan mentioned “the achieved level of strategic partnership in the political sphere.”
- Bulgaria: on 24 March 1998 the Presidents of Ukraine and Bulgaria signed the Declaration on the Further Development and Deepening of Co-operation between Ukraine and the Republic of Bulgaria. Clause 1 of the document declares that “the parties are committed to strengthening and deepening mutual understanding, developing the relations of all-round co-operation and strategic partnership.”
- Georgia: on 2 October 1999 the Declaration on Advancing Special Partner Relations between Ukraine and Georgia announced that the parties “will deepen bilateral co-operation with the purpose of achieving a qualitatively new level of special partnership.”
- Azerbaijan: on 16 March 2000 the Preamble of the Agreement on Peace, Co-operation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Republic of Azerbaijan referred to the “achieved level of strategic partnership.”



Ukraine's strategic partner relations with six countries—Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, the United States, and Uzbekistan—have been documented. Her special relations with Canada and Georgia have been fixed, but not documented in an official treaty or agreement. The strategic nature of Ukraine's relations with China, Israel, Finland, Argentina, Hungary, Slovakia, and Germany has also been proclaimed, but these relations have not been as strong as the six mentioned above.

According to the group of Ukrainian experts (politicians and scholars) surveyed by UCEPS, Russia, the United States, Germany, and Poland are seen as Ukraine's most important international partners. This is hardly surprising, given the level of political, economic, and military support Ukraine has received from these countries, particularly from the United States and Germany. The graph below indicates that Ukraine sees its strategic partners primarily in economic (trade), security, and political terms.



Having identified Ukraine's strategic partners, I shall turn to an analysis of the quality and quantity of ties between the actors in order to determine which of them have manifested strategic partnership in a practical sense. Relations with the United States and NATO, Russia, and the region (Poland and GUAM) are considered below.

Ukraine's Relations with the United States and NATO

To ensure foreign support in the event of external military aggression or internal conflict, Ukraine's leadership has sought to establish strategic ties with states and institutions that have had influential positions in the United Nations Security Council, a high level of diplomatic and economic clout, and effective and experienced armed forces and are willing to render assistance to Ukraine. Ukraine's top priority has been the enhancement of ties with the United States and NATO.

The term “strategic partnership” with respect to relations between Ukraine and the United States was first used at an official level in September 1996 in the joint declaration establishing the United States-Ukraine Binational Commission. In June 2000 the presidents of Ukraine and the United States reaffirmed their “commitment to advancing and deepening the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the United States into the twenty-first century.” Although the Bush administration has preferred not to refer to Ukraine as a strategic partner, the Kuchma administration still uses the term to describe the closeness of United States-Ukraine relations.

NATO and Ukraine concluded the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership in 1997, institutionalizing their relations and elevating their ties to a much higher political and military level. Moreover, during the Prague Summit Ukraine and NATO concluded an action plan to provide some specific direction and milestones for economic, political, military and social reforms. Ukraine has often been referred to as NATO’s partner, but the term “strategic partner” has not been generally used.

Among Ukraine’s declared strategic partners, the United States possesses the greatest potential for promoting Ukraine’s interests in the international arena through the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. Specifically, on a political-military level, both NATO and the United States are Ukraine’s prominent strategic partners.

Ukraine’s Military Contacts with the United States and NATO

Funded through various sources, including multilateral and bilateral, the United States and NATO have co-operated with Ukraine in the military sphere for a decade.⁴ Both sides have had fairly clear goals and objectives, which, more often than not, have coincided.

From the perspective of the United States and NATO, the following goals have been paramount to the success of peacetime military contacts with Ukraine:

- to ensure the survival of an independent and democratic Ukrainian state;
- to encourage Ukraine’s democratic transition, not just in the military, but in all areas of government;
- to ensure the adoption of Western-type models (for example, civilian control of the military, establishment of a non-commissioned officer corps, and improved conditions for military personnel);

4. In 1993 a "Memorandum of Understanding on Defense and Military Contacts" between the United States and Ukraine was signed. It established semi-annual meetings of a Defense and Military Contacts Bilateral Working Group and annual talks between the United States Joint Staff and Ukraine’s General Staff (Joint Staff Talks).

- to foster regional co-operation and coalition building through Partnership for Peace (PfP) and bilateral "in the spirit of PfP" programmes;
- to improve Ukraine's inter-operability with Western military forces, specifically NATO;
- to encourage defense reform and restructuring along Western lines; and
- to improve mutual trust and understanding and effective communications.

There are a number of areas in which significant progress has been made in building a "strategic partnership" by achieving the goals detailed above, but there is still room for improvement. Ukraine is an independent state and has not had any direct challenges to her sovereignty or territorial integrity. Ukraine has also made progress towards adopting Western-style defense models, such as placing emphasis on establishing a non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps (by establishing a NCO Academy for training purposes), thereby developing a more professional military force in Ukraine. However, the day-to-day living conditions, the delayed and low pay, and the types of duty often performed by military personnel (rebuilding roads or digging sewers) have tended to lower morale significantly and discouraged individuals from staying in the military beyond their mandatory conscription period.

Reforming the military bureaucracy has been only partially successful. Ukraine's Ministry of Defense has been headed by a military person, General Volodymyr Shkidchenko, and Ukraine's General Staff is not subordinate to the ministry and, generally, tensions between the two defense agencies remain high. Progress in military reform has been marginal: the Ukrainian military is still not properly manned, equipped, and organized to meet the needs of the state, and is not entirely suited to Ukraine's real security situation. However, Ukraine is slowly moving in the direction of a light infantry-based mobile force that is capable of contributing to NATO and UN-led peacekeeping and peace-supporting operations in the region (i.e., its new Rapid Reaction Force). Military exercises with NATO and the United States have helped to move Ukraine in this direction.

Ukraine's military co-operation with the United States and NATO has been successful in terms of facilitating regional co-operation and coalition building, thus strengthening strategic ties with the West. There has been a substantial increase in regional co-operation through NATO's Partnership for Peace as Ukraine has become a leading participant hosting maritime exercises in the Black Sea and at Ukraine's official PfP training centre in Iavoriv. Exercises in the Spirit of the Partnership for Progress (ISO PfP) have also been held regularly by Ukraine's military forces with those of the United States, as well as with other partner countries in the Co-operative Partner exercise series; and they have often been staged on Ukrainian territory (in June 2001 the exercise was conducted for

the first time in Georgia).⁵ The Rough and Ready ISO PfP exercise held by American and Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv in 1999 was the largest ever civil-emergency-and-response exercise with a PfP country. This exercise vignette in response to a plane crash, flood, and earthquake was particularly valuable for the Ukrainian side.

A more recent example of success in building strategic relations in the region, as well as increasing inter-operability for exercises or contingency operations with Western forces, was Ukraine's participation in the Polish-Ukrainian Peacekeeping Battalion (PolUkrBat) deployed to the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The battalion was the first joint military force consisting of a NATO member and a NATO partner. It offered a unique opportunity to take PfP to a higher level—one that is primarily focused on reducing the burden on NATO while increasing regional co-operation and inter-operability among partners.⁶

Thanks to their military contacts, mutual trust, understanding, and respect have developed between Ukraine and the United States or NATO. This has been particularly evident at the higher-, middle-, and lower-level meetings between the parties, at which they have usually shared doctrinal information. The Ukrainian military, for example, has become more familiar today with American and Western military doctrine through exercises, educational exchanges, and co-operation in the Balkans. Counterparts have had the opportunity to meet on many occasions and have, more often than not, earned each other's respect and friendship. The development of these kinds of positive relationships during peacetime can be extremely valuable, especially when tensions in the world or in the region are heightened and strategic-partner support is sought, as during the Kosovo campaign and, more recently, in the new United States-led war on terrorism. In such cases the West's direct access to persons and facilities from partner countries, based on previous contacts, is critical in constructing a coalition in an effective and timely manner.

Further indications of Ukraine's strong political-military ties with the United States and NATO can be seen in the following political decisions by the Ukrainian government.

5. In this series, two scenarios have been practiced, involving (1) ships engaged in manoeuvres to save the crew of a vessel that was in trouble and (2) the landing of an amphibious landing force and repelling an air attack. See "Joint Georgian-NATO Co-operative Partner-2001 Military Exercise Viewed," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 21 June 2001.

6. ISO PfP exercises focused on inter-operability and co-operation between combat units have also been held regularly by the U.K. and Ukraine in the Cossack Express exercise series, conducted at Iavoriv in June 2001.

- In 1998 Ukraine rescinded a previous agreement with Iran and Russia and refused to participate in the construction of a nuclear-power plant in Busher, Iran.
- In June 1999, at the urging of NATO, Kyiv briefly closed Ukrainian airspace to Russian aircraft attempting to reinforce Russian troops at the Priština airbase in Kosovo.
- In 2000 the Ukrainian Parliament ratified the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which determines the legal status of foreign military forces and provides the necessary legal protection to the military forces of NATO members.
- In 2000 the Ukrainian Parliament also ratified the Open Skies Treaty, which allows its signatories to carry out supervisory flights over each other's territories.

As I have mentioned, most of NATO's and the United States' goals of a military and defense relationship with Ukraine have been shared. However, it is not yet clear whether Ukraine's enthusiastic participation with Western defense and military structures is viewed in the West as a way of bringing Ukraine closer to an Article 5 security guarantee. In other words, is co-operation through PfP, for example, seen as a stepping-stone to NATO membership or as an end in itself? Clearly, for the newly invited NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe who have worked with NATO allies through the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process, robust participation in PfP and later MAP has been seen as a means of achieving NATO membership after significant defense, economic, and social reforms had taken place. For Ukraine, however, although full membership in NATO is not in the cards in the very near future, the NATO-Ukraine Charter, MAP, and Ukraine's participation in PfP has served as a kind of "quasi" security guarantee. With Western support of Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity at a multitude of levels, including bilateral (e.g., the United States-Ukraine Bilateral Defense Co-operation) and multilateral (e.g., the NATO-Ukraine Joint Commission, parliamentary ties, missions in Brussels and Kyiv), Ukraine's leadership has been psychologically reassured that the United States and NATO will not stand by idly if Ukraine's security is threatened.

Trends in Ukraine-United States and Ukraine-NATO Relations—Partnership with a Goal?

Dynamic political-military relations with the West have clearly encouraged Ukraine's leaders to strengthen strategic ties and invigorate Ukraine's "European choice:" that is, to deepen co-operation with Western states and institutions with the goal of eventual integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. Both Ukrainian presidents have supported this policy, differing only in their political tactics: Kuchma has opted to institute closer bilateral ties with Russia at the same time

as developing Ukraine's ties with NATO, the EU, and key Western states, while Kravchuk simply focused on the latter. Even though at times it has seemed as if Ukraine's foreign- and security-policy course was going to shift in favour of the "Eurasian vector under Kuchma," this has not occurred, except for a few minor hiccups in response to the shifting domestic political environment in Ukraine (in response to Kosovo and the Kuchmagate scandal). In July 2001 at a conference in Kyiv, NATO Secretary General George Robertson asserted that NATO "still considers Ukraine the cornerstone of the European security system." Ukraine-NATO relations were also galvanized at the beginning of the summer of 2001 following former Minister of Defense Oleksandr Kuzmuk's visit to NATO Headquarters in Brussels to attend a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council session. During the talks in Brussels, NATO emphasized the importance of the implementation plan of reform in Ukraine, which includes military and defense reform. NATO's view is that military reform can be conducted with the active "assistance" of NATO and that further reforms will serve to enhance the Ukrainian Army's combat readiness and free up considerable funds that were spent on maintaining unnecessary infrastructure. These funds could be channelled back into the economy.⁷

Ukraine's leadership responded with a statement that was even more positive than the ones it has typically made. Kuchma said Ukraine's orientation towards joining the European community presupposes further development of relations with NATO⁸ and claimed that for Ukraine the future expansion of NATO will be good: it will not pose a threat but, on the contrary, *will provide additional security guarantees*. He also said that "NATO expansion is capable of guaranteeing Ukraine's security" and it is the sovereign right of each nation to choose its own way and ensure its security.⁹ NATO and Ukraine have also made progress in diversifying areas of co-operation, most notably in the area of military technology (aircraft building, the space industry, and missile defense) because of Ukraine's powerful military complex¹⁰. However, as we shall see below, Ukraine's main partner in this area continues to be Russia.

According to National Security and Defense Adviser Ievhen Marchuk, "The reform of Ukrainian forces will follow an exclusively Ukrainian blueprint, which

7. "NATO Chief Assures Kyiv that Ukraine Is 'Cornerstone' of European Security," *Kommersant*, 6 July 2001.

8. "President Kuchma Happy with NATO Developments," INTERFAX (Moscow), 5 July 2001.

9. "Zlenko Says NATO Will Provide Security Guarantees," Kyiv Ukrainian Television UT2, 5 July 2001; and "Foreign Minister: Ukraine Wants Special Partnership with NATO to Grow Stronger," INTERFAX (Moscow), 5 July 2001.

10. "NATO Chief Welcomes Joint Projects in Defense, Space Industry," UNIAN, 5 July 2001.

is formulated to enable easy adaptation to the military structures of Western countries." Ukraine has, in fact, co-operated with NATO on the reform of armed forces, but NATO's role has been advisory in nature. Marchuk considers the most difficult challenge in defense and military reform to be ensuring civilian control of the military and safeguarding human rights in the military (two issues on which NATO members have had considerable experience).¹¹ There is thus every indication that Kyiv will seek support, as well as models for defense and military reform, from Brussels rather than from Moscow.

Ukraine, Russia, and the CIS

In most sectors with a strategic focus, the development of ties between Ukraine and Russia or CIS has fallen short in comparison to the West. As I have mentioned, Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma have clearly favoured political, military, and economic co-operation with Western states and institutions. Kuchma has adhered to an approach based on more pragmatic relations with Russia through bilateral ties, as opposed to multilateral ties through the CIS structures. Both presidents have clearly rejected the CIS Collective Security Treaty and the invitation to join a new union with Russia and Belarus because they have seen these organizations as a threat to Ukraine's sovereignty. Because the proliferation of strategic ties with Russia or the CIS has been seen to lead to a concession of sovereignty in the military or security sphere, Ukraine has opted to maintain a non-bloc status while clearly developing ties with those actors that promote Ukraine's independence, not detract from it. Therefore, because solidifying Ukraine's sovereignty has been the paramount concern of Ukraine's political elite, strategic relations with Russia or within the confines of the CIS have been significantly less dynamic than with Western states and institutions. However, there are some noteworthy strategic ties that should be highlighted.

Ukraine and Russia began their military co-operation programme after the signing of the Friendship Treaty in May 1997. Only a few months later, the first joint exercise, Main Course of Peace, was conducted in the Black Sea, with seventeen Russian and eleven Ukrainian ships participating. The number of joint events increased each year, from twenty-eight in 1998 to thirty-one in 1999 and about forty-five in 2000. The first ever joint exercises of the independent Ukrainian and Russian navies were held in 2000. It is worth noting that before 1997 only eight to twelve military exchanges took place each year on an ad hoc basis.¹²

11. "Ukraine's Reformed Army Will Be Adaptable to Western Forces," UNIAN, 5 July 2001.

12. *National Security and Defense*, 2000, no. 7. pt 1.

Ukraine and Russia have had strategic ties in some sectors, most notably in the defense industry. Military-technical co-operation has been intended to provide dilapidated military units with up-to-date weapons systems and, at the same time, increase exports from the defense industry. The military-industrial complexes of the former Soviet Union have proven to be profitable trading partners for Ukraine and allow for defense-related co-operation in a sector that has not been threatening to Ukrainian sovereignty. Thus, Russia has been Ukraine's main partner in this field, which is highly regulated by bilateral treaties. More than sixty Ukrainian defense companies have been accorded the right to enter into joint ventures with Russian companies. This sector has probably been the only one in which Ukrainian-Russian co-operation has been at the level of strategic partnership, or rather of *strategic dependence*.¹³ Still, it is important to note that there have also been high-level political discussions aimed at stepping up Ukraine-NATO co-operation in the area of military technology, which, until recently, has been much less dynamic than that with Russia. NATO Secretary General George Robertson stated on a two-day visit in Ukraine that future co-operation may be based on projects in aircraft building, the space industry, and missile-defense systems.¹⁴

Although over the past decade Russia has put political pressure on Ukraine time and again to intensify bilateral or multilateral military ties with the CIS, to join the Russia-Belarus Union, and to sign the CIS Collective Security Treaty, Ukraine has resisted, citing her "neutrality" or non-bloc status. While she has often downplayed her military ties with Russia, Ukraine has been attentive to NATO, claiming to pursue only co-operation, not integration, with the alliance; that is, until the spring of 2002, when Ukraine officially stated her desire to integrate with NATO. This was a very significant step and a clear signal that Ukraine was not neutral.

On the other hand, Russia still has a considerable hold in the security sphere over Ukraine and other former Soviet states. For example, Moscow was allegedly behind the decision of the GUAM alliance to exclude an originally proposed military element to the new organization, since GUAM has been viewed as a counterforce to the military and political integration of the CIS as a whole.¹⁵ This move in itself signifies that Russia remains a most powerful and persuasive force in the region and that it continues to dictate the extent to which the former

13. The UCEPS report in *National Security and Defense*, 2000, no.7, cited above, referred to this concept.

14. "NATO Chief Welcomes Joint Projects in Defense, Space Industry," UNIAN, 5 July 2001.

15. "Moscow Seen behind 'Neutralization' of 'Anti-Russian' GUAM Bloc," *Stringer*, 11 March 2001.

Soviet states are able to take “independent” decisions in the security sphere. In the end, as a strategic partner Russia is much more attractive to those former Soviet states that have been considered conflict zones, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, the Dniester Moldavian Republic, the Republic of Abkhazia, and the Republic of South Ossetia, than to a state, such as Ukraine, that has well-developed ties with states and institutions presenting no threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. These regions of conflict have tended to rely on Russia as a guarantor of security and to reject the possible introduction of international peacekeeping forces, particularly NATO ones, into conflict zones. Furthermore, they have been wary of the deepening of co-operation among the former Soviet states outside the CIS, that is, those in GUAM.

Ukraine's Regional Strategic-Partner Relations: Ukraine and Poland

Ukrainian leaders have pursued international recognition of the state's geopolitical identity as a Central European, not a Eurasian state. Placing emphasis on its relations with Poland, Ukraine wants to be known as a Central European nation within the larger European continent. This recognition would solidify Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity and allow her to distance herself from Russia and to diversify its international relations. Further, Kyiv has regarded its western neighbours as the “gateway to the West” and counted on their support in her efforts to establish links with Western states and institutions. Therefore it should come as no surprise that Ukraine has placed great importance on maintaining friendly relations with her closest geographical neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe, specifically with Poland.¹⁶

Ukraine's support for NATO enlargement in the spring of 1995 greatly improved her strategic-partner ties with Poland. Polish leaders have stressed the need for a special partnership not only between NATO and Russia, but also between NATO and Ukraine, and Poland has championed Ukraine's crucial role in European security and stability. Poland successfully lobbied for Ukraine's membership in the Council of Europe in the fall of 1995 and also supported Ukraine's accession to the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA).¹⁷ Again with the support of Poland and the other Visegrad members, Ukraine won membership in the Central European Initiative (CEI). Poland has also been instrumental in promoting Ukraine's defense ties with both NATO and the EU.

16. Oleksandr Pavliuk, “Ukraine and Regional Co-operation in Central and Eastern Europe,” *Security Dialogue* 28, no. 3 (1997): 348.

17. It remains to be seen how important groupings such as CEFTA are in light of the likely upcoming of EU expansion. Its members are sure to leave the organization upon their accession to the EU.

Drawing upon the successes of PolUkrBat¹⁸ in KFOR, Polish military leaders suggested to the EU that it could include a Ukrainian battalion in its brigade that will serve in the EU's rapid deployment force, which is to be operational by 2003. In this regard, Poland presented the EU with a report on the matter that mentions the possibility of including one Ukrainian unit in the Polish EU brigade.¹⁹ At a meeting on 26 July 2001 between the EU's High Representative for Foreign Policy, Javier Solana, and Defense Minister Kuzmuk, Solana indicated that the EU's utilization of Ukraine's strategic air forces could be one such possibility.²⁰ Regardless of whether this materializes, it is clear that Poland has been Ukraine's strongest regional supporter in both NATO and the EU.

Ukraine and GUAM

Ukraine's association with the GUAM subregional group is another example of how the Ukrainian government has sought to promote its sovereignty and ties with the West. Moreover, one of the main ideas behind GUAM was to lessen the effects of the possible emergence of new dividing lines in Europe. Thus, former Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk argued that as NATO and the EU expanded eastwards, Ukraine and the other GUAM members should try to dispel the notion that they belong outside Europe and thereby within Russia's sphere of influence in Eurasia.²¹ GUAM members have been united on several goals:

- to deprive the CIS of the right to represent them in international organizations and to remove the CIS as a regional international organization;²²
- to oppose the right of the CIS to resolve armed conflict within the CIS, and to recognize the impossibility of reforming the CIS because any reforms would encourage Russian hegemony within the CIS;
- to recognize the failure of Russia and the CIS to resolve ethnic conflict within the CIS;
- to prevent Russia from using economic leverages to obtain strategic objectives;

18. There has even been talk of a German peacekeeping battalion in Macedonia supported by a Ukrainian unit. This indicates that the Ukrainian peacekeepers in KFOR have impressed NATO to the point of being considered for action in another hotspot in the Balkans.

19. "Poland to Help Ukraine Join EU Military Force, Defense Minister Says," *Dziennik PAP*, 15 May 2001.

20. "EU Official Says Ukraine's Role in European Defense Undecided," UNIAN, 30 July 2001.

21. *Financial Times*, 11 September 1999.

22. In this regard GUAM members believe that CIS officials should not have the status of international civil servants with diplomatic status.

- to support those states advocating a minimalist role for the CIS and independent development outside its confines;²³
- to promote GUAM members' desire to integrate into European and transatlantic institutions; and
- to foster a shared pro-Western orientation and the desire to profit jointly from the export of part of Azerbaijan's Caspian oil via Ukraine and Georgia.

Ukraine has used GUAM primarily as a vehicle to gain international-relations experience and recognition as a regional leader; to promote collectively the sovereignty of its members by increasing the political pressure on Russia to reduce its military presence in GUAM countries; to convince the West (particularly NATO and the United States) that GUAM members are not heading back to Russia's direct sphere of influence; to diversify its economic and energy ties; and to render the CIS a defunct organization.

The problem with having the GUAM entity as Ukraine's strategic partner is that GUAM, being a newly institutionalized organization (June 2001), has proven to be susceptible to Russian pressures to reduce the scope of strategic co-operation. For example, after months of discussions to incorporate a peacekeeping element within GUAM, this idea was abandoned. Moscow was able to push just the right button in each of the GUAM members so as to disrupt the strategic plan of the organization. But, as it turned out, GUAM has probably strengthened its viability by narrowing its focus only to those sectors in which co-operation is most feasible, such as trade relations and humanitarian affairs.

The Way Forward: Who Should Be Ukraine's Strategic Partners?

Over the past decade the Ukrainian government has been concerned primarily with protecting Ukraine's sovereignty and independent status. However, many developments, such as the economic decline, domestic political scandals, and high-level corruption, have weakened Ukraine and her international standing and, therefore, have increased the likelihood that she will have to choose between Europe and Eurasia on a strategic and economic level. President Kuchma has opted both to expand and diversify his ties with other states. In order to provide a real impetus to Ukraine's international relations beyond the bilateral or diplomatic level, it is advisable that the government emphasize those relations that best serve Ukraine's national interests. Ukraine should seek to develop and sustain strategic partnerships with those states that

- help Ukraine to improve her international standing;

23. Taras Kuzio, "Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The Emergence of GUAM," *European Security* 9, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 81–114.


- recognize the importance of an independent and stable Ukraine to Europe's security;
- promote Ukraine's integration into the European Union;
- promote the deepening of Ukraine's ties with NATO in many sectors, such as military technology, science, and technology.
- address transnational security issues and help to improve Ukraine's border security on her eastern flank;
- encourage Ukraine to take a leadership role in the region (for example, in GUAM);
- help Ukraine to improve her economy;
- promote social and democratic values;
- reduce corruption and promote human rights;
- serve as a model for defense reform and restructuring along Western lines; and
- help Ukraine to reduce her energy dependency on Russia.

In addition to these factors, the arbitrary use of the term "strategic partnership" should be abandoned. The designation of "strategic partners" should be reserved for those states and institutions with which Ukraine has had deep and interconnected long-term economic, political, military, or other relations that have gone beyond normal bilateral ties and have been solidified in formal documents.

Fifteen of Ukraine's nineteen strategic partners have not met these criteria—only relations with the United States, Poland, Germany, and Russia have been closest to this level. Ukraine should have between two and five strategic partners at any given time.

It is important to note that none of Ukraine's present strategic-partner relationships guarantees military assistance in the event of aggression. Co-operation in the political-military sphere, with NATO for example, does not imply an Article 5 guarantee. However, the deepening of co-operation with NATO in a plethora of sectors has not only led to the institutionalization of ties (the NATO-Ukraine Commission and its various committees, NATO missions to Kyiv on a political and military level, legislative ties, invigoration of working groups, pro-NATO officials in the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense), but has reduced the likelihood that an aggressive, destabilizing act against Ukraine will go unnoticed by NATO. Although this is not a military guarantee, the network has served as psychological reassurance that the West is concerned about events in Ukraine and will support efforts to maintain Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Of the four states that should be Ukraine's strategic partners, three have viewed the preservation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity as



integral to broader European security concerns. Russia has attempted to draw Ukraine into pooled and unequal strategic alliances. Therefore, if Ukraine's most compelling reasons to develop strategic partnerships with other states or institutions is to promote its security and independence, a deepening of strategic ties with Russia or the CIS is *not* consistent with Ukraine's national interests. However, the Western vector of Ukraine's foreign and security policy—towards the United States, NATO, the EU, Poland, Central Europe, and GUAM—is consistent with her declared primary national interests.

Possible Ways of Invigorating Strategic Partnerships

It is important to note the asymmetrical nature of Ukraine's strategic partnership: presently only Poland has officially declared Ukraine as its strategic partner. In order to give real impetus to Ukraine's heightened bilateral ties with key actors, and to ensure their positive response, specific steps should be taken in the short term. The Ukrainian government should

- deepen top-level political dialogue, which will clearly elevate normal bilateral ties to a new level, to improve confidence building and conflict prevention and management;
- ensure that executive and legislative agencies are in agreement on who Ukraine's strategic partners are;
- appoint special representatives and senior support staff to take part in international events with Ukraine's strategic partners, such as conferences and symposiums, military exercises, and other bilateral and multilateral activities;

- encourage trade and direct foreign investment with the West and with Ukraine's East European neighbours through the creation of a system of preferences relating to the strategically important sectors of co-operation (defense industry and military-technical co-operation);
- promote interregional co-operation on a social and economic level among Ukraine and her neighbouring strategic partners, following up on the EU concept of Euroregions; and
- promote stronger informational support mechanisms, such as the creation of joint information centres, exchange of blocks of air transmission, and joint bilingual newspaper publications that would discuss the partnership and the state of bilateral relations in a very positive light.²⁴

Conclusions

In most instances, the proclamation of strategic-partner relations has failed to bring about any marked qualitative improvement beyond bilateral co-operation. Ukraine must first have clearly defined national interests before it can build strategic partnerships with other states. These partnerships should be based on long-term economic, political, military, and other interests that are critical to both actors. In order for there to be any possibility of establishing strategic partner relations, there must not only be shared interests in foreign-policy issues that are of fundamental importance to the partner countries, but they must also be unattainable within the confines of normal bilateral co-operation.

Ukraine has sought to develop strategic partnerships with those states and institutions that serve to strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity, such as the United States, NATO, Poland, and GUAM, even if these ties were met with disapproval or skepticism by Russia. Ukraine has not taken any political steps to join strategic unions with blocs in which Russia is the dominant member, such as the CIS Collective Security Treaty, the Russia-Belarus Union, or the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), which is dominated by Russia and China, since these organizations would limit Ukraine's rapprochement with the West and would likely threaten Ukraine's sovereignty. Instead, Ukraine under President Kuchma has pursued bilateral ties with Russia directly, not in the confines of the CIS, and has sought to diversify its energy sources of oil and gas in order to decrease its dependence on Russia. Ukraine has also taken a leadership role in GUAM, whose four member-states are united in their focus on national sovereignty, their dislike of the CIS, and their desire to deepen political, economic, and military ties with Europe and the United States.

24. Some of these principles were mentioned in UCEPS's *National Security and Defense*, 2000, no. 7, pt. 1.

All of these factors indicate that Ukraine's paramount national interest is to guarantee her existence as an independent state and protect her territorial integrity. Ukraine has developed truly dynamic strategic ties only with those states and institutions that are capable of advancing these fundamental goals. As Foreign Minister Anatolii Zlenko stated, "Relations with the EU, the Council of Europe, and NATO are the key ingredients in Ukraine's European course. However, co-operation with these institutions should not necessarily be at the same level. The important consideration is to what extent the level of co-operation serves Ukraine's national interests and benefits European security as a whole."²⁵ It is clear that Ukraine's leaders have favoured the West for traditional security guarantees because they have increasingly viewed Ukraine's security as being integrally tied to the security relationships in Western Europe. This is particularly evident in threats to transnational security such as drug trafficking, terrorism, illegal immigration, and other border security issues on Ukraine's eastern and southern flanks, which, if unmonitored, could eventually destabilize the continent as a whole.

25. "Zlenko says NATO will provide security guarantees," Kiev Ukrainian Television UT2, 5 July 2001.

Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (1600–1945)

Andreas Kappeler, Zenon E. Kohut,
Frank E. Sysyn, and Mark von Hagen, eds.

The series of four sessions on the Russian-Ukrainian encounter held alternately at Columbia University and Cologne University from June 1994 to September 1995 had their origin in both the world of great political events and the world of scholarly discussions. Ukraine's declaration of independence, ratified by the referendum of 1 December 1991, and subsequent international recognition were followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 25 December 1991. These developments made Ukrainian-Russian relations a major international issue. A new, difficult, and uncertain phase in these relations began with the establishment of these two independent, neighbouring states. Since Russia would clearly remain a major world power, while Ukraine was the largest and one of the most populous states of Europe, those relations took on more than binational significance. The future of the post-Soviet order depends largely on how these two largely Slavic countries will work out their relations.

The editors of *Culture, Nation, and Identity*, representing the Seminar for East European History at Cologne University, the Harriman Institute at Columbia University, and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta, invited seventy specialists to examine the Russian-Ukrainian encounter in four chronological symposia, from the seventeenth century to the present. The papers on the contemporary session were published in the *Harriman Review*. The present volume is a selection of sixteen articles developed from presentations on the Ukrainian-Russian encounter from the early modern period to World War II. Historians and Slavists from Canada, Germany, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States employ diverse methodologies to examine the many spheres in which Russians and Ukrainians and their identities and cultures interacted.

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Ukraine's Climate of Opinion and the Political Problem of the “Western Vector”

Victor Chudowsky

Ukraine has enjoyed some extraordinary foreign-policy successes in its ten years of independence. The driving force behind most of them has been the struggle for sovereignty and the desire to develop economic, political, and security relationships with a variety of nations. Perhaps foremost among these successes was the signing of the Friendship and Co-operation Treaty with Russia in 1997, in which Russia was forced to accept, clearly and unambiguously, Ukrainian sovereignty outside the context of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). A second major Ukrainian foreign-policy success has been to prevent the CIS from becoming an economic, political, and military alliance directed by Minsk- or Moscow-based bureaucracies. These two accomplishments have served to a great extent to free Ukraine from the confines of a “post-Soviet space” with centralized “co-ordinating” institutions. Ukraine has emerged as an important geopolitical actor in the space of the former USSR, second only to Russia in power and significance.

Having established itself as a sovereign state, Ukraine has been asked repeatedly over the past ten years, mostly by Western observers, where it sees its most fruitful and beneficial relationships in the future—in the East or the West? The question is somewhat simplistic, because it does not take into account two realities: first, the constraints of Ukraine’s geographic position next to Russia, a great power, and second, the changing international setting. Ukraine cannot afford to alienate or threaten Russia. To do so would endanger Ukrainian security, since there is a long porous border between the two countries, Russia has military bases in Crimea, and Ukraine depends on Russia for trade and energy. Second, if the future holds greater co-operation and integration between Russia and the West, then the choice between the East and the West becomes

increasingly irrelevant, for Ukraine benefits by not choosing sides.¹ Ukraine's "multi-vector" foreign policy is not an evasion of the "East or West" question but, in the judgment of the Ukrainian elite, the optimal foreign policy for a new state in the context of decreasing East-West tensions. This was also true of the initial foreign policies of the last wave of "newly independent states," the former colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.

Despite these successes, fulfilling Ukraine's stated goal of integration with the West has been difficult. For many years Ukraine has engaged the West very vigorously in the areas of diplomacy and defense, but the pace of the economic and political reforms that are necessary for true economic integration with the West has been very slow. So far Ukraine's record consists of a great deal of co-operation and interaction, but not integration. The actions of Ukraine's foreign-and-economic-affairs bureaucrats and her delegations to the Council of Europe, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and other international bodies, while important, have not by themselves provided an impetus for integration. As Jennifer Moroney points out in her contribution to this volume, Ukraine has signed a myriad of agreements, declarations, and statements of intent with numerous nations and international organizations, but has still to achieve highly substantive and robust relations with her "strategic partners."

Ukraine's interaction with the West has had an incomplete quality. It has been marked by vigorous *bureaucratic* activity on the part of the relevant ministries, which have been staffed by some highly dedicated professionals. However, the *political* impetus for integration with the West has been weak and has tended to come only from the western Ukrainian public, national-democratic political leaders (who have occupied positions of power only for a short time), perhaps a small number of business interests, and the bureaucracies concerned with foreign affairs.² This is not enough for integration. What has been missing is direction from the top: the top political leadership of the country has failed to engage the media, political parties, and the public in a discussion of the necessity of integration with the West. Also missing has been any engagement

1. See M. A. Kulinich, *Ukraine in the New Geopolitical Frontier: Problems of Regional and Subregional Security* (Kyiv: National Institute of Strategic Studies, 1994). This contention is a matter of debate among Ukrainian analysts. Others state that tension in the East-West relationship increases Ukraine's importance to both the West and Russia. See O. L. Valevsky and M. Honchar, *The Structure of Ukraine's Geopolitical Interests* (Kyiv: National Institute of Strategic Studies, 1994).

2. Indeed, quarterly "expert polls" conducted by the Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine have consistently shown a pro-Western bias in Ukraine's foreign-policy analysis community in comparison to the public at large. See <<http://www.cpcfpu.org.ua>>.

from the bottom, from the public, which has remained inert in its policy preferences and apparently unmoved by the idea of integration with Europe or the United States.

Political theorists who study integration seem to agree that an important role in the process of integration is played by leaders, bureaucracies, interest groups, public opinion, and transnational organizations.³ In his classic account, Ernst Haas described integration in the European setting as a process in which "political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states."⁴

In order to integrate, leaders must change their conception of the nation-state to one that allows for the benefits of integration at a cost to sovereignty and authority. If leaders are convinced of the benefits of integration, they must set agendas and agitate to achieve those goals. Haas understands that, first and foremost, integration is a *political* act of elites, not consultation among bureaucrats.

The role of public opinion in foreign policy is to set limits and constraints on the actions of leaders and to provide a "climate of opinion" in which discourse takes place.⁵ In the case of Ukraine, the crucial elements of vigorous leadership and engagement on the part of the public have been lacking, and this has made movement in the enormous project of reform and integration very difficult. Ukraine has lacked these elements not only because of corrupt business associations with Russian capital and backroom deals among tycoons, but also because of the overall "climate of opinion" among the public and the elite, which has tended to favour integration with Russia rather than the West. An examination of public opinion, as well as the mindset, ideology, or set of perceptions of the elite will largely explain why integration with the West has been extraordinarily difficult for Ukraine.

This paper explores the concept of integration as a political act by focusing on the attitudes of the public and the elite on the issue of Ukraine's integration with the West. It does not offer a complete explanation of why integration has been difficult for Ukraine, but it does explain why the process of integration practically cannot begin.

3. For a review of the literature on the pluralist or liberal school of international relations theory, see Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond* (New York: Macmillan, 1993).

4. Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 16.

5. Bruce M. Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1981), 242–3.

Mass Attitudes on Integration with the West

Ukrainian public opinion has seemed to be in favour of greater integration with Russia and other CIS countries. All of the monthly tracking polls of the SOCIS/Gallup organization in Ukraine which cover foreign-policy issues have confirmed the Ukrainian public's pro-Russian or Slavic tilt. All have indicated that the prospect of integration of one sort or another with Russia and other members of the CIS is seen at least as a more attractive or realistic option for Ukraine than integration with Europe.

The use of polling has important policy implications in various areas, including foreign policy. For example, in 1998 NATO commissioned a poll of Ukrainian attitudes toward the alliance and found support for Ukraine joining NATO to be quite low.⁶ In 1994 a NATO conference on the Partnership for Peace referred to opinion polls that mentioned the Ukrainian public's preference for participation in the CIS as a major impediment toward the government's ability to "move West."⁷

Despite the data, the reluctance of the Ukrainian masses to integrate with NATO and the West has probably been overstated. This is because many of the studies of Ukrainian public opinion on the topic have ignored the context and made no reference to mainline theory about the character of public opinion. However, public opinion on such issues does have some influence and may make it difficult for a Ukrainian political leader to call upon the populace to make sacrifices for the purpose of integration with the West.

The Societal Context of Ukrainian Public Opinion

A Ukrainian poll on foreign-policy issues should not be viewed in the same way as a poll on such issues in a Western nation for two reasons. First, the societal context is not the same. Secondly, the Ukrainian poll data should be viewed within a theoretical approach more suited to the context.

The Ukrainian public differs from the Western public. It has been resigned, ambivalent, anxious about the future, and concerned primarily with survival. It has felt that it has very little power, and relative to the ruling regime, this is, in fact, true. There is no functioning "feedback loop" between society and the decisions of political elites and institutions.⁸

6. Igor Galin, *Mass Public Opinion in Ukraine about NATO and NATO-Ukraine Relationships* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1998).

7. Jeffrey Simon, "Partnership for Peace: Guaranteeing Success," *Strategic Forum* 44, summary of the Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., of a conference held in Budapest, 12–13 June 1995.

8. See Martin Aberg, "Putnam's Social Capital Theory Goes East: A Case Study of Western Ukraine and Lviv," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 2 (March 2000): 295–318.

Ukrainian sociologists understand that public opinion in Ukraine has not carried the weight with the political leadership that public opinion in the West has. The words most commonly used to characterize the nature of Ukrainian society seem to be “nihilism” and “anomie.”

Typically, the prevailing view has been that the apolitical nature of Ukrainian society stems from the Communist legacy of terror, social atomization, and the almost complete destruction of independent social institutions. To this Ukrainian sociologists add colonization and the degradation of the Ukrainian language, culture, and self-image. Finally, there is the economic disaster of the first decade of Ukrainian independence, in which the nomenklatura was able to enrich itself vastly and shore up its power with wealth. Democratization has not led to a flourishing public and a strong civil society; instead, the state has continued to exploit a powerless and atomized society.⁹ While the language of the Ukrainian sociologists may be too bleak, the fact is that the Ukrainian public has played a far less important role in political life than the Western public.

In the field of Western public opinion, theory has kept pace with the reality of a more committed, interested, involved, and active public. The view of the role of public opinion in political life has evolved. In the mid-twentieth-century United States, theorists of pluralism such as Walter Lippmann and Robert Dahl more or less dispensed with the idea of the public as a community that can always express itself coherently. They viewed the public as an amalgam of disparate interest groups, often uninterested and uninformed.¹⁰ However, Lippmann and Dahl understood that a segment of a population—even a small minority—can have tremendous influence if it is highly committed and acts on the basis of self-interest. This is the pluralist’s minimalist definition of the modern public. Eventually, and particularly after the various social movements in the 1960s and 1970s in the West, theories of public opinion adopted more participatory models according to which an active, informed, and engaged public and a vigorous civil society could affect policy independently of the state and the elites.¹¹

9. See, for example, Mykola Riabchouk, “Civil Society and Nation Building in Ukraine,” in *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, ed. Taras Kuzio (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 81–99. Articles by Ukraine’s most prominent sociologists on the nature of the elite and of society in post-Communist Ukraine can be found in Oleksandr Derhachov et al., *Ukrainska derzhavnist u XX stolittii: Istoryko-politologichnyi analiz* (Kyiv: Politychna dumka, 1996); *Politychna dumka*, January 1994; and *Politychna dumka*, January 1996.

10. See Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Walter Lippmann, *The Phantom Public* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925).

11. See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes*

It makes little sense to examine Ukrainian public opinion using a participatory model of public opinion or to insist that public opinion in some way directs the actions of elites in Ukraine. It may, however, be useful to examine foreign-policy issues in the light of the pluralist model of public opinion. Ukrainian public opinion on foreign policy should be viewed not only as the basis of a "climate of opinion," but also as a matter of concern to a committed minority.

Ukrainian Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

In this section longitudinal poll data on foreign-policy issues are examined in order to get a better idea of the stability of opinion and to determine its volatility, which typically indicates that the public is uninterested, uninformed, or simply responding to heightened media awareness without yet having formed an opinion.

The data below was obtained from archives of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and SOCIS/Gallup.

A. Intensity—the Declining Importance of Foreign Affairs

The table shows that for the Ukrainian public, foreign-policy issues have drastically decreased in importance. In fact, virtually all major issues (respondents were asked to name three) pale in comparison to the state of the economy:

Q. Which problems in Ukraine concern you the most?

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2001
Living standards	74	72	66	79	83	89	76
Crime	49	55	50	42	45	37	43
Ukraine's security	25	23	20	16	15	10	16
Relations with Russia	29	28	23	21	16	9	21
Revival of Ukr. nation	11	9	7	9	4	4	8
Russian language	5	5	6	5	4	2	5
Crimea & BSF	9	5	7	3	4	1	—

B. More mass support for integration with the East than the West

When asked to choose one option, Ukrainians as a whole have preferred a foreign-policy orientation toward Russia and the CIS:

and *Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); and Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).

Q. Which direction of development would you prefer? Develop relations with ...

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
CIS	40.5	38.8	31.8	23.7	23.8	18.4
Russia	17.5	14.8	14.4	4.5	5.0	4.8
Eastern Slav (Rus & Bel)	—	—	—	24.3	23.7	23.9
Total "Eastern option"	58	53.26	46.2	52.5	52.5	47.1
Western nations	13.3	13.9	15.9	13.8	12.8	16.4
Self-sufficiency	13.3	14.4	18.5	16.1	17.7	19.7
Don't know	9.5	10.8	12.2	11.3	9.3	9.7

For the above question the addition of the option of integration with Russia and Belarus in 1997 made it more difficult to determine the stability of opinion. This option appears to have drawn a great deal of support away from better relations with Russia and the CIS. From 1994 on the trend line for Russia and the CIS has been clearly downward, but the Ukrainian public has shown a rather consistent and somewhat stable preference over time for integration with the East Slavic countries and the CIS. Therefore, I added the "Eastern option" line, which is the sum of preferences for better relations with Russia, Belarus, or the CIS. However, it should be noted that there have been very subtle shifts upward in favour of Ukraine's reliance primarily on herself and better relations with the West. One might argue that there has been a very slight downturn in support for the "Eastern option," but this has been complicated by volatility; for example, there was a twelve-point drop in support between 1994 and 1996.

Furthermore, I should point out that public support for integration with the East has been three to four times greater than for integration with Western countries. At no point has more than one fifth of Ukraine's population supported integration with the West.

Ukrainians' desire for close relations with Russia is made more obvious in the following:

Q. What relationship with Russia would you prefer?

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2001
Closed borders (visa & customs)	15	14	18	13	11	10	9
Independence, open borders (no visa or customs)	49	49	53	53	50	52	56
Union into a single state	34	31	25	30	36	35	32
Don't know or no answer	3	6	4	4	3	3	2

These longitudinal findings basically support the arguments of Shulman and others about the public's foreign-policy preferences and bolster them by showing how solid the pattern of support for an eastward foreign-policy orientation has been. There has been very little variation over time, even in light of periodic tensions over issues such as energy and the Black Sea Fleet. One cannot make the argument that opinion is volatile or unstable; it is safe to say that the data are quite valid. However, there may be a problem in looking at public opinion data as a whole. As I stated earlier, the pluralist model of public opinion recognizes not one public but a variety of them, each concerned with different issues at different times. A minority that aggressively acts on its preferences is more effective than a silent majority. Nationwide data conceal various levels of intensely held beliefs.

The intensity issue is observed in Galin's NATO poll taken in March 1998. Here is the regional breakdown of sentiment on the military threat to Ukraine.¹²

Q. Is there an external military threat to Ukraine?

	Yes	Probably yes	No	Probably no	DK/NA
West	12.3	9.8	7	45.9	25
Kyiv	13.5	5.8	17.3	46.8	16.7
North	6.6	3.9	4.9	63.5	21.1
Central	11	9.3	14.2	49.1	16.3
Southern	8.9	3.9	7.1	56.1	23.9
Eastern	10.5	6.4	10.4	51.9	20.8
Crimea	7.1	6.3	8.9	50.9	26.8
Total	10.3	6.9	9.6	51.8	21.4

In addition, the NATO study found that the regions most concerned with military threat were also far more likely to name Russia rather than some other area as the source of the threat:

12. Galin, *Mass Public Opinion*, 8 and 10.

Q. From which countries does the military threat to Ukraine come?

	Russia	W. Europe	E. Europe	USA	Other
West	61	12	11	9	7
Kyiv	46	17	15	11	10
North	29	22	16	24	4
Central	34	18	17	26	4
Southern	17	28	12	40	3
Eastern	15	25	16	34	10
Crimea	18	23	18	32	9

Thus, western Ukrainians and Kyivites were more likely to feel that the country is threatened (although the level of concern was not high), and more likely to identify Russia as the source of the threat. The intensity of opinion on foreign-policy issues and Russia was greater there than in the rest of the country. In the east and south, the population was not worried about military threats to Ukraine and, if the numbers are added, majorities believed that the threat that exists emanates from the United States and Western Europe.

It is clear that in Ukraine there has been no mass public support for integration with the West. Such integration has been supported only by a minority, albeit a vocal one. Nonetheless, any Ukrainian politician who supports integration with the West would face the considerable task of explaining and selling such a policy to the public as he tries to change public opinion in order to reform and overhaul Ukrainian political and economic life. However, despite the overall pro-Russian climate of opinion, this would not be an impossible task, because of the very low priority placed on foreign policy by the population. It is actually to the advantage of a committed elite that the populace has not been terribly concerned about these questions. Few Ukrainian leaders have pursued this course, however.

Elite Attitudes toward Integration with the West

If and when it is decided that political and economic integration with the West is in Ukraine's strategic interest, then the job of convincing a reluctant public of the value of such a course will fall on the shoulders of Ukraine's political elite. This includes the presidential administration, the National Security and Defense Council, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The same political elite will also have to direct lobbying and public-relations campaigns in Washington, D.C., and European capitals and undertake serious political reforms for the sake of integration.

An examination of the cultural and political background of President Kuchma and many of his closest advisers and of their views on foreign policy

suggests that this elite is not likely to expend the political capital necessary for integration with the West. At different times during his two terms, Kuchma relied on advisers with different views on integration with Russia or the West. During the first period, in 1994–95, Kuchma's top advisers were in favour of integration with Russia. From 1995 to 1997, at the height of disagreements with Russia, he relied on pro-Western advisers. Then, after the 1997 treaty with Russia and throughout his re-election period, Kuchma returned to a circle of advisers and cronies who favoured closer ties with Russia.

Leonid Kuchma—Eurasianist

Kuchma's electoral support has come overwhelmingly from Ukraine's east and south. Cultural issues, particularly the official status of the Russian language, played a large part in Kuchma's election.¹³ There was considerable debate about what Kuchma's precise intentions toward Russia were. His views on Ukraine's sovereignty and relationship with Russia were considerably obscured by the rhetoric of the presidential campaign. Of the two candidates in 1994, the incumbent, Leonid Kravchuk, was seen as the one who was more hostile to Russia. Kuchma stressed economic reform and closer economic relations with Russia as means of alleviating the economic crisis.

Both candidates were strong supporters of Ukrainian sovereignty. The main difference between them was that Kuchma was known to be a Russophone who had married an ethnic Russian and saw Ukraine's geopolitical place in Eurasia rather than Europe. The difference was amplified by the campaign rhetoric and Kuchma's reliance on coverage from Russian media broadcasts in Ukraine, while Kravchuk controlled the state media.

Before and during the campaign, Kuchma was deliberately vague about his foreign-policy orientation. However, new information on his pre-independence views has been found by his Ukrainian biographer, Iurii Lukanov.¹⁴ Everything about Kuchma's background suggests that he was the personification of a loyal Soviet citizen. He rose from extremely humble beginnings in the northeastern Ukrainian countryside and spoke a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian. An academic overachiever, the engineer Kuchma became head of the Pivdenmash complex, which designed and built missiles and rockets for the Soviet military and space programmes. He also headed the enterprise-level Communist Party cell at the complex, which employed tens of thousands of people.

13. For a measurement of various factors influencing Kuchma's election, see the paper by Robert S. Kravchuk and Victor Chudowsky, "Political Culture in the 1994 Ukrainian Elections," presented at the Conference of the Northeast Political Science Association, Boston, November 1996.

14. Iurii Lukanov, *Tretii prezydent: Politychnyi portret Leonida Kuchmy* (Kyiv: Taki spravy, 1996).

Lukanov describes Kuchma's experience at Pivdenmash as one of great accomplishment as well as isolation. Dnipropetrovsk, where Pivdenmash was located, was home to some of the most sophisticated scientific and industrial enterprises of the Soviet Union and a well-known springboard to Union-rank positions in Moscow. Kuchma was a respected manager and a reformist who supported Mikhail Gorbachev. His introduction, in anticipation of the conversion of military enterprises to civilian use, of trolley-bus assembly lines at his complex caused a stir. For this he was awarded the Socialist Hero of Labour medal. Because of his position, Kuchma could not travel outside of the USSR. In addition, Dnipropetrovsk was closed to all foreigners.¹⁵

In 1990 and 1991, during increasing democratization under Gorbachev, Kuchma displayed an interesting duality: he associated himself quietly with both nationally oriented as well as Union-oriented political forces. For example, he attended the last major plenum of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), held in the autumn of 1990, and established ties with the Inter-Regional Group of deputies in the Supreme Soviet elected in 1990. This was a group of large-enterprise heads who backed greater regional and enterprise-level autonomy while preserving economic ties among the Soviet republics because their enterprises were tied in with Union-wide planning and production systems. Pivdenmash was one of these enterprises. Kuchma also became director of the Ukrainian branch of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, a loose association headed by Arkadii Volsky. At various times Kuchma supported Ukrainian participation in Russian-based financial-industrial groups, basically monopolistic associations of manufacturers with their own banks. Thus he belonged to a reformist group of top Soviet industrial managers who demanded greater autonomy from Moscow without disrupting the unified Soviet economic zone.

To be sure, Kuchma expressed moderate nationalist sentiments. For example, Lukanov researched transcripts of the autumn 1990 CPU plenum. Speaker after speaker attacked Rukh, the nascent nationalist movement, and demanded greater discipline. While supporting his hard-line colleagues, Kuchma also called for "the full economic and political sovereignty of Ukraine as a state."¹⁶ In effect, like Kravchuk, Kuchma straddled both sides of the fence, calling for independence while at the same time urging the suppression of the independence movement. Perhaps, like most of the Ukrainian elite in 1990 and 1991, Kuchma sensed that the USSR was coming to an end and saw possibilities for preserving and even increasing his power—as long as Rukh did not unseat the ruling elite.

15. Ibid., 6–21.

16. Ibid., 19.

In his presidential bid Kuchma was supported by powerful Dnipropetrovsk industrial interests, as well as by centrists, the powerful Inter-Regional Group, the Unity faction of Parliament, and the Communists and Socialists (after the first runoff, in which their candidates lost). Attacked by Kravchuk and the right as an opponent of independence, Kuchma was constantly on the defensive. He had to distinguish repeatedly between his views on independence and foreign policy, as in the following newspaper interview:

Question: Therefore you are for Ukrainian statehood?

Kuchma: With both hands. But this does not mean that I have changed my mind about the need for tight economic co-operation among Ukraine and neighbouring states, particularly members of the CIS, and, I emphasize, first of all with Russia. We can't avoid this—it is primarily Russia, both economically and geopolitically, that is our number one partner.¹⁷

Lukanov gives numerous other examples of Kuchma's campaign statements that are critical of the West's stance toward Ukraine and in favour of greater participation in the CIS and a "strategic partnership" with Russia. There is no question that Kuchma was counting on the votes of those who were most disaffected with independence, and he received them, winning overwhelmingly in the east, south, and Crimea.

Kuchma's Inner Circle

In 1994 President Kuchma and his top foreign-policy and presidential campaign advisers wanted a close economic and political relationship with Russia. In terms of personal and political background, culture, upbringing, language, and so on, these men were not nationalists: they were suspicious of the West and saw Ukraine's natural place, geopolitically speaking, to be with Russia rather than Europe. Using modern polling methods, they carefully researched the voting public and crafted a successful message: close ties with Russia, but on the basis of sovereignty. The emphasis on sovereignty, however, meant that a normal relationship with Russia could not be established until the Crimean and Black Sea Fleet issues were settled and a friendship and co-operation treaty was signed. Therefore, until the signing of such a treaty in 1997, the relationship with Russia was strained and Ukraine's co-operation with the West was far more fruitful.

During his campaign and first term in office, Kuchma surrounded himself with a number of individuals who shared his views on Russia. Among them were Volodymyr Malynkovich, a former journalist, member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, and dissident, who coined the term "strategic partnership," and Mykhailo Pohrebinsky, head of a think-tank called the Institute for Political Studies and Conflictology. Malynkovich caught Kuchma's attention with his articles in the

17. Ibid., 83.

Ukrainian press on the need for a “political union” with Russia. Soon he and Pohrebinsky were working in the Kuchma campaign as speechwriters and public-opinion analysts. From their research Malynkovych and Pohrebinsky determined that a winning presidential candidate had to follow a moderate, non-Communist, “left of centre” course that included calls for close relations with Russia in order to reach voters disaffected with independence.¹⁸

Three other figures who favoured integration with Russia were also prominent in Kuchma’s entourage—Dmytro Tabachnyk, Dmitrii Vydrin, and Vladimir Grinev. All were top advisers or administrators in the president’s office. Grinev envisioned a high level of integration with Russia, including common economic, language, and security policies.¹⁹ Tabachnyk and Vydrin were more concerned about sovereignty and envisioned a close relationship only after Russia had fully and unequivocally recognized Ukrainian independence. Others in Kuchma’s inner circle were tough administrators and leaders from eastern Ukraine, such as presidential advisers Vladimir Kuznetsov, Evgenii Kushnarev (a Kharkiv-based politician), and, of course, Pavlo Lazarenko and Valerii Pustovoitenko.

Grinev, Tabachnyk, Vydrin, Malynkovych, and Pohrebinsky had their disagreements with Kuchma and left or were forced out during the period from about 1995 to 1997. At that time, as Pohrebinsky explained to me, it was difficult to lobby openly for integration with Russia either with Kuchma or publicly, because of tensions in the relationship with Russia over the CIS, the Black Sea Fleet, border issues, Crimea, and the Friendship and Co-operation Treaty. During this period Kuchma relied on more pragmatic and even nationalist figures, such as National Security Adviser Volodymyr Horbulin and Foreign Minister Hennadii Udovenko, who favoured a tougher line with Russia and an assertion of Ukrainian sovereignty through greater co-operation with the West. Udovenko, along with his successor Borys Tarasiuk, were favourites of the political right.

The final period, from about 1997 to 2001, has been marked by a return to a more pro-Russian foreign policy. To boost his re-election chances, Kuchma has allied himself with oligarchic figures who have ties with Russian industry, the energy sector, and the media; in particular, with Aleksandr Volkov, an energy importer who has served as a parliamentary deputy and a member of the National Security Council (NSC). The research arm of the NSC, the National Institute for Strategic Studies, was split, and a separate institute was set up to promote Ukrainian-Russian relations. A secretary of the NSC, Aleksandr Razumkov, headed an official commission to improve relations with Russia. Clearly, these

18. My interviews with Malynkovych and Pohrebinsky in July 1996.

19. See Vladimir B. Grinev, *Novaia Ukraina: Kakoi ia ee vizhu* (Kyiv: Abris, 1995).

initiatives were taken to match similar initiatives on the part of the West, such as the Kuchma-Gore Commission, and had definite results. The period from 1997 saw a clear increase in Ukrainian-Russian military co-operation, joint production of aircraft, a settlement of many trade and energy issues, and, most significantly, a sell-off of top energy facilities and steel and chemical factories to Russian businesses. The Gongadze scandal further cemented the eastward orientation in Ukraine's foreign policy: while Kuchma suffered withering criticism from the United States, he was embraced by Russia's President Vladimir Putin.²⁰

At the same time, pro-Western political figures dropped out of Kuchma's circle. Horbulin retired, and Udovenko became head of a splinter of Rukh. Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk was ousted, apparently because of his pro-Western positions, as was Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, the only prime minister in Ukraine who has vigorously pursued economic reform along Western models.

After Yushchenko's ouster, there have been virtually no Ukrainian political leaders in national office who have vigorously and publicly argued in favour of integration with Europe. It was in the mid-1990s, during the Horbulin-Udovenko period, that Ukrainian leaders last displayed any *political* activity in pursuit of integration with the West. At that time the leadership was locked in a struggle with the Ukrainian left over the constitution, language, economic reform, and foreign policy. These debates, which were reported widely and televised, engaged the public in political issues. Since then, apart from Kuchma's re-election and the Gongadze affair, there has been no attempt by the leadership to draw the public into political discussion.

The Problem of the Western Vector: Politics or a Clash of Civilizations?

Ukraine's integration with the West can be attained only by a concerted political effort on the part of the elite to make the public aware of what is necessary for reform and integration with the West. The Kuchma leadership, by virtue of its background and worldview, is incapable of mounting such an effort. Although there has been some movement towards the West, Ukraine is basically at the stage of co-operation rather than any real integration with Europe and the United States. In the absence of any public discussion on foreign-policy issues, public opinion in this field has remained essentially unchanged for most of the decade.

In academia, numerous public opinion polls have been cited to bolster the argument that Ukraine will or should eventually ally herself in one way or

20. In 2000, at the height of the scandal, Kuchma and Putin met eight times. See Taras Kuzio, "Ukrainian Security Policy: Re-Orientation Eastwards," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, December 2001.

another with Russia or the CIS. This is part of the immense academic debate over whether Ukraine sees itself as part of the West or of the Eurasian cultural sphere.²¹ Huntington's thesis has enthralled Ukrainian and Western scholars and has helped to focus attention on Ukraine's existential questions and its internal political divide. The polls cited in this article and the mentioned preferences of the leaders seem to support the contention that the cultural divide is real and that most Ukrainians and their leaders see their nation as a natural ally of Russia.

There are, however, alternative explanations of Ukraine's turn toward Russia based on more traditional theories of state-to-state relations and Ukraine's internal politics. The first is geopolitical: Ukraine's leadership dropped its hostile stance toward Russia once Russia recognized Ukraine's sovereignty in 1997. This was Ukraine's top foreign-policy priority. In 1995 and 1996, we should recall, the Ukrainian elite hinted quite openly that it wanted to join NATO.²² This indicates flexibility and pragmatism rather than cultural identification and isolation. All Ukrainian leaders, be they from western or eastern Ukraine, are virtually unanimous on the issue of sovereignty²³ and, being pragmatists, they are free to shift their foreign-policy preferences in response to external circumstances. Eventually, the Ukrainian leadership found that Ukraine's chances of NATO and EU membership were remote not merely for cultural but also for socio-economic reasons. Ukraine's entry into these organizations would mean a considerable drain on Europe's resources, not to mention her own. In short, although there has been a certain set of cultural preferences among the current elite, it does not follow that these preferences have been a major determinant of policy or that the current elite cannot be replaced.

21. See Marko Bojcun, "Where is Ukraine? Civilization and Ukraine's Identity," *Problems of Post-Communism*, September–October 2001: 42–50; Stephen Shulman, "Culture in Competition: Ukrainian Foreign Policy and the 'Cultural Threat' from Abroad," *Europe-Asia Studies* 50, no. 2 (1998): 287–303; Stephen Shulman, "National Integration and Foreign Policy in Multiethnic States," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 4, no. 4 (1998): 110–32; Anatol Lieven, *Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999); Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Samuel Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996).

22. Foreign Minister Udovenko openly expressed this desire on a trip to Poland in 1996. He was rebuffed by Volodymyr Horbulin, who himself expressed his interest in "entry into European institutions" in print just a few months earlier. See "Udovenko Criticized for Speaking 'Inaccurately' about NATO," FBIS-SOV-96-130, 4 July 1996; and Volodymyr Horbulin, "Ukraine's Place in Today's Europe," *Polityka i chas* (October–December 1995): 10–5.

23. See the focus-group study of elites, "Ukrainian Elites Worry over Threats to Sovereignty," USIA Opinion Analysis, 7 June 1996, M-132-96.

Domestic politics is also an important factor. In 1995 and 1996 the Ukrainian elite had to contend not only with Russia but also with powerful domestic leftist forces over the constitution and Ukraine's relations with the CIS and Russia. In this domestic political environment, Kuchma needed the support of the Ukrainian right, as well as financial assistance from the United States, Europe, and Western lending institutions. Conversely, the Gongadze scandal led Kuchma to seek support from Putin.

As to the preferences of the Ukrainian public, it should be noted that it attributes little importance to foreign policy. This gives the leadership considerable leeway in the area of foreign policy. Also, because of simple inertia and deeply rooted political and cultural beliefs, the public's foreign-policy preferences have remained virtually unchanged for a decade. While the cultural or civilizational argument can also be used, it is worth noting that there has been an almost complete lack of trust and real interaction on policy issues between rulers and ruled. Sociological surveys have shown a withdrawal from politics and an utter lack of faith in politicians on the part of the public. Even the president has rarely attained a twenty percent approval rating.²⁴ The current relationship between the regime and the public is one of distrust, leading one pollster to remark that distrust of leaders "almost appears to be ingrained in the national psyche."²⁵

Given this state of affairs, it is difficult to see how the public and the elite can engage in a meaningful discussion on reform and foreign policy. The elite is unable to rally the population to make changes or sacrifices for the sake of integration with the West, reform, or any other cause. The result is inertia. The distrust between rulers and ruled, along with an unfavourable climate of opinion concerning integration with the West among the masses and the political elite, will make a sustained political effort toward such integration very difficult.

24. See Nataliia V. Panina and Evgenii I. Golovakha, *Tendencies in the Development of Ukrainian Society (1994–98): Sociological Indicators* (Kyiv: Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 1999).

25. Gary Ferguson, *Public Opinion in Ukraine* (Washington: International Foundation for Election Systems, 2000).

Review Articles

The Hrushevsky Controversy at the End of the 1990s

Thomas M. Prymak

Iaroslav Hrytsak and Iaroslav Dashkevych, eds. *Mykhailo Hrushevsky i ukraїnska istorychna nauka: Materialy naukovykh konferentsii prysviacheniykh Mykhailovi Hrushevskому*. Lviv: Instytut istorychnykh doslidzhen Lvivskoho derzhavnoho universytetu im. Ivana Franka and Instytut ukraïnskoi arkheohrafii ta dzhereloznavstva im. Mykhaila Hrushevskoho NAN Ukrayny, Lvivske viddilennia, 1999. 375 pp.

Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934) was one of the most important Ukrainian figures of modern times. Not only was he Ukraine's greatest historian and organizer of scholarship, but he was also a prominent public figure, an adviser to politicians in Austrian Galicia and imperial Russia, the pre-eminent ideological writer behind the pre-revolutionary Ukrainian national movement, and, in 1917 and 1918, the head of Ukraine's revolutionary parliament, the Ukrainian Central Rada, as well as the first president of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR). The rapid collapse of this republic and its eventual replacement by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic led to recriminations against Hrushevsky on the part of certain elements of the Ukrainian national movement. With the rise of Stalinism and the prohibition and condemnation of his works in the USSR, these accusations increased. The virulent and sustained attacks on Hrushevsky, including a well-organized campaign of "disinformation" that began during his lifetime, continued without let-up until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and it still finds an echo in certain publications today. Thus it is heartening to welcome onto the scholarly book market a volume of conference papers dealing in a rational and restrained manner with some of the most important questions of his still very controversial life and work.

The volume under review is the product of three different scholarly conferences devoted to Hrushevsky. It goes well beyond the topic indicated in the title by discussing not only his historical works and their place in Ukrainian historiography, but also his role in the history of Ukrainian political thought and in Ukrainian political history. There is a strong accent in the book on ideological questions, especially the extremely vexing one of the relationship between Hrushevsky's place in Ukrainian history as a populist, a partisan of the people (*narodnyk*), or, in contrast, as a partisan of independent Ukrainian statehood (*derzhavnyk*). Most observers see an incompatibility, or at least a serious tension, between these two principles, and the problem of clarifying or resolving this tension forms the main theme of the book.

Throughout most of the twentieth century, there were two major non-Soviet Ukrainian views about Hrushevsky. According to the first of these, which was generally upheld by left-wing but liberal democratic scholars and political activists living as émigrés, many of them former Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) from 1917, Hrushevsky was the far-sighted scholar who criticized the Russian bureaucratic-police state and the moribund Habsburg monarchy and spread European learning and a modern sense of national consciousness among the impoverished and oppressed Ukrainian people. He saw that the era of the landlords and capitalists was coming to an end, and he bound the fortunes of the national movement to the Ukrainian peasantry and the newly emerging Ukrainian working class. He symbolized in his person the most honourable phase of the democratic and socialist Revolution of 1917, and he was a principal architect of the independent and precedent-setting UNR, which forced the Bolsheviks to take cognizance of the existence of Ukrainian national aspirations and create a rival pseudo-independent Ukrainian SSR. According to this view, Hrushevsky's enormous scholarly corpus, especially his multi-volume *History of Ukraine Rus'*, prepared the way for these developments and stood throughout the many long years of Soviet rule as a monument to the existence of the Ukrainian people and a declaration of its commitment to democracy, to its social aspirations, and to its future political independence.¹

1. This point of view is most clearly expressed in the American-based democratic socialist journal *Vilna Ukraina* (Detroit and, from 1961, New York), which flourished during the 1950s and 1960s. The main achievement of this group was the publication of a very revealing collection of Hrushevsky's political and autobiographical writings under the title *Mykhailo S. Hrushevsky: Vybrani pratsi. Vydano z nahody 25-richchia z dnia ioho smerty (1934–1959)*, ed. Mykola Halii, with an introduction by Volodymyr Doroshenko (New York: OURDP v SShA, 1960). *Vilna Ukraina*, which, by the way, was the rallying cry of the democratic and socialist Ukrainian revolution of 1917, was also the title of one of Hrushevsky's major programmatic pamphlets of the time, and the American journal bearing this name published a number of articles criticizing the historian's Soviet

The second non-Soviet interpretation of Hrushevsky's life and work was far more critical. It was generally shared by more conservative Ukrainian scholars and publicists, many of them his critics during the Revolution of 1917 and supporters of the conservative regime of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, which replaced the revolutionary UNR in a German supported coup d'état. According to this school of thought, Hrushevsky's populist approach to history and politics and his critical attitude toward statehood were nothing more than outdated and narrow-minded prejudices. As a historian he ignored the cultural achievements and traditions of the educated land-owning classes; as a politician he was more a theoretician of anarchy than a statesman concerned about the construction of a national state for the Ukrainian people. Moreover, during the revolution he was the leader of a nation at war who preferred vague talk of liberty and federalism to organized power, and he merely led the confused and illiterate masses down the path of anarchy and destruction. His *narodnyk* convictions had led the Ukrainian nation to unmitigated disaster.²

When the Ukrainian national movement made a sharp swing to the right during the 1920s and 1930s, the new "integral" Ukrainian nationalists added their voices to this conservative chorus, condemning Hrushevsky's rationalism and moderation as well as his socialism and commitment to democracy. Unlike their historian forerunner, these nationalists were willing to sacrifice all upon the altar of the nation and the national state. Although the defeat of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy largely discredited integral nationalism throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, elements of its ideology were preserved for many years within a certain part of the Ukrainian political emigration, and within this part criticism of Hrushevsky remained fierce for many years.³

and non-Soviet adversaries and documenting his role in the revolution.

2. The clearest statement of this conservative position is Omelian Pritsak, "U stolittia narodyn M. Hrushevskoho," *Lysty do priyateliv*, 1966, nos. 5–7: 1–19; reprinted in the conservative "Hetmanite" compendium *Idei i liudy vyzvolnykh zmahan* (New York: Bulava, 1968), 187–230. I have used the reprint. The respected historian of the Ukrainian Revolution Dmytro Doroshenko (1882–1951), who was most active during the interwar period, the important memoirist Natalia Polonska-Vasylchenko (1884–1973), who was also a professional historian and who flourished during the early 1960s, that is, during the central years of the Cold War, and others shared this view. With the end of the Cold War and the re-establishment of an independent Ukrainian state on the ruins of Soviet Ukraine, Hrushevsky's multi-volume *History* was reprinted in the new country and Omelian Pritsak was invited to write the introduction to the set. In this introduction, Pritsak's conservative criticism of Hrushevsky was considerably muted and the historian was characterized as a "positivist" who evolved into a "historian-sociologist." See Omelian Pritsak, "Istorirosifia Mykhaila Hrushevskoho," in Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrayny-Rusy*, vol. 1 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1991), xl–lxxiii.

3. See, in particular, Petro Mirchuk, *Ukrainska derzhavnist 1917–1920* (Philadelphia,

While this controversy continued in the Ukrainian émigré community, Soviet attacks on Hrushevsky, which labelled him a “bourgeois nationalist” and an “enemy of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples,” remained undiminished throughout the long Cold War. The need for a more balanced view that acknowledged his great contributions to the creation of the modern Ukrainian nation, yet took account of his ideological and political limitations, soon became evident. As early as 1954, the premier Ukrainian émigré historian of the Cold War period, Oleksander Ohloblyn (1899–1992), made an attempt at such an evaluation. In a speech before the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States at a conference devoted to the memory of the great historian, he outlined what he believed to be Hrushevsky’s ideological limitations and also his great services to the Ukrainian cause.

Ohloblyn began by acknowledging that Hrushevsky’s primary emphasis had always been upon “the people.” He demonstrated this by quoting from Hrushevsky’s inaugural speech at Lviv University in 1894 at the start of his university career. In this speech Hrushevsky frankly declared that for him “the popular masses,” with their ideals and strivings, were the alpha and the omega of the Ukrainian historical process. Ohloblyn also turned to the latter part of Hrushevsky’s career and quoted from the latter’s 1920 article “Ukrainska partia sotsialistiv-revolutsioneriv ta ii zavdannia” (The Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries and Its Tasks), a kind of confession of faith addressed to his fellow Socialist Revolutionaries and, indirectly, to the nationally conscious Ukrainian Communists. Put most succinctly, there Hrushevsky wrote: “In the conflict between the people and the state, blame always attaches to the state.” Thus, thought Ohloblyn, Hrushevsky viewed “statehood and power” (*vladerzhhava*) as, in Ohloblyn’s exact words, “an absolute evil.”⁴

Having established Hrushevsky’s unequivocal populist credentials, Ohloblyn went on to say that although the reading public was accustomed to view Hrushevsky as primarily a populist writer, and this may be true of the first volumes of his great *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, it was not necessarily true of the latter volumes of this history. Ohloblyn then brought up the matter of Ukrainian

1967). Mirchuk (1913–99) was an active member of the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN[b]), was arrested by the Germans in 1941, and later wrote a book about his experiences in Nazi concentration camps. From 1948 to 1952 he was a member of the OUN(b) leadership in the West.

4. Oleksander Ohloblyn, “Mykhailo Hrushevsky i ukrainske natsionalne vidrodzhennia,” *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, 1964, nos. 2–3: 1–6; and reprinted in Oleksander Ohloblyn, *Studii z istoriï Ukrayiny: Statti i dzhherelni materiialy*, ed. Liubomyr Vynar (New York-Kyiv-Toronto, 1995), 55–63, esp. 60, citing M. Hrushevsky, “Ukrainska partia sotsialistiv-revolutsioneriv ta ii zavdannia,” *Boritesia - Poborete!* 1 (Vienna, 1920): 1–54, here 12.

statehood at the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and quoted from Hrushevsky's 1918 booklet on the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 between Moscow and Ukraine: "Cossack Ukraine in 1648 to 1654 was really in fact an independent state," "the unification of Ukraine with Moscow was a unification of states," and even after 1654 Ukraine "preserved clear elements of its statehood." Ohloblyn concluded that the political lessons of 1917–18 and serious study of the later Cossack period were causing Hrushevsky to evolve into a clear partisan of Ukrainian statehood; that is, that Hrushevsky was becoming a "*derzhavnyk*." Ohloblyn then went on to quote from Hrushevsky's political tract of 1918, *Na porozi novoi Ukrainy* (On the Threshold of a New Ukraine) regarding the obsolescence of a federal orientation on Moscow ("Kinets moskovskoi orientatsii"), and from his reflective 1926 jubilee speech in Kyiv in which Hrushevsky quoted his friend and close colleague, the poet Ivan Franko, and stated that he had worked all his life to complete the structure of the Ukrainian nation until the time that it would "shine brightly among the circle of free peoples."⁵ For Ohloblyn, who, it must be said, came into personal conflict with the great historian in Soviet-ruled Kyiv during the 1920s, Hrushevsky's great contribution to the Ukrainian cause and Ukrainian state building was never in doubt.

Others also thought that Hrushevsky had evolved into a partisan of independent statehood during the course of his career. Of course, this was particularly true of the historian's left-wing émigré admirers. The most striking example was Matvii Stakhiv (1895–1978), a democratic socialist activist from western Ukraine, who later, during the post-Second World War period, became closely associated with the Ukrainian Workingmen's Association and the newspaper *Narodna volia* based in Scranton, Pennsylvania. In 1978 Stakhiv, who had met Hrushevsky during the early 1920s, published a collection of materials about the great historian and included in this collection an article on the evolution of Hrushevsky's political thought from a radical form of anti-state populism to a more moderate form that made possible his manifold contributions to the building of an independent Ukrainian national state during the revolution.

5. Ohloblyn, "Mykhailo Hrushevsky i ukrainske natsionalne vidrodzhennia." Hrushevsky's "Kinets moskovskoi orientatsii" and his 1926 speech were reprinted in Halii's edition of the historian's *Vybrani pratsi*, 65–8 and 225–34. In fact, Halii reprinted most of the important collection *Na porozi novoi Ukrainy*, which Hrushevsky later considered to be his "political testament." After the end of the Cold War, this collection of revolutionary essays and speeches was also reprinted, this time without any omissions, in Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Na porozi novoi Ukrainy: Statti i dzherelni materiialy*, ed. with an introduction by Lubomyr Wynar (New York, Lviv, Kyiv, Toronto, and Munich: Ukrainske istorychnye tovarystvo, 1992); and in M. Hrushevsky, *Kho taki ukrainsti i choho vony khochut*, ed. O. M. Myronenko et al. (Kyiv: Tovarystvo Znannia Ukrainy, 1991).

Stakhiv pointed out that Hrushevsky in one of his first major articles published in the 1890s praised the common people of central and western Ukraine, who at the time of the second Mongol invasion abandoned their own princes (in particular, Danylo Romanovych) and preferred to put themselves directly under the more distant authority of the Mongol or “Tatar” khans. These “Tatar people,” as they were called, were defended by Hrushevsky as an example of the people rising up against their own state when it was in their best interests. The article was praised by Hrushevsky’s Kyiv University mentor, Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908), whom Hrushevsky later described as holding quasi-anarchist views, but was attacked by Antonovych’s counterpart, the liberal émigré scholar Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95) for its naive acceptance of what Drahomanov believed to be an artificial distinction between state and society dreamed up by nineteenth-century German philosophy. Drahomanov pointed out that such clear distinctions did not exist in western Europe, where what we would today call civil society had deep roots; that it was constructive conservatives, not destructive radicals, who had carried out the liberating and precedent-setting English Revolution of the seventeenth century; and that in the major modern Ukrainian example of the abandonment of one’s own state for the sake of a distant overlordship—that of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who fled the Russian Empire to live under the Turks in the eighteenth century—the Cossacks were used to put down revolts against the Turks, and, moreover, never produced any higher culture of the kind that gave Shevchenko and his *Kobzar* to tsarist-ruled Ukraine. Thus, according to Drahomanov, it was questionable whether such revolts had any “progressive” character whatsoever.

This critique made a strong impression upon the young Hrushevsky, and many years later he mentioned it while contrasting the views of Antonovych and Drahomanov. Stakhiv believed that Hrushevsky adjusted his views on the “Tatar people” away from the position of Antonovych and towards the position of Drahomanov in the third volume of his great history. Thus, according to Stakhiv, quite early in his career the great historian was already evolving in a *derzhavnyk* direction and, in fact, became “the first Ukrainian historian-*derzhavnyk*.” In general, Shakhiv did not see any contradiction between Hrushevsky the *narodnyk* and Hrushevsky the *derzhavnyk*. “In actual fact,” he wrote, “the goal of Hrushevsky’s activity was the victory of a peasant people and its constitution as a nation within its own state.”⁶

6. Matvii Stakhiv, “Materiialy pro svitohliad Hrushevskoho,” in *Mykhailo Hrushevsky u 110 rokovyny narodzhennia 1866–1976. Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka*, vol. 197, ed. Matvii Stakhiv (New York, 1978), 221–36, esp. 221–6 and 236. In this article, Stakhiv quotes from Hrushevsky’s reflective piece “Ukrainska partiaia sotsialistiv-revolutsioneriv ta ii zavdannia,” cited in note 4 above, and considerably more extensively from Drahomanov’s review of his work, which originally appeared in the Galician journal

Stakhiv's analysis of Hrushevsky's historical work, a very late example of the defense of the historian in the *Vilna Ukraina* tradition, probably reveals as much about the evolution of the scholar's socialist followers after the revolution and, later on, during the Cold War period, as it does about Hrushevsky's own evolution. After all, the demand for complete independence was a postulate of the entire Ukrainian political emigration as early as the 1920s and was never abandoned up to its actual attainment in 1991. By the time of the Cold War when Stakhiv was writing—his book was only published in 1978, the very year that he died—the democratic socialists were a very small part of this emigration, and it was natural that they reacted, and perhaps overreacted, to the jibes of their more numerous and more influential “nationalist” rivals, who accused the heroes of the left of undervaluing the importance of sovereign statehood.

A considerably less overtly ideological contribution to Hrushevsky scholarship, or at least to the debate about Hrushevsky as a partisan of the people or as a partisan of statehood, actually had come a decade earlier, in 1966, when, in the journal of the newly established American-based Ukrainian Historical Association, *Ukrainskyi istoryk*, in a commemorative volume published on the centenary of the scholar's birth, an economic historian from Galicia, Illia Vytanovych (1899–1973), published a pioneering article on Hrushevsky's methodology and ideas about history. In this article, which had actually been written in 1938 but never saw publication because of the war, Vytanovych argued that Hrushevsky's ideas about history were actually quite sophisticated and contained elements of both traditional Ukrainian populism, which was quite opposed to the various states that had ruled Ukraine over the centuries, and also elements of a “modern” appreciation of the advantages of statehood. Vytanovych claimed that Hrushevsky was primarily a political historian who turned to social and cultural history as a kind of backup when there were few or no sources for Ukrainian political history. Vytanovych wrote that Hrushevsky clearly identified with his populist predecessors, firstly Mykola Kostomarov (1817–85), who reflected an early Romantic, indeed almost “mystical,” reaction against the Russian bureaucratic state, and secondly Kostomarov's successor, Volodymyr

Narod in 1893. This journal was edited by Ivan Franko and Mykhailo Pavlyk. Examination of Hrushevsky's *Istoriia Ukrayny-Rusy*, vol. 3, 2d rev. ed. (Lviv, 1905) does not, in my opinion, substantiate Stakhiv's contention that Hrushevsky revised his views on the “Tatar people” at this early date. His portrait of Prince Danylo remained quite negative, and his impressions of life under the Tatars rather positive when compared to life under the contemporary princely regime. See esp. 154, including note 2. Nevertheless, as Stakhiv noted, many years later Hrushevsky did recall Drahomanov's critique and understood its importance, thus indicating that even if he did not completely accept it earlier on, this criticism did make a significant impression upon him.

Antonovych, who represented a later “documentalist” and rationalistic positivism while retaining most of Kostomarov’s quasi-anarchist attitudes.

But Hrushevsky, claims Vytanovych, went far beyond his predecessors in producing an actual synthesis of Ukrainian history that combined both external and internal factors and political and social themes in a way that had never been done before. Hrushevsky, Vytanovych continued, also corrected populist critics of the native Ukrainian elite, like Oleksander Lazarevsky (1834–1902), who had stressed only the negative aspects of the Ukrainian gentry while ignoring its patriotic achievements. Moreover, Vytanovych pointed out, Hrushevsky commissioned his student, Ivan Dzhydzhora (1880–1919) to investigate Moscow’s influence upon social relations in Ukraine and praised him when Dzhydzhora discovered that the native Ukrainian nobility often selflessly defended Ukrainian autonomy against this influence. (Hrushevsky even boldly reprinted Dzhydzhora’s collected essays in Soviet Ukraine in 1930.) Vytanovych concluded that in his rigorous analytic approach, in which generalizations had no place, in his methodological pluralism, which rejected any kind of economic determinism, in his balance between social factors and the individual will, in his firm commitment to the “scientific method,” which was characteristic of late nineteenth-century positivism, and, finally, in his acceptance of early twentieth-century psychology and sociology in the forms proposed by Wilhelm Wundt and Émile Durkheim, Hrushevsky was not simply a historian who related a simple chronology of established fact, but was also a real historian of “social, political, state, and national consciousness.”⁷ A naive romantic populist he was not.

Finally, Ukrainian émigré historiography of the Cold War period, especially in its later phases, produced a significant synthesis of this revisionist approach to Hrushevsky in the voluminous writings of Lubomyr Wynar (b. 1932), a pioneer in the collection and publication of materials on the previously much maligned Hrushevsky and a leading figure in popularizing his cult in the Ukrainian emigration. Beginning in 1966, Wynar began publishing source materials and interpretive studies of Hrushevsky’s life and work. This enterprise continued through the latter half of the Cold War and was taken up in Ukraine itself once freedom of intellectual inquiry and political independence had been established there.⁸ In essence, Wynar continued explaining Hrushevsky’s life and

7. Illia Vytanovych, “Uvahy do metodolohii i istoriohrafii M. Hrushevskoho,” *Ukrainskyi istoryk* 3, nos. 1–2 (1966): 32–51.

8. See, in particular, Liubomyr Vynar, *Naivydatnishiyi istoryk Ukrayny Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934) u 50-littia smerty*. This pamphlet was published by the émigré publishing house Suchasnist without noting place of publication and with two different publication dates: 1985 appears on the title page, and 1986 on the cover. Also see, Liubomyr Vynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Istoryk i budivnychyi natsii. Statti i materialy* (New York, Kyiv, and Toronto: Ukrainske istorychne tovarystvo and Instytut ukraïnskoi

work in the tradition established by Ohloblyn in the 1950s; that is, Wynar sought to “rehabilitate,” as it were, Hrushevsky’s reputation among that “nationalist” emigration of Ukrainian scholars that had been displaced by the Second World War (the so-called DPs). His approach was to emphasize “national” themes in Ukrainian history while maintaining that these were not necessarily “nationalist,” the latter term being more appropriate when discussing the “integral nationalists.” This fit in well with Hrushevsky’s own position and lexicon, for in his various historical and political writings the great historian usually used the word “national” in a positive sense and the word “nationalist” in a negative sense. However, Wynar tended to go beyond this position in constantly emphasizing Hrushevsky’s supposed stress upon “state,” “independence,” and “nation” at the expense of the older vocabulary used by the historian himself; that is, “the people” or *narod*, and “Ukrainianism” or *ukrainstvo*. This tilt toward Hrushevsky as a partisan of the state (*derzhavnyk*) rather than as a partisan of the people (*narodnyk*) went far beyond anything that Ohloblyn had to say on the subject, and it comes out in almost all of Wynar’s writings.

Let us take a single recent example. In one of his essays on Hrushevsky’s “leading ideas”⁹ Wynar points to three principal themes in the historian’s work. (1) The Ukrainian people as an entity that strives for national rebirth; that is, an entity that strives for national freedom. In Wynar’s own words, “In the *History of Ukraine-Rus*” and his other researches, Hrushevsky emphasizes the struggle of the Ukrainian people for freedom and liberty in its political-state, cultural, and socio-economic aspects. This conception of the freedom principle (*svobodaryzm*), that is, the struggle of the people for freedom and self-expression, is the central idea of Hrushevsky’s historical work, which runs like a red thread through his work.” (2) The idea of Ukrainian statehood, which took federal forms in old Ukraine during the times of Hetmans Khmelnytsky, Doroshenko, and Mazepa and took the form of a movement toward “the realization of the independence and state sovereignty of the modern Ukrainian nation” at the time of the Ukrainian Revolution. (3) The conception of territory and the unity of the various Ukrainian lands.

Wynar’s interpretation of Hrushevsky was obviously formed within the milieu of the “nationalist” Ukrainian emigration of the post-1945 period, and it stresses those values that were dearest to that emigration, namely, state and nation. Missing from this interpretation are the historian’s enormous commitment to democracy and equality, which were inherent in his populism from the very beginning and unfolded to the fullest extent during the great revolution of

arkheohrafiia ta dzhereloznavstva im. M. S. Hrushevskoho NAN Ukrayiny, 1995).

9. See Vynar, “Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Istoryk Ukrayiny,” in *Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, 99–120, esp. 112–4.

1917–18. It is this vision of “Hrushevsky as a democrat,” which had been captured so clearly by his early followers of the *Vilna Ukraina* school, that needs to be added to Wynar’s interpretation to make it full. And when it is added to the principles Wynar outlined, it colours and limits these principles considerably.

As intellectual freedom became established in Ukraine in last years of the USSR and the early years of Ukrainian independence, the debate about Hrushevsky moved from the emigration to the homeland itself. Hrushevsky was quickly rehabilitated and soon became an almost mythical national hero with streets named after him and monuments erected in his honour. From 1994 to 1996 numerous commemorative meetings and at least three major scholarly conferences were devoted to him, and it is the material from these conferences that form the content of the book *Mykhailo Hrushevsky i ukrainska istorychna nauka*. Once again, it was the vexing question of “Hrushevsky as *narodnyk*” versus “Hrushevsky as *derzhavnyk*” that immediately came to the fore. This question not only was addressed in several of the conference papers, but it also clearly dominated the following discussions, which are printed as a long appendix to the volume.

Without a doubt, the paper which dealt with this question in the most direct and the fullest possible way is Iaroslav Dashkevych’s “Mykhailo Hrushevsky: A Historian of the Populist or *Derzhavnyk* Tendency?”¹⁰ Dashkevych has no doubts whatsoever in answering this question, for he places Hrushevsky squarely in the *derzhavnyk* school; indeed, not only does he place Hrushevsky in this “tendency,” but he also argues rather persuasively that Hrushevsky was both the founder and the greatest representative of this tradition.

Dashkevych begins his argument by quoting the famous Russian historian Vasilii Kliuchevsky (1841–1911) on the difference between the Russian populist school and the Russian statist school. Kliuchevsky identified the first with the Romantic movement and Slavophilism of the early nineteenth century, and the latter with the emergence of “scientific” or positivist historiography later in that century. Dashkevych points out that Hrushevsky, unlike many of his direct predecessors, such as Mykola Kostomarov or Volodymyr Antonovych, was never a Romantic populist, because he did not study populist subjects; that is, he never made the “spirit” of the people or its way of life, customs, manners, and morals the subject of his research. Dashkevych believes that both Kostomarov and Antonovych reacted to Russian state despotism by stressing the negative aspects of statehood and emphasizing the positive aspects of “the people.” He thinks that Hrushevsky broke with this tradition by stressing *derzhavnyk* elements in Ukrainian history; moreover, he maintains that post-revolutionary Ukrainian

10. Iaroslav Dashkevych, “Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Istoriyk narodnytskoho chy derzhavnoho napriamu?” 65–85.

émigré and Galician historians dreamed up an artificial difference between Hrushevsky and the later, post-revolutionary *derzhavnyk* school of Ukrainian historiography on the basis of the historian's political writings, especially his programmatic essay "Ukrainska partiia sotsialistiv-revolutsioneriv ta ii zavadnnia" (1920). Dashkevych sees this essay, which was used to discredit "Hrushevsky the partisan of Ukrainian statehood," first by the famous émigré historian Dmytro Doroshenko (1885–1951) and then by many others, including Ivan Krevetsky in the 1920s and Oleksander Ohloblyn in the 1950s, as cheap "Bolshevized" propaganda filled with socialist jargon that does not in any way reflect the master's true *derzhavnyk* historical views. Indeed, Dashkevych believes that Hrushevsky was an excellent historian but a bad politician, and that the two should never be confused.

In the second half of his essay, Dashkevych tries to define positivism and Hrushevsky's relationship to it. He sees five characteristics of this tendency: (1) Scientism, that is, an emphasis upon historical professionalism, proper preparation for a specialty, avoidance of philosophical questions and of discussing "spirit" or "laws" in history, and reliance upon rationalism and empirical methods. (2) Objectivity, that is, emphasis upon the ideal of objectivity independent of religious or political, especially party, concerns. (3) "Deheroization" of political leaders and of "the people," with a corresponding emphasis upon collectives in history. (4) Emphasis upon the evolutionary character of history, with account taken of modern sociology, social psychology, and the other social sciences. (5) Westernism, with the inclusion of the Ukrainian people in the European family of nations.

According to Dashkevych, on all accounts Hrushevsky was a positivist and thus can in no way be considered a romantic populist. Dashkevych states, contrary to the prevalent sentiment among Ukrainian historians, that it was not Antonovych but rather Hrushevsky who turned fully to positivism and was responsible for the rational subdivision of Ukrainian historical science into specialties like paleography, numismatics, genealogy, and historical geography. Moreover, almost all of Hrushevsky's students can be counted as members of the *derzhavnyk* school of Ukrainian history, and Dashkevych believes it to be illogical to think that this did not begin with the master himself.

Finally, Dashkevych emphasizes that Hrushevsky's aversion to theory and generalization was so strong that no clear idea of his "philosophy of history" can be derived from his few scattered remarks on the subject. This rigorous adherence to analysis rather than synthesis is also a prime characteristic of the historian's positivism.

Dashkevych concludes by summarizing Wynar on the content of what Ukrainian history actually is: (1) the history of the nation, (2) the history of the state, and (3) the history of a territory. This triad of nation, state, and territory, Dashkevych, like Wynar before him, sees as going back to Hrushevsky himself.

Dashkevych's effort to emphasize Hrushevsky as a partisan of Ukrainian statehood at the expense of Hrushevsky as a partisan of the people goes very far indeed; so far, in fact, that it seems to deny any role whatsoever for the historian in the history of Ukrainian populism. Thus the road along which Ohloblyn had started in the 1950s, and Wynar had continued a generation later, is taken to its extreme conclusion. Just as Wynar went farther than Ohloblyn while acknowledging his contribution, so too does Dashkevych go farther than Wynar, also acknowledging the contribution of his predecessor. Hrushevsky was a *derzhavnyk*, and that is that.

Of course, this rather extreme opinion does not pass without criticism in *Mykhailo Hrushevsky i ukrainska istorychna nauka*. Two papers, in particular, challenge it. The first, Natalia Iakovenko's "The Individual as Actor of the Historical Process in the Historiography of Mykhailo Hrushevsky,"¹¹ analyzes several passages from Hrushevsky's great history. Iakovenko concludes that the positivist statements by the historian in this work are merely formal declarations, while in actual fact he makes ample use of the idea of "the hero in history." Thus in describing leaders such as Volodymyr the Great, Petro Sahaidachny, and Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Hrushevsky does not hesitate to describe their energy, ambition, and ability. This stress upon character and especially upon the "energy" of the dynamic leader is not characteristic of positivism but rather of Romanticism, and thus Iakovenko sees more than a trace of "neo-Romanticism" in Hrushevsky's ideology and work. Therefore he is not as detached from traditional Ukrainian populism as people like Iaroslav Dashkevych would have him be.

Iaroslav Hrytsak is the author of the second essay that sees Hrushevsky as being closer to the populist than to the *derzhavnyk* tradition. In "Was there a Hrushevsky School [of History]?"¹² Hrytsak argues that Hrushevsky stood closer to his populist predecessors, especially the quasi-anarchist Volodymyr Antonovych, than to his students, whose formative experience included the revolution and the struggle for Ukrainian statehood and almost all of whom openly rebelled against their master, some of them in Galicia even prior to 1914. Hrytsak argues that Hrushevsky was indeed a populist and, in fact, in his later years considered himself to be "the last Mohican of the populists." Moreover, Hrytsak points out that Hrushevsky not only criticized the "independentists" or partisans of Ukrainian statehood in the 1920s, but even prevented some of their work from being published, in particular, that by the author of the independentist manifesto *Ukraina Irredenta*, Iuliian Bachynsky.

11. Natalia Iakovenko, "Osoba iak diiach istorychnoho protsesu v istoriohrafii Mykhaila Hrushevskoho," 86–97.

12. Iaroslav Hrytsak, "Chy bula shkola Hrushevskoho?" 162–71.

Hrytsak further argues that Hrushevsky's historical school was neither an institutional one (as Omeljan Pritsak would have it) nor an ideological one (as Lubomyr Wynar of the territorially dispersed Ukrainian Historical Association would have it), but rather a practical workshop of students who sat through his seminars, contributed to his scholarly serials, especially *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka*, and whose main purpose was to gather and digest raw materials for the master's great *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. This workshop dispersed ideologically and physically after the master was removed from the scene, and thus can hardly be said to have existed after 1918; most certainly, it did not endure unto a second generation, the great example of this being Pritsak himself, who may be said to be a product of the school of Hrushevsky's student Ivan Krypiakevych (1886–1967), but not of Hrushevsky himself. All of the great historian's students went on to become *derzhavnyky*, and so did the next generation. There is no doubt, therefore, that Hrushevsky remains "the last populist."

In *Mykhailo Hrushevsky i ukrainska istorychna nauka* there is a contribution that takes an intermediate position between that of Dashkevych (Hrushevsky as *derzhavnyk*) and that of Hrytsak (Hrushevsky as populist): Leonid Zashkilniak's essay "The Historiographical Work of Mykhailo Hrushevsky against the Background of European Historical Thought of the End of the Nineteenth Century and the Beginning of the Twentieth."¹³ In this paper, Zashkilniak argues that the historian's historical corpus is neither purely Romantic nor purely positivist, but rather a mixture of the two as well as some other elements. He believes that Hrushevsky began as a youthful Romantic with an emotional devotion to the Ukrainian people that bordered on "self-exaltation." This was combined very early with a commitment to enlightenment rationalism and a close reading of the early Ukrainian and other positivists, especially the Polish historian Michał Bobrzyński (1849–1935), to produce a combination of enlightenment values, Romantic commitment to the idea of "the people-nation," and positivist methodology. It is this specific combination that became characteristic of his historical writings. Moreover, during the course of his career Hrushevsky further refined this potent combination. Thus, Zashkilniak believes, the historian was affected by the "neo-Kantianism" and anti-materialist reaction of the end of the nineteenth century and that this somewhat tempered his positivist beliefs, especially his strong belief in science, progress, and objectivity. At the same time, however, Hrushevsky became exposed to new developments in the social sciences in France and Germany, especially the work of Durkheim,

13. Leonid Zashkilniak, "Istoriohrafichna tvorchist Mykhaila Hrushevskoho na tli ieropeiskoi istorychnoi dumky kintsia XIX– pochatku XX st.," 31–46. This essay seems to be a summary of a longer piece. See idem, "Istorychna teoriia v naukovii tvorchosti Mykhaila Hrushevskoho," *Ukrainskyi istoryk* 36, nos. 2–4 (1999): 30–54.

and that this also deeply affected his later historical writings. Thus Hrushevsky always avoided deterministic theories, all kinds of “monism,” economic or otherwise, and stuck to close analysis of the individual facts, balancing economic, psychological, social, and political factors to produce a cautious conclusion that was always open to revision upon the discovery of new facts. His faith in science and progress, like that of his British colleague J. B. Bury, was almost, but not quite, absolute.

Of course, Hrushevsky understood that scientific objectivity was very difficult to realize and that the historian always had to choose a proper frame of reference and make a balanced selection among innumerable facts. But as is clear from his later writings on methodology, he resolved this difficult epistemological problem by maintaining that the working historian must make this selection on the basis of contemporary general knowledge of the social sciences and, moreover, make it in the interests of general human progress and the values of “humanity, democratism, and socialist ideals” (*humanosty, demokratychnosty, i sotsialistychnosty*). His was a patriotism tempered by systematic doubt. Thus, unlike some of his contemporaries, such as the Romanian Iorga or the Bulgarian Zlatarsky, Hrushevsky never really caved in to any irrational “neo-romanticism,” and, in fact, in vivid contrast to Iorga in particular, always remained a “progressive.” Along with the people-nation, general human progress was, perhaps, his ultimate value.

Zashkilniak’s analysis of Hrushevsky as a historian seems balanced and convincing. Not only does it identify both the Romantic and the positivist in the historian’s work, but it also takes account of the possibility of change and evolution in the formation of his ideas. The one weak link in his presentation is the point about the possible influence of neo-Kantianism upon the historian, for which he gives no evidence and which, in fact, leads nowhere.

Mykhailo Hrushevsky i ukraїnska istorychna nauka contains several other important articles on Hrushevsky and his students, but most of these articles only very indirectly touch upon the question of “Hrushevsky as populist” versus “Hrushevsky as statist.” The most remarkable are, perhaps, Ihor Hyrych’s “The Statist Tendency and the Populist School in Ukrainian Historiography (against the Background of the Relations between Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Viacheslav Lypynsky),”¹⁴ in which the author stresses the positive relations between the two men—Hrushevsky, the ostensibly great populist, and Lypynsky, the supposed founder of the *derzhavnyk* tendency in Ukrainian historiography; a second article by Iaroslav Hrytsak, entitled “The History of the Nation: A Continuation of

14. Ihor Hyrych, “Derzhavnytskyi napriam i narodnytska shkola v ukraїnskii istoriohrafii (na tli stosunkiv Mykhaila Hrushevskoho i Viacheslava Lypynskoho),” 47–64.

Hrushevsky's Scheme into the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,"¹⁵ in which Hrytsak points out that the weakness of Hrushevsky's historical scheme was the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (and that most recent scholars, such as Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky and Paul R. Magocsi, have thus far tried to extend this scheme only as far as the nineteenth century); and an article by Feodosii Steblii on Ivan Krevetsky, who was the only one of Hrushevsky's Lviv students to bypass earlier eras of Ukrainian history and study the nineteenth century, and who, together with the émigré Dmytro Doroshenko, led the attack on the master's populism during the 1920s.¹⁶

The question of populism and *derzhavnytstvo*, federalism versus independence, does, however, almost completely dominate the discussions that followed the presentation of the various papers. Only parts of the most important points can be summarized here. For example, Ihor Hyrych, who had already stressed the co-operation before the revolution between Hrushevsky and the future *derzhavnyk* leader, Lypynsky, criticized Hrytsak (pp. 297–98) for stressing the ostensible continuity between Hrushevsky and his quasi-anarchist mentor, Antonovych, while simultaneously emphasizing the break between the historian and his students of the *derzhavnyk* tendency. Hyrych pointed out that after moving to Galicia Hrushevsky did, indeed, become critical of his populist teacher, put his student Dzhyzhora to work debunking populist myths about the left-bank Ukrainian nobility, and actually approved and sponsored an article attacking Antonovych by Stepan Tomashivsky in a 1906 issue of *Literatuno-naukovyi vistnyk*. Meanwhile, Hyrych pointed out, there never occurred any split or conflict whatsoever between Hrushevsky and his star students, Ivan Krypiakevych and Myron Korduba, who led the Lviv *derzhavnyk* school of historians during the 1920s and 1930s. These two statements by Hyrych dealing with demonstrable facts point to a serious weakness in Hrytsak's argument.

Others followed in Hyrych's footsteps, claiming, for example, that in the Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada, which in 1918 declared the state independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Hrushevsky acted as an "independentist" (*samostiinyk*) and was therefore a *derzhavnyk* of sorts. Leonid Zashkilniak (pp. 302–3) repeated his assertion that Hrushevsky was both a *derzhavnyk* and a populist and pointed out that Hrushevsky did, in fact, support Ukrainian statehood if this statehood was "responsible" and responsive to the needs of society.

Hrytsak answered these points by agreeing that some *derzhavnyk* elements can be found in the great historian's work, but that this was not a new idea and

15. Iaroslav Hrytsak, "Istoriia natsii: Prodovzhennia skhemy Hrushevskoho shchodo ukrainskoi istorii XIX–XX st.," 98–132.

16. Feodosii Steblii, "Ivan Krevetsky—istoryk," 200–11.

does not negate his populism. For Hrushevsky it was impossible to become a true partisan of statehood because he thought that states were, in fact, a necessary evil but, indeed, an evil. According to this point of view, only social organization from below, from the community level, was good. Hrytsak sees the debate about populism and *derzhavnytstvo* in Ukrainian historiography as arising out of primarily political experiences. He explains (p. 304):

The divide between the partisans of statehood and the partisans of the people arose only after the revolution, and it arose in the dispute as to who was guilty for the defeat of the revolution: the people or the elite. The contribution of the *derzhavnyky* lay in the fact that they were the first to turn attention to the fact that the elite was not traitorous, that it seemingly built a state during the times of Khmelnytsky, and that if Hrushevsky and the other leaders of the Ukrainian People's Republic had not been doctrinaire socialists, they [too] would have gladly built a state in 1917 to 1920. But the populists did not want to do this, and the national revolution failed. Only in this sense can we speak about a distinction between the partisans of the people and the partisans of statehood; and in this respect I consider that Hrushevsky was indeed a populist.

Hrytsak then turns (p. 304) to the distinction that Iaroslav Dashkevych had drawn between Hrushevsky as a historian and Hrushevsky as a politician:

Is it valid or not to use Hrushevsky's ideological and political works for evaluating his scholarly views? First of all, Hrushevsky expressed his views not only in his ideological and political works. These views are expressed also in his work about the so-called "Tatar people," and he held to them to the end of his scholarly career. They are very revealing for characterizing the populist viewpoint. Secondly, we must be conscious of the fact that all intellectuals of the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth were ideologues and that ideology occupied an enormous place in their consciousness. A formal division between scholarship and polemics existed. But in one way or another certain ideological fundamentals were common to both.

Having contradicted Dashkevych (and Matvii Stakhiv) on the question of the evolution of the historian's ideas about the "Tatar people," and having rejected his division of Hrushevsky the "good" historian from Hrushevsky the "bad" politician, Hrytsak turns to the question of positivism and its place in Ukrainian historical thought. Once again, he directly contradicts Dashkevych (p. 305):

We are all still positivists. We all still live in the age of Hrushevsky. We have not yet gone through the great revolutions, the great crisis that has taken place in historiography in the West. We all still think that there can be only one faithful significance [to things]. Like Hrushevsky, we all still think that we can only understand one verity [*istyna*], which will set us free. But above all, truth is not one, it is many. This is the post-positivist or postmodernist way of dealing with things.... In Hrushevsky's time the archeographic inclination [that is, the inclination towards the collection and publication of raw documentation in the expectation that this would reveal scientific truth] was very strong, and at that time this was a very good and modern thing because that was the era of

positivism, which was in full blossom. That was the era of the predominance of fact, the triumph of fact. But now it is very difficult to think like this in the wider world, because by doing this we very easily become trapped in a corner. And what about a line from this or that chronicle, is this fact? This is an inscription; this is a text. And what stands behind this text? An enormous theoretical problem arises about which we have not yet spoken. Soviet historiography was also living in the nineteenth century, and it was truly in its own way both populist and positivist. It did not survive this crisis. I am not a critic of the archeographic tendency, because, of course, without archeography nothing would take place [in historiography]. But there is a certain distortion, an upsetting of the balance, in Ukrainian scholarship. We have too much archeography but too little serious historiography, and we do not have any serious synthesis. I fear that if this continues we will create for ourselves a history "for home use." Because if we want to enter the world scholarly market the standards will be completely different, the demands higher, and they will not accept us there so easily.

Thus Hrytsak concedes one of Dashkevych's main points about Hrushevsky being a positivist, while adding that it is time for Ukrainian historical science to go beyond positivism and thus beyond Hrushevsky. In further discussions, Hrytsak maintains that the fact of Hrushevsky's positivism did not negate his populism. Hrytsak claims that populism could transcend both Romanticism and positivism and exist together with both. So could nationalism, which, Hrytsak believes, is basically "democratic." And Hrytsak obviously sees Hrushevsky as a democrat.

Of course, Hrytsak's word was not final at any of the three conferences dealt with in *Mykhailo Hrushevsky i ukrainiska istorychna nauka*. For example, Jaroslaw Pelenski (pp. 316–18) made the important point that it was not the partisans of Ukrainian statehood who were Hrushevsky's principal opponents, but rather the "nationalists" and the Communists. Olga Andrievsky (pp. 323–4) made bold to correct him, saying that in historiography, at least, Hrushevsky's main opponents were not Ukrainians at all, but rather Russian academics like Pogodin and Sobolevsky, who believed that the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture were merely a local variant of a higher Russian language and culture. At any rate, both Pelenski and Andrievsky both seem to believe that it was not the partisans of Ukrainian statehood who were the historian's chief opponents, especially in his purely historical work.

Finally, the Cossack specialist Iurii Mytsyk (pp. 318–22), criticized Natalia Iakovenko's thesis about Hrushevsky accepting the idea of "the hero in history." Mytsyk maintains that a close reading of Hrushevsky's book on Khmelnytsky reveals no hero worship whatsoever. Rather the historian always remained very critical of the renowned hetman. In fact, he fiercely criticized such historians as Mykola Arkas (1853–1909) and Dmytro Iavornitsky (1855–1940) who, he

thought, rated the hetman rather too highly. On this account, at least, there is no reason to view Hrushevsky as a “neo-romantic.”

Further in the discussions, Iakovenko (p. 347) seemed to criticize Hrushevsky as a mythmaker and, pointing to his strong belief in progress, compared him to the Communists; she was immediately corrected by Iaroslav Isaievych (pp. 313–16), who pointed out Hrushevsky’s great respect for fact (he even calls him a “factologist”), which clearly set him apart from the Communists. In general, the discussion seemed to flow against Iakovenko and towards Dashkevych’s view that the great historian was indeed a positivist. However, the question remained: did this automatically make him a partisan of Ukrainian statehood? Did this make him a *derzhavnyk*?

Mykhailo Hrushevsky i ukraїnska istorychna nauka offers no definitive answer to this question. Indeed, given the vast gulf that separates the two major points of view presented at the conferences, it is difficult to see how it could. Nevertheless, the book does mark the attainment of a new stage in the history of Hrushevsky scholarship. For the link established early on by Dashkevych between Romanticism and populism on the one hand, and positivism and *derzhavnytstvo* on the other, was a new point that had previously been left unconsidered by Ukrainian polemicists during the interwar period or by Ukrainian émigré historiography throughout the Cold War. This innovative link seemed to dominate the discussions at the conferences completely, and the various participants were obviously impressed by it. In future treatments of the problem of Hrushevsky’s relative populism and *derzhavnytstvo* it will certainly have to be taken into consideration.

Nevertheless, certain continuities can be seen between previous Ukrainian historical scholarship and the contributors to *Mykhailo Hrushevsky i ukraїnska istorychna nauka*. Among the principal protagonists, for example, Dashkevych and Hyrych are obviously continuing in the tradition established by Ohloblyn and Wynar, Hrytsak is in some ways an heir of Stakhiv, and Zashkilniak has the precedent of Vytanovych before him. In spite of their very real disagreements, all of these scholars have gone beyond their predecessors and made a positive contribution to modern Hrushevsky scholarship.

There remains the question of important gaps in the papers and discussions. In my opinion, the most important omission of the book is a defense of Hrushevsky from the continuing campaign of defamation emanating from Moscow and its followers in Ukraine. I am referring specifically to the allegation of “biological nationalism,” that is, racism pure and simple, that has been levelled against the great historian from time to time in Moscow and finds an echo in certain Ukrainian publications.¹⁷ This allegation fits in well with the

17. See Nikolai I. Ulianov, *Proiskhozhdenie ukraїnskogo separatizma* (New York,

general campaign against Ukrainian nationalism, which Moscow has systematically accused of “fascism” and “chauvinism.” However, in so far as it concerns Hrushevsky, the accusation of biological nationalism is completely groundless. For in his firm commitment to rationalism and general human progress, which does come out very clearly in the book under review, Hrushevsky stood as a strong opponent of nationalist extremes of all kinds. Moreover, in 1918, when he was considering the question of the relationship between historical research and practical education in a Ukrainian national state, his rejection of racism and nationalist extremes was complete and explicit.¹⁸ It is this image of the great national leader who is simultaneously committed to his own people and to democracy, humanism, and progress, that draws forth comparisons between Hrushevsky and the Czech leader Tomáš Masaryk (made in the book by Zashkilniak on pp. 42 and 313), and remains relevant today for West European and, especially, North American scholars of Ukraine, who face problems of racism and chauvinism in their own countries. Hrushevsky anticipated and faced problems of these kinds and was able to stand up to them. In spite of his personal faults and political failures (and he had many), Hrushevsky’s firm ideological position on the “nation in the world” stood as a positive example for national leaders of all kinds during the maelstrom that was to be the twentieth century. Hrushevsky endures.

The authors and publishers of *Mykhailo Hrushevsky i ukrainska istorychna nauka* are to be commended for their efforts. This serious, attractive, indexed, and timely book is a positive contribution to Hrushevsky scholarship. Several different ideological positions are staked out, and various interpretations are offered. We may now proceed to backing up these interpretations with appropriate documentation.

1966; repr. Moscow: Indrik, 1996). I first discussed the problems with this book in my *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 5–6, note 5. The appearance of the Moscow edition was noted by Ihor Ševčenko in Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research, *The Hrushevsky Translation Project* (Edmonton, n.d.), p. 54. These scurrilous ideas about Hrushevsky’s alleged racism are repeated in an ostensible work of scholarship: O. L. Kopylenko, “Ukrainska ideia” M. Hrushevksoho: *Istoriia i suchasnist* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1991). I dealt with these, as well, in my “Prints and Reprints: Some of the Recent Publications on Mykhailo Hrushevsky,” *Ukrainian Quarterly* 51, no. 4 (1995): 359–68.

18. See, in particular, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Na porozi novoi Ukrainy*, especially the article: “Istoria i ii sotsialno-vykhoviuiche znachennia,” 119–33, which on p. 126 directly attacks “racial egocentrism as, for example, ‘Arian’ or ‘white’ egocentrism, which places itself against the Semitic race or the yellow race.”

Last but not Least? The New Encyclopedia of the Ukrainian Language

Andrii Danylenko

V[italii] M[akarovych] Rusanivsky, O[leksandr] O[nysymovych] Taranenko, et al., eds. *Ukrainska mova: Entsiklopediia*. Kyiv: Ukrainska entsyklopediia im. M. P. Bazhana, 2000. 752 pp.

Iu[iii] N[ikolaevich] Karaulov, ed. *Russkii iazyk: Entsiklopediia*, 2d ed. Moscow: Bolshaia rossiiskaia entsiklopediia, 1997. 703 pp.

A[rnold] Ia[fimovich] Mikhnevich, ed. *Belaruskaia mova: Entsiklapedia*. Minsk: Belaruskaia entsiklapediia imia Petrusia Brouki, 1994. 655 pp.

There is no way that a review can do justice to the informative and, to some extent, provocative volume, *Ukrainska mova: Entsiklopediia* (hereafter UE), whose editors purport, somewhat optimistically, to have systematically presented all the existing information relating to the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian linguistics. Indeed, the overall impression is that, envisaged as a wholly new publication, the UE was designed to cover extensively various aspects of the Ukrainian language, such as its structure, socio-linguistic and stylistic functions, historical development, place among and contacts with other Slavic idioms, literary records, and contemporary state and status, as well as the retrospective significance of Ukrainian linguistic scholarship and its unfolding legacies. Moreover, the significance of this publication is said to be intrinsically connected with the restoration of Ukraine's independence and especially with the new status of the Ukrainian language (UE, 5).

Considering that the UE was prepared jointly by researchers from the O. O. Potebnia Institute of Linguistics and the Institute of the Ukrainian Language of the National Academy of Sciences, not to mention numerous contributors from educational institutions, the above-mentioned goals appear to have been successfully met. One can assume, therefore, that readers finally have in their possession a meticulously prepared and well-grounded reference work, which, hopefully, will appeal to a new generation of philologists keenly interested in an independent and objective assessment of the past and future of Ukrainian linguistics.

The UE is, to be sure, a long overdue publication in the East Slavic world. It was preceded by a conceptually similar Russian encyclopedia entitled *Russkii iazyk: Entsiklopediia* (hereafter RE) and by a Belarusian encyclopedia, *Belaruskaia mova: Entsyklapediia* (hereafter BE). It is tempting to view the UE, at least en passant, in the framework of developments in East Slavic linguistic thinking, which might have influenced the emergence of these publications. In spite of the conspicuous similarity of their titles and a particular commonality in their approach to linguistic and extralinguistic phenomena, the three encyclopedias also have some very distinctive features. For this reason it is instructive, especially in the context of the development of Ukrainian linguistics, to dwell specifically on the most remarkable traits of the UE that distinguish it from both the RE and the BE.

Unlike the RE, which does not devote separate entries to prominent linguists who have contributed to the advancement of Russian linguistics, the UE is replete with such entries. In trying to bring together all those “linguists and writers, particularly from outside Ukraine, who have made a substantial contribution to the development of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian linguistics” (UE, 5), the contributors of the UE become lost in the pool of data and, unfortunately, demonstrate a lack of acquaintance with the latest achievements in the West. They still use distorted concepts that they inherited from the Soviet period.

To begin with, the reader finds all the necessary information about contemporary Ukrainian linguists (to name some at random, Bevzenko, Doroshenko, Horbach, Lysychenko, Rusanivsky, Taranenko, Melnychuk, and Shevelov) who have contributed to the development of Ukrainian linguistics. Both Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian scholars of earlier periods are also mentioned in abundance, including Hantsov, Kurylo, Finkel, Karsky, Meillet, Miklosich, Mykhalkchuk, Shakhmatov, and Sobolevsky. Most baffling, however, is the attempt of the editors of the UE to define the ethnic origin of all the linguists who have separate entries as a basis for their scholarly significance in Ukrainian studies. Some curious judgments appear now and then. For example, the Croatian Vatroslav Jagić (1838–1923) is called “a philologist-Slavicist” (UE, 744) almost in the spirit of the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*¹; meanwhile Franz Miklosich (1813–91) is labelled “an Austrian and Slovenian linguist” (UE, 317) although it is not clear to what extent this scholar of the Austro-Hungarian Empire might have been Austrian or Slovenian. Similarly, another contributor identifies the Pole Jan Niecisław Baudouin de Courtenay (1845–1929) as “a Russian and Polish linguist,” but his first and middle names, Ivan Oleksandrovich, are

1. Volodymyr Kubijovyč, ed., *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 377.

modelled on the East Slavic, more precisely Russian, pattern. It is no surprise that both the earlier Ukrainian émigré encyclopedia and the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, which were published outside the Russian linguistic tradition, call him “an outstanding Polish linguist.”²

At first glance, these cases are exceptional and should be disregarded. But a parochial interpretation of ethnicity, viewed as the true basis for the new nationalistic loyalty of contributors, is applied systematically in the UE. Like Miklosich and Baudouin de Courtenay, the linguist Oleksandr Finkel (1899–1968), who worked almost all his life at Kharkiv University, also stands out as “a hyphenated scholar,” that is, “a Ukrainian and Russian linguist” (UE, 698). Meanwhile, Ivan Izmailovich Sreznevsky (1812–80), a well-known researcher of Old Church Slavonic and Old Rus’ texts, who began his academic career as an ethnographer specializing in Ukrainian folklore, is dubbed “a Russian philologist” (UE, 590).

The latter assessment looks confused, especially in light of a truly nationalistic interpretation of the towering figure of another Slavist from Kharkiv, Oleksandr Potebnia (1835–91), who is described as “a Ukrainian linguist, philosopher, folklorist, ethnographer” (UE, 472). Endorsing on the whole this definition, which is explicitly corroborated by Potebnia’s own writings on the history and contemporary state of the “Little Russian language” among other Slavic, more specifically East Slavic, languages,³ one can only wonder why the author of the article, Vira Franchuk, did not take into account Potebnia’s role in founding the Kharkiv Historical-Philological Society. This is strange, for the society is known to have served as a basis for the development of a particular philological tendency known later as the Kharkiv School.

Franchuk’s statement looks all the stranger when one notes that she recently co-authored a separate article on the Kharkiv Linguistic School in the RE (613–5). Being a kind of “hyphenated patriot” herself, she presents Potebnia as a Ukrainian (UE, 472) and then as a Russian scholar who, along with other philologists from Ukrainian territories, belonged to the Kharkiv Russian Linguistic School (RE, 613). Among the members of the Kharkiv School are figures such as Dmitrii Ovsianiko-Kulikovsky, called, oddly enough, “a Ukrainian linguist” in the EU (391); Oleksii Vetukhov, called, correctly “a Ukrainian linguist” (UE, 63); and finally Aleksandr Popov (1856–80), an extremely talented pupil of Potebnia. Popov, a graduate of Kharkiv University and the author of a breathtaking study in the field of Indo-European syntax,⁴

2. Ibid., vol. 1, 187; Volodymyr Kubiovych, ed., *Entsyklopedia ukrainoznavstva: Slovnykova chastyna*, vol. 1 (Paris and New York: Molode zhyttia, 1955), 148.

3. O. O. Potebnia, *Mova, natsionalnist, denatsionalizatsiya: Statti i fragmenty*, ed. Iurii Shevelov (New York: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 1992).

4. Aleksandr Popov, “Sravnitelnyi sintaksis imenitelnago, zvatelnago i vinitelnago

which methodologically fits well into the Kharkiv School founded and influenced largely by Potebnia, is not even mentioned in the UE. Its editors demonstrate, therefore, a short-sightedness and ignorance that become all the more obvious in light of Vadim Krysko's latest successful attempts to introduce Popov as "a Russian scholar."⁵

In contrast to the UE, the editors of the BE prove to be more realistic and use common sense in singling out linguists who have made a contribution in the development of the Belarusian language and linguistics. I do not possess the exact statistics, but I am certain that the number of, so to speak, non-Belarusian linguists included in the BE is much smaller than in the UE. The BE includes scholars who really have worked in the domain of Belarusian studies; for example, the Pole Stanisław Glinka (BE, 157) and the German Karl Gutschmidt (BE, 169–70). Probably the only bizarre case is that of Zarnian Dalenha-Khadakovski (1784–1825), who is viewed as "a Belarusian-Polish-Russian-Ukrainian archaeologist, ethnographer, and Slavist" (BE, 173).

As for the editors of the RE, they decided, quite reasonably, to provide the necessary information about different linguists in the articles dealing with linguistic schools. Like members of the Kharkiv Linguistic School, foreign linguists are treated there as intrinsic elements of particular schools and trends. Aside from *Ivan Aleksandrovich Baudouin de Courtenay*, identified as an outstanding Russian linguist who distinguished himself in the context of the Kazan Linguistic School (RE, 172–4), some valuable information is also provided about Russian scholars who worked outside Russia or the Soviet Union.

In this regard, it is worth reminding the "Ukrainian ideologues," particularly Valentyna Perebyinis, who in her entry "Structural Linguistics" (UE, 608) discusses the tenets of Prague structuralism, that apart from Czech scholars, three Russian linguists—Roman Jakobson, Nikolai Trubetzkoy, and Sergei Kartsevsky—were active founders of the Prague Linguistic Circle in 1928. The editors of the UE, Rusanivsky and Taranenko, as devotees of the ethnographic treatment

падезhei v sanskrite, zende, grecheskom, latinskom, nemetskem, litovskom, latyshskom i slavianskom narechiiakh," *Filologicheskii zapiski* (Voronezh), 1879, nos. 4–5: 1–42, 43–76; 1880, no. 1: 77–100; no. 2: 102–46; no. 3: 147–82; nos. 4–5: 183–240; no. 6: 241–66; 1881, no. 2: 267–308.

5. Vadim Krysko, "Iz istorii russkoi lingvisticheskoi kritiki (retsensiia F. F. Fortunatova na 'Sintaksicheskie issledovaniia' A. V. Popova)," *Izvestiia Akademii nauk. Seriia literatury i iazyka* 49, no. 1 (1990): 51–61; and idem, "Istoria indoeuropeiskogo akuzativa v 'Sintaksicheskikh issledovaniakh' A. V. Popova," *Voprosy iazykoznaniiia*, 1990, no. 4: 119–30. Krysko's recent monograph, *Istoricheskii sintaksis russkogo iazyka: Obekt i perekhodnost* (Moscow: Indrik, 1997), is largely inspired by Popov's book and, as such, is substantially a modernized reiteration of the basic tenets of the Kharkiv philologist's syntactic theory.

of linguists and their scholarly work, particularly in the field of Ukrainian studies, would be surprised by the role of the Ukrainian element in the Prague Circle. Among those who helped crystallize the linguistic conception of Jakobson and Trubetzkoy was Petr Savitsky (Petro Savitsky), a Ukrainian-born economic geographer and an active member of the circle, who co-authored its programmatic theses and subsequently introduced ecologically oriented disciplines in its linguistic research. Then there was Dmytro Chyzhevsky, fatally omitted in the UE, who was recognized recently by Jindřich Toman as a "Ukrainian scholar."⁶ Another Ukrainian linguist deserves mention—Agenor Artymovich (Ahenor Artymovych), who was a good practitioner rather than a theorist. On the basis of these facts Toman quite reasonably concludes that "the scholars from the Russo-Ukrainian community" played a prominent role in the development of Prague structuralism.⁷

As this case shows, the editors of the UE are inadequately trained and have a narrow view of contemporary trends not only in the West, but also, which is more deplorable, in the countries of the former people's democracies and Soviet Union. To return to structural linguistics, this tendency in linguistic thought is, according to Soviet tradition, reduced by Perebyinis to three manifestations: the Prague School, American descriptivism, and glossematics (UE, 608). Poorly acquainted with modern trends, Perebyinis is unaware of recent methodological advancements by Algirdas Julien Greimas or Umberto Eco, to say nothing of Bernard Pottier's contributions (which were copied indiscriminately by the Russian Vladimir Gak) and Eugenio Coseriu and his followers in the confines of the Lexematic School.

In view of the conspicuous gaps in her linguistic training, Perebyinis's bold claim that "the grammar of the Indian philologist Panini" should be treated as a true example of the structuralist approach is too hasty. It is no surprise that the author attempts to date Ukrainian structuralism back to 1963, when "research on all the levels of the Ukrainian language with the help of structural methods was initiated on a regular basis." In identifying structuralism with formalistic (mathematical) methods, she demonstrates that Ukrainian linguistic thought lags behind linguistic scholarship outside Ukraine.

Given the shortage of qualified specialists, the break in the research tradition in the 1930s, and the lack of contact with the West until the late 1980s, little could have been done in this domain. But the UE assiduously conceals the critical situation in Ukrainian linguistics. In the historical survey of Ukrainian linguistics (UE, 646–52), apart from a couple of gentle hints about the Stalinist

6. Jindřich Toman. *The Magic of a Common Language: Jakobson, Mathesius, Trubetzkoy, and the Prague Linguistic Circle* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), 112.

7. Ibid., 107.

purges and their disastrous impact on the discipline, not a single word is said about the crisis that still exists in various linguistic fields.

For example, Vitalii Rusanivsky offers a highly dubious reading of the word *ukrainistyka*, which contrary to the traditional understanding of similar terms (cf. *russistika* ‘the science of Russian studies’ in RE, 430), is understood as ‘Ukrainian linguistics’ (UE, 646). Projecting *ukrainistyka* as far back in time as the period of Kyivan Rus’, Rusanivsky discusses in detail the Middle Ukrainian grammars and dictionaries without even trying to delimit these texts from the non-Ukrainian East Slavic ones. Without describing the discriminatory language policy of the Russian Empire, particularly towards Ukrainian, he singles out the “progressive Russian intelligentsia” that allegedly supported the independent development of the Ukrainian language (UE, 647).

In his survey, Rusanivsky designs a detailed periodization of Ukrainian linguistics from 1917 to independence: (1) from 1917 to the 1930s, (2) the 1930s and 1940s, (3) the 1950s and 1960s, and finally (4) the 1970s and 1980s. But serious information gaps are immediately obvious within these periods. To take the first period as an example, Rusanivsky says nothing about the existence of two research traditions among the linguists who worked on normalizing standard Ukrainian. The main representatives of the so-called ethnographic trend were Ahatanhel Krymsky, Ievhen Tymchenko, Olena Kurylo in her early writings, and others. The synthetic, or European, group consisted of scholars such as Oleksa Syniavsky, Mykola Sulyma, and Vsevolod Hantsov. One can only wonder why Rusanivsky fails to mention the contributions of these scholars,⁸ who have a rightful place in the history of Ukrainian linguistic research.⁹ Rusanivsky does

8. Rusanivsky must have heard about the existence of these two schools, since the competition between them largely inspired the process of normalization of the Ukrainian language in the twentieth century. Yet it is hard to tell whether he is aware of the eventual impact of their activities in the 1920s and thereafter, up to the present time, on the overall development of Ukrainian linguistics. In any case, in his new monograph, *Istoriia ukrainskoi literaturnoi movy* (Kyiv: ArtEk, 2001, p. 329), Rusanivsky devotes eight lines to the Kyiv (ethnographic) school as opposed to the Kharkiv one. This suggests that the author, most likely, is not able to assess the attainments and failures of linguistic research in modern Ukraine, particularly, in the 1920s. Svitlana Iermolenko, who contributed an article on purism, dwells on the activities of these two schools (UE, 503). Yet, strangely enough, she reduces the puristic principles elaborated in the 1920s to a mere compilation of terminological dictionaries.

9. See Paul N. Wexler, *Purism and Language: A Study in Modern Ukrainian and Belorussian Nationalism (1840–1967)* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 113–7; and George Y. Shevelov, *The Ukrainian Language in the First Half of the Twentieth Century (1900–1941): Its State and Status* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 1989), 138–9. This work does not appear in Iermolenko’s bibliography on purism (UE, 503).

not have a conceptual grasp of this history and reduces it to a succession of events.

Therefore it is no surprise that Rusanivsky prefers to rely on “domestic” sources, which are easier to handle than, say, the historiographic assessments by George Y. Shevelov.¹⁰ Thus Rusanivsky’s survey, covering at least the period up to the mid-1960s, requires substantial revisions. It is evident from his entry that Ukrainian linguists have been uninterested in theoretical issues since the 1930s and have a poor command, if any, of the linguistic scholarship abroad. Hence they are afraid of competing with ideas from abroad without permission from the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and have replaced Bilodid’s theory of the convergence of the Ukrainian and Russian languages with excessive patriotism.

In this respect, another entry by Rusanivsky, on the history of the Ukrainian language, attracts notice. According to it, Ukrainian “goes back to the Common Slavic unity (before the sixth century AD)” (UE, 219). At first glance, this thesis is reminiscent of Shevelov’s view¹¹ that specifically Ukrainian features began accumulating as early as the sixth century AD. But, unlike Rusanivsky, Shevelov did not postulate the existence of Ukrainian *before* the sixth century. Besides, Shevelov did not speak of Ukrainian proper, but of a language system that accumulated what were later identified as Ukrainian linguistic properties. Rusanivsky’s chronology appears even more “revolutionary” than, say, Knut-Olaf Falk’s reconstruction that established the existence of Ukrainian in the tenth century on the basis of the seven names of the Dnipro rapids.¹²

Providing a rather customary picture of the history of the Ukrainian language, Rusanivsky follows the long-standing interpretation of some fundamental changes in the phonological system of Ukrainian. He believes, for example, that the loss of the final jers in the twelfth-thirteenth centuries brought about a diphthongization of *o*, *e* in the preceding syllable, and later their monophthongization (UE, 219). Unfortunately, he does not mention Kurylo’s and Shevelov’s competing theory and the corresponding bibliography. Yet the average reader with minimal linguistic training is, surely, familiar with the dialectal difference in the development of these sounds, which is more than satisfactorily explained

10. George Y. Shevelov, “Belorussian and Ukrainian,” in *Soviet and East European Linguistics*, vol. 1 of *Current Trends in Linguistics*, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok (The Hague: Mouton, 1963), 217–64.

11. George Y. Shevelov, *A Historical Phonology of the Ukrainian Language* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1979), 40.

12. Knut-Olaf Falk, *Dneprforsarnas Namn i Kejsar Konstantin VII Porfyrogennetos’ De administrando imperio* (Lund, 1951); cf. also my article “Iurii Shevelov iak istoryk skhidnoslovianskykh mov,” *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 239 (Lviv, 2000), 286–7.

by Kurylo and Shevelov: in the southwest, *o* and *e* assimilated to *u* and *i* in the next syllable, and in the north, into diphthongs. As for the assimilation that resulted in narrowing, this was a change whose inception antedated not only the reduction of jers, but, as Shevelov assumes,¹³ even their rise. Generally speaking, Rusanivsky's thinking remains within the traditional view of Ukrainian ikavism (see UE, 199). He disregards not only Western linguistics, represented by Shevelov, but also Ukrainian linguistic achievements of the 1920s.

This holds true of most contributors to the UE, whose ignorance of Western linguistics is almost pathetic. To take the article by Oleksandr Taranenko on lexical meaning (UE, 284–7) as an example, not a single foreign-language work is mentioned in the bibliography. Moreover, among the eight references, only one is to a Ukrainian linguist, while the rest are to Russians. A similar Russian-centred orientation is evident in other lexicological articles. In his note entitled “Componential Analysis” (UE, 245–6), M. Kocherhan refers to but one American article dating back to 1956. Returning to Taranenko, his “Antonyms” (UE, 27–9) does not contain any foreign references, while the article “Synonyms” (UE, 539–42) has only one such reference—to a Czech-language monograph dealing with Czech synonymy.

The entries by the two editors, Rusanivsky and Taranenko, are unnaturally long for a publication of this type. For instance, Rusanivsky's articles on the verb and its categories seem to represent the most favoured field of contemporary Ukrainian linguistics. Stuffed with a plethora of details, these articles are better suited for a textbook than an encyclopedia. The reader is overwhelmed with complete paradigms of the aorist (UE, 30), perfect (UE, 437), and plusquamperfect (UE, 455) as reconstructed for Common Slavic and “Old Russian.” I should point out that along with the latter term Rusanivsky also uses the term “Common East Slavic,” in an article on the history of the Ukrainian language (UE, 219f.). This inconsistency testifies most likely to a lack of training in linguistic methodology, which among Ukrainian linguistics remains basically Neogrammarian, supplemented with odds and ends from sociological and psychological approaches.

Speaking of linguistic methodology, the article “Euphony” (UE, 314–6) is highly emblematic. It defines euphony as the “ability of a phonetic system to produce euphonic sounds” or, according to the BE (p. 349), simply “a pleasant sound.” Definitions of this type are based on conspicuously naïve ideas of what functions a linguistic system, and specifically its phonetic subsystem, may fulfil. Consequently, the author of “Euphony” offers a very dubious interpretation of some peculiarities of Ukrainian phonetics (for example, the existence of variants

13. George Y. Shevelov, *A Prehistory of Slavic: The Historical Phonology of Common Slavic* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 447.

of the type *v – u – uv – uvi – vi* ‘in’ depending on the initial sound of the next word), thereby assimilating Ukrainian with Italian. Positivistic and, what is more aggravating in this case, totally aesthetic at its core, this claim has nothing to do with linguistics or, in particular, Ukrainian consonantism and vocalism. Even more disconcerting is a compatible thesis advanced in the BE (p. 349), which identifies euphony with the prevailing quantity of open syllables encountered not only in Belarusian, but also in Russian. Since Ukrainian is not mentioned there, although it shares with these two languages a tendency toward open syllables, one is left confused on this score.

The Ukrainian and Belarusian authors are not even aware of the chauvinistic streak in their approach to analyzing what is commonly, in popular and nationalistic publications, called Ukrainian and Belarusian euphony and opposed to “the cacophonous phonetics” of Russian. The main methodological problem, of which the editors of the UE and BE are oblivious, emerges if one takes Semitic languages into account. A typical feature of their consonantism is the existence of “triads,” groups of three consonants with the same point of articulation: voiced, voiceless, and emphatic. The latter are pronounced pharyngealized in Arabic, as glottalized ejectives in Ethiopian and Modern South Arabic, and dropped in Modern Hebrew.¹⁴ Therefore it would not be out of place to remind East Slavic philologists, particularly the editors of the volumes under consideration, that linguistic phenomena can be analyzed adequately from a purely linguistic viewpoint, which, if necessary, may be reinforced by some *extralinguistic*, that is, social, aesthetic, or other, consideration, but not vice versa.

Unfortunately, the contributors of the articles on euphony, especially in the UE, which contains the most preposterous conjectures about the tendency toward open syllables, are not familiar with Baudouin de Courtenay’s apt remark that “It is not recommended for a modern grammarian to talk about euphony in a language. To explain linguistic phenomena with the help of euphony, or melody, is an outdated point of view. This is what is called by the Germans a ‘längst überwundener Standpunkt.’”¹⁵ It is easy to see that both the contributors and the editors of the UE are reluctant to entertain new ideas and that they substitute occasionally extralinguistic (aesthetic, political, nationalistic, and the like) assessments for linguistic analysis proper.

14. Robert Hetzron, “Semitic Languages,” in *The World’s Major Languages*, ed. Bernard Comrie (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 657.

15. Jan Niecisław Baudouin de Courtenay, “O tak nazywajemoi ‘evfonicheskoi vstavke’ soglasnogo v slavianskikh iazykakh,” in his *Dziela wybrane*, vol. 5 (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1983), 354.

The UE contains entries about outstanding Slavists with a basic bibliography. Some important names (Hantsov, Kurylo, Shevelov) have been included in the UE after years of oblivion in Ukraine. This seems to be the only positive feature of the UE, but it is soon overshadowed by some drawbacks and mistakes in the presentation of the material. Some bibliographies, Shevelov's,¹⁶ for example, are marred by substantial gaps (UE, 735–6). Then, surprisingly enough, the editors eliminated the indentation of paragraphs, either to ape the West European tradition or, what is more serious under current conditions, to undermine Ukrainian orthography. Furthermore, some diacritic symbols are missing here and there, cf. *y* instead of *ë* to denote the short vowel that changed subsequently to a *jer* (UE, 506). Finally, the UE is hard to use because it has no index or a standard list of abbreviations, which are common in scholarly publications. Four decades ago Shevelov pointed out that “no Ukrainian publication in linguistics had an *indix*.¹⁷ This shortcoming remains unrectified.

A more serious flaw of the UE is its poor command of literary Ukrainian. The language of some of its contributors is patterned on the Russian language; for example, *bahatochysel'nyi* (a wholly Russified *surzhyk* form modelled on the Russian *mnogochislenyi*) appears instead of *chyslennyi* (UE, 622). The introductory article (UE, 5) contains mistakes of the type *maty vidnoshennia do* instead of *maty stosunok do*, *vmishcheno* instead of *umishcheno* phrase-finally, and *vesty doslidzhennia ta propahandu ukrains'koi movy*, which is obviously influenced by parallel Russian constructions with a verbal component, instead of the proper Ukrainian *doslidzuvaty ta propaguvaty ukrains'ku movu*. Many more examples can be found.

All things considered, the UE has not surpassed similar Russian (RE) and Belarusian (BE) reference books. Although it was envisaged as a pioneering project, the UE has turned out to be a failure. While the editors claim that the UE is a new encyclopedic work in Ukrainian linguistics, it is devoid of any originality and is littered with typographical errors (as in the first column on p. 480) and substantive omissions. The quality of this “imposing” publication is not imposing at all. Except for some articles dealing with the Ukrainian dialects, the UE should be treated not as the latest achievement of Ukrainian linguists, but rather as the last page in the history of Soviet Ukrainian linguistics, which must now give way to new developments based on the traditions that were severed in the 1930s.

16. His latest bibliography is Andrii Danylenko and Lev Chaban, comps., *Iurii Volodymyrovych Shevelov (Iurii Sherekh): Materialy do bibliohrafiï* (New York: Ukrainian Acadmy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. and the Shevchenko Institute of Literature of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 1998).

17. Shevelov, “Belorussian and Ukrainian,” in *Soviet and East European Linguistics*, 225.

Book Reviews

Mykhailo Hrushevsky. *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. Vol. 7. *The Cossack Age to 1625*. Translated by Bohdan Strumiński. Edited by Frank E. Sysyn and Serhii Plokhy with the assistance of Uliana M. Pasicznik. Introduction by Serhii Plokhy. Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1999. lxvi, 548 pp.

Mykhailo Hrushevsky was, without a doubt, one of the most important Ukrainians of the twentieth century. Not only was he the foremost leader of the pre-revolutionary Ukrainian national movement and the first president of the briefly lived Ukrainian state of 1917–18, but he was also Ukraine's outstanding historian and organizer of scholarship. His ten-volume *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, which charted Ukrainian history from ancient times to the mid-seventeenth century, remains a landmark of modern Ukrainian national consciousness. With its clear conceptualization of the Ukrainian national historical process that extended across the centuries, its wealth of detail, and its critical analysis of the sources on almost every one of its thousands of pages, the work remains an unsurpassed monument of historical scholarship a century and more after the author first put pen to paper.

The specific volume under review, *The Cossack Age to 1625*, is particularly significant in so far as it initiates a kind of sub-series within the general framework; this sub-series is devoted to the history of Ukrainian national life during the Cossack age, which began at the close of the fifteenth century and extended into the eighteenth century, past the end of Hrushevsky's narrative, which broke off in the mid-seventeenth century. Hrushevsky saw the Cossack age as the third period of Ukrainian national history, being preceded by the periods of Kyivan Rus' and the Lithuanian ascendancy. He wished to continue his narrative further into modern times, but the stormy political climate of his day took a heavy toll upon both his academic and personal life; his contribution to the historiography of these latter times was limited to survey histories and specialist studies of individual topics, although these were very abundant indeed.

The topics addressed in volume seven include the origin of the Ukrainian Cossacks, the struggle between the Cossacks and the Turks and Tatars to the south of settled Ukraine, the first Cossack revolts or wars against the gentry-centred political and social system of the Polish-Lithuanian state (translated in this volume somewhat awkwardly, for some unknown reason, as the "nobiliary system"), the Cossacks' alliance with the Orthodox Church and its subsequent influence upon Ukrainian national life, and, finally, the Cossacks' role in relations between the Polish-Lithuanian state (called the "Commonwealth" after 1569) and the Ottoman Empire and its dependent states.

With regard to Cossack origins, Hrushevsky took a boldly independent position, rejecting earlier theories that traced their roots to either Kyivan Rus' or to foreign, primarily Circassian or Tatar, influences. Instead Hrushevsky saw the Cossacks as a somewhat unique Ukrainian phenomenon that had its origins in the existence of the frontier zone, the no man's land between Christian Poland-Lithuania and the lands of Islam represented by the Ottoman Empire and its client Crimean Khanate. Indeed, this frontier zone, it is generally believed, is the origin of the very name "Ukraina" (borderland).

To this frontier fled thousands of poor, oppressed Ukrainian peasants (and sometimes townsfolk and noblemen) from the more heavily populated lands of what is today western and northern Ukraine. Hrushevsky rejected the thesis that certain Polish nobles had sponsored the first organization of this settlement to the east, and he preferred to think of it as being primarily a spontaneous popular development to which certain Ukrainian princely families contributed only occasionally. The nobleman to whom Hrushevsky gave most attention was Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetsky (1516–63), who enjoyed a high reputation in Ukrainian historiography as being a precursor or even early founder of the Zaporozhian Cossack Sich, the fortified headquarters on the lower Dnipro River. Since Hrushevsky's time, new Ottoman documents describing Vyshnevetsky's death have been discovered; they clarify somewhat his political activities and strengthen his association with the famous "Baida" Vyshnevetsky of Ukrainian Cossack legend.

The first Cossack revolts against the Polish-Lithuanian authorities were traditionally seen in both Polish and Ukrainian historiography as a reflection of an age-old religious conflict—the confrontation of Orthodox Rus' and Catholic Poland. Hrushevsky, however, clearly demonstrated that these first revolts were not against Catholic domination, but rather against the gentry- or prince-dominated social system of the Commonwealth. Indeed, the first revolt, which was led by the Cossack adventurer Krystof Kosynsky (d. 1593), was directed against a pillar of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, the mighty Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozky (c.1526–1608), who owned vast estates in the important Ukrainian province of Volynia.

The latter parts of the volume under review deal with the re-establishment of the formerly suppressed Orthodox hierarchy under the protection of Hetman Petro Sahaidachny (d. 1622) and with the ambiguous and unstable position of the Cossacks as the unrewarded occasional defenders of the Commonwealth against the Turks and Tatars. The re-establishment of the Orthodox hierarchy and the protection of the Orthodox Church by the Cossacks made possible the flowering of Ruthenian Orthodox culture, which Hrushevsky interpreted as being one manifestation of a much longer Ukrainian national tradition. Cossack military aid with Sahaidachny in the lead made possible the defeat of a great Turkish invasion force at Khotyn in 1621. This victory symbolized the military success of the Commonwealth during the first half of the seventeenth century. But the Cossacks got little reward for their effort and the problem of their unrecognized social and political status grew steadily more serious until the final outbreak of the Khmelnytsky revolt of 1648.

Perhaps one of the most revealing parts of the book is Hrushevsky's citation and discussion of the "Protestation" of the Orthodox bishops to the Polish government in 1621. In this document the hierarchy rejected the claim of some Poles that the Orthodox clergy had incited the Cossacks to disobedience. The bishops stressed the innate Christian

origins of the Cossacks, their old Ukrainian lineage, and their honourable role in the defence of Christendom from the Turks and Tatars. So interesting and so important did Hrushevsky find this “Protestation,” which drew parallels between the ancient Varangian attacks on Byzantium and the contemporary Cossack raids on Istanbul and stressed the liberation of Christian slaves (especially galley slaves) in the Islamic world, that he quoted part of it as a kind of extended epigraph to the entire volume. Indeed, this quotation seems to underline and embody the general continuity of Ukrainian national history from Kyivan Rus' through the Cossack period, which is Hrushevsky's general thesis. We can do no better than to quote it again here:

As for the Cossacks, we know that these military men are our own kin, our brothers, and Christians of the true faith.... For this is the tribe of the glorious Ruthenian nation, born of Japheth's seed, that campaigned against the Greek Empire across the sea and overland. It is the best of the generation that under Oleh [Oleg], the monarch of Rus', traveled in its dugouts overland [putting boats on wheels—M.H.] and sea and stormed Constantinople. It was they who, under Volodymyr, the holy monarch of Rus', campaigned against Greece, Macedonia, and Illyria. It was their ancestors who were baptized together with Volodymyr and accepted the Christian faith from the Church of Constantinople, and are born and baptized and live their lives in that faith today. They live not as pagans, but as Christians.... When they go to sea, they first pray, stating that they are going against the infidel for the Christian faith. They set the liberation of prisoners as their second goal.... To save their souls they redeem prisoners.... It is certain that no one in the world, except God, renders as much benefit to enslaved Christianity as do the Greeks with their ransoms, the Spanish king with his strong fleet, and the Zaporozhian Host with its courage and victories.... It is God who placed the Tatars on earth like lightning bolts and thunder to afflict and punish the Christians with them. Similarly He has placed the Cossacks of the Lower Dnipro region, the Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Don Cossacks, like the other lightning bolts and thunder on sea and land, to frighten and rout the infidel Turks and Tatars with them. (pp. 305–7)

Could there possibly be a more succinct characterization of the early period of Ukrainian Cossack history than this? The identification of the Cossacks with the Ukrainian past and with Orthodox Christianity, and the struggle between Christianity and Islam, between Cossack and Tatar, are all there. Even the internal tensions of the Commonwealth are alluded to in the purpose of this protestation. Only the social conflicts are passed over in silence. Hrushevsky examined them in detail in his preceding and subsequent analytic discussions of the early history of the Ukrainian Cossacks, and, it should be emphasized, in these same discussions he qualified, limited, and further explained both the religious questions and the general continuities of Ukrainian history from Kyivan Rus' to Cossack times. As mentioned above, in spite of his general continuity thesis, Hrushevsky basically saw the Cossack phenomenon as a *sui generis* process.

Indeed, the great value of Hrushevsky's history lies in this critical analysis of events, sources, and literature. Although weak as a narrator, Hrushevsky shines as an analyst, carefully picking apart the most complex and potentially misleading sources and interpretations, even the important one quoted at length here. Add to this the critical

discussions of the work of previous historians in his lengthy appendices, and we have a true masterpiece of Ukrainian historical literature.

With regard to the translation and the editing of the volume, it can be said that the present English-language edition improves considerably over the Ukrainian original. So far as I can tell (and here I admit that I am not a native speaker of the Ukrainian language), this translation reads more smoothly and more easily than the difficult original. Where necessary, the notes and appendices have been expanded to take account of the secondary literature and the few sources published since Hrushevsky's time, and a full bibliography of sources and studies used by Hrushevsky has been added. The volume also includes a very useful and well-informed introduction by Serhii Plokhy and a full index. The dust jacket is attractive, and the general design is solid and respectable. Only a series of historical illustrations with captions emphasizing some of the more important points made in the text (as, for example, was done in Bury's illustrated edition of Gibbon, or W.H. McNeill's world history) is missing. But this, it must be admitted, is a counsel of perfection. The translator, publisher, and editors can be justly proud of their achievement thus far, and seem to be doing justice to "the *magnum opus* of a great scholar."

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Terry Martin. *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939*. The Wilder House Series in Politics, History and Culture. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000. xvii, 496 pp.

Terry Martin's *Affirmative Action Empire* is an exceptional and unique book, indispensable for any student of ethnic politics in the Soviet Union and its successor states, notably the Russian Federation. It is unique both in its comprehensive, in-depth treatment of the evolution of the Soviet nationalities policy from its inception until the end of the 1930s and in its reliance on Soviet archival sources that have become accessible only recently.

Access to hitherto closed primary-source materials sheds new light on the policy's implementation. It reveals previously unknown information about the implementation and results of the policy, especially at the grassroots level, and offers new insights into the scope and nature of internal Party and state concerns, debates, and conflicts on the subject. The "strategy of ethno-territorial proliferation" (the systematic formation across the USSR of a pyramid of territorial national soviets for minority groups, from the village-kolkhoz-town level to the autonomous or Union republic), discussed in chapter two, is a revelation. It explains the unprecedented ethnic mobilization that followed, and strikingly illustrates the strategic efficacy of ethnicity as a channel of upward mobility for minority elites. Some stereotypes are undermined or modified. The richness of the data is at times overwhelming.

The focus of the book is indicated by its singularly apt, if contemporary, title. It centres on the commitment of the Soviet leadership, Lenin and Stalin in particular, to the policy of *korenizatsiya*, its implementation, and its consequences. The policy, which aimed

at endowing each of the non-Russian groups, large and small alike, with a sense of national identity, territory, institutions, and culture, was expected to pre-empt a growth of ethnic nationalism. Significantly, the commitment excluded the majority Russians, who were tainted by their imperial past and "Great Russian chauvinism." Martin tells the story of how and why precisely the opposite happened. Ethnic nationalism, which prevailed in the 1920s, was followed in the 1930s by purges of "nationalist deviationists," the rehabilitation of the Russians' leading role, and a re-emphasis on centralization. But the policy and the state's multinational character survived.

The book is organized along thematic lines in chronological order. Three major sections follow the introduction, which sets out the conceptual context of "affirmative action." Part I, concerned with the early implementation of the *korenizatsiia* policy, deals primarily with the NEP period. Part II focuses on the resulting political crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Part III deals with the resulting shifts in affirmative-action policy in the 1930s and the linkages between "nationalist deviation" and industrialization, collectivization, and the recurrent purges, especially the Ukrainian famine of 1932–33 and the great purge of 1937–38. The book fills in much of the gap in our knowledge of Soviet ethnic politics in the 1920s and 1930s. Few scholars have attempted a comprehensive treatment of the interwar period or extended the effort beyond the study of major national groups. Gerhard Simon's *Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union* (1986, translated 1991) is a notable exception. Simon, of course, had no access to Soviet archives.

This reviewer was struck by the salience and continuity of several major variables in the development of Soviet nationality relations. Ukraine had clearly been a pacesetter in the evolution of *korenizatsiia*, both as a pioneer in its creative implementation and as primary target for the repression of the "nationalist deviation." As the second-largest nation of the Soviet Union, strongly represented in the Bolshevik leadership and possessed of an articulate national intellectual elite and illiterate peasantry as well as a Russified technical intelligentsia and industrial proletariat, Ukraine was the prototype and model of the policy's contradictions, successes, and pitfalls. Clearly, Ukraine was the most important actor in the *korenizatsiia* scenario, and it plays a leading role in the book. Martin devotes chapter seven to the Ukrainian famine of 1932–33, considering the political implications of the Kuban and Ukrainian nationalist crisis and the grain-requisition crisis. He concludes that the famine, while linked to the nationalist terror, was due to the grain requisition terror and "was not an intentional act of genocide specifically targeting the Ukrainian nation" (p. 305).

The importance as well as ambiguous status of the Russians, the country's largest group, emerges as another key variable. Contrary to the prevalent stereotype, the Russians were, in fact, underprivileged in the first round of affirmative action and were on the losing side of the *korenizatsiia*: their national territory and political and cultural life were not institutionalized. The Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was a honeycomb of national territorial units, and there was no Russian Communist Party. Officially, "Great Russian chauvinism" was for years the most dangerous deviation, loudly denounced but punished relatively mildly. Central authorities were rather lax also in their support for the rights of the non-Russians. Russian resentment smoldered for years, fuelling ethnic conflict, and remained even after the Russians were elevated to the status

of everybody's "big brother." It exploded years later when Boris Yeltsin took the RSFSR out of the Soviet Union, signing thereby the Union's death warrant.

Korenizatsiia's differential impact on the "developed" western part and the "culturally backward" eastern periphery of the Soviet Union is another enduring variable. The level of national consciousness and the strength of educated national elites in the western republics made possible a programme of nationalization on a broad cultural and technical as well as political front. In most of the eastern periphery, however, the national culture had to be built from scratch, and this led to the emergence of an enduring dichotomy between the mostly European technical intelligentsia and the humanities-trained, politically visible local elites (chapter four).

A work of this magnitude and complexity cannot avoid some weaknesses. A certain bias is imposed by the nature of the sources. To use a musical metaphor, stenographic reports of Party and state meetings are like concerts: from the heard music one learns little about the rehearsals or the writing of the score. Stalin's explicit role as the decision-maker at critical junctures of the policy's evolution punctuates all the proceedings and is clearly visible in the book. Nonetheless, from time to time one gets the impression that there was free debate and a genuine exchange of conflicting views. The primary socialization value of the debate, with its ritualized crescendo of vicious accusations alternating with abject self-criticism, is not brought to the reader's attention. Neither is the cynical expediency of Stalin's Byzantine politics or his reliance on manipulation of ethnic prejudices and loyalties in line with the old principle of "divide and rule."

One example that illustrates the point is the author's treatment of the Mykola Skrypnyk case in Ukraine (pp. 344–56). Another is the discussion of the 1930 Ukrainian and Belarusian show trials (pp. 250–66), which leaves unclear whether the indicted "counter-revolutionary" Ukrainian and Belarusian liberation organizations (SVU and SVB respectively) were real or only a product of the OGPU's imagination (p. 266). The debate on the abolition of the Latin script for many Soviet languages appears spontaneous in the author's account. The first shot against Latinization was fired at the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 by the first secretary of the Tatar Autonomous Republic, who is said to have "hit the jackpot" (pp. 418–9). Yet the almost immediate support his proposal received from the Party newspaper, *Pravda*, and the Party journal, *Bolshevik*, indicates that he was addressing an issue that had already been decided. His speech started a campaign to educate the audience in the evils of the Latin script and to flush out and destroy opponents. Part of the illusion of a free debate might have resulted from the very nature of the investigated topic. Concentrating on the "national form" of the Soviet system, the author has underestimated the underlying socialist realities. Referring to the new Soviet (Stalin) constitution, for example, he asserts that it confirmed the "sovereignty" of the republics (p. 432), a claim that cannot be sustained except in Soviet double-speak.

Surprisingly, one misses a discussion of structural dimensions of the system and of its ideological matrix. The division of labour between the Party and the state (soviet) bureaucracies had been of critical importance in the application of the nationality policy. The first represented the "socialist content" of the "socialist in content—national in form" formula and the centre's decision-making powers. The second embodied the "national form" and was there primarily to carry out the centre's decisions: its interests were secondary to those of the Party. In the eyes of the system's founders, the structural

dichotomy was to insure against two potential evils: the minority nationalism getting out of hand and Russification. In the end it failed because the blurring of the Party-state differentiated functions led to the aggregation of their respective interests on a common ethno-national base. Martin does not refer to the structural dichotomy, but differentiates between “hard- and soft-line” policies (pp. 21–3 and *passim*) and the control-versus-visibility factor in cadre placement, especially in the eastern periphery.

The Marxist-Leninist ideological matrix is mentioned briefly (pp. 4–5), and the *korenizatsiia* policy is not linked with the concept of dialectics. But the Soviet system was an ideological system based in the Marxist-Leninist *Weltanschauung*, and this meant that ideological considerations outweighed everyday rationality in decision making. The Bolsheviks’ apparent belief that territorial institutionalization of ethnicity would prevent an emergence of ethnic nationalism makes sense only in dialectical terms, as does Stalin’s obsession with a policy that proved to be manifestly counterproductive to the interests of his centralized state and personal power. According to Marxist-Leninist theory, nationalism as a part of the capitalist stage of development is in decline, but first it has to reach the apogee of its historical development. Stalin’s acceptance of the primordial explanation of national identity (pp. 442–3) did not affect the dialectical explanation of the nationalist phenomenon, which was adhered to in the post-Stalin period as well.

The mass of data, the exhaustive documentation, and a certain repetitive pattern in the preview to and the summation of each chapter betray the dissertation origins of the book. However, my criticisms are not meant to detract in any way from the general value of the work, which is a major contribution to the history of the Soviet Union and to the study of ethnicity.

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Sheila Fitzpatrick. *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times. Soviet Russia in the 1930s*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. x, 288 pp.

This is an impressive addition to Sheila Fitzpatrick’s oeuvre on Soviet social and cultural history. The companion volume to her *Stalin’s Peasants* (1994), *Everyday Stalinism* deals with urban life during the 1930s. But readers expecting a traditional history of everyday life are in for a surprise because the state and its institutions occupy a prominent place in this work. A pioneer of “revisionist” Soviet social history, Fitzpatrick is now bringing the state back into the picture. Such a manoeuvre is entirely appropriate, for the state had a central and ubiquitous presence in all everyday activities under Stalin’s regime.

The book begins with a chapter on the role of the Party in Soviet society and ends with a chapter on the Great Terror as seen from below. In between is a detailed description of survival strategies in a hierarchical society plagued by shortages. Relying on archives, newspapers, memoirs, and the collection of postwar interviews of former Soviet citizens known as the Harvard Project, Fitzpatrick studies a multiplicity of everyday practices. Prominent among them are “shopping as a survival skill,” “mastering

culture," dealing with family problems, using patrons and connections, and petitioning the authorities. Having established that the Stalinist everyday-ness was constituted by the manifold nuances of interconnections between the state and society, the author seeks to recover the ways in which people ascribed meaning to such notions as socialism, class war, bureaucracy, culture, privilege, and terror.

One notable absence in this catalogue of everyday practices is work. Fitzpatrick explains that she is interested in common urban experiences, whereas "work varies greatly from one occupational group to another" (p. 11). The decision to ignore the differences in labour practices, as well as the tensions in the workplace, is not incidental. The author claims that "Relations between classes were comparatively unimportant in Soviet society. What mattered was the relationship to the state, in particular, the state as an allocator of goods in an economy of chronic scarcity" (p. 12). Fitzpatrick is right when she argues that the Stalinist notion of "class" was a de facto reversion to the tsarist system of social estates that defined an individual's relationship to the state. But dismissing the contemporary official understanding of class is not a good enough reason to ignore class as a *category of historical analysis*. Stalinist subjects did not live in a world free of social inequalities. The fact that they conceptualized these problems in terms of "enemy wrecking," administrative malpractice, or "speculators' profiteering" does not mean that a historian may neglect social tensions under Stalinism. Rather, an investigation of how social concerns were expressed in the permissible linguistic code might be in order.

Fitzpatrick concludes her excellent book by offering three metaphors of Soviet society: the prison, the boarding school, and the soup kitchen. The first two models capture the elements of regimentation, discipline, force-fed patriotism, and the rules that the pupils learn to evade. However, Fitzpatrick's preferred metaphor is the third one, that of the soup kitchen or the relief agency, whose clients are supplicants. "There were fearful things that affected Soviet life and visions that uplifted it, but mostly it was a hard grind, full of shortages and discomfort. *Homo Soveticus* was a string-puller, an operator, a time-server, a freeloader, a mouther of slogans, and much more. But above all, he was a survivor" (p. 227).

The introduction to *Everyday Stalinism* warns the reader that the book's "subject is everyday life in Russia, not the Soviet Union" and that non-Russian republics could display "significant variations" (p. 13). This claim is somewhat misleading. Fitzpatrick does not address in any detail the *national* specifics of daily experiences in the Russian republic. Moreover, throughout the book she analyzes numerous cases from Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan, and the RSFSR's non-Russian regions, most notably Dagestan, Chuvashia, the city of Kazan, and the Khanty region. Fitzpatrick is far from assuming that "Soviet" meant "Russian," but some of her non-Russian examples call for elaboration. When a Tadjik Stakhanovite told a conference that he was awarded a European-style house and he lived "like a civilized person" (p. 103), this was not just about becoming "more cultured." Under Stalinism, "backwardness" was all too often connected with nationality, and "modernity" with assimilation.

Not surprisingly, the large majority of non-Russian examples come from the Ukrainian SSR, which is consistently called "the Ukraine." Some of these glimpses are fascinating and make one look forward to the time when someone finally writes a history of everyday life in Soviet Ukraine. Here are just several illustrations. Soviet citizens, who attempted to

conceal their past, often claimed Kyiv (Kiev in the text) as their birthplace, since records there had been destroyed during the Civil War (p. 133). The local authorities in Odesa and other Ukrainian centres spontaneously reintroduced food rationing in 1928–29; other Soviet cities followed their lead (p. 55). During the food shortages of 1929–30, Odesa housewives had reportedly attacked local co-operative stores with cries of “Down with industrialization, give us bread” (p. 169). In 1933 Dnipropetrovsk still had no sewage system; in its workers’ settlements water was rationed and sold for 1 rouble a bucket; 26,000 cases of malaria were registered in the city in 1933 (p. 51). In the mid-1930s a regional party secretary in Dnipropetrovsk received on average 250 personal letters and petitions per day (pp. 175–7). One railroad conductor specialized in reselling foreign goods that he obtained in Shepetivka from the locals who smuggled them across the Soviet-Polish border (p. 61; so much for the Stalinist newspaper slogan, *Granitsa na zamke*).

Fitzpatrick also refers to some better-known events of the Stalin period in Ukraine: the famine of the early 1930s (pp. 42–3); the rise of the new generation of industrial managers (exemplified by the career of Roman Belan [Bilan] of Zaporizhzhia Steel, p. 86); the official interpretation of Panas Liubchenko’s suicide as a sign of his guilt (p. 174); and the critique of Postyshev’s “cult” after his removal from the republic (p. 196).

However, the most impressive “Ukrainian” story in the book is that of the Pioneer Lena Petrenko. Returning from Artek Pioneer Camp in Crimea in 1937, the girl allegedly overheard a fellow traveller on a bus to Dnipropetrovsk whispering in German about rails and signals. She followed the suspect to the station buffet, where he dropped a letter in German containing directives for acts of terror and sabotage. The police duly apprehended the man (p. 207). Whether or not this bizarre newspaper narrative had any factual basis to it (as we know, the widely publicized “show trials” of the time had none), the real or imaginary feat of Lena Petrenko was a part of Ukrainian Stalinist everyday life, in which denunciation was endemic and children saw catching spies as a great sport.

Overall, Fitzpatrick’s book is a wonderful read, and it gives its readers much to think about. By penetrating below the power structure of Stalinism, the author’s analysis opens new perspectives on Soviet social and cultural history. The book will undoubtedly work well in an undergraduate classroom. One hopes that Fitzpatrick’s fine study will prompt further investigations of everyday life under Stalinism, including works based on Ukrainian material.

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Themenschwerpunkt: Die ukrainische Nationalbewegung vor 1914.
Vol. 49, no. 2 (2001) of *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*.
Pp.161–324.

This special issue of *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, including primarily papers given at a conference at the Central European University in Budapest in 1999, appears to deal with the most traditional of Ukrainian historical topics—the Ukrainian national movement of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet, the innovative articles it

contains show that a younger generation of historians from Germany and Ukraine are applying newer concepts and methods of nationality studies to the topic and that much remains to be done. The volume also reminds one that the German-speaking countries have once again become a centre of active research in Ukrainian history. The fact that the three Ukrainian and one Russian contributors have chosen to write in English demonstrates the dominance of this “world language,” but the three German-language contributions are an indication that scholars in Ukraine and North America should brush up on their German and insist their graduate students gain a real reading knowledge of the language.

To a large degree, the rebirth of Ukrainian historical studies in the German-speaking lands is thanks to the Swiss-born historian Andreas Kappeler, formerly professor at the University of Cologne and now at the University of Vienna. He edits this volume and provides a contextual introduction. He may be exaggerating somewhat when he sees the Western research on Ukrainian nationalism and national movements as limited and confined largely to Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine (indeed the work of Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky, whom I assume Kappeler meant instead of the Ukrainian linguist Jaroslav Rudnytsky [Rudnyckyj], dealt considerably with the Ukrainian national movement in the Russian Empire). Still, one can agree that the Ukrainian case has not been fully integrated into discussions of East Central European movements, as its omission in Myroslav Hroch’s groundbreaking study testifies, although here we know the reason was the mandate of Czech censors. Kappeler sees the work of the early 1990s in Ukraine as a reaffirmation of Ukrainian nationhood and even a reintroduction of national myths. He places nationality studies as best developed in Lviv and sees the 1996 Kyiv monograph of the Lviv historian Yaroslav Hrytsak, *Narys istorii Ukrayiny: Formuvannia modernoi ukrains'koi natsii XIX–XX stolittia*, as a sign of the entry of Ukrainian scholarship into the general discussion of nationalism. He is pleased that the studies printed here are fully part of new discussions on multiple identities and nation-building projects, and looks forward to a time when historians in Ukraine will expand their research interests beyond the national question, so understandably central after decades of Soviet oppression, to topics in social, family, gender, everyday, and cultural history.

Yaroslav Hrytsak opens the issue with a tantalizing study on the employment of first names to construct Galician Ukrainian historical memory between 1830 and the 1930s. The topic is hardly a new one, since the taking of Slavic names by the Ruthenian Triad in the 1830s is a landmark event in the Ukrainian national revival in Galicia. Hrytsak has given us much more by examining naming practices and the mechanisms by which princely names (especially Volodymyr, Iaroslav, and Olha) and names of national heroes (Bohdan, Taras, Nestor) came to be propagated by the national movement and spread out from the cities and intelligentsia to the villages and peasantry. He ranges widely in a article based on preliminary and scattered evidence. He even discusses naming practices in the medieval and early modern period, making him the only author who looks for connections between the nineteenth century and early periods, a needed practice even if the answer is negative. He might well have taken more care in delineating the relative importance of the Ukrainian national-populists, as opposed to the Old Ruthenians and Russophiles, in popularizing the princely names.

More attention to the Russophiles, or Muscophiles, is just what Anna Veronika Wendland calls for in her German-language programmatic piece, “The Return of the Russophiles to Ukrainian History.” Based on her dissertation research soon to appear as

a monograph, the article describes the Russophile ideology and identity as an indigenous Galician phenomenon. Wendland discusses organizational and political activities that mobilized a considerable part of the Galician Ukrainian populace in the nineteenth century. She places the movement in the context of the policies of the Austrian and Russian empires. In demonstrating that the “Russia” the Russophiles paid attention to was primarily eastern Ukraine and that at the grassroots level Ukrainian populists and Russophiles often co-operated, she sheds new light on the process of Ukrainian nation building. One might have hoped for more attention being paid to the relationship of the Russophiles with the Greek Catholic Church and to their early twentieth-century activities when the “New Course” turned to outright Russian identity and an alliance with Polish forces, but these issues may well be treated more fully in her forthcoming monograph.

Ostap Sereda focuses specifically on the question of public debates about identity, concentrating on the 1860s. He uses the concept of public sphere to show how political and social changes in Galicia and the Habsburg monarchy resulted in the question of Ruthenian identity being debated in the press and in the Galician Diet. His piece is of particular interest in demonstrating the role of Polish institutions and the political and cultural Poles of Ruthenian origin (*gente Rutheni, natione Poloni*) in defining Ruthenian identity and in initiating the contest for the modernization of the identity of the Ukrainian peasantry. The Galician section of the issue closes with Torsten Wehrhan’s piece on the relation of nationalism and socialism in the early twentieth-century student organization Young Ukraine (Moloda Ukraina). He brings out the distinction of the more national emphasis of members such as Lohyn Tschelsky and the greater socialist emphasis of members such as Volodymyr Starosolsky and Ievhen Kosevych. His discussion of the rejection of “Ruthenianism” by this organization should serve as the basis for a comparative discussion with the “New Course” of the Russophiles some years later.

With Serhy Yekelchyk’s article on constructing a Ukrainian higher culture in the Russian Empire the focus moves to eastern Ukraine. Through discussion of novels, drama, and opera he reminds us that Ukrainian cultural activity was viewed as a political act both by the actors and the Russian imperial authorities, who sought to impede it. In a certain way, the Russian authorities were “imagining Ukraine” when they, as the article tells us, banned Ukrainian-language plays in Kyiv but not in Moscow, asserting “there it is only theatre, and here it is politics.”

Especially original is the contribution of Ricarda Vulpius on the question of the role of the clergy in the Ukrainian nation. She compares the relatively well-known and very important role of the Greek Catholic clergy in Galicia with her own research on the role of the Orthodox clergy in the Russian Empire. She examines the split of Orthodox clergy in Dnipro Ukraine into “Russophile” and “Ukrainophile” wings on the basis of a subtle analysis of the church press, meetings, and socio-political activities. She also mentions a third camp, which sought to maintain a strong Ukrainian regional identity under the umbrella of a Russian national identity, though here one must question whether repression may have made this alternative the politics of the possible in the Russian Empire. Vulpius goes far toward explaining, how in periods of opportunity after the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, Ukrainian activists emerged from the clergy so quickly. Her argument that this identity always existed and did not have to be invented anew might benefit from an examination of the identity and customs of the clergy extending back into the eighteenth and even seventeenth centuries, which might reveal a specific Ukrainian traditionalism

that outlasted the integration and Russifying policies of the nineteenth-century tsarist regime. One looks forward to an examination of this and other topics, such as the historical vision of the clergy and the place of scholarship in shaping visions of identity and church, in Vulpius's doctoral dissertation.

The issue ends with a stimulating essay by the Russian historian Alexei Miller on shaping Russian and Ukrainian identities in the nineteenth century. In what he terms methodological remarks, he posits that the Russian-Ukrainian encounter of the nineteenth century should be seen as between two nation-building projects: the Ukrainian and the all-Russian. He outlines what he sees as the reasons for the ultimate success of the latter in the twentieth century. In such a schematic piece one can find much missing and unexplained, for which one should turn to Miller's monograph, "*Ukrainskii vopros*" v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii: *Vtoraia polovina XIX v.* (St. Petersburg, 2000). Still, much that is asserted is questionable. Can one refer to the eighteenth century Russification of the Hetmanate's elite as "spontaneous" in view of the Petrine repressions, the ban on Ukrainian versions of church books, and the abolition of the Hetmanate, which Zenon Kohut, whom Miller cites, has shown met considerable resistance? Is it true that Ukrainians were never discriminated against on ethnic grounds in the nineteenth century? Vulpius tell us of the policy of conferring hierarchical positions in the Ukrainian lands on "Great Russians" and even paying Russian clergy a supplement to serve in Ukraine. Also, in explaining the failure of the all-Russian project, should "awkward and counterproductive restrictive measures against the Ukrainian language" be seen as a major factor? Bans on publishing the Bible or permitting primary schools in Ukrainian seem to have greatly impeded the Ukrainian movement. In general, the issue of the repression and self-censorship is given short shrift in the essay. Miller's methodology might benefit from a more rigorous examination of the seventeenth-and eighteenth-century roots of the Ukrainian and all-Russian projects. Indeed, the very nature of the nineteenth-century all-Russian idea must be fleshed out if it is to be called a project. At the same time, the Little Russian component of it must be examined. It would seem that too little content was permitted any Little Russian identity, thereby furthering the Ukrainian cause.

The reader will find much original research, innovative methodology, and many interesting perspectives in this special issue. Let us hope that *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* will continue the practice of publishing Ukrainian special issues.

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Peter Jordan, et al., eds. *Ukraine: Geographie – Ethnische Struktur – Geschichte – Sprache und Literatur – Kultur – Politik – Bildung – Wirtschaft – Recht.* Vol. 42, nos. 3–4 (2000) of *Österreichische Osthefte*. Frankfurt am Main and Vienna: Peter Lang and Österreichisches Ost-und Südosteuropa-Institut. 843 pp.

The independence of Ukraine is one of the constitutive factors of stability not only of Eastern Europe, but of the whole continent. The Western political class and society at

large do not seem to be particularly conscious of that fact even though a decade has passed since the collapse of the USSR. That is why (nearly) any book on Ukraine that overcomes the Russocentric perspective and is scientific without being addressed to a small circle of specialists is welcome.

This book was published as a special edition of the quarterly *Österreichische Osthefte*, a journal that has been published for over forty years by the state-run Austrian Institute of Eastern and Southeastern European Studies in Vienna. The aim of this book is to give a multidisciplinary general overview of Ukraine. The years 1995 and 1998 saw similar editions on Croatia and Macedonia respectively, and a volume on Albania is in preparation. The thirty-six articles (four in English and the rest in German) in the volume have been contributed by twelve Austrian, eleven German, eight Ukrainian (from Kyiv and Lviv), four Canadian, one British, and one Romanian scholars. They represent a wide variety of research traditions with somewhat divergent methods, perspectives, and results, even though the objectivity of argumentation was kept up throughout. Although the editors point out that they cannot identify themselves with all the viewpoints represented in the volume, they have not tried to minimize the differences. The book draws its life also from the pluralism of approaches to Ukraine's past and present.

The introductory article by Günter Friedlein of the Institute for Geography (Länderkunde) in Leipzig outlines the geography of Ukraine. Leonid Rudenko, professor at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NANU) in Kyiv, illustrates the enormous environmental problems of Ukraine, which cannot be reduced to the consequences of the 1986 disaster at the nuclear-power station in Chornobyl. Peter Jordan of the Austrian Institute of Eastern and Southeastern European Studies, in a detailed and informative paper, analyzes the evolution of the ethnic structure of Ukraine based on the 1959 and 1989 Soviet censuses. After 1989 one has to rely on estimates. Jordan says that by 1997 the percentage of Ukrainians rose to 75 percent (from 72.7 percent in 1989) owing to returnees from other former Soviet republics (p. 63). He also explains the significance of the most important minorities (Russians, Jews, Moldovans or Romanians, Belarusians, Bulgarians, Poles, Hungarians, Greeks, Crimean Tatars, and Gagauz). Ulrich Göttke-Krogmann's (Vienna) contribution on the Hutsuls of western Ukraine, who are practically unknown in the West outside scholarly circles, has a special appeal.

The three articles in the next section treat problems of Ukrainian historiography. According to the intention of the editors, they should critically analyze traditions and myths of Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish national historiography. Stephen Velychenko (Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Toronto) writes about "Rival Grand Narratives of National History: Russian/Soviet, Polish and Ukrainian Accounts of Ukraine's Past (1772–1991)," and Frank E. Sysyn (Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies), about Bohdan Khmelnytsky's image in Ukrainian historiography since independence. The Swiss professor Andreas Kappeler, one of the best known historians (focused on nationalities) of Eastern Europe in the German-speaking countries and currently holder of the Chair for Eastern European History at the University of Vienna, is a co-editor of this book. In his contribution he advocates the convincing thesis that before 1945 interest in Ukraine was heightened in Austria and Germany only when it was believed that she could be exploited economically or politically (p.164). Thereafter German-speaking historians of Eastern Europe were less interested in Ukraine until the revival of the Ukrainian national movement at the end of the 1980s.

The largest section of the book is devoted to Ukrainian history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It comprises nine articles. The work by Professor Yurii Shapoval of the NANU on the Soviet secret police and its terror regime is especially noteworthy. In his article “Battlefield of Totalitarian Dictatorships,” Dieter Pohl (Institute for Contemporary History, Munich) illuminates the darkest period in the history of Ukraine, the Second World War. He examines, among other issues, collaboration with and resistance against the Germans. It is generally known that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) had a significant share in both phenomena. His assessment of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is negative, but he is hardly interested in its resistance to the return of Soviet power to western Ukraine, which lasted until the 1950s (p. 375). A negative judgement of the UPA is also given by Kathrin Boeckh (Institute for Eastern Europe, Munich) in her survey of the period between 1945 and 1991 (p. 368), even though she states (referring to Shapoval) that from the 1920s to the 1950s Stalinism cost Ukrainians about ten million lives (including the victims of the famine in the 1930s) (p. 375).

A separate section is dedicated to the regions that have formed in the course of history due to different areas of power and culture on the territory of what is now Ukraine. Case studies are presented of Galicia (Anna Veronika Wendland, Geisteswissenschaftliches Zentrum/History and Culture of Central Europe, Leipzig), Transcarpathia (Paul Robert Magocsi, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Toronto), and Crimea (Gwendolyn Sasse, London School of Economics and Political Science). It is regrettable that not a single oblast in eastern Ukraine is portrayed, because this would have enabled a direct comparison with the western oblasts.

The development of the Ukrainian language and literature is described in seven contributions. The Ukrainization policy of the 1920s is discussed by several authors. Professor Julianne Besters-Dilger, who holds the Chair of Slavic Languages at the University of Vienna, analyzes the current language situation in Ukraine and stresses that the “bilingualism” officially advocated in the USSR from the time Nikita Khrushchev came to power clearly favoured ethnic Russians: while the non-Russian peoples had to learn Russian, the Russians living in the Union republics did not have to master the languages of the titular nations (p. 499). In her opinion, the “equality” of Ukrainian and Russian demanded by many Russians living in independent Ukraine would “most likely restore the old dominance of the Russian language” (p. 505).

Yaroslav Hrytsak of the Institute of History at Lviv University draws a contradictory conclusion in his outstanding paper on Ukrainian nation building: “The Ukrainian identity is not dominant, but at the same time it is most widespread of all the possible identities” in Ukraine (p. 208). This contribution is complemented by parts of a study based on a poll of 1,200 people, titled “Ukraine between East and West: Collective Memory and Political Orientation towards the Future of the Population,” by two demographers of the Humboldt University (Berlin), Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger. They analyze select problems of state and nation building and of historical memory and orientation towards the future during the post-Soviet transformation process. Their diagnosis is that Ukraine is a “nation-state in the making” (p. 718). Their empirical results clearly document the well-known differences between the national-democratic and pro-West western Ukraine and the pro-Russian (or even pro-Soviet) southern and eastern regions, where the majority of the population lives. Correspondingly, the assimilation of the Ukrainians to the Russian language and culture is greatest in the south and east. It does not play a significant role

in the west and in the centre of the country. This result apparently contradicts the statement the authors make a few pages before that Russian and Ukrainian culture and traditions are not clearly distinguishable (cf. pp. 717 and 712). In addition, the two authors first count three administrative territories with a Russian majority, but eventually they reduce this (correctly) to one, namely, Crimea (pp. 714, 717).

The editors give special attention to the developments in Ukraine since independence. Alexander Ott (Berlin) examines domestic politics, while Olga Alexandrova (German Institute for International Politics and Security, Berlin) deals with foreign affairs. She rightly criticizes the West for underestimating Ukraine's importance (p. 707). Other articles focus on the economy, education, the constitution, the rule of law (an area that is not well-developed), theatre, and music in Ukraine.

Taisija Sydorchuk's (Lviv) well-written contribution deals with Ukrainians in Vienna from the end of the eighteenth century to the 1920s. One would have liked to see an article on the important diaspora in North America. More importantly, the famine at the beginning of the 1930s, which was undoubtedly a decisive event with lasting effects in Ukrainian history, does not get separate treatment, but is dealt with in the space of two pages, almost *en passant*, in the article "Soviet Ukraine between the World Wars." Its author, Benedikt Praxenthaler (an archivist at the German Federal Archives, Koblenz), estimates that four million to six million people (Shapoval mentions three million to four million, p. 338) were killed by the famine, but denies that this was genocide on the part of the Soviet leadership (pp. 309–10). The article "The Jews in Ukrainian History" by Alexis Hofmeister (Institute for Jewish History and Culture, Leipzig) covers only the time before the Soviet regime extended its power to Ukraine. Thus the Holocaust during the Second World War is not covered. Pohl tackles this question, but only briefly (pp. 348–9).

Most of the contributors have used sources in the Ukrainian language, which is hardly a matter of course for Western analysts of Ukraine. Shapoval supports his theses with research in archives, and Sydorchuk and Sasse refer to archival material. The numerous maps, drawings, and tables (especially in Jordan's and Münz and Ohliger's contributions) enrich this volume. The articles on the Hutsuls and on architecture even contain photographs. An index of personal and geographical names makes use of this voluminous work easier.

All in all, this volume is an excellent introduction for students of Eastern European history, Slavic languages, and political sciences, as well as anyone else who wishes to get a sound knowledge of Ukraine. For more detailed information one has to go to specialized literature, but this collection is a good starting point. It has fulfilled its aim of promoting understanding in the West of the *terra incognita* Ukraine in the West and encouraging the study of Ukraine.

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Marta Dyczok. *Ukraine: Movement without Change, Change without Movement*. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000. xx, 164 pp.

This book is a sketch of Ukraine since 1991. It is part of a series that seeks to provide general overviews of developments in a number of post-Communist states and nations after the collapse of the Soviet Union—Belarus, Armenia, Poland, Kyrgyzstan, and so forth. It employs a basic format—introduction and historical background sketches of political, economic, social, and cultural developments and foreign policy and issues of particular concern—that allows for a straightforward discussion and analysis (without employing theoretical frameworks or developmental models) and affords a basis for comparative study.

Within these parameters, Dr. Dyczok, an assistant professor of history and political science at the University of Western Ontario who, in the early 1990s, spent half a decade in Ukraine while finishing her graduate work at Oxford University, does quite well. Her work provides us with succinct and insightful sketches, which give a well-rounded introduction to Ukraine in its formative years after independence. It is not, nor is it meant to be, ground-breaking material. Dyczok covers most of the bases competently (although I would have liked more discussion about how President Leonid Kravchuk co-opted much of the “democratic opposition,” and, I am sure, many readers will also have a particular topic or theme they wish had been dealt with more thoroughly), and in some areas she positively shines.

The author adds brief touches that bring abstract concepts into sharper focus. For example, she underlines Ukraine’s initial lack of human resources in dealing with complex economic matters by noting that “when [Ukraine] declared independence there was not one economist in the country who had a Ph.D. in economics from a Western university” (p. 71). In a similar vein, she notes that Ukraine’s energy woes can be in part be attributed to inefficiencies and cites as an example the fact that apartments are not equipped with thermostats to regulate temperature and hence are often unnecessarily overheated (p. 75).

My major criticism of the book is that it reads as though it was hastily written. One encounters bouts of awkward prose, the same point(s) being repeated in different chapters, and some factual errors and inconsistencies. The publisher must bear at least part of the blame for this. It is obvious from the text that the manuscript was submitted in 1997, yet the book did not appear until late 2000. This allowed more than enough time for a thorough copy-edit, which is not evident here. Conversely, the publisher might have afforded the author more time to polish up the manuscript. There is the added factor that such a long turnaround time on a book about contemporary developments in Ukraine (or elsewhere, for that matter) can render the material somewhat dated by the time it appears in print. That certainly appears to be the case here.

There are three minor points. The first involves the occasional lapse in Ukrainian and Russian name forms. Dyczok has obviously gone out of her way to present Ukrainian personal and place names based on their original Ukrainian forms. Yet, the Donbas region is rendered from its Russian form as “Donbass,” and Hetman Ivan Mazepa is given as “Mazeppa.” I raise this matter not as a criticism, but rather to underline the difficulties faced by authors seeking to render names from their original Ukrainian forms. In spite of

their best intentions, they still face a situation in which the common English forms are usually rendered from Russian as well as a Ukrainian orthography that, over time, has adopted certain Russianisms as a standard. That said, there is also the pitfall of Ukrainianizing Russian names, in this case having Boris Nemtsov appear as "Borys." The second point concerns the degree of oversimplification that can be accommodated within a brief sketch. Here I would point to the fact that Dyczok's treatment of culture (pp. 100–2) cites material shortage and Western pop culture as the greatest "challenges" facing contemporary Ukrainian culture, yet she ignores the ubiquitous presence of Russian and Russian-language cultural products in Ukraine. Finally, the theme of the book's wonderful subtitle, "movement without change, change without movement," regrettably is not developed at all within the text.

Ultimately we are left with a useful, albeit hurried, sketch of Ukraine's development from 1991 to 1997. In many ways it has been superseded by events since that time. Not surprisingly, it has a distinctly optimistic tone that is somewhat at odds with current assessments of Ukraine. After all, in 1997, when the manuscript was completed, there seemed to be good reason for optimism about Ukraine: the country had achieved macroeconomic stabilization; it had finally resolved some acrimonious disagreements with Russia and Romania and signed basic treaties with all its neighbouring states; it had recently adopted a Western-style constitution; it had passed its "first test" of democracy with the peaceful transfer of executive power during the 1994 presidential elections; and throughout it had managed to maintain social peace. Dyczok has provided a good overview of this period, and we look forward to more from her in the future.

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Myroslaw Tataryn. *Christian Churches in the New Ukraine*. Homeland Series No. 3. Series editor Bohdan S. Kordan. Saskatoon: Heritage Press and Prairie Centre for the Study of Ukrainian Heritage, 2001. 48 pp.

The annual Mohyla lectures are devoted to the Ukrainian heritage and current affairs. This slim volume presents the 1996 Mohyla lecture delivered by the Rev. Dr. Myroslaw Tataryn on October 25 of that year at St. Thomas More College, University of Saskatchewan, where he serves as associate professor and chair of the Department of Religious Studies.

The principal theme of Tataryn's lecture is the tension between Western religious pluralism and the Byzantine model of *symponia* of church and state. He does not, however, define *symponia* or discuss the problematic nature of such church-state harmony. Thus, in summarizing the history of Kyivan Christianity, he simply states that "The Kyivan period, in effect, marks the apparent reality of the Byzantine *symponia* between church and state" (p. 10). When, in the next sentence, he remarks that even in the Lithuanian and Polish-Lithuanian periods "the harmony of church and people" (quite a different matter) was sustained, one is not sure whether he has digressed or whether "the people" are an element of *symponia*. Further on, he speaks of the failure of the 1596

Union of Brest “to maintain the traditional relationship between the Church, the leading classes of society as well as the state—but in a radically different form” (p. 12). Here again it is not altogether clear whether the *symponia* of church and state necessarily entails a harmony of church and people or of any particular classes of society. Despite the failure of the Union of Brest, Tataryn finds continuity in the attempt of both the pro-Union and the anti-Union forces to win and maintain the support of the Polish-Lithuanian state. He considers the Orthodox metropolitan Petro Mohyla, the namesake of these lectures, an embodiment of *symponia* (pp. 12–13). In the absence of a definition, however, it is difficult to evaluate this claim.

Turning to the western Ukrainian territories that passed under Austrian rule in 1772, the author asserts that for the Greek Catholic Church “the state was not in any way to be regarded as a ‘protector’” (p. 14). This debatable proposition deserves some explanation. More convincing is his assertion that the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church of the 1920s continued the tradition of church-state unity (p. 15). In a longer lecture or article, Dr. Tataryn would presumably elaborate how the *symponia* between church and state developed over the centuries as these two institutions themselves evolved from Kyivan Rus' through the Cossack era and into the modern age. It is puzzling, however, that he summarily characterizes Christianity in Soviet Ukraine as “controlled, officially sanctioned and in no way nationally self-conscious” (p. 16) without at least acknowledging the possibility that the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church represented a Russian variant of *symponia*. Indeed, it could be argued that the Russian church in Ukraine was very much “nationally self-conscious” in that it promoted Russian nationalism.

Passing to the late 1980s, Tataryn makes the puzzling assertion that “not since the time of Kyivan Rus' had Christians in Ukraine been able to say that their state was effectively run by co-religionists” (p. 19). Yet his underlying point is true and important: Ukrainian Christians were quite unprepared for religious liberty. Although the chronology of events on the succeeding two pages reverses the rebirth of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches (an error correctible by the simple insertion of a pluperfect verb on page 21, line 8), the author succeeds admirably in condensing a flurry of historic events into just a few pages.

Particularly valuable is Tataryn's snapshot of religious life in Ukraine in the mid-1990s. It is significant, for example, that the heaviest concentration of membership in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is not in the eastern oblasts of Ukraine, but in Vinnytsia, Volynia, Transcarpathia, Rivne, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts. Similarly, and despite its ideological roots in central and eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church finds eighty-three percent of its members in Lviv oblast. This may herald new directions in Ukrainian Orthodoxy, but it also sets the stage for considerable religious conflict west of the Dnipro River. Although it is the Greek Catholic Church that predominates in much of that territory, the most significant tensions are among the Orthodox. Not least among the factors in these conflicts, it would seem, is the value of western Ukraine as a source of church income.

Catholic-Orthodox tension remained high in the 1990s and has not altogether abated. The outrage of the Orthodox Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) at the June 1996 installation of a Greek Catholic exarch in the Ukrainian capital has only been exacerbated by the recent announcement by the latter churchman, now Major Archbishop Liubomyr

Cardinal Husar, that his church's center will be moved from Lviv to Kyiv. Metropolitan Volodymyr's assertion of "canonically Orthodox territory" (p. 32) continues to bode ill for ecumenical relations. Yet Tataryn does offer a ray of ecumenical hope, pointing out that Volodymyr has not ruled out the possibility of eventual autocephaly for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Independence from Moscow is the prerequisite for a union of Ukraine's three Orthodox churches, which in turn would make possible a serious ecumenical rapprochement with the Greek Catholics.

In the succeeding pages, Tataryn ably traces the muddled recent history of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, including the sometimes bizarre attempts by the "non-canonical" churches to gain recognition in places like Bulgaria and Pakistan. He then mentions some of the issues vexing the Greek Catholics, such as the role of diaspora bishops, ecumenism, lay participation, the twin legacy of Byzantine and Latin ecclesiastical culture, and the tension between the "catacomb" clergy and those who returned from Russian Orthodoxy. Tataryn ends this discussion in a positive key in light of the 1996 Constitution and the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches. Events have vindicated his hopes for the latter.

In his conclusion, the author returns to the questions of Ukrainian Orthodox unity and Orthodox-Greek Catholic unification, pointing out the importance of relations between the diaspora and the "Mother Church" of Constantinople. He also demonstrates the precedential value of the Estonian Orthodox "schism," which may show the way for the Ukrainian Orthodox to obtain autocephaly from Constantinople rather than Moscow. He concludes on a note of ecumenical optimism.

In a lecture centred on the ideas of pluralism and church-state relations, one would expect some discussion of the 23 April 1991 Ukrainian Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations. More understandable is the scant attention paid to the Constitution of 28 June 1996, which contains important articles on religious liberty (pp. 40–1): Dr. Tataryn's lecture was delivered less than four months later. If, however, the theme of Western-style pluralism and Byzantine *symphonia* is taken merely as a loose organizational principle for this wide-ranging discussion, then these objections will appear petty. One cannot, after all, expect a single lecture, in a publication of forty-odd pages, to cover all aspects of Ukraine's church-state relations while providing a comprehensive view of her Christian communities.

Yet, the brevity of this book is among its virtues. Although it can offer little that is new to the specialist, it is ideal for the business executive, diplomat, or professional person reluctant to take on a full-length monograph on the Ukrainian churches but willing to spend an hour or so getting a grasp of the subject.

While the editing is less than impeccable, the publishers are to be complimented on the dignified and imaginative graphic design.

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Wsevolod W. Isajiw. *Understanding Diversity: Race and Ethnicity in the Canadian Context*. Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing, 1999. 272 pp.

Apparently intended—too modestly—as a text for university courses on ethnicity, Isajiw's remarkable book makes clear why it is said that basic courses should not be entrusted to junior faculty. This comprehensive treatment of the subject combines erudition, analytical depth, and awareness of the societal importance of the problematics addressed, with considerable theoretical sophistication thrown in as a bonus.

For readers of Ukrainian ethnicity, the book holds out several lines of interest. The history of Ukrainians in Canada is an important part of the history of Canada itself. It also serves to illustrate the odyssey traversed by most Canadian immigrant groups: from a looked-down-upon minority to one of the established ethnic groups outside the Anglo-French tandem. Finally, the Ukrainian-Canadian experience reflects and shows in full relief the forces that act upon allophone groups (those that do not speak the dominant language) and the myriad connections between these groups' cultures, actions, and collective adjustment patterns and the cultural sensibilities and pressures of the dominant population, its needs for social and economic integration, as well as the shifting policy reactions of the government.

Isajiw's commitment as a sociologist to generalization leaves little room for focusing on any one ethnic group in a descriptive, historical way. Yet his treatment of such topics as stereotyping and culture and identity retention, and his analysis of the problems of ethnic organizations or of the status of political refugees, all suggest thorough familiarity with both the fortunes of the Ukrainian-Canadian community and the specifics of Ukrainian ethnicity *per se*.

The study may be viewed either as a sociological interpretation of ethnic-group relations in Canada or, alternatively, as a conceptualization and analysis of diversity in general that uses the Canadian case for its empirical referents. The latter is the author's avowed purpose. In the introduction and the first chapter he lays out his analytical framework. This includes the concepts, theoretical approaches, and problematics of the field. His definitions of terms at times depart from conventional usage or go beyond it. Thus he chooses "incorporation," carefully separating its social-structural, cultural, and psychological or identity aspects over the traditional, somewhat fuzzy "assimilation." This introduces what is analytically a refinement of Milton Gordon's well-known formulation of racial and ethnic group relations; at the same time, it is of a piece with his own definition of ethnic group, and this makes things simpler all around. Somewhat surprisingly, he opts for "majority group" even though "dominant" is preferable, since it not only has a good lineage but is directly linked to power (the discussion on p. 111 clamours for it!) and, most importantly, avoids confusion with numbers.

Isajiw's notion of ethnic group is not only well-reasoned and up-to-date, but especially relevant to the Ukrainian experience, emphasizing the crucial role of ethnic enculturation, endogamy, and individual involvement in organized ethnicity beyond the family context. His discussion of the double boundary delineating ethnic groups is a classic contribution to the field, and so is his analysis of the intersection of ethnic political power and nationalism.

The author offers a useful summary of a range of theoretical approaches to ethnicity, wisely deciding not to commit himself exclusively to any one of them. Instead, he shows how each perspective sheds light on a particular aspect of inter-group relations; for example, competition and conflict, minorities' contribution to society, and ethnic identity as a matter of *meaning* that every group, or even every generation within it, has to construct for itself. Isajiw's own approach is firmly rooted in the sociological tradition. His constant concern with cultural consensus reminds us of the need to heed the legacy of Émile Durkheim, both in theory and in today's world. His analysis of ethnic stratification bears the imprint of Max Weber, as does his conviction that scientific generalization about human affairs must still deal with the historical uniqueness of situations. His preoccupation with power as the ultimate object of desire is akin to Ralf Dahrendorf's variation on the theme developed by Karl Marx. One of the major theoretical problems he formulates encompasses interrelations between globalization and cultural or ethnic diversity. Another set of problems concerns the impact of economic development on Canada's immigration policy (in response to changing demand for certain types of workers) and on stratification between and within ethnic groups (via occupational distribution). While attending to theoretical problems, Isajiw directs the reader to the large societal problem areas arising from ethnic diversity both for the groups involved and for the Canadian social system—the former focusing on the allocation of opportunities and rewards, the latter on inter-group solidarity in the interest of overall integration.

In chapter two, guided by the idea that the "ethnic phenomenon" can only be understood when group relations are placed in their structural and historical contexts, Isajiw shows how the socio-economic characteristics of Canadian society generated by industrial urbanization have influenced the destinies of ethnic groups and their relations to each other and to the larger whole. Dwelling on the place of diversity in Canada's development, he points out that the government and other major institutions have been patient with pluralism, but he has no doubt that diversity was tolerated rather than accepted and that the ultimate goal was assimilation. The chapter also contains a detailed description of the ethnic composition of the Canadian population, showing Ukrainian Canadians currently as the sixth largest ethnic group (slightly edged out by Italians only in the last decade).

Chapter three offers a survey of types of international migration, focusing on those with the greatest demographic and socio-economic significance. Isajiw's typology revolves around two underlying variables: intent behind the migration ("push" versus "pull"), which, in turn, is likely to affect the degree of permanence, and the immigrants' initial relation to the native population (superordinate, subordinate). The discussion is accompanied by statistical data on political refugees, exiles, and displaced persons, which should be of particular interest to readers of Ukrainian background, as Ukrainians constituted one of the largest groups of such immigrants after the Second World War.

In what may be the most trenchant elaboration in the book, chapter four explores the social and psychological processes involved in immigrant adjustment, providing uncommonly insightful analyses of culture shock, family transformation (status of women, parent-adolescent relations), and the special problems of political refugees, such as downward occupational mobility. Isajiw is one of the few writers who specifically targets the phenomenon of status dislocation, including the often painful adjustment attempts of *déclassé* immigrants.

The fifth chapter is devoted to ethnic stratification. Isajiw sees this dynamically—as a result of differential rates of social incorporation for different ethnic groups, with the dominant one using its powers to open or limit job and other mobility opportunities for specific minorities. Apart from this obvious control mechanism, he identifies “structural discrimination,” which, although latent and not aimed directly against individuals, is nevertheless very effective: in a competitive situation, one finds oneself outside of common networks (and thus, for example, will not find out about employment opportunities) and without group support. A group’s ethnic status is determined not only by opportunity structures and dominant decisions, but also by its own values, organized strength and, of course, the qualifications of its members. Comparative measurement in this area is a methodological challenge, and it is refreshing to see a modern sociologist like Isajiw demonstrate the abiding usefulness of Emory Bogardus’s “social distance scale.”

Chapter six offers a hard-hitting yet sophisticated analysis of the social and psychological mechanisms that support and help perpetuate prejudice. After an overview of various explanations of the origins of prejudice, the author emphasizes its impact on all parties involved and ultimately on society itself. Of overriding practical significance is the possibility that group ideology will supply justification for prejudice (as in racism) which then serves as a basis for social policy. Isajiw presents some suggestions for reducing prejudice, focusing on the importance of increasing contact among groups, particularly under conditions of mutual functional dependence. In terms of the Canadian experience, gender is cited as an added factor that has compounded ethno-racial prejudice. Here one must note, however, that, even before changes in the perception of women became noticeable, minority women have often contributed to their group’s incorporation into Canadian society. Ukrainian women, in particular, were able to give the lie to the stereotype of the passive immigrant female, as Frances Swyripa has shown convincingly.

Having previously noted the structural incorporation of minority groups, Isajiw turns to questions of culture and identity. It is here that he makes his most distinctive contribution to our understanding of the processes, competing pressures, and multi-dimensional changes that shape the consciousness and the social behaviour of “hyphenated” Canadians. Both chapter seven, devoted to enculturation (including language) and identity transformation, and chapter eight contain innovative thinking on these subjects, much of it based on the author’s own research. The discussion of identity and its perceptions in continuity and change is especially sensitive and broad-based. Use of the concept of commitment as a pivotal concern enables Isajiw not only to reveal the ultimate dynamics of incorporation, but also to provide a theoretical foundation for pulling together the social-structural, cultural, and psychological dimensions of the process.

Unlike most writers, who focus on assimilation and accord only token recognition to various groups’ attempts at resisting or postponing it, Isajiw reserves chapter eight entirely for ethnic-identity retention, a theme especially relevant to Ukrainians, who have proved to be one of the most stubbornly retentionist groups throughout their diaspora. It is necessarily the second generation that is subjected most directly to the conflicting desires for, and demands of, assimilation and retention—“living in two worlds.” The author identifies several patterns of adjustment to marginality, partly reminiscent of the alternatives outlined by W. L. Warner; calling them “strategies” is too strong, since in many cases the individual simply “winds up” enacting this or that pattern without a

deliberate decision. The fact that assimilating or resisting is not entirely up to the person is brought home forcefully by the author's enumeration of factors favouring retention: most of them are structural features of either the ethnic community or Canadian society.

Chapter nine takes a close-up view of inter-ethnic relations, predictably focusing on political questions—who gets what, when, and how—to recall Harold Lasswell's classical formula. Aside from the attainment of specific limited goals, a group's long-term progress is charted mainly in terms of changes in occupational distribution, tending towards increasingly remunerative and prestigious positions. The author shows the crucial part minority leadership and organizational effectiveness play and distinguishes between instrumental and expressive functions (an emphasis on the latter limits a group's external impact). Since inter-ethnic politics frequently boil down to conflicts over issues, and diversity means that each group tries to call attention to its own, "issue legitimacy" becomes crucial: turning a minority issue into a Canadian one is the first step toward successful resolution (which so far has eluded Ukrainian Canadians who seek recognition of the wartime internment of their co-ethnics). This underscores the strategic role of the media, which can lend support or withhold it. Some of the points made in the chapter are illustrated with two case studies, the French in Quebec and the aboriginal peoples.

In the final chapter Isajiw looks at ethnicity from the vantage point of society as an entity, posing the problem of the functions of diversity for national integration: how does Canada manage to survive as *a whole*? The focus here is on the organized political initiatives of the state. In striving to harness immigrant energies to the work of society, the government has tried to balance the human rights of minorities against the need to ensure a modicum of societal and cultural coherence. Given the history of shifting official decisions, the policy of multiculturalism, a uniquely Canadian product, is singled out for detailed critical discussion. The volume ends with all too brief a sketch of what the author considers the master route to be taken if inter-ethnic co-operation and societal unity are to be achieved and maintained: resolving problems by negotiation, which presupposes identity recognition, that is, acceptance of all groups as equal participants in an ongoing discourse guided by humanistic principles. This, in turn, requires considerable knowledge of both the historical and cultural uniqueness of specific groups and the workings of ethnicity.

Some of the book's obvious merits derive from the author's pedagogical thoroughness: careful definition of terms; compact, lucid exposition and incorporation of outside materials into the main line of discussion; abundant examples; and effective use of insets, particularly the "key issues" page in each chapter. The same thoroughness leads him to warn the reader against making facile assumptions; for example, he points out that the loss of ethnic identity does not automatically entail acquisition of mainstream identity, just as retention is not necessarily incompatible with assimilation.

A unique virtue of Isajiw's work is his inherent perspicacity in detecting and articulating connections apparently overlooked by others. Thus he notes that as globalization asserts itself alongside growing diversity within societies, human-rights concerns become a common denominator cutting across very dissimilar cultures (p. 242). Elsewhere he identifies the historical link between the search for identity, which he sees as a major socio-historic moving force, and emerging nationalism (p. 204). His deconstruction of as many as eight "layers" of today's Canadian culture constitutes not

only astute analysis, but a methodological tool that will be invaluable to Ukrainian-heritage social scientists studying contemporary culture, especially to those in Ukraine.

At times Isajiw's reluctance to leave anything unsaid results in a plethora of information that may exceed the needs of his main argument; for example, the classification of geographical races (p. 21) or some of the dimensions in the taxonomy of ethnic groups (pp. 23–9). The index does not mirror this overabundance of information and needs expansion and revision.

There are a few other minor imperfections. In the section on the measurement of ethnic stratification, the explanation of the "index of dissimilarity" may leave some uncertain as to how it differs from simple "over- and under-representation." The discussion of organizational leadership and effectiveness, although highly informative, is uncharacteristically abstract; some examples would have been helpful. An especially regrettable lapse is the author's failure to develop the distinction between *retention* (observed degree of continuity of culture or identity) and *retentionism*, either as individual attitude or group policy, which in many cases influences individual behaviour.

These cases, however, are neither numerous nor serious enough to affect the overall impression of solidity. If there is a danger in this, it is that of overwhelming the reader with the sheer density and breadth of knowledge. The author's arguments are so transparently reasoned, convincingly presented, and well documented that the reader may be tempted to take some of the generalizations that apply specifically to the North American or the Canadian situation as universal.

The volume, beginning with the cover design, is attractive. Considering the amount of use it is likely to get, a hard-cover binding would have been appropriate.

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Rostyslav Melnykiv. *Maik Iohansen: Landshafty transformatsii*. Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2000. 156 pp.

Maik Iohansen (1895–1937) is one of the least familiar Ukrainian writers of the twentieth century. He is also one of the most unusual and most interesting writers. He wrote poetry, short stories, novels, essays, screenplays, children's stories, and translations. According to his student and bibliographer, Stepan Kryzhanivsky,¹ Iohansen wrote eight collections of poetry, ten books of prose, and five books of essays. To this should be added four collections of works for children and a series of translations. He also worked as a linguist, participating in the preparation of two dictionaries and publishing two studies of regional dialects. But aside from Mr. Melnykiv, hardly anyone has ever explored this legacy. Perhaps the lack of interest is a result of the foreign surname? No doubt, many a reader enjoying one of Iohansen's tales has assumed that he was reading

1. "Romantyk revoliutsiinoho slova," introduction to *Maik Iohansen: Poezii* (Kyiv: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1989), 19.

a translation of a Scandinavian classic rather than an original work by a Kharkiv-born Ukrainian writer. But that does not explain why the 1989 collection of Iohansen's poetry edited by Kryzhanivsky from which I cite the numbers above is not found in major North American Slavic library collections.

Melnykiv's monograph is an attempt to bring Iohansen's poetry out from this undeserved obscurity. It is part of a larger endeavour by this enthusiast to rescue Iohansen's reputation and all of his works from oblivion. Melnykiv's effort also includes the publication of Iohansen's prose in Ukrainian journals and the recent edition of his selected works². It has also led to the appearance of some of Iohansen's prose on the Internet in the Electronic Library of Ukrainian Literature.

Melnykiv's small monograph consists of a brief introduction and three chapters. The first chapter presents a chronological survey of the development of Iohansen's poetry. In the early 1920s the optimism of the day was directly reflected in a poetic repertoire of ideas focused on what was conceived as the immense benefit that would accrue to society and to literature from the victory of communism. These ideas included a notion of the mechanization of poetic creativity. Properly trained workers were all potential poets. The second period of Iohansen's creativity, according to Melnykiv, was characterized by the influence of Mykola Khvylovych's ideas emphasizing both personal and national individuality. Iohansen's earlier naive notions of proletarian poetry were then replaced by a professional respect for aesthetic categories and creative individuality. In the third and final period of Iohansen's writing, after the official attack on VAPLITE, Melnykiv sees a deliberate attempt by Iohansen to adjust to political circumstances. In order to accommodate the official ideology, Iohansen eliminates all traces of individuality, indeed of humanity, in his poems. This accommodation, unfortunately, did nothing to change Iohansen's inevitable fate as a victim of Stalinist repression.

In the second chapter Melnykiv changes focus from a general political reading of the periods in Iohansen's creativity to a detailed description of the structural-mythological principle he sees governing Iohansen's poetry. Using abundant quotations from numerous cultural, linguistic, and literary theoreticians, including Potebnia, Jung, Foucault, Barthes, Toporov, and Lotman, Melnykiv advances a theory of the linguistic sign or, more specifically, the lexical root as a marker and carrier of cultural myths. Applied to Iohansen's poetry, this approach reveals a reformulation of revolutionary changes as a cosmic creation myth signalled in the very lexemes of the playful surface texture of his verse.

The third chapter focuses on structure in Iohansen's poetry, or, more precisely, on its replacement by a ludic principle of organization implemented on a variety of linguistic levels, from the individual phrase to the work as a whole. In the deliberate but ambiguous appeal to the reader that is inherent in this playfulness, Melnykiv sees numerous parallels with German expressionism, French surrealism, and Ukrainian romanticism. He considers Iohansen an important intellectual precursor of existential thought.

The central focus of Melnykiv's analysis, the lexical and the structural planes of Iohansen's poetry, are certainly on the mark. Every reader of Iohansen, whether of his poetry or his prose, cannot but notice the deliberate eccentricity of Iohansen's vocabulary and the unusual construction of his works. Melnykiv's choice of analytic tools—

2. Maik Iohansen, *Vybrani tvory* (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2001).

mythology, linguistics, history, stylistics—is very diverse and yields varied and disparate results. Readers may well find these results inconclusive and unconvincing. There are simply too many approaches involved to produce a satisfying, unified conclusion. But the subject Melnykiv has attempted to analyze does not yield to simple approaches. His study is certainly deserving of attention and consideration. The characteristics he analyzes are among the important features of Iohansens's poetic individuality. In the general obscurity of Iohansen's poetry, Melnykiv's monograph is, at least for now, one of the very few illuminating guides for the reader.

Maxim Tarnawsky
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Ivan Rusnak. *Ukrainska literatura Kanady i formuvannia natsionalnoi svidomosti kanadskykh ukrainitsiv*. Sniatyn: PrutPrynt and Chernivetskyi derzhavnyi universytet im. Iu. Fedkovycha, 1999. 128 pp.

The author of this slender volume attempts to analyze the development of Ukrainian literature in Canada during the pioneer years prior to 1920. Addressing readers in Ukraine, where until recently only the works of a select few “progressive” Ukrainian-Canadian authors were accessible, he seeks to redress the balance by drawing attention to a broader spectrum of writers. He suggests that Ukrainian literature in Canada emerged primarily as an expression of the grief and sorrow experienced by immigrants in a strange and often inhospitable land and argues that it went through two phases during the pioneer period. Initially, Ukrainian folklore and folksongs, especially the melodies and cadences of the *kolomyika*, exerted a strong influence on the verse, anecdotes, and stories produced by immigrant writers. Within a decade, the emergence of new literary forms, such as the short story and drama, influenced by the realism of Vasyl Stefanyk, Les Martovych, and Ivan Franko, heralded the second phase of Ukrainian pioneer writing in Canada. Although Rusnak repeatedly asserts that Ukrainian literature played an important role in the emergence of Ukrainian national consciousness and the preservation of ethnic identity among the immigrants, he does little to elucidate this assertion, preferring instead to cull pious declarations from the works of Ukrainian-Canadian journalists and on one occasion even invoking Hegel's ruminations on the national spirit and the state.

After preliminary chapters on the emergence of national consciousness among Ukrainian immigrants in Canada and the social and cultural context of Ukrainian immigrant literature, Rusnak devotes one chapter each to poetry, prose, and drama. The chapter on poetry and verse, twice as long as those on prose and drama combined, provides biographical information about and discusses the work of Ivan Zbura, Mykhailo Govda, Sava Chernetsky, Teodor Fedyk, Symon Palamariuk, Dmytro Rarahovsky, Pantaleimon Bozhyk, Stepan Doroshchuk, and Semen Kovbel. Chernetsky, who wrote sonnets as well as satirical verse during the two years he spent in Canada at the turn of the century, and Doroshchuk, better known to social historians (but apparently not to the author) as the editor and publisher of the scurrilous monthly *Tochylo*, are singled out for the lyrical and relatively sophisticated quality of their poetry. The chapter on prose focuses on Chernetsky, Vasyl Kudryk, Apolinarii Novak and Myroslav Stechyshyn, while

the final chapter on drama discusses only the work of Semen Kovbel and Iakiv Maidanyk. Inexplicably, the poetry and prose of Pavlo Krat and the drama of Ivan Bodrug, whose *Ubiinyky* (1905) was one of the most frequently performed Ukrainian plays in Canada prior to 1920, are not even mentioned.

Specialists and students of Ukrainian-Canadian literature and history will find nothing new in the book. It is based exclusively on Ukrainian-language secondary sources written during the 1960s, primarily the works of Oleksa Hai-Holovko, Yar Slavutych, and Michael Marunchak, but also those of Peter Krawchuk, the Ukrainian-Canadian communist publicist whose narrowly ideological approach to literary criticism the author rejects. Only two primary sources—plays by Kovbel and Maidanyk—and not one of the many English-language works on Ukrainian-Canadian history and literature published during the past two decades, are cited in the book. As a result, especially in the preliminary chapters, the author repeats a number of allegations that were challenged and refuted by scholars years ago. The notion, repeatedly belaboured by the author, that Ukrainian immigrants were forced to settle on inferior and heavily forested land by a callous and indifferent Canadian government, is only the most obvious of these. Ukrainian peasant immigrants *preferred* to settle on forested land precisely because access to forests and their natural products had been monopolized by estate owners in Galicia and Bukovyna. And just as often they *chose* to settle on inferior land because they wanted to live in proximity to their countrymen or because they lacked the capital, inventory, and experience to farm the open prairie. In view of the emphasis placed on grief, exploitation, and betrayal as stimuli for Ukrainian writers during these years, the author's failure to integrate the work of social historians into his analysis is an unfortunate omission.

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The Selected Poems of Oleh Lysheha. Translated by Oleh Lysheha and James Brasfield. Cambridge, Mass.: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 1999. xxvii, 121 pp.

With the publication of *The Selected Poems*, Oleh Lysheha joins a small but distinct group of contemporary Ukrainian poets, namely Ivan Drach, Bohdan Boychuk, Lina Kostenko, Ihor Kalynets, Vasyl Holoborodko, Mykola Vorobiov, and Oksana Zabuzhko, who have lived to see their poetry rendered into English and published in the West. Taking into account how rare an event a publication of Ukrainian poetry in English is and how slim Lysheha's overall poetic output has been to date (only one tiny collection, published in Ukraine in 1989), the appearance of this English volume may be viewed as a particularly Herculean accomplishment. Yet, given the uniqueness of his voice and the hauntingly serene qualities of his verse, it is an accomplishment and distinction Lysheha no doubt deserves.

The Selected Poems reveals a poet bound to find the way back home. It is not so much a journey in time and space as it is a passage from one plane of experience to another, a shift from the dimension of "becoming" to that of "being." By the same token, Lysheha's "home" does not entail a mere place of family origin (though we do find

references to his hometown in a number of poems), but becomes a metaphor for the place in which man, as in the phrase from the Eesha Upanishad, “can see all creatures in himself, himself in all creatures.” This metaphysical or even mystical streak of Lysheha’s poetry is so subtle, so free of abstract intimations, so unimposing and embedded in everyday realities, that it comes across as the poet’s utmost solidarity with the entities of the natural world (however insignificant—be it a horseradish, young nettle, a dog) rather than as his quest for the ultimate truth. In the end, the poet’s return home does not imply restoring some kind of a “lost paradise” but finding within himself a new way of looking at things. In “Song 551” he makes it explicit: “Break through, look … / You will see a miraculous world …” (p. 3).

This bilingual edition, elegantly brought forth by the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, represents a successful collaboration between the American poet James Brasfield and the author. Himself a gifted translator of poetry (his translations from Ezra Pound, D. H. Lawrence and Sylvia Plath have been published in *Suchasnist*), Lysheha goes to great lengths to make sure that Robert Frost’s maxim about poetry being lost in translation does not apply to this project. And indeed Brasfield’s polished final versions faithfully capture the movement of Lysheha’s voice with its subtle ironies and colloquial diction. The simplicity, directness, and narrative qualities of the poet’s free verse are well served by English, a language that, by and large, poorly tolerates overly prosodic and baroque syntax. No doubt the most lasting achievement of this collaboration is a text that reads well in English and takes on a life of its own. Not only does Lysheha’s poetic vision come alive on the page, but it seems to suffer little from being exported out of its local idiom. This is a rarity in any translation endeavour.

The Selected Poems consists of three sections, two of which are made up of poems. The first includes eight shorter poems, and the last, four long poems, including the previously published and much acclaimed “Swan.” Unexpectedly (given the title of the book), the middle section is comprised of the play “Friend Li Po, Brother Tu Fu,” subtitled “A Mystery.” Brasfield justified its inclusion by stating that “the play can be read as a long, dramatic prose poem” (p. xxiii). But he also admits that it was Lysheha himself who chose the poems for this collection. Hence one can assume that the decision to include “Friend Li Po, Brother Tu Fu” was Lysheha’s as well. In addition to Brasfield’s introduction, the volume contains an insightful and informative foreword by George G. Grabowicz. Both introductory essays provide the reader with the necessary biographical background and place the author’s poetic evolution within the historical and political context. What could have been avoided, however, is an unnecessary reiteration of details pertaining to Lysheha’s life. For example, in Grabowicz’s foreword we read: “In 1975 Lysheha left the army and returned to Ukraine, settling first in Tys’menytia and then in L’viv, where he worked at various odd jobs” (p. xiii). A few pages later we find in Brasfield: “In 1975, Lysheha returned to L’viv and worked odd jobs. A year later he returned to Tys’menytia, his hometown in the Carpathian region, where he was born in 1949” (p. xxi). Such redundancies and, for that matter, discrepancies (however minor) do stand out in a volume as compact as this one.

The last paragraph of the introduction sheds some light on the collaboration and its inner working. Brasfield concludes: “our collaboration has been a process of finding a way toward recreation” and warns: “fluent bilingual readers will find at times omissions and departures in the translations from the Ukrainian” (p. xxvii). While unwaveringly

literal renderings are never an option for a good translator, the collaborators' warning, perhaps unintentionally, invites a line-by-line comparison with the original. By and large the departures Brasfield alludes to work to Lysheha's advantage. For example, in "Song 551" the opening lines include the twice-entered phrase "byisia holovoiu ob lid," which in the English version is rendered only once. In "Song 352," "Koly vam khochetsia khoch trokhy tepla" becomes in English, "When you crave a bread crumb" (p. 5). In the same poem, a simple "zhar" in the original is turned in translation into the intriguing oxymoron "snowy embers". But there are also solutions (mistranslation?) that are puzzling, given Lysheha's own involvement in the project. It is rather difficult to understand why the line "U Voroni z doroslym synom" becomes in translation: "In the Crow River, a mature sun overhead" ("Father," p. 11). A departure of this kind finds little justification in the context of the poem.

On the whole, however, such liberties are rare, and they do not mar an otherwise excellent rendition. One can only hope that the publication of *The Selected Poems of Oleh Lysheha* is not an isolated event and that it signals the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute's more systematic approach to making available to the English reader the best of what contemporary Ukrainian poetry has to offer.

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Yuri Vynnychuk. *The Windows of Time Frozen and Other Stories*. Translated by Michael M. Naydan, with one translation by Askold Melnyczuk. Edited by Oksana Tatsyak. Lviv: Klasyka Publishers, [2000?]. 272 pp.

Yuri Vynnychuk has played an important role in the development of contemporary Ukrainian literature; hence, he deserves not just recognition for his work, but also introduction to those beyond the Ukrainian community. With the appearance of this collection, people who cannot read Ukrainian have the opportunity to appreciate this iconoclast's vision. For students and teachers of contemporary Ukrainian literature, this collection is a boon. The translation, for the most part, is expertly done, and there are no major mistakes that stand out, although the use of the Polish *kielbasa* instead of garlic sausage or even the Ukrainian term *kovbasa*, which is quite known and acceptable in many regions of Canada, is a touch irksome. But this is a minor point.

The collection draws from a broad sphere of Vynnychuk's work, covering various themes and styles. It is divided into five sections: The Lyrical and Philosophic Imagination, Psychologist of the Human Soul, Fantastic and Alternative Worlds, Black Humor and Satire, and Pulp Erotica. This division is apt, and the works selected for this scheme provide the reader with the opportunity to experience the many different aspects of Vynnychuk's worldview. Unfortunately, the translator and editors do not mention when and where these stories first appeared. This information is important for placing the stories in the proper socio-historical context.

The main problem with this anthology is that the works selected do not survive the test of time. Few of the stories still possess the attraction that they held when they first

appeared. This is not a criticism of the author or the translator. It is just that the situation has changed and people have moved on, and the older stories are no longer contemporary. One exception to this is the story "Max and Me." It still retains its freshness owing to the perversity of its black humour. Most of the other stories do not. Although they have lost their original crispness and spunk, they are important because of the themes and topics Vynnychuk covers. It is surprising how quickly such stories age.

Nevertheless, this is an important collection for students of Ukrainian literature.

Jaroslaw Zurowsky
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In Memoriam: Janusz Radziejowski (1925–2002)

John-Paul Himka

On 10 March 2002 the historian Janusz Radziejowski passed away in Warsaw. He was perhaps best known for his book on the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, published in both Polish (1976) and English (1983).

Janusz Radziejowski was born on 3 June 1925 in Kyiv. His father, Henryk Politur, was politically active in the Polish Socialist Party and later joined the Communist Party of Poland. He emigrated to Soviet Ukraine in 1919 and worked among the Polish minority, becoming a co-founder and vice-director of the Institute of Polish Culture of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Janusz's mother, Jadwiga, was a physician. She was born in Siberia as the granddaughter of an exiled Polish insurgent.

In 1933 Henryk Politur was arrested and sent to a camp in Kazakhstan, on an island in the Caspian Sea. His wife and children (Janusz and Wanda) voluntarily followed him there in the fall of 1934, but were forced to leave in the spring of the following year. They settled not far away, in Guriev (today Atyrau). Janusz told me that as a child he became a favourite of the criminals (*ugolovniki*); he remembered them as friendly but violent. In 1937 Politur was shot. Jadwiga Radziejowska, who continued to work as a physician, also raised the children of her arrested sister-in-law. She died of spotted fever in 1942.

In 1943 Janusz was put to work in a munitions factory, where the conditions were extremely harsh. He readily volunteered for the Polish Armed Forces, which were being formed then in the USSR under the command of General Berling. He fought with Berling's army until it reached Berlin and witnessed many atrocities. In later years he repeatedly told me that even though he himself was not a believer, he felt religion was beneficial in restraining man's bestial impulses. The war taught him that. He received decorations for his service at the front, including Crosses of Valour. He did not have a high opinion of such honours, however.

The war's end found him in Gleiwitz (Gliwice) in Silesia, where he is said to have spoken out for fair treatment of the German civilian population. In 1948 he was ordered, as a Soviet citizen, to leave the Polish Armed Forces and return to the USSR. At first he lived in Pervomaisk, where he continued his education. He had an opportunity to take

courses from the eminent Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Slabchenko. He later published a memoir of Slabchenko's last years in the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*.

In 1950 Janusz married a girl he knew from school in Guriev, Lidia Shenderova, whom he would always refer to as Lilka. From 1949 to 1954 Janusz studied at the Higher School of Economics and Statistics in Moscow, where he majored in demography. His real love was history but, as the son of an "enemy of the people," he was excluded from a career in the humanities. After completion of his studies he went to work in the Department of the Census of the Central Statistical Office in Moscow. He worked on preparing the 1959 census, in particular with regard to nationalities issues.

In 1959, after the posthumous rehabilitation of his father and in the context of the relative liberalization of the Khrushchev-Gomulka era, Janusz and Lidia, with their little daughter Waleria, moved permanently to Poland. Janusz immediately received Polish citizenship and was employed as a researcher at the Institute of Party History in Warsaw. Here he concentrated his attention on the history of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (CPWU). He served as scholarly secretary of the institute's CPWU division, organized the CPWU archives, and arranged interviews of surviving CPWU activists. In 1970 he defended his doctoral dissertation on the CPWU at the University of Warsaw. He published a number of articles on the CPWU, and in 1976 he published his book *Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Ukrainy, 1919–1929*.

In 1970 the Institute of Party History was dissolved, and Janusz went to work for the Institute of Scientific Policy, Technological Progress, and Higher Education. He worked mainly on a study of higher education in the USSR, but this was not a project that engaged him fully.

His publications on twentieth-century Ukrainian history brought him to the attention of Ukrainian historians in North America and Western Europe. In the fall of 1974 I ended up in Poland for doctoral research and met Janusz. Roman Solchanyk had set up the meeting by correspondence. This was the beginning of a long and intense friendship. Janusz gave me good advice all along the way. He pointed me to interesting sources for my thesis, kept me focussed on it when I was tempted to disperse my efforts, and continually exchanged texts, ideas, and information with me for almost the next twenty years. Many times over the years I visited his home, one of these East European apartments crammed with books, and Janusz and Lidia would provide excellent tea and stimulating conversation for hours on end. They were an unforgettable pair.

Because of his contributions to modern Ukrainian history, Janusz was invited to spend a year as a visiting professor at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta. In Canada during the academic year 1979–80, he wrote a pioneering article on collectivization in Soviet Ukraine, which he published in English in the *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies*, and also revised his history of the CPWU for publication in English. *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919–1929* was published in Edmonton in 1983. Janusz was a bright addition to the Edmonton environment, and he and Lidia were frequent guests at the home of Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky, which in those years functioned much like a salon. The Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard took advantage of Janusz's presence in North America to invite him down for a month in the spring of 1980.

Janusz was a deeply political person, and his stay in Edmonton was not limited to scholarship. He worked closely with the then rather youthful milieu of the Ukrainian left

who were publishing the journal *Dzialoh*. He sympathized with the journal's stance, captured well in its motto "For socialism and democracy in an independent Ukraine." I had actually sent Janusz the first issue of *Dzialoh* in June 1976 shortly after it appeared. He waited impatiently for the next one. When he came to Edmonton, he and Lidia threw themselves into the work of the journal. He wrote an article for it, and Lidia typed at least one of the issues herself. He spent many hours in discussion with the *Dzialoh* group, who drew from his immense knowledge of the history of the Ukrainian left as if from a well. Janusz returned to Poland in the summer of 1980, having stopped first in Cologne to see his daughter Waleria (who was then married to the historian Hans Henning Hahn). That was the summer of Solidarity, and Janusz threw himself into that political work as well. Both he and Lidia joined Solidarity. The *Dzialoh* group seized the opportunity to send emissaries to Poland, and Janusz and Lidia hosted a whole troupe of them over the next year. In 1983 Janusz was called to the Ministry of Internal Affairs for an unpleasant conversation about his contacts with certain Ukrainians abroad.

Political involvement had been a constant in Janusz's life, at least since his move to Poland. He had been enthusiastic about the possibilities of the Polish October and joined the party soon after his arrival. (In 1980, applying for a visa to the United States, he had to admit to this party membership and was denied the visa as a formality; then the consulate waived whatever was necessary to waive and gave him the visa.) He had opposed the anti-Semitic purge and repression of students in 1968. He was connected with KOR, the Committee for the Defense of the Workers, and pointed out to me that one of its leading figures, Adam Michnik, was the son of the CPWU activist Ozjasz Szechter. After the imposition of martial law, Janusz used his trips to see his daughter in Germany to run errands for the Solidarity underground and for those imprisoned. He was involved in underground publications, particularly the journal *Krytyka*, and helped with the preparation of underground Polish editions of John Armstrong's and Alexander Motyl's books on Ukrainian nationalism.

Janusz and I shared an interest in Roman Rosdolsky (Rozdolsky), a Ukrainian Marxist scholar who had been one of the co-founders of the CPWU. Rosdolsky had won renown in Marxist circles for his brilliant study of the *Grundrisse* in its relation to *Capital* (*The Making of Marx's "Capital"*) and for his study of Engels and the non-historic peoples. He also wrote an important book on serfdom in Galicia. He was hard to place in any pigeon hole, because he had no use for either Soviet-style Communism or Ukrainian nationalism. He helped Jewish escapees from the Kraków ghetto during the Holocaust and ended up in Auschwitz. He died in Detroit in 1967. Janusz had got to know him personally when Rosdolsky visited Poland in connection with his work on Galician social history. At my urging, Janusz wrote a biography of this fascinating figure to mark the tenth anniversary of his death (published in *Science and Society* in 1978). Janusz once wrote to me: "I respected and loved that man, and the circumstance that he was Ukrainian seems to me to be important. There's a general view that the Ukrainian movement is monolithically and radically right-wing ... and if this is true in part, then Rosdolsky was one of the brightest exceptions to that rule." In 1985 Janusz was commissioned by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies to write Rosdolsky's biography. Unfortunately, ill health and politics delayed progress on the biography.

By the mid-1990s Janusz was falling victim to Alzheimer's disease. He ceased correspondence with me. I would ask friends in Warsaw if he was still alive, and received

reports that he was getting old. I did not suspect what was encoded in these words until I visited Warsaw in the summer of 2000. I called the Radziejowskis' number, fearing that it would no longer be in service. How pleased and surprised I was when Lidia answered the phone and invited me over, as in old times. The evening, however, was painful, as I gradually came to realize that Janusz had lost his memory and that he no longer knew who I was. He offered several times to make tea, his specialty as long as I had known him, but he was incapable of doing it. When I asked him how he was occupying his time, he said he was writing the biography of a very interesting figure, Roman Rosdolsky. Had I heard of him? Lidia was as sharp as ever, but totally exhausted.

I learned by accident, months after the event, of the death of my old friend, this sterling comrade and scholar, and then his daughter Waleria helped me to prepare this memorial sketch by sending some obituaries that had appeared in the Polish press.

I am sure I speak for many when I say that Janusz will always be missed.

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a—a	i—i	t—t
б—b	ї—i	у—u
в—v	ÿ—i	ф—f
г—h	к—k	х—kh
ґ—g	л—l	ц—ts
д—d	м—m	ч—ch
е—e	н—n	ш—sh
с—ie	օ—o	շ—shch
ж—zh	ռ—p	յ—iu
з—z	ր—r	յ—ia
и—y	ս—s	յ—omit
		ий—y in endings of personal names only.

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